Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi

Yogācāra Elements in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Robert Kritzer

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I. Introduction

Traditionally, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra are considered to be three clearly separated Buddhist schools. Sarvāstivāda is seen as highly conservative, Hīnayānist, and obsessed with its detailed analysis of existence and experience. Sautrāntika is supposedly more progressive and more concerned with the Buddha's spiritual message and is said to have Mahāyānist tendencies. Finally, Yogācāra is firmly on the side of Mahāyāna, having absorbed the basic Mahāyāna teaching of *dharmaśūnyatā* (the emptiness of all the entities comprising existence), which informs its characteristic doctrine of idealism.

Fortunately, it would be difficult to find a contemporary scholar of Buddhism who subscribes to such a simplistic scheme. Today, we no longer take for granted that Mahāyāna Buddhism is more advanced than or superior to Hīnayāna, an appellation that has been largely superseded by non-derogatory ones such as "Śrāvakayāna," and the very definition of Mahāyāna is coming under scrutiny (see Silk 2002). The occurrence of the term Sautrāntika before Vasubandhu has been questioned (Katō 1989: 101-109), as has the existence of Sautrāntika as an actual school (Kritzer 2003a). Moreover, early Yogācāra texts have been shown to rely on the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Āgama* tradition (Schmithausen 1970), and a connection between meditators such as An Shih-kao, who were perhaps forerunners of Yogācāra, and Sarvāstivāda has been suggested (Deleanu 1993: 17; Yamabe 1997).

Still, traces of the traditional rigid classifications linger in our minds, especially since the sources for historical information about Buddhist schools and their founders (for example Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* and Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu) accept these classifications so completely. Preconceptions regarding Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra are a particular obstacle in the study of Vasubandhu, the renowned fifth century philosopher (or was it the fourth century? or were there two Vasubandhus, one in each century?), because his name is associated with all three schools.

This book is a study of one of Vasubandhu's works, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* which he is said to have written after he had become disillusioned with Sarvāstivāda and while he favored Sautrāntika, but before he converted to Mahāyāna and became a Yogācāra. Beginning with Hakamaya's seminal article (1986), Japanese scholars have been finding evidence that Vasubandhu sometimes relies on the *Yogācārabhūmi,* supposedly a Mahāyāna text, in his criticisms of Sarvāstivāda. These discoveries raise doubts about the actual course of Vasubandhu's career.

My systematic comparison of these two texts shows for the first time the extent of Vasubandhu's dependence on the *Yogācārabhūmi.* In order to complete this project, I have extensively referred to the **Nyāyānusāra,* Saṃghabhadra's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* Below, I introduce the relevant texts and explain the significance of my results.

The Yogācārabhūmi

General Description of the Text

Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* is one of the most prominent early texts associated with the Yogācāra school, there is nothing even approaching a complete translation in a western language,[1] nor is there a comprehensive monograph on the text. There are several reasons for this, one of which is the sheer length of the work: the Chinese translation is about six hundred Taishō pages. Furthermore, although virtually the entire *Yogācārabhūmi* also exists in Tibetan translation, the Sanskrit text is only partially extant. Perhaps most daunting is the fact that the structure of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is extremely complicated, and even the individual sections appear to consist of various chronological layers. In what follows, I can hope to give only a very general description of the structure and contents of the text and show its place in Yogācāra literature.

It is often assumed that two *sūtras,* the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra,* constitute the earliest Yogācāra texts. However, Schmithausen argues that at least some portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* predate both of these *sūtras* (1987: 11-12) as well as the three *śāstras* associated with Maitreya (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Madhyāntavibhāga,* and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*) and the three *śāstras* by Asaṅga (*Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun, Abhidharmasamuccaya,* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*) (1969a: 819-822). A final group of early Yogācāra texts includes six *śāstras* by Vasubandhu (*Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā,* and *Triṃśikā*).

The influence of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is particularly evident in the *Hsien-yang*

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[1] An English translation of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation is planned in the BDK Tripitaka translation series but has not yet appeared.

sheng-chiao lun and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya,* both of which on occasion quote from or closely paraphrase it. In the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and the *Triṃśikā,* concepts from the *Yogācārabhūmi* are developed more systematically. In contrast to these works by Asaṅga, the Maitreya texts contain terms such as *abhūtaparikalpa* that do not appear in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Schmithausen 1987: 98-99), while they do not mention *ālayavijñāna.* Furthermore, they were influenced by Tathāgatagarbha ideas (Keenan 1993: 204). Nevertheless, Schmithausen asserts that the Maitreya texts "presuppose some elements" from portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1987: 260-261 n. 98).

As the title indicates, the *Yogācārabhūmi* deals with the stages (*bhūmi*) of Buddhist practice. The first section of the text, the *Maulī Bhūmi,*[2] includes seventeen stages, and essentially the entire section exists in manuscript form. However, the Sanskrit texts of only some of these stages have been edited. In Table 1, I list only the editions of complete *bhūmis.* A complete account of published versions of all portions of the Sanskrit text can be found in Silk 2001: 153-158.

Hattori aptly characterizes the contents of the *Maulī Bhūmi:* "The *Yogācārabhūmi* enumerates, classifies, and explains all elements that relate to the practice of each of the seventeen stages in the same manner as that of the Abhidharma treatises" (1987: 525).[3] However, the organization according to stages is not typical of the extant *abhidharma* texts, and it leads to a good deal of repetition, since similar topics often pertain to more than one stage.

An examination of the Chinese translation shows that the individual chapters vary considerably in length. The two longest are the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Śrāvakabhūmi,* both of which seem to have also existed as separate texts. At eighty-three Taishō pages, the shorter of these two, the *Śrāvakabhūmi,* is considerably more than twice as long as the combined third, fourth, and fifth chapters (the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*),[4] which comprise the third longest section. Several other *bhūmis* are only one or two Taishō pages long.

The second section, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī,* is not extant in Sanskrit,

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[2] Until recently, the Sanskrit title of the first section of the text was unclear (see Schmithausen 1969: 17-18 n. 4). However, Matsuda has discovered a reference to *maulyāṃ bhūmau* in a Sanskrit fragment of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (1988: 18), leading Schmithausen to adopt *Maulī Bhūmi* as the best way of referring to this section (2000: 245).

[3] Among others who make similar observations regarding the *abhidharma*-like nature of the *Yogācārabhūmi* are Wayman (1961: 45) and Rahula (1980: xiv).

[4] For convenience, I use the designation *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* to refer to the *Savitarkā Savicārā Bhūmi, Avitarkā Vicāramātrā Bhūmi,* and *Avitarkāvicārā Bhūmi.*

although a few manuscript fragments exist.[5] In addition to the Tibetan and Hsüan-tsang's

[5] The St. Petersburg fragments contain a portion corresponding to *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 31a5-59b2; T. 1579: 589b19-600c10 (Matsuda 1988). Furthermore, Matsuda has edited a folio of a manuscript in Kathmandu containing a portion of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* as quoted in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, corresponding to T. 1579: 728c16-730c21 (1995).

Table 1[6]

Stage	Edition(s)
1. *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi*	*Yogācārabhūmi:*[7] 3-10
2. *Manobhūmi*	*Yogācārabhūmi:* 11-72
3. *Savitarkā Savicārā Bhūmi*	*Yogācārabhūmi:* 73-232
4. *Avitarkā Vicāramātrā Bhūmi*	*Yogācārabhūmi:* 73-232
5. *Avitarkāvicārā Bhūmi*	*Yogācārabhūmi:* 73-232
6. *Samāhitā Bhūmi*	
7. *Asamāhitā Bhūmi*	
8. *Sacittikā Bhūmi*	Wayman 1960, 1984 (Schmithausen 1987: 220-222)
9. *Acittikā Bhūmi*	Wayman 1960, 1984 (Schmithausen 1987: 220-222)
10. *Śrutamayī Bhūmi*	
11. *Cintāmayī Bhūmi*	
12. *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmi*	
13. *Śrāvakabhūmi*	*Śrāvakabhūmi*[8]
14. *Pratyekabuddhabhūmi*	Wayman 1960
15. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*	*Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Dutt); *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Wogihara)
16. *Sopadhikā Bhūmi*	Schmithausen 1991
17. *Nirupadhikā Bhūmi*	Schmithausen 1991

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[6] I have followed Wayman (1961: 43) in listing the names of the *Bhūmis* as they appear in Bhattacharya's text (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 3.7-12). Note that the third, fourth, and fifth *bhūmis* are not divided in the text. Below, I refer to them as *Savitarkādi-bhūmi.* Also, in the Tibetan translation, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* are contained in separate volumes from the remainder of the *Maulī Bhūmi.*

[7] Bhattacharya's edition of the first five *bhūmis.*

[8] Shukla's edition. A partial edition is found in Wayman 1961. The *Śrāvakabhūmi* study group at Taishō University (Taishō Daigaku Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Shōmonji Kenkyūkai 大正大学綜合佛教研究所声聞地研究会) has started publishing a new edition with a Japanese translation. In addition to some portions published in periodicals (see Silk 2001: 156), the first chapter of the text has appeared in book form (Taishō Daigaku Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Shōmonji Kenkyūkai 1998).

Chinese translation, there is also a partial translation by Paramārtha entitled *Chüeh-ting tsang lun* 決定藏論 (T. 1584).[9] Wayman describes the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* as "a commentary on the seventeen *bhūmis* in their order" (1961: 43); in fact, as is noted in both the Chinese (T. 1579: 694c16) and the Tibetan translations (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*$_t$: zi 300a6), the *Pratyekabuddhabhūmi* is not commented on in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*. Wayman's description essentially agrees with that of Ui, who, relying on the commentary of Jinaputra (Tsui-sheng-tzu 最勝子),[10] says that in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* various obscure but important points from the *Maulī Bhūmi* are examined and authoritative explanations are given, hence the word *viniścaya* in the title (1958: 10).

The order of the remaining three sections differs between the Chinese (**Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī, Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī, Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*) and the Tibetan editions (*Vastusaṃgrahaṇī, Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī, *Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī*).[11] These sections, too, are not extant in Sanskrit.[12] The **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* and *Paryāya-saṃgrahaṇī* are both very short, ten and twelve Taishō pages. Again relying on Jinaputra, Ui summarizes the contents of these sections: the **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī*

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[9] The contents of this text correspond to the first part of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 1a1-60b7; T. 1579: 579a8-601a25).

[10] *Yü-ch'ieh shih-ti lun shih* 瑜伽師地論釋 (T. 1580).

[11] The Tibetan translation actually contains a sixth section, **Vinayasaṃgrahaṇī*, between the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* and the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*. In the Chinese translation, most of this section is included in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, although, as far as I can tell, the first several folios of the Tibetan **Vinayasaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 1a1-5a8) do not correspond to anything in the Chinese. The corresponding portion in the Chinese begins at T. 1579: 868c6. The end of the **Vinayasaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 27a2) coincides with T. 1579: 877c2. The Tibetan text abbreviates a list of definitions of five types of powers after the second item (*bsam pa'i stobs, i lê li* 意樂力), while the Chinese goes on to define all five items (through T. 1579: 877c17).

The Sanskrit titles of the **Vinayasaṃgrahaṇī* and the **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* are not attested. Hakamaya proposes **Vyākhyasaṃgrahaṇī*- instead of **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* (2001: 89). For the remaining titles, see Schmithausen 1969: 18 ns. 5-8.

[12] Matsuda has identified and edited a one-folio fragment of the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* that is kept in Kathmandu (1994). In the same article, he also reconstructs a portion of the text, identifies the *sūtras* from which the words under discussion in the text are drawn, and shows the significance of this little-studied section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*.

describes in detail the principles for interpreting scripture; the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* collects, classifies, and explains synonyms found in the *sūtras;* the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* explains all the significant contents of the *tripiṭaka* (1958: 9).

The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* is by far the longest and most important of these last three sections. In the Chinese translation, it consists of three main parts, concerning *sūtra* (*ch'i-ching shih* 契經事 = **Sūtravastu*),[13] *vinaya* (*tiao-fu shih* 調伏事 = ** Vinayavastu*),[14] and *abhidharma* (*pên-mu shih* 本母事 = **Mātṛkāvastu*).[15] The first and longest part is to a large extent a commentary on the *Saṃyuktāgama* (Mukai 1985).

Composition and Authorship

Traditionally, the *Yogācārabhūmi* is considered to be the work of a single author: Maitreya, according to the Chinese translation; Asaṅga, according to Tibetan sources. However, Chinese sources say that Maitreya descended from heaven to transmit the *Yogācārabhūmi* to Asaṅga, so in both traditions the text is closely associated with Asaṅga. Some modern scholars, notably Wayman (1989: 201-202) and Mukai (see Schmithausen 1987: 183), insist that Asaṅga was the sole author of the entire *Yogācārabhūmi.* Others, like Hakamaya, maintain that Asaṅga was at least the compiler of the text (see Schmithausen 1987: 183). However, Schmithausen thinks that the text is a compilation of material that varies considerably in age and that the authors and compilers cannot be identified (most recently, 1987: 13-14, 184-185). Many scholars today agree with Schmithausen on this point, including me (see Kritzer 1999: 13-17 for a more detailed discussion of this issue).

Among both those who insist that Asaṅga alone composed the *Yogācārabhūmi* and those who believe that it is a compilation, there is some disagreement about the chronological order of the various sections. Wayman states that Asaṅga composed the text as follows: 1) the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Samāhitā Bhūmi* when he was very young; 2) the *Paryāyasaṃgraha,* the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, the *Śrutamayī Bhūmi* the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi,* and the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmi* before being converted to Mahāyāna; 3) the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* the remainder of the *Maulī Bhūmi,* and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* after his conversion (Wayman 1989: 203). According to Schmithausen, there are three main layers in the following chronological order: 1) parts of the *Maulī Bhūmi,* including the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*; 2) the remainder of the *Maulī Bhūmi;* 3) the *Viniścaya-*

[13] T. 1579: 772b16-868b22. This corresponds to the entire Tibetan *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 143a1-381b6).

[14] T. 1579: 868c6-878a24. As mentioned in note 11, the first portion (through T. 1579: 877c22) corresponds to the majority of the Tibetan **Vinayasaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*$_t$: yi 5a8-27a2).

[15] T. 1579: 878a25-881c2. This part is entirely lacking in the Tibetan.

saṃgrahaṇī (1987: 14). Aramaki, on the other hand, mentions seven layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in a list of fourteen strata of early Yogācāra texts: 1) the *Śrāvakabhūmi;* 2) the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*; 3) the *Bodhisattvabhūmi;* 4) the Maitreya, Viśālamati, Paramārthasaṃbhava, and Guṇākara chapters of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*; 5) what Schmithausen refers to as the Proof, Pravṛtti, and Nivṛtti portions of the exposition of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*; 6) the *Sacittikā Bhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*; 7) the *Maulī Bhūmi* excluding the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (2000: 39 n. 2).

While Wayman believes that Asaṅga composed the *Yogācārabhūmi* section by section, both Schmithausen and Aramaki see the development of the text as a gradual accretion of material from various sources. Thus they do not simply identify sections that are earlier or later; rather they see different strata even within the same section. If one accepts their premises, then hardly any characteristic can be attributed to the *Yogācārabhūmi* as a whole. However, the heterogeneous contents of the text suggest that the Schmithausen-Aramaki approach is correct, even though the exact stratification remains uncertain.

Nobody presumes to give an exact date for the *Yogācārabhūmi* or for its various strata. Those who attribute the text to Asaṅga naturally place the text during Asaṅga's lifetime, usually thought to span the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. However, if the text is a compilation assembled over a period of time, it seems likely that the oldest portions of the text might have been composed somewhat earlier than the end of the fourth century.

Doctrinal Content

The *Yogācārabhūmi* is one of the oldest texts, if not the oldest, associated with the Yogācāra school, and it contains some of the philosophical concepts distinctive to that school. Schmithausen has shown that the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain all of the doctrines characteristic of later Yogācāra texts.[16] Nor does it maintain a consistent doctrinal position. Furthermore, the same terms can have somewhat different meanings in different sections of the text. Nevertheless, certain characteristically Yogācāra terms and doctrines appear, sometimes for the first time, in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

The most striking of these doctrines is *ālayavijñāna,* "the container or storehouse of the latent residues or Impressions of previous actions (*karman*) and mind process, or...the basic layer of mind processes or even the very basic constituent of the whole living being" (Schmithausen 1987: 1). The term *ālayavijñāna* is completely

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[16] In addition to *abhūtaparikalpa,* Schmithausen mentions the term *vijñaptimātra,* which appears, but only once, in a quotation from the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (1987: 32, 297 n. 221).

lacking in much of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* but it is explained in great detail in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* which includes a logical "proof" of its existence. The development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* is explored thoroughly in Schmithausen 1987, and studies of *ālayavijñāna* will probably rely greatly on his work for some time to come.[17]

Another term important for the Yogācāra school that is found frequently in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is *bīja* (seed). Although the term *bīja* is used metaphorically in the *Āgamas,* it is first seen as a technical term in the early Yogācāra literature, where *bījas* comprise or are contained in the *ālayavijñāna.* Yamabe identifies seven different senses in which the term appears in the *Yogācārabhūmi:* seeds of the future life; seeds of *kleśas;* seeds of karma; seeds of good *dharmas;* seeds of the *pravṛttivijñānas;* seeds of *rūpa;* seeds of all *dharmas* (1989). These seeds are not considered to be real *dharmas;* rather, they are designations for the potential of beings to produce good or bad results.

Other distinctive Yogācāra concepts found in the text include *kliṣṭamanas* (defiled mind) and *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (transformation of the basis of existence), as well as the three natures, i.e., *parikalpitasvabhāva* (imaginary nature), *paratantrasvabhāva* (dependent nature), and *pariniṣpannasvabhāva* (ultimate nature). But it must be emphasized that these terms appear only sporadically. Unlike in later Yogācāra texts, most of them are not systematically presented.

In addition, certain Sarvāstivādin positions are refuted in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* Most important is the doctrine of *sarvāstivāda* itself, namely the idea that past, present, and future *dharmas* all really exist. The real existence, accepted by Sarvāstivāda, of various other items, such as the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* and *avijñaptirūpa,* is denied in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* which frequently appeals to the operation of *bījas* to explain phenomena that according to Sarvāstivāda result from real *dharmas.*

Finally, much of the contents of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is not specifically Yogācāra at all. As I have mentioned above, a large percentage of the text is non-Mahāyāna *abhidharma.* Wayman argues strenuously that Asaṅga was a Mahīśāsaka before converting to Mahāyāna and that his *abhidharma* is Mahīśāsaka *abhidharma* (1961: 26-29; 1989), but his arguments are convincingly criticized by Schmithausen (1970: 94-95, 115-119).[18] Certainly, in many cases the *Yogācārabhūmi* is in essential

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[17] An example of a recent study is the psychological discussion in Waldron 2003.

[18] However, Wayman receives some support from Bareau, who points out the similarity between the list of eight *asaṃskṛtadharmas* in texts attributed to Asaṅga, including the *Yogācārabhūmi,* and a list of nine *asaṃskṛtas* attributed to the Mahīśāsakas in Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra.* Bareau thinks that this proves conclusively that Asaṅga was a Mahīśāsaka before he converted to Mahāyāna (1993). Hakamaya also points out the reliance of the *Yogācārabhūmi* on Mahīśāsaka here (1990: 254). On the other hand, Schmithausen reasonably maintains that the

agreement with Sarvāstivāda, and it appears that, although it disagrees with Sarvāstivāda on some extremely important points, the *Yogācārabhūmi* is closely connected to the Sarvāstivāda tradition.

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

General Description of the Text

Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is best known as a compendium of Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma,* but it is also famous for its criticisms of certain points of Sarvāstivādin doctrine. In contrast to the *Yogācārabhūmi,* it is completely extant in Sanskrit and is available in two editions.[19] There are two Chinese translations, Hsüan-tsang's (T. 1558) and Paramārtha's (T. 1559), as well as a Tibetan translation (Tohoku 4090, Peking 5591). Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation has been completely translated into French by La Vallée Poussin (1971),[20] and this French translation has in turn been translated into English by Pruden (1988-1990). Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation has also been completely translated into Japanese by Nishi in the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* series (Bidon-bu 25-26). In addition, several chapters have been translated separately into Japanese from the Sanskrit (Funahashi 1987; Sakurabe and Odani 1991; Sakurabe, Odani, and Honjō 2004) and the Tibetan (Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955). Some important resources for the study of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* include Saeki's annotated edition of the Chinese translation (1978), Hirakawa's index to the Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan (1973-1978), and Fukuhara's study of the *kārikas* (1973, 1986).

The Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* literature can be divided into several general groups.[21] First are the seven canonical texts, listed here in the chronological order suggested by Cox (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 177 ff.): *Saṅgītiparyāya, Dharmaskandha, Prajñaptiśāstra, Vijñānakāya, Dhātukāya, Prakaraṇapāda,* and

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fact that the *Yogācārabhūmi* contains some Mahīśāsaka teachings, including this list of *asaṃskṛtas,* is not enough to prove that the text is largely based on Mahīśāsaka (1970: 119).

[19] *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* edited by P. Pradhan (1967), and *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra,* edited by Swami Dwarkidas Shastri (1973). The Pradhan edition is more widely used by scholars.

[20] In an earlier publication (1914-1918), La Vallée Poussin also translated Chapter Three from the Tibetan translation.

[21] The following discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, and not all *abhidharma* texts will be mentioned.

Jñānaprasthāna.[22] Next are three texts entitled *Vibhāṣā,* nominally commentaries on the *Jñānaprasthāna,* among which the one commonly known as the **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T. 1545)[23] is the longest and most famous. These texts contain discussions of various positions on doctrinal points, and the **Mahāvibhāṣā* establishes the orthodox position for the branch of the Sarvāstivāda school known as the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 237-238). The name Vaibhāṣika, which is frequently used more or less synonymously with Sarvāstivāda, is derived from the title of this text. The *Vibhāṣās* are followed by three texts known as **Abhidharmahṛdaya:* the **Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* of Dharmaśrī or Dharmaśreṣṭhin, the **Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* of Upaśānta, and the **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra.* According to Dessein, these texts are for the most part organized according to the four noble truths, with various topics discussed in an appropriate order (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 255-269).

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* closely follows the structure of the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* texts (Frauwallner 1995: 137-140; Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 269-274). It purports to give an account of the *abhidharma* of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika school but frequently adopts unorthodox positions, especially those associated with Sautrāntika. (More will be said about this later.) There are several reasons for the enduring fame of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* First of all, despite the deviations from orthodoxy, the text gives the clearest and most complete account of the Sarvāstivādin system. Furthermore, the arguments for different points of view, orthodox and unorthodox, are skillfully presented so that they reveal the issues that are really at stake. It is also possible that the fact that Vasubandhu's name is associated with Mahāyāna as well as Sarvāstivāda added to the prestige of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Japan. Finally, among modern scholars, its availability in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, not to mention the excellent French translation, make it uniquely accessible among *abhidharma* works.

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* inspired some critical reaction from the defenders of Sarvāstivāda, notably Saṃghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* (extant only in Chinese)[24] and the *Abhidharmadīpa* (author unknown, extant only in Sanskrit). In addition, eight commentaries, originally in Sanskrit, are found in the Tibetan Bstan-'gyur, of

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[22] For complete titles, Taishō text numbers, and detailed discussions of authorship, contents, etc., see Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 177-229.

[23] The term **Mahāvibhāṣā* is not attested in Sanskrit, and I use it here only because it is the most common designation for this text. Elsewhere, I refer to T. 1545 as "the *Vibhāṣā.*"

[24] *A-p'i-ta-mo shun cheng-li lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論 (T. 1562).

which Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*[25] (available in Sanskrit, as well) and Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha*[26] are particularly noteworthy.[27] In China, three of Hsüan-tsang's disciples, Shen-t'ai 神泰, P'u-kuang 普光, and Fa-pao 法寶, also wrote extensive commentaries.[28]

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* contains nine chapters (see Table 2). The first eight chapters consist of verses, which generally are consistent with Sarvāstivāda, and commentary on each verse, in which Vasubandhu often discusses and sometimes accepts positions that disagree with Sarvāstivāda. The ninth chapter, often characterized as an appendix, is entirely prose. Although many commentaries cover all nine chapters, Saṃghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* ends with chapter eight. Dessein refers to chapters three and nine as "additional chapters," since they do not fit into a division of the entire text according to the four truths, a division that he traces back to the **Abhidharmahṛdaya* texts (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 255-274).

Vasubandhu's Career

The traditional account of Vasubandhu's career is found in Paramārtha's *P'o-su-p'an-tou fa-shih chuan* 婆藪槃豆法師傳 (T. 2049; translated in Takakusu 1904):[29] Vasubandhu was originally a Sarvāstivādin, and he composed the verses (*karikās*) of the *Abhidharmakośa* from the Sarvāstivādin point of view, in accordance with the teaching of the *Vibhāṣā*. However, when he wrote his own commentary on his verses (the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*), he frequently rejected orthodox Sarvāstivāda in favor of Sautrāntika positions. Saṃghabhadra, an orthodox Sarvāstivādin from Kashmir, then wrote two works, one of which was extremely critical of Vasubandhu. Later, Vasubandhu converted to Mahāyāna under the influence of his older brother, Asaṅga, and he wrote a number of commentaries on Mahāyāna *sūtras* and *śāstras,* as well as some Yogācāra *śāstras* of his own.

Like most dates in the history of Indian Buddhism, the date of Vasubandhu is

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[25] Tohoku 4092; Peking 5593.

[26] Tohoku 4421; Peking 5875.

[27] Regarding Indian commentaries in Tibetan translation, see Mejor 1991.

[28] Respectively, *Chü-she lun shu* 倶舎論疏 (*Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō* 1.8.3-4), *Chü-she lun chi* 倶舎論記 (T. 1821), and *Chü-she lun shu* 倶舎論疏 (T. 1822). The last two of these are frequently referred to in Saeki 1978, on which La Vallée Poussin (1971) often seems to rely in turn.

[29] Other accounts are found in the works of Hsüan-tsang and of Tibetan historians, particularly Bu-ston. Cox summarizes the differences among these accounts (1995: 53-55).

Table 2

Title[30]	Subject-matter
1. *Dhātunirdeśa*	Elements of existence
2. *Indriyanirdeśa*	Sense faculties
3. *Lokanirdeśa*	Cosmology
4. *Karmanirdeśa*	Action and its results
5. *Anuśayanirdeśa*	Defilements
6. *Mārgapudgalanirdeśa*	The path and the noble ones (*āryapudgala*)
7. *Jñānanirdeśa*	Knowledge
8. *Samāpattinirdeśa*	Meditation
9. *Pudgalanirdeśa*	Refutation of a self or soul

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[30] For the titles of the first eight chapters, I follow Pradhan's Sanskrit text. For the ninth chapter, I follow common usage, although I have not found any textual attestation of *Pudgalanirdeśa*.

not known exactly. Since different dates appear in Chinese sources, and since the number of works attributed to Vasubandhu is very large, his date has been a matter of considerable controversy among scholars. In what follows, I give a simplified account of the complex debate about Vasubandhu's career.[31]

The source of the problem is that Paramārtha gives (or is reported to give) two different dates, one in the fourth century and one in the fifth. The later date appears in his biography of Vasubandhu, while the earlier date is attributed by K'uei-chi 窺基 and Hui-hsiang 慧祥 to works of Paramārtha that are no longer extant (Frauwallner 1951: 3-5). In order to make sense of this discrepancy, Frauwallner, in a well-known monograph, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu,* proposes his theory of two Vasubandhus. According to Frauwallner, Vasubandhu the elder was the younger brother of Asaṅga. Frauwallner identifies this Vasubandhu the elder with the Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu and the Sthavira Vasubandhu mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (1951: 21-22). This elder Vasubandhu became a believer in Mahāyāna, and he was the author of many Mahāyāna works, including the *Śataśāstra, Madhyāntavibhāga, Daśabhūmikaśāstra, Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa, Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāśāstra,* and *Bodhicittotpādana-śāstra* (1951: 55). Vasubandhu the younger, on the other hand, was a Sarvāstivādin who moved in the direction of Sautrāntika but never converted to Mahāyāna. He was the author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* The only other work that Frauwallner attributes to Vasubandhu the younger at this point is the *Paramārthasaptatikā,* and he withholds judgement concerning the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā,* saying, "We must therefore employ other means in order to determine the author of these works; we must gain the necessary basis from their contents and the doctrines upheld in them" (1951: 56). He does not mention by name the *Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka,* and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa,* or the commentaries on the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, Mahāyānasaṃgraha,* and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.*[32]

Schmithausen, following the principle stated by Frauwallner, has examined the doctrinal features of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the various Yogācāra texts attributed to Vasubandhu. In his first publication concerning this issue, he basically agrees with Frauwallner's theory but added the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* to the list of works by the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1967: 136), an

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[31] Perhaps the clearest account of this controversy is Kajiyama's (Nagao, Kajiyama, and Aramaki 1976: 419-422). A concise English summary can be found in Griffiths 1986: 164-165 n. 9. Other, more detailed accounts include: Jaini 1958b; Wayman 1961: 19-24; Hirakawa 1973-1978 v. 1: ii-x; Kochumuttom 1982: xi-xiv; and Mejor 1991: 3-13.

[32] This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the works that have ever been attributed to Vasubandhu.

addition later accepted by Frauwallner (1969: 425). In his most recent statement on this subject, Schmithausen designates the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā,* and *Triṃśikā* as "works of Vasubandhu the Kośakāra." Although he indicates that the texts he attributes to the Kośakāra contain certain terms and ideas, particularly *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa,* that are not found in the "Vasubandhu commentaries" (on the *Madhyāntavibhāga,* etc.) and the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa,* Schmithausen now refuses to commit himself regarding the authorship of the latter group of texts or the question of two Vasubandhus (1987: 262-263 n. 101).

Frauwallner's theory has been attacked by various scholars since shortly after it was published, beginning with a very critical article by Sakurabe (1952), who, like Frauwallner, refers to a wide range of Chinese sources. Addressing the issue from a more doctrinal point of view, Jaini argues that criticisms in the *Abhidharmadīpa* of Vasubandhu's "Sautrāntika" views show how close these views are to Mahāyāna. Therefore, Jaini thinks that the account of Vasubandhu's career in Paramārtha's biography is reliable and that after writing the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya,* Vasubandhu went on to compose Mahāyāna works. Regarding Vasubandhu's date and his relation to Asaṅga, Jaini is noncommittal. He does not deny the existence of an older Vasubandhu (the Vṛddhācārya mentioned in the *Abhidharma-kośavyākhyā*), but, unlike Frauwallner, he does not think that Paramārtha conflated two Vasubandhus in his biography (Jaini 1958b).[33] Hirakawa challenges Frauwallner's interpretation of his Chinese sources and arrives at conclusions similar to Jaini's (1973-1978). In general, Japanese scholars do not accept Frauwallner's theory;[34] instead, they account for differences among the various texts in terms of Vasubandhu's doctrinal development (Nagao, Kajiyama, and Aramaki 1976: 421).[35] Most recently, Skilling sharply questions Frauwallner's methodology and attempts to establish the works of the Kośakāra on the basis of either cross-references in Vasubandhu's texts (or references by Vasubandhu's commentators) or "the evidence of style, sources used, methodology, and development of ideas" (2000: 299). Skilling includes as works by the Kośakāra the same texts as Schmithausen, as well as the *Gāthāsaṃgraha* texts[36] and the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa.* The authorship of the commen-

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[33] Wayman, Kochumuttom, and Griffiths generally agree with Jaini, while Mejor is somewhat ambiguous (1991: 111).

[34] Hakamaya (2001: 107) cites works of Harada (1996, 1997, 1998) and Fukuda (1998b) as representative examples.

[35] Hakamaya (2001: 107) has assembled an extensive bibliography of recent Japanese studies along this line, including those of Matsuda (1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1985) and Muroji (1993). Another recent contribution is Iwamoto 2000.

[36] These include three texts only extant in Tibetan: *Gāthāsaṃgrahaśāstra, Gāthārtha-*

taries on the Mahāyāna *sūtras* or the Maitreya texts remains a matter about which scholars are reluctant to say anything definite.

It is probably fair to say that most scholars today, while admitting the existence of other figures named Vasubandhu, agree on the single authorship of at least the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā,* and *Triṃśikā.* My comparison of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* provides further evidence of Vasubandhu the Kośakāra's affinity for Yogācāra and thus supports Jaini's arguments against Frauwallner's theory. However, I do not directly address the issue of the authorship of the works attributed to Vasubandhu.

The Question of Sautrāntika

Writers about Buddhism confidently use the term "Sautrāntika" to refer to one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism (along with Sarvāstivāda, Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra). In fact, little is known about who the Sautrāntikas were and what they believed. In the last twenty years, however, a number of studies, mainly originating in Japan, have begun to question old assumptions about Sautrāntika, and a 2003 issue of the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* is dedicated to this topic. The brief discussion in the present book is based on my introduction to the *JIABS* issue, "Sautrāntika Reconsidered" (Kritzer 2003a).

As the name suggests, a Sautrāntika is one who follows the *sūtras,* and Sautrāntikas are generally considered to be people who disagreed with the Sarvāstivādin reliance on *śāstra,* that is to say, on the Vaibhāṣika *abhidharma* texts. What little we know of the history of the school comes from Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra,* specifically in Hsüan-tsang's translation (*I-pu-tsung lun lun* 異部宗輪論 [T. 2031]), and from several works of Hsüan-tsang's disciple, K'uei-chi. In the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu chi* 成唯識論述記, K'uei-chi gives the names of two early Sautrāntika teachers, Kumāralāta, whom he also calls "Dārṣṭāntika" (T. 1830: 274a8-13), and Śrīlāta (T. 1830: 358a10-12). The term Dārṣṭāntika is also used to refer to a dissident group within Sarvāstivāda, and there are various opinions concerning the relationship between Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika. In the commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* the terms are very close to being synonymous, but it has also been suggested that Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika are, respectively, positive and negative designations for the same group or that there were two distinct groups with these names (Cox 1995: 37-41).

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saṃgrahaśāstra, and *Ekagāthābhāṣya.* Despite the fact that the *Gāthāsaṃgrahaśāstra* was translated into both German and English in the nineteenth century (Skilling 2000: 306 n. 22), these texts are rarely referred to, and I am grateful to Skilling for bringing them to my attention.

Our main source of information about early Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika doctrine is the *Vibhāṣā,* where there are some eighty-six references to Dārṣṭāntika ideas (Katō 1989: 70). The term Sautrāntika, on the other hand, does not appear to have been used in the original text of the *Vibhāṣā* (Katō 1989: 113-119). Nor is Sautrāntika found in the **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya,* although three opinions are attributed there to Dārṣṭāntika. Harivarman's **Tattvasiddhiśāstra,* although it does not mention either Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika by name, frequently agrees with the Dārṣṭāntika positions in the *Vibhāṣā* (Mizuno 1930).

Thus, it seems as though the earliest occurrence of the word Sautrāntika is in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* where nineteen positions are attributed to "the Sautrāntikas" (Kritzer 2003b); Vasubandhu agrees with these positions. Only two positions are attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas,[37] on the other hand, and Vasubandhu disagrees with these positions (Katō 1989: 81-84; Cox 1995: 39). This suggests that Vasubandhu does not consider Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika to be identical. Among the Sautrāntika opinions of which Vasubandhu approves are rejections of the reality of various *dharmas* accepted as real by Sarvāstivāda, including the *cittaviprayukta-saṃskāras* (forces not associated with mind), the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* (unconditioned *dharmas*), the *anuśayas* (latent defilements), and *vijñaptirūpa* (manifested matter) and *avijñaptirūpa* (unmanifested matter). Vasubandhu also agrees with the Sautrāntika rejection of the reality of past and future, the insistence that one cannot fall from arhatship, and the theory of seeds (*bīja*) that appears in many Sautrāntika explanations.

Many of these positions are also found in Yogācāra texts, especially the *Yogācārabhūmi,* and scholars have characterized Sautrāntika as a kind of bridge between Hīnayāna Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna Yogācāra. This explanation fits well with the story of Vasubandhu's career as told by Paramārtha: Vasubandhu was on his way to accepting Mahāyāna when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*

However, some suggest an even closer affinity between Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika positions and Yogācāra. For example, Jaini points out that the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* reviles Vasubandhu as a *vaitulika,* a believer in Mahāyāna, and he stresses the similarity between some of Vasubandhu's statements and Yogācāra doctrine (1959: 247-248). Hakamaya has shown that the term *pūrvācāryāḥ* (former teachers) in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* refers to Yogācāra teachers, with whose explanations Vasubandhu often agrees (1986). Yamabe has identified the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* as Vasubandhu's source for his *bīja* theory (1990) as well as for his idea of the mutual perfuming of *nāma* and *rūpa* (2000a). In addition, Yamabe has identified the *Manobhūmi* as the source of a statement, attributed to the *pūrvācāryas,* concerning the transition from the *antarā-bhava* to birth in the hells (1999). Miyashita (1986) and Harada (1993, 1996) have also noted similarities between the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

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[37] Vasubandhu mentions the term three times, but two of his references are to the same Dārṣṭāntika opinion.

In 1993, on the basis of very limited evidence, I argued that Vasubandhu's so-called Sautrāntika definition of consciousness as a member of the formula of conditioned origination actually reflected Yogācāra beliefs, in other words, that Vasubandhu was inserting Yogācāra ideas into the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* under the guise of Sautrāntika. In a number of publications since then, I have identified a variety of correspondences between the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1998, 1999). Most recently, I have examined all the occurrences of the term Sautrāntika in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and identified correspondences for a large majority in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (2003b).[38]

It seems as though these corresponding positions in the *Yogācārabhūmi* can be categorized in two groups. One group consists of ideas that cannot be traced to the Dārṣṭāntikas of the *Vibhāṣā* and are in fact not found in texts earlier than the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Some examples include the theory of mutual perfuming, mentioned above, and the idea of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa*. The other group includes ideas (for example, the denial of the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*) that are also found, frequently in a less developed form, in the *Vibhāṣā*, where they are attributed to Dārṣṭāntika. It is Vasubandhu who first calls positions belonging to both of these groups "Sautrāntika."

However, not all of the Dārṣṭāntika positions are found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and it seems as though Vasubandhu accepts and labels as Sautrāntika only ones that are. Furthermore, Vasubandhu also criticizes, without using the term Dārṣṭāntika, a number of positions attributed to individual Dārṣṭāntika teachers, such as Śrīlāta. As Harada points out, in the case of many of these positions, Vasubandhu agrees with the *Yogācārabhūmi* in favoring the Sarvāstivāda opinion over the Dārṣṭāntika (1993: 109-110). It must also be noted that Vasubandhu does not accept all the Dārṣṭāntika opinions contained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The two positions attributed to Dārṣṭāntika by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* can both be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But in each case, the *Yogācārabhūmi* elsewhere also contains the Sarvāstivādin position, with which Vasubandhu in these cases agrees.[39]s

It is clear that there is a close relation between Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika

[38] In the same article, I examine a number of positions in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* characterized by Lamotte as Sautrāntika and identify definite or probable correspondences in the *Yogācārabhūmi* for all of these positions.

[39] Position 1: The Dārṣṭāntikas say that there are four possibilities regarding the experience of the results of karma. This statement implies eight types of karma, three of which are determined according to the lifetime in which their results will be experienced but undetermined as to whether they will be experienced at all. Vasubandhu rejects this, saying that if karma is determined according to the lifetime in which it comes to fruition, then its result definitely must be experienced (Pradhan: 230: 10-13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 116-117).

ideas and the *Yogācārabhūmi,* but the precise nature of that relation is difficult to understand. Yamabe remarks that the passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi* to which the Sautrāntika positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* correspond do not appear to presuppose the idea of *ālayavijñāna* (2000b: 68). Furthermore, one idea that appears in several of the passages common to the two texts is *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa,* which may be a concept that is superseded by the theory of *ālayavijñāna.* If one accepts Schmithausen's general line of reasoning, one might say that these passages were composed before the idea of *ālayavijñāna* was formulated. The notion of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* (transformation of the life-stream)[40] is also found in Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā,* where Schmithausen characterizes it as a "trace" of Sautrāntika (1967); presumably, he considers it to be a Sautrāntika element in the *Yogācārabhūmi* as well.

Thus, one explanation for the correspondences between Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika positions and passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is that the authors of both texts rely on a common source that represented an intermediate stage between Sarvāstivāda and fully developed Yogācāra, based on the concept of *ālayavijñāna.* But we search in vain for any text earlier than the *Yogācārabhūmi* containing ideas

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The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* gives the same four possibilities as the Dārṣṭāntikas (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* zi 152a3-4; T. 1579: 635c5-6). The *Yü-chieh-lun chi* (T. 1828: 362b10-22) discusses this passage and mentions that Sautrāntika and Sauryodayika accept the Mahāyāna interpretation concerning this issue and arrive at eight types of karma (I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for this reference).

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* on the other hand, gives the traditional explanation, which Vasubandhu accepts: karma can be determined or undetermined regarding whether its result will be experienced, and there are three possibilities regarding the lifetime in which it comes to fruition: in the present life; in the immediately following life; in a later life (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 189.15-16, 189.19-190.1; *Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 110a5, 110a8; T. 1579: 319b3, 319b7-9).

Position 2: The Dārṣṭāntikas say that *abhidhyā, vyāpāda,* and *mithyādṛṣṭi* are mental karma. Vasubandhu disagrees and accepts the Sarvāstivādin view that they are *karmapatha* but not karma (Pradhan 237.15-20, 248.2-12; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 136, 168-170; see Katō 1989: 81-84 for detailed analyses of these passages).

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* defines the three as mental karma (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 182.9-14; *Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 105b5-8; T. 1579: 317b22-29).

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* says that they are *karmapatha* but not karma (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* zi 153b3; T. 1579: 636a29).

Schmithausen discusses these passages (1970: 117). Again, I thank Yamabe Nobuyoshi for the reference.

[40] Cox's translation (1995: 95).

such as *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* or the mutual seeding of body and mind, according to which mind contains the seeds of the physical sense organs, and vice versa. And as we have seen, the term Sautrāntika is not attested before the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*

My own conclusion is that in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Vasubandhu uses the term Sautrāntika to designate positions in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvāstivāda. As I argue elsewhere (1999: 203-204; 2003b), Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* adjusts the traditional Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* so that it no longer conflicts with the central theories of Yogācāra. Unlike in the Yogācāra texts attributed to him, his purpose in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is not to propound or defend these theories. Therefore, he does not mention *ālayavijñāna,* which would be glaringly out of place in a work that is described by its author as being largely based on Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma,* specifically that of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas.[41] Instead, he borrows from the *Yogācārabhūmi* ideas like *bīja,* which do not represent such a radical departure from tradition. Attributing an opinion to Sautrāntika may simply be Vasubandhu's way of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpretation of *sūtra* than its Sarvāstivādin counterpart.

[41] *prāyeṇa hi kāśmīravaibhāṣikāṇāṃ nītyādisiddha eṣo 'smābhir abhidharma ākhyātaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 450.1-2; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 5: 223).

II. Methodology and Results

Methodology

Although previous studies have identified a number of passages in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* that seem to be based on the *Yogācārabhūmi,* no systematic comparative study of these two texts had appeared before the private publication of my results for the first three chapters of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Kritzer 2001). The present work consists of the results for all eight main chapters of the text.[42]

This project was made feasible by the fact that we have Chinese translations by Hsüan-tsang of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* the **Nyāyānusāra,* and the *Yogācārabhūmi.* Although these texts were translated over an eight-year period,[43] they contain similar translations of most technical terms. Since the three texts are now available electronically,[44] they can be searched in a way that was impossible ten years ago.

The first step was to identify passages in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* that do not concur with Sarvāstivāda. In order to do this, I referred to Saṃghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra,* in which many of Vasubandhu's statements are criticized for their deviations from orthodoxy. Conveniently, Saṃghabhadra uses the appellation *ching-chu* 經主 to refer to Vasubandhu in these cases. The meaning of *ching-chu* is not completely clear, and Cox summarizes what other scholars have said about the

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[42] In Kritzer 2001, I included the Chinese text of all relevant passages of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* together with the Sanskrit if edited text was available. Here, I add the Tibetan text of all passages, except for the handful for which no Tibetan translation exists.

[43] The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* was translated between 651 and 654 (Lancaster 1979: 346, 343), the **Nyāyānusāra* between 653 and 654 (Lancaster 1979: 343), and the *Yogācārabhūmi* between 646 and 648 (Lancaster 1979: 187).

[44] All three texts are now available from both the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Tekisuto Dētabēsu 大正新脩大藏經テキストデータベース at Tokyo University (http://www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~sat/japan/) and the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (Chung-hwa tien-tzu fo-tien hsieh-hui 中華電子佛典協會) at Taiwan National University (http://www.cbeta.org/cd/index.htm). However, when I started this project, the only available text of the *Yogācārabhūmi* was from the Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai 瑜伽行思想研究会 at Nagasaki University.

term: "Some have suggested that this reflects Saṃghabhadra's identification of Vasubandhu as a Sautrāntika. However, a quotation from the **Nyāyānusāra* in Sthiramati's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* suggests that the Sanskrit equivalent is *sūtrakāra*. This could refer to Vasubandhu's role as author of the *sūtra,* in this case the *kārikā* of the *Abhidharmakośa,* or it could be used with sarcasm suggesting Vasubandhu's lack of familiarity with Buddhist scripture" (1995: 56). This issue is far from settled. Given the fact that the vast majority of Vasubandhu's departures from Sarvāstivāda are found in the *bhāṣya,* not in the *kārikās,* it would seem strange for Saṃghabhadra to preface his criticisms of what Vasubandhu says in the *bhāṣya* with the epithet *sūtrakāra*. In any case, there is no doubt that in the approximately 250 places where Saṃghabhadra uses the term *ching-chu* he is always criticizing Vasubandhu.

Next, I located the passage in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on which Saṃghabhadra was commenting. Saṃghabhadra usually follows the order of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* but not always, so it was sometimes necessary to search rather far afield to find the corresponding passage. This task was made easier by the notes to the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Japanese translation of the **Nyāyānusāra,* which give the location of quoted passages in the *Kandō Abidatsumakusharon* (Saeki 1978), the Japanese edition of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*

The final step was to search for a corresponding opinion in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* This was made difficult by the fact that the two texts are organized in completely different ways, as we have seen above. Sometimes one can find phrases or sentences identical to those of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* used in similar contexts, to make the same argument, but these cases are inconveniently few. Despite the fact that both texts were translated by Hsüan-tsang, translations of Sanskrit words can vary, and sometimes different Sanskrit words are used to convey the same idea. Frequently, Vasubandhu makes a statement to which Saṃghabhadra takes exception that has no obvious parallel in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* but the possibility remains that Vasubandhu's argument relies on a statement in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that appears in a totally different, perhaps seemingly unrelated context. The correspondences I have found are therefore not all equally convincing. Nevertheless, I have included even the more dubious ones, usually in parentheses. Finally, Saṃghabhadra attacks many of Vasubandhu's statements that do not appear to be related to anything in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* Sometimes Saṃghabhadra finds fault with Vasubandhu's presentation of Sarvāstivādin positions; on other occasions, Vasubandhu may be expressing an idiosyncratic idea of his own that cannot be characterized as Sautrāntika or Yogācāra. However, even some of these cases may upon further investigation reveal a connection to the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

Distribution and General Characterization of Results

Distribution within the *Yogācārabhūmi*

The corresponding passages that I have found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* are distributed approximately as follows:

<u>*Maulī Bhūmi*</u>	number of passages
Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi	1
Manobhūmi	8
Savitarkādi-bhūmi	25
Samāhitā Bhūmi	2
Asamāhitā Bhūmi	1
Śrutamayī Bhūmi	1
Cintāmayī Bhūmi	3
Śrāvakabhūmi	10
Bodhisattvabhūmi	5
<u>*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*</u>	
Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi	55
Savitarkādi-bhūmi	8
Samāhitā Bhūmi	1
Sacittikā Bhūmi	1
Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi	9
Śrāvakabhūmi	4
Bodhisattvabhūmi (*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*)	2
<u>**Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī*</u>	3
<u>*Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī*</u>	2
<u>*Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*</u>	16

As can be seen from this chart, Vasubandhu relies most heavily on portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that have no specifically Mahāyāna content and, as I have mentioned, that do not expound the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*. Furthermore, I have found relatively few correspondences to what Schmithausen and Aramaki consider to be the oldest sections of the text, namely, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Maulī Bhūmi* and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*.

General Classification According to Theme[45]

Many of the correspondences between the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* can be classified according to a few general themes. In most cases, these involve rejections of major Sarvāstivādin doctrines.

sarvāstivāda

In Chapter Five of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* Vasubandhu criticizes at length the basic Sarvāstivādin principle that past, present, and future *dharmas* all really exist. Many of his arguments are similar to those found in refutations of *sarvāstivāda* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* and the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* (items 5.12-18 and 5.21-27 in Chapter Three of this book).

prajñapti

A number of points concern *dharmas* that the Vaibhāṣikas consider to be real entities but that both Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi* classify as provisional (*prajñapti*). In Chapter One, Vasubandhu indicates his disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika definition of *avijñaptirūpa,* and Saṃghabhadra, looking forward to Chapter Four, states that Vasubandhu does not accept *avijñaptirūpa* as being real. Similarly, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* defines both **saṃvararūpa* and **asaṃvararūpa,* equivalent to *avijñapti,* as provisional, while the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi* includes *avijñapti* in a long list of *prajñaptis* (item 1.2).

In Chapter Two, Vasubandhu criticizes at great length the Vaibhāṣika definitions of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* (*dharmas* associated with neither matter nor mind), calling them all *prajñaptis.* Again, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* also denies the reality of these *dharmas,* and some of its arguments are reflected in Vasubandhu's discussion (items 2.7, 2.13, 2.15-28).[46] Vasubandhu's well-known theory of *bīja* is found in his discussion of the *viprayukta, prāpti,* and Yamabe

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[45] Much of this section appears in a slightly different form in Kritzer 2000b.

[46] For more details, see Kritzer 1999: 225-248.

has shown Vasubandhu's reliance here on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (1990).

Also in Chapter Two, Vasubandhu indicates that he does not accept the reality of the unconditioned *dharmas* (*asaṃskṛtadharmas*). Statements in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* similarly question the status of the individual *asaṃskṛtadharmas* (items 2.37-40).

In Chapter Four, Vasubandhu declares that *saṃsthānarūpa* (shape) is merely a *prajñapti*. The definition of *saṃsthānarūpa* in the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi* is similar to Vasubandhu's, and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñāna-kāyamanobhūmi* explicitly says that *saṃsthānarūpa* is a *prajñapti* (items 4.3-4.6).

There is, moreover, another possible correspondence regarding *prajñapti*. In Chapter One, Vasubandhu maintains that the *skandhas*, being collections (*rāśi*), do not have independent reality, and to support his position, he refers back to a *sūtra* that he has quoted earlier. Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not directly state that the *skandhas* are *prajñapti*, the idea that collections are *prajñapti* can be found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamano-bhūmi* quotes the same *sūtra* as Vasubandhu to show that the meaning of *skandha* is *rāśi*. This may imply that the *skandhas* are *prajñapti* (items 1.5-6).

bīja

In Chapter Two, Vasubandhu relies on the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and on the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* for his statement that *bījas* are nothing other than *nāmarūpa* or the *āśraya* (item 2.11; see Yamabe 1990). He explains many of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* in terms of *bījas*, and in almost every case, a similar explanation can be found in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñāna-kāyamanobhūmi* (items 2.7-2.16).

Outside of the context of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, other statements by Vasubandhu explicitly or implicitly rely on the idea of *bīja* in giving explanations that deviate from Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy. For example, Vasubandhu offers an opinion to the effect that the unperceived *mahābhūtas* in a composite object exist as seeds. A closely related statement is found in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi* (item 2.4).

In Chapter Five, Vasubandhu refutes the orthodox Vaibhāṣika idea that *paryavasthāna* (active defilement) and *anuśaya* (latent defilement) are synonymous, and he insists that *anuśayas* are defilements in the state of seeds. This idea appears in several different sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, including the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* and the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi*, and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (items 5.3-5.4).

The Coming Together of Causes and Conditions

On a number of occasions, Vasubandhu offers the coming together of causes and conditions to account for events explained otherwise by the Vaibhāṣikas. For example, regarding the Vaibhāṣika opinion that it is the eye that sees *rūpa,* Vasubandhu says that, according to the Sautrāntikas, perception is nothing more than cause and effect: there is nothing that sees or is seen. The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains a number of similar statements, for example, in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñāna-kāyamanobhūmi* and in the *Paramārthagāthās* and their commentary in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* (item 1.14).

Another example is Vasubandhu's denial of the reality of the reflected image, which, he says, appears due to the power of the coming together of causes and conditions. Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not explicitly state that the reflected image is unreal, a number of statements seem to imply its relative unreality. For example, in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Sacittikā Bhūmi,* the *pravṛttivijñānas* are said to depend on *ālayavijñāna* as the reflected image depends on the mirror. In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*), the meditational image is said to be no different from the consciousness in which it is perceived, just as the reflected image depends on the mirror, with the object acting as a condition (item 3.6).

Special People and Their Powers

Finally, Vasubandhu makes a number of statements regarding the powers of special people that correspond to similar statements in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* For example, he says that one cannot fall from arhatship because an arhat has completely destroyed the defilements, including their seeds. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* makes the same argument (item 6.9).

In his discussion of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras,* Vasubandhu states that *jīvitendriya* is not the result of karma in the case of the arhat, who can prolong his life by the power of his meditation. According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* arhats, Tathāgatas, and bodhisattvas have a special type of *jīvitendriya* that gives them the power to extend their *āyuḥsaṃskāras.* This *jīvitendriya* is defined as "proceeding due to own-force." All other types are defined as "not proceeding due to own-force." This seems to be equivalent to the distinction made in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* between *jīvitendriya* that is not *vipāka* (that of the arhat) and ordinary *jīvitendriya,* which is *vipāka.* Furthermore, in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi,* the Buddha is said to obtain mastery of *samādhi* (*samādhivaśitā*), which he uses to discard his former *āyuḥsaṃskāras* and to produce a new body (item 2.3).

A related example occurs in a discussion of why the Buddha chose a womb-birth over an apparitional one. One Vaibhāṣika answer is that it was in order to leave a

body as a relic. Vasubandhu objects that this explanation will not satisfy those who think the Buddha has *ādhiṣṭhānikī ṛddhi,* by means of which he can prolong his life. This is reminiscent of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* according to which the Buddhas and bodhisattvas can use their magical power to continue to exist after death (item 3.4).

With the exception of *bīja,* one can find none of the characteristic terms of Yogācāra among the above correspondences: words such as *ālayavijñāna, vijñapti-mātra,* and *trisvabhāva* simply do not appear. Nor is there any explicit statement of Mahāyāna themes, such as the emptiness of *dharmas* or the three bodies of the Buddha. However, the disagreements regarding these *abhidharma* issues between Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivāda are far from insignificant. As Saṃghabhadra and the Dīpakāra often point out, Vasubandhu's criticism of the Vaibhāṣika *abhidharma* system reflects a very different view of the world, one that we can now see is provocatively similar to that of the authors of the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

III. Passages from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Related Passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi*

1.1) Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the Buddha preached the *abhidharma* for the purpose of investigating *dharmas* and that Kātyāyanīputra and others collected the scattered *abhidharma* sayings of the Buddha and put them all together in the *abhidharmapiṭaka,* just as Dharmatrāta put together the *Udānavarga.*

atas tadhetos tasya dharmapravicayasyārthe śāstrā kila buddhenābhidharma uktaḥ / na hi vinā 'bhidharmopadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto dharmān pravicetum iti / sa tu prakīrṇa ukto bhagavatā bhadantakātyāyanīputraprabhṛtibhiḥ piṇḍīkṛtya sthāpito / bhadanta-dharmatrātodānavargīyakaraṇavad ity āhur vaibhāṣikāḥ
(Pradhan: 3.1-4; T. 1558: 1b22-28; Poussin 1: 5-6; Saṃghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu, whom he calls the sūtra-master (*ching-chu* 經主), for not believing that the *abhidharma* was really preached by the Buddha and for believing that Kātyāyanīputra and the others actually created it [T. 1562: 329c18-22].)[47]

[47] Here and below, I quote from Pradhan's edition of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* which I refer to as "Pradhan," and I abbreviate "La Vallée Poussin 1971" as "Poussin." For other works by Poussin, I include the date, for example, "Poussin 1936-1937." I have not systematically corrected the texts provided in this comparison. However, I have incorporated Hirakawa's corrections to Pradhan's Sanskrit text. For the Tibetan text of the *Yogācārabhūmi,* I have generally relied on the Peking edition, but I have made some corrections on the basis of the Derge. The Chinese text of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is the electronic text provided by the Yugagyō Shisō Kenkyūkai, with the punctuation of the printed Taishō edition restored. In a few cases, I have supplied Chinese characters that were not included in the electronic version.

1.1) In the **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī*, the insights of the Buddha's disciples into, as well as the Buddha's own understanding of, the nature of *dharmas* are both included in the category *mātṛkā*, which is equated with the *abhidharma*.[48]

gaṅ du bcom ldan 'das kyis mtshan ñid bstan pa daṅ gaṅ du ñan thos gźi mthoṅ bas rtogs pa la gnas pas chos kyi mtshan ñid mnoṅ bar bstan pa de yaṅ ma mo yin te chos mṅon pa yaṅ yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 64b6-7); 謂於是處世尊自廣分別諸法體相。又於是處諸聖弟子已見諦迹。依自所證無倒分別諸法體相。此亦名爲摩呾理迦。即此摩呾理迦亦名阿毘達磨 (T. 1579: 753b10-14)

[48] See also item 8.3.

1.2) Vasubandhu indicates his disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika definition of *avijñaptirūpa*.

ucyata iti ācāryavacanaṃ darśayati
(Pradhan: 8.8-9; T. 1558: 3a24-25; Poussin v. 1: 21; Saṃghabhadra states that Vasubandhu misrepresents the Vaibhāṣika definition and that he does not accept *avijñaptirūpa* as being real [T. 1562: 335b16-c9].)

1.2) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi, rūpaskandha* consists of both real and provisional *rūpas. *Saṃvararūpa* (*lü-i se* 律儀色) and **asaṃvararūpa* (*pu lü-i se* 不律儀色) are defined as provisional.[49] (See also item 4.8.)

tatra sarvasmād rūpaskandhasaṃgṛhītād rūpān navaprakāraṃ dravyasat spraṣṭavyasaṃgṛhītāt tu catvāri mahābhūtāni dravyasanti / tadanyat prajñaptisad veditavyaṃ / dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ punā rūpaṃ dvividhaṃ dravyasat prajñaptisac ca / yat prabhāvataḥ samādhigocaraṃ nirmitavat tatphalaṃ tadviṣayaṃ tatpra*tisaṃyuktavijñānaviṣayaṃ ca tad dravyasat / saṃvarāsaṃvarasaṃgṛhītaṃ tu prajñaptisat;*[50] *de la gzugs kyi phuṅ pos bsdus pa'i gzugs thams cad las rnam pa dgu ni rdzas su yod do / reg byas bsdus pa las 'byuṅ ba chen po bźi ni rdzas su yod pa yin no / de las gźan pa rnams ni btags pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o / chos kyi skye mched du gtogs pa'i gzugs ni rnam pa gñis te / rdzas su yod pa daṅ btags pa'i yod pa'o / mthu las byuṅ ba'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi spyod yul sprul pa lta bu de'i 'bras bu daṅ / de'i yul daṅ de daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i rnam par śes pa'i yul gaṅ yin pa de ni rdzas su yod pa yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 51a7-b1); 如是一切色蘊所攝色中。九種是實物有。觸所攝中四大種是實物有。當知所餘唯是假有。墮法處色亦有二種。謂實有假有。若有威德定所行境猶如變化。彼果彼境及彼相應識等境色是實物有。若律儀色不律儀色皆是假有 (T. 1579: 597b4-9; see Fukuhara 1973: 93)

According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi, avijñapti* is included, along with the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras,* in a long list of *saṃskṛtadharmas* that are *prajñapti.*

'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dṅos po la skye ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / mi rtag pa daṅ / sa bon daṅ rnam par rig byed daṅ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa daṅ / thob pa daṅ / 'thob pa ma yin pa daṅ / srog gi dbaṅ po daṅ / ris mthun pa / miṅ gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs daṅ / yi ge'i tshogs rnams daṅ so so'i skye bo ñid daṅ / tshogs pa daṅ ma tshogs pa daṅ / 'jug pa so sor ṅes pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / mgyogs pa daṅ / go rims daṅ / dus daṅ yul daṅ graṅs ñe bar 'dogs pa daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 208a4-6); 又於有爲諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有

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[49] **Saṃvararūpa* and **asaṃvararūpa* here seem to be equivalent to *avijñaptirūpa.* See Hirakawa 1990:190-193.

[50] According to Matsuda Kazunobu (private communication), this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has reconstructed it as above (non-italicized portions represent Matsuda's reconstruction).

1.2 continued) 表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)

1.3) Regarding the question of whether *avijñapti* is *rūpa*, one Vaibhāṣika argument maintains that it is *rūpa* because *vijñapti* is *rūpa*. Vasubandhu gives an analogy to a tree and its shadow: as the tree moves, the shadow moves. He then says that unlike *vijñapti*, *avijñapti* is subject to modification, and he points out that the analogy is false because *avijñapti* continues to exist even after *vijñapti* no longer exists, while a shadow ceases to exist as soon as the tree ceases to exist.

sāpivijñaptirūpaṇād rūpitā bhavati / vṛkṣapracalane cchāyāpracalanavat / nāvikārāt / vijñaptinivṛttau cāvijñaptinivṛttiḥ syād vṛkṣābhāve cchāyā 'bhāvavat
(Pradhan: 9.18-20; T. 1558: 3c5-8; Poussin v. 1: 26; Saṃghabhadra states that the analogy is the sūtra-master's, not that of the school, i.e., Vaibhāṣika, that makes this argument [T. 1562: 338a9-14].)

1.3) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* denies the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* [see item 1.2], but it does not contain a discussion of the analogy of a tree and its shadow.)

1.4) Regarding the question of whether *avijñapti* is *rūpa,* another Vaibhāṣika explanation maintains that it is *rūpa* because the *mahābhūtas* that comprise its *āśraya* are *rūpa.* Vasubandhu objects that, according to that logic, the first five *vijñānas* would also be *rūpa.* The Vaibhāṣika answer to this is that the relationship between *avijñapti* and the *mahābhūtas* is like that between the shadow of a tree and the tree or the glitter of a jewel and the jewel. Vasubandhu says that it is against the principles of the *Vibhāṣā* to say that the shadow and the glitter rely on the tree and the jewel because, according to the *Vibhāṣā,* the shadow and the glitter rely on their own *mahābhūtas.* Furthermore, he says, even if one says that the shadow and glitter rely on the tree and the jewel, the case of *avijñapti* is different because, unlike in the case of the tree and jewel, *avijñapti* does not cease to exist at the same time as the *mahābhūtas* on which it is based.

idaṃ tāvad avaibhāṣikīyaṃ vṛkṣam āśritya cchāyā vartate maṇiṃ cāśritya prabheti / cchāyādivarṇaramāṇūnāṃ pratyekaṃ svabhūtacatuṣkāśritatvābhyupagamāt / saty api ca tadāśritatve cchāyāprabhayor nāvijñaptis tathaivāśritā yujyate / niruddheṣv api avijñaptyāśrayeṣu mahābhūteṣu tasyā anirodho 'bhyupagamyate

(Pradhan: 9.23-10.2; T. 1558: 3c12-17; Poussin v. 1: 26; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master misrepresents the teaching of the *Vibhāṣā* regarding the relationship between *avijñapti* and the *mahābhūtas* [T. 1562: 338a25-b4]; furthermore, the sūtra-master's objection that *avijñapti* and the *mahābhūtas* on which it is based do not perish simultaneously is not relevant to the meaning in the *Vibhāṣā* [T. 1562: 338b4-22].)

1.4) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* denies the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* [see item 1.2], but it does not contain a discussion of the relationship between *avijñapti* and the *mahābhūtas*.)

1.5) Vasubandhu says that the *skandhas* are merely *prajñapti* because a collection is not a real thing.

yadi rāśyarthaḥ skandhārthaḥ prajñaptisantaḥ skandhāḥ prāpnuvanti / aneka-dravyasamūhatvāt rāśipudgalavat
(Pradhan 13.21-22; T. 1558: 5a11-12; Poussin v. 1: 37-38; Saṃghabhadra does not specify that this is the opinion of the sūtra-master, but he refutes it, saying that *skandha* means not a collection but that which is the basis of a collection, in other words, the real *dharmas* that comprise the *skandhas* [T. 1562: 343c24-344a1; Poussin v. 1: 38 n. 2]; P'u-kuang attributes it to Vasubandhu and distinguishes it from the position of the Vaibhāṣikas, who say that *skandhas, āyatanas,* and *dhātus* are all real, and that of the Sautrāntikas, who say that, since the *āyatanas* are also *prajñapti,* only the *dhātus* are real [T. 1821: 19a24-29].)

1.5) There are a number of statements in the *Yogācārabhūmi* to the effect that the meaning of *skandha* is "collection."

See the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*:
'du byed du gtogs pa rnam pa bcu gcig gcig tu bsdus na 'du byed kyi tshogs 'gyur te / tshogs kyi don ni phuṅ po'i don du rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 207a3-4); 復次當知十一種相總攝諸行立爲行聚。應知聚義是其蘊義 (T. 1579: 796c2-3)

See also the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi:*
phuṅ po'i don ni spuṅs pa'i don to źes gaṅ gzuṅs pa de la spuṅs pa'i don gaṅ źe na / smras pa / spuṅs pa'i don ni bdag ñid sna tshogs maṅ po'i don daṅ / de bźin du phan tshun 'dres pa'i dṅos pos 'jug pa'i don daṅ / de bźin du gcig tu mṅon par bsdus pa'i don daṅ / 'phel ba daṅ 'bri ba'i don (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 80a4-5); 問如說積聚義是蘊義。何等名爲積聚義耶。答種種所召體義。更互和雜轉義。一類總略義。增益損減義。是積聚義 (T. 1579: 608c16-19)

See elsewhere in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi:*
de la phuṅ po'i don ni gaṅ ci'i phyir na phuṅ po rnam par bźag pa yoṅs su bstan ce na / gzugs gaṅ yin pa ci yaṅ ruṅ ste / 'das pa daṅ / ma 'oṅs pa daṅ / da ltar byuṅ ba nas thag riṅ ba daṅ / ñe ba'i bar daṅ gzugs ji lta ba bźin[51] *rnam par śes pa'i bar du yaṅ de bźin te / de dag gcig tu bsdus pa ni rnam pa thams cad du bsdus pa yin pa'i phyir bsdus pa'i don ni phuṅ po'i don to / yaṅ phuṅ po de dag ni bdag ñid sna tshogs maṅ po yin pa'i phyir 'du byed tsam ste de las don gźan pa'i bdag med par yoṅs su bstan pa'i phyir phuṅ po rnam par*[52] *rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 41a4-6); 復次蘊義云何。爲顯何義建立諸蘊。謂所有色若去來今乃至遠近。如色乃至識亦爾。如是總略攝一切蘊。積聚義是蘊義 (T. 1579: 593c18-20)

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[51] Derge reads *bźin du*.

[52] Derge inserts *gźag par* here.

1.6) Vasubandhu mentions two alternative *Vibhāṣā* definitions of *skandha:* 1) "that which carries the burden of an effect"; 2) "a part." He quotes a *sūtra* to show that these definitions do not conform with *sūtra* and that the meaning of *skandha* is indeed "collection" and nothing else.

kāryabhārodvahanārthaḥ skandhārtha ity apare / pracchedārtho vā / tathā hi vaktāro bhavanti tribhiḥ skandhair deyaṃ dāsyāma iti / tad etad utsūtram / sūtraṃ hi rāśyartham eva bravīti yat kiṃcid rūpam atītānāgatapratyutpannam iti vistaraḥ
(Pradhan: 13.23-26; T. 1558: 5a14-18: Poussin v. 1: 38; Saṃghabhadra comments only on the second of these definitions, saying that the statement that it does not conform with *sūtra* is the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 344a13-15] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu insists too strictly on *sūtra* in determining the meaning of *skandha,* when he should rely more on reason [T. 1562: 344a15-18].)

1.6) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* (see above) quotes the same or a similar *sūtra* in defining *skandha* as "collection" (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 41a4-6; T. 1579: 593c18-20; [see Fukuhara 1973: 114, where the page number is mistakenly given as 592]).[53]

[53] See also the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, which comments on this *sūtra* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 207a3-4; T. 1579: 796c2-3).

1.7) Vasubandhu says that the teachings of the *skandhas, āyatanas,* and *dhātus* are directed variously at people who have differing degrees of ignorance, faculties, and faith.

trayaḥ prakārās traidham/ tri prakāraḥ kila sattvānāṃ mohaḥ/ kecic caitteṣu saṃmūḍhāḥ piṇḍātmagrahaṇataḥ / kecid rūpa eva / kecid rūpacittayoḥ / indriyāny api trividhāni / tīkṣṇamadhyamṛdvindriyatvāt / rucir api trividhā / saṃkṣiptamadhyavistaragrantha-rucitvāt / teṣāṃ yathākramaṃ tisraḥ skandhāyatanadhātudeśanā iti
(Pradhan: 14.10-13; T. 1558: 5b4-8; Poussin v. 1: 40; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master has abbreviated the explanation [T.1562: 344a24-27] and gives an expanded explanation [T. 1562: 344a27-b2; see T. 1545: 366c26 ff.].)

1.7) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain a discussion relating the teaching of *skandha, āyatana,* and *dhātu* to the three types of people.)

1.8) An alternate explanation is given for why the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* are included in the *āyatanas* and *dhātus,* but not in the *skandhas:* like a pot which, when broken, is no longer a pot, the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* are the cessation of the *skandha,* and hence are not the *skandhas.*[54] Vasubandhu refutes this explanation by saying that the same argument would apply to the *āyatanas* and *dhātus.*

yathā ghaṭoparamo na ghaṭa evaṃ skandhoparamo na skandho bhavitum arhatīty apare / teṣāṃ dhātvāyataneṣv apy eṣa prasaṅgaḥ
(Pradhan: 15.4-6; T. 1558: 5b26-28; Poussin v. 1: 42; Saṃghabhadra identifies the objection as that of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 345a10-11] and criticizes it, justifying the simile of the pot [T. 1562: 345a11-20].)

[54] This explanation is found in the *Vibhāṣā,* where it does not seem to be an alternate opinion but rather a further reason in support of the standard Vaibhāṣika position (T. 1545: 385b17-18).

1.8) (I have found no similar discussion in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, various passages imply that the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* are not included in the *skandhas* because, unlike the entities that comprise the *skandhas,* they are not real.

First, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi* defines real *dharmas* as entities belonging to the five *skandhas.*

de la gzugs la sogs pa'i phuṅ po'i miṅ can gyi dṅos po ni rdzas su yod pa yin pa'o [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 208a1-2]; 此中色等諸蘊想事是實物 [T. 1579: 659a7-8])

Then it goes on to include the *asaṃskṛta, ākāśa,* among those items that are merely *prajñapti* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 208a7; T. 1579: 659a16-17].

In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi, ākāśa* and *aprati-saṃkhyānirodha* are said to be mere appellations [see items 2.38 and 2.40], while in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is said to be simply a designation [see item 2.39].)

1.9) Vasubandhu says that the physical position of the organs (eye highest, body lowest, mind without a physical position) is a possible reason for the order in which the sense organs are traditionally listed.[55]

athavā asmin śarīre cakṣuṣo 'dhiṣṭhānam upariṣṭāt niviṣṭam / tasmād adhaḥ śrotrasya / tasmād adho ghrāṇasya / tasmāt jihvāyāḥ / tasyāḥ kāyasya bāhulyena / manaḥ punas tāny eva niśritam adeśastham ceti yathāsthānam eṣām kramaḥ syāt
(Pradhan: 16.11-13; T. 1558: 6a5-7; Poussin v. 1: 44-45; Saṃghabhadra quotes this passage in a slightly expanded form [T. 1562: 345c27-346a2], says that the sūtra-master is either speaking provisionally or following some "other" interpretation, and points out that the organs of seeing, hearing, and smelling are arranged like a garland, with none higher or lower [T. 1562: 346a2-5].)[56]

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[55] The same explanation is given in the *Vibhāṣā,* where, as in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* it is one of several possible explanations (T. 1545: 63a22-23).

[56] In a different context, the *Vibhāṣā* states that these three organs are arranged like a garland (T. 1545: 380c28-381a3), but in its discussion of the order of the organs, it does not refute the opinion attacked by Saṃghabhadra.

1.9) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain a discussion of the order of the sense organs. However, in the *Manobhūmi*, consciousness at the moment of death is said to leave the body from the top down or from the bottom up, with *manas* being the last *āyatana* to be abandoned in either case[57] [see also the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, where a departing consciousness other than *manovijñāna* is adduced as proof of *ālayavijñāna*].[58] This perhaps suggests a correlation between the physical placement of the organs and the order in which they are traditionally listed.)

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[57] *tataś cyutikāle akuśalakarmakāriṇāṃ tāvad ūrdhvabhāgād vijñānam āśrayaṃ muñcati / ūrdhvabhāgaś cāsya śītībhavati / sa* (*taṃ*?) *punas tāvan muñcati tāvad dhṛdayapradeśam / sukṛtakāriṇāṃ punar adhobhāgād vijñānam āśrayaṃ muñcati / adhobhāgaś cāsya śītībhavati tāvad yāvad dhṛdayapradeśaṃ / hṛdayadeśāc ca vijñānasya cyutir veditavyā / tataḥ kṛtsna evāśrayaḥ śītībhavati* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 18.16-20, incorporating Schmithausen's corrections [1987: 311 n. 278]); *de bas na re źig mi dge ba'i las byed byed pa rnams ni 'chi 'pho ba'i tshe rnam par śes pas ro stod nas lus 'dor bar byed de / de'i ro stod graṅ mor 'gyur ro / de yaṅ sñiṅ gar thug pa'i bar du 'dor bar 'gyur ro / legs pa byed byed pa rnams kyi rnam par śes pas ni / ro smad nas lus 'dor bar byed de / de'i ro smad graṅ mor 'gyur ro / de yaṅ sñiṅ gar thug pa'i bar du 'dor bar 'gyur te / sñiṅ ga nas rnam par śes pa 'pho bar rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 11a2-4); 又將終時。作惡業者。識於所依從上分捨。即從上分冷觸隨起。如此漸捨乃至心處。造善業者。識於所依從下分捨。即從下分冷觸隨起。如此漸捨乃至心處。當知後識唯心處捨。從此冷觸遍滿所依 (T. 1579: 282a7-12)

[58] *ci'i phyir kun bźi rnam par śes pa med na 'ci 'pho mi ruṅ źe na / 'di ltar 'pho* (Derge reads *'ci 'pho*) *ba'i tshe'i rnam par śes pas lu ro stod dam / ro smad du drod yal bar byed ciṅ sboṅ la yid kyi rnam par śes pa ni nam yaṅ mi 'byuṅ ba ma yin pas / de'i phyir lus len par byed pa'i kun gźi rnam par śes pa kho na daṅ bral bas lus kyi drod yal pa daṅ / lus la tshor ba med par snaṅ bar zad kyi / yid kyi rnam par śes pa daṅ bral bas ni ma yin te / de'i phyir yaṅ mi ruṅ ṅo* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 4a2-4); 何故若無阿賴耶識。命終時識不應道理。謂臨終時或從上身分。識漸捨離冷觸漸起。或從下身分。非彼意識有時不轉。故知唯有阿賴耶識能執持身。此若捨離。即於身分冷觸可得。身無覺受。意識不爾。是故若無阿賴耶識不應道理 (T. 1579: 579c17-22)

1.10) According to the Vaibhāṣikas, *gandhadhātu, rasadhātu, ghrāṇavijñāna-dhātu,* and *jihvāvijñānadhātu* are lacking in *rūpadhātu* because the only function of *gandha* and *rasa* is to be *kavaḍīkārāhāra,* from which beings in *rūpadhātu* are detached. Vasubandhu objects that, if *gandha* and *rasa* serve no purpose in *rūpadhātu,* then the corresponding organs, *ghrāṇa* and *jihvā,* also serve no purpose and should be similarly lacking. However, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the organs *ghrāṇa* and *jihvā* are present since they are needed to beautify the body and for speech. Vasubandhu maintains that the basis for the organs, i.e., the nose and tongue, are adequate for these purposes; there is no need for the organs. There follows an argument about the functions of these organs and their difference from the sexual organs, which all parties admit are lacking in *rūpadhātu.* The point of Vasubandhu's argument is hard to figure out, especially since in the *Pañcaskandhaka* (si 18b1-2), he simply states that these four *dhātus* are lacking in *rūpadhātu.* However, the logical implication in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* seems to be that in fact *gandha* and *rasa* must somehow be present.

evaṃ tarhi ghrāṇajihvendriyayor abhāvaprasaṅgo niṣprayojanatvāt / asti prayojanam / tābhyāṃ hi vinā 'śrayaśobhaiva na syād iti vyavahāraś ca / yady etat prayojanam adhiṣṭhānam evāstu śobhārthaṃ vacanārthaṃ ca mā bhūd indriyam
(Pradhan: 21.4-6; T. 1558: 7c9-12; Poussin v. 1: 56; Saṃghabhadra identifies the objection as the sūtra-master's [T. 1562: 349b22-24] and basically quotes the Vaibhāṣika answer provided by Vasubandhu, without further discussion of *ghrāṇa* and *jihvā* [T. 1562: 349b24-25.)[59]

[59] In the *Vibhāṣā,* the argument goes as follows:

There is no masculine or feminine organ in *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu* because there is no lust there, because one is born having abandoned those organs, and because in *rūpa* and *ārūpyadhātus* there is no *kavaḍīkārāhara,* which is necessary to cause the arising of those organs. And because these organs arise only in the absence of *hrī* and *apatrapā,* they do not exist in *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu* because they would have no function there.

Objection: If this is so, then there are likewise no organs of smell or taste, since there is no *gandha* to smell or *rasa* to taste.

Reply: The organs of smell and taste have a function there since they beautify the body and give rise to speech. The masculine and feminine organs, however, render the body disgusting. Those with *hrī* and *apatrapā* must hide them (T. 1545: 463c15-21).

1.10) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, although there are no actualized smells or tastes in *rūpadhātu*, *gandhadhātu* and *rasadhātu* exist there.

de la gzugs kyi khams na ni dri daṅ ro ni med la de dag gi khams ni yod do / de ci'i phyir że na / de gñis ni kham gyi zas kyis bsdus pa yin pa'i phyir ro / de dag med pas sna'i rnam par śes pa daṅ / lce'i rnam par śes pa yaṅ med de / kun tu 'byuṅ ba kho nar med kyi khams las ni ma yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 51a5-7); 復次色界中無現香味然有彼界。何以故。此二皆是鼻食攝故。由無此二鼻舌二識亦無。此就現行説非就界説 (T. 1579: 597b1-3)

1.11) Vasubandhu says that the reason why the first five *vijñānas* are always associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra* is that these *vijñānas* are gross since they are directed toward external (objects).

nityam ete vitarkavicārābhyāṃ saṃprayuktāḥ / avadhāraṇārtho hiśabdaḥ[60]
(Pradhan: 22.4; T. 1558: 8a12-14; Poussin v. 1: 59;. Saṃghabhadra says that this is the reasoning of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 350a7-8], and he refutes it, saying that *mano-vijñāna,* even when directed internally, is sometimes associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra.* According to Saṃghabhadra, the real reason is that the five *vijñānas* occur only in realms in which *vitarka* and *vicāra* are present [T. 1562: 350a8-12].)

[60] Note that the reason, which is omitted from the Sanskrit, is stated in the Tibetan and Chinese translations: *'di dag ni rtag tu rtog pa daṅ dpyod pa dag daṅ mtsuṅs par ldan pa yin te / 'di ltar kha phyi rol du bltas pa'i phyir rtsiṅ ba yin no / ni zhes bya ba ni ṅes par gzuṅ ba'i phyir ro* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*$_t$: gu 45a4); 由與尋伺恒共相應。以行相麁外門轉故。顯義決定。故說唯言 (T. 1558: 8a12-14).

1.11) In the *Śrāvakabhūmi* it is stated that *vitarka* and *vicāra* arise internally and encompass the external objects.

ete punar vitarkavicārāś caitasikāś cetasy utpadyamānā utpadyante / sahabhuvaḥ saṃprayuktāḥ / ekālambanavṛttayaḥ / evam ete adhyātmam utpadyante / bāhyāyatana-saṃgṛhītāś ca (*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 448.9-13; see also Wayman 1961: 127-128)[61]; *rtog pa daṅ / dpyod pa de dag kyaṅ sems las byuṅ ba ste / sems skyes na skye bar 'gyur śiṅ lhan cig 'byuṅ ba mtshuṅs par ldan pa dus gcig tu 'jug pa yin no / de ltar na de dag ni naṅ nas skyes pa daṅ phyi rol gyi skye mched du gtogs pa yin te* (*Śrāvakabhūmi*$_t$: wi 203a4-5); 又正了知如是尋伺是心法性。心生時生。共有相應同一縁轉。又正了知如是尋伺依內而生外處所攝 (T. 1579: 467a26-29)

[61] In general, I rely on Wayman's edition. I have given Shukla's text here because Wayman does not provide the whole passage.

1.12) According to Vasubandhu, the reason that *vitarka* is never associated with *vitarka* is that it is impossible for two *vitarkas* to exist at one time.

vitarkas tu nityam avitarko vicāramātro dvitīyavitarkābhāvāt vicārasaṃprayogāc ca (Pradhan 22.10; T. 1558: 8a19-20; Poussin, v. 1: 60; Saṃghabhadra says that this is the reasoning of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 350a20], and he refutes it, saying that it is not impossible for two *vitarkas* to exist at one time, but only for two of the same thing to be associated [T. 1562: 350a20-27].)

1.12) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not include a similar statement regarding *vitarka*. However, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* says the following regarding the simultaneous occurrence of two *dharmas* of the same type: each *dharma* has one nature, not two, and no two *dharmas* of the same type can be associated at one time because there is no second nature. This statement seems, if anything, to agree with Saṃghabhadra. On the other hand, the phrase "at one time" seems superfluous: how can two things be associated if they are not simultaneous? Perhaps the intention here is the same as Vasubandhu's.

又一切法一一自性無有第二自性可得。又定無有同類二法一時相應。即由第二自性無故 [T. 1579: 880c14-16])[62]

[62] This portion of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* is not included in the Tibetan translation.

1.13) Vasubandhu says that the six organs and the six consciousnesses are internal since *citta* is the basis for the idea of an *ātman*. The six *viṣayas* are external.[63]

ṣaḍ vijñānāni ṣaḍ āśrayā ity ete dvādaśa dhātava ādhyātmikāḥ / rūpādayas tu ṣaḍ viṣayadhātavo bāhyāḥ / ātmany asati katham ādhyātmikaṃ bāhyaṃ vā / ahaṃkāra-sanniśrayatvāc cittam ātmety upacaryate / ātmanā hi samudāntena svargaṃ prāpnoti paṇḍita ity uktam / cittasya cānyatra damanam uktaṃ bhagavatā / cittasya damanaṃ sādhu cittaṃ dāntaṃ sukhāvaham iti / ata ātmabhūtasya cittasyāśrayabhāvena pratyāsannatvāt / cakṣurādīnām ādhyātmikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ viṣayabhāvād bāhyatvam / evaṃ tarhi ṣaḍ vijñānadhātava ādhyātmikā na prāpnuvanti / na hy ete manodhātutvam aprāptāś cittasyāśrayībhavanti / yadā tadā ta eva te bhavantīti lakṣaṇaṃ nātivartante / anyathā hi manodhātur atīta eva syān nānāgatapratyutpannnaḥ / iṣyante cāṣṭādaśa dhātavas traiyadhvikāḥ / yadi cānāgatapratyutpannasya vijñānasya manodhātu-lakṣaṇaṃ na syāt atīte 'py adhvani manodhātur na vyavasthāpyate / na hi lakṣaṇasyādhvasu vyabhicāro 'stīti
(Pradhan: 27.5-15; T. 1558: 9c17-10a1; Poussin v. 1: 73-74; Stcherbatsky 1988: 58-59; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 360b21-c4] and criticizes it, largely on the grounds that the *caitasikas,* which are included in *dharmadhātu* and are thus classified as external, should also be considered as the basis for the idea of an *ātman* [T. 1562: 360c4-361a8].[64] He then devotes a long section to a criticism of the Sthavira's position that all *dharmas* are included in *dharmadhātu*[65] [T. 1562: 361a17-362a7].)

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[63] Vasubandhu's position seems to be almost identical to an alternate position in the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 381a26-b3).

[64] The **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* seems also to include the *caittas* (T. 1552: 887b12-18).

[65] See the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 383b15 ff.).

1.13) (I cannot find anything in the *Yogācārabhūmi* directly relevant to the question of whether the *caitasikas* should also be considered as the basis for the idea of an *ātman*. However, the following pertain to the distinction between internal and external and the mistaken idea that the internal is a self.

From the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition:

adhyātmam ajñānaṃ katamat / pratyātmikān saṃskārān ayoniśa ātmato[66] *manasikurvato yad ajñānam / bahirdhājñānaṃ katamat / bāhyān asattvasaṃkhyātān*[67] *saṃskārān ātmīyato 'yoniśo manasikurvato yad ajñānaṃ / adhyātmabahirdhā 'jñānaṃ katamat / pārasāntānikān saṃskārān mitrāmitrodāsīnito 'yoniśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñānam* [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 204.10-15]; *naṅ mi śes pa gaṅ źe na / so so raṅ gi 'du byed rnams la tshul bźin ma yin par bdag tu yid la byed pa'i mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o / phyi rol mi śes pa gaṅ źe na / phyi rol gyi 'du byed sems can du ston pa ma yin pa rnams la bdag gi bar tshul bźin ma yin par yid la byed pa'i mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o / naṅ daṅ phyi rol mi śes pa gaṅ źe na / pha rol gyi gyud la yod pa'i 'du byed rnams la mdza' bśes pa daṅ / dgra daṅ / tha mal par tshul bźin ma yin par rtog pa'i mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*,: dzi 119a5-8]; 於内無知云何。謂於各別諸行。起不如理作意。謂之爲我。所有無知。於外無知云何。謂於外非有情數諸行。起不如理作意。謂爲我所。所有無知。於内外無知云何。謂於他相續諸行。起不如理分別謂怨親中所有無知 [T. 1579: 322b11-17]

From the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* [the last part of this passage points out the ambiguous status of *dharmadhātu*, which is external in one sense but internal in another]:

sṅon gyi mtha' daṅ phyi ma'i mtha' ni ma 'oṅs pa rnams skye pa'i chos ñid daṅ skyes pa rnams zad pa'i chos ñid du mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o / de de ltar ma śes pas sṅon gyi mtha' la sogs pa las rtsams nas ci bdag 'das pa'i dus nas byuṅ bar gyur ram źes bya ba rgyas par tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed de / ji ltar 'dug ji lta bur gyur / sems can 'di dag ga las 'oṅs / 'di nas śi 'phos nas gaṅ du 'gro bar 'gyur ba źes bya ba 'di ni snoṅ gi mtha' daṅ phyi ma'i mtha las brtsams nas tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa'o / de de ltar mi rtag pa ñid la kun du rmoṅs pas 'du byed rnams la bdag tu lta ba'i rjes su 'brel ciṅ naṅ daṅ phyi daṅ gñi ga dag la chos tsam du mi śes te / naṅ ni naṅ gi skye mched la'o / phyi ni phyi'i lṅa po dag la'o /

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[66] Corrected by Schmithausen (1987: 518 n. 1421) from *ātmanā* on the basis of the manuscript.

[67] Corrected by Schmithausen (1987: 518 n. 421) from *bāhyān sattvasaṃkhyātān* on the basis of the Chinese and Tibetan translations.

1.13 continued) *phyi daṅ naṅ ni dbaṅ po'i rten de dag ñid daṅ chos kyi skye mched la ste / chos de dag ni naṅ gi yin par yaṅ dmigs śiṅ phyi'i skye mched dag gis bsdus pa yin no* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 54b2-6]; 於前後際無智者。謂於未來諸行當生法性及當生已當盡法性。不了知故。彼於如是不了知者。謂依前際等起不如理思惟。我於過去世爲曾有耶。乃至廣説。我爲是誰。誰當是我。今此有情從何而來。於此沒已當往何所。如是依前後際不如理作意故。於如是無常法性。愚癡不了。於諸行中我見隨逐。於内於外俱於二種。唯有法性不能了知。内謂内處。外謂外迹。内外即是根所住處及以法處。由彼諸法於内可得。又是外處之所攝故 [T. 1579: 771b26-c8])

1.14) In verse 42, Vasubandhu gives the accepted Vaibhāṣika opinion that it is the eye that sees *rūpa,* but, according to Saṃghabhadra, he uses the word *kila* to indicate that he disagrees.[68] Vasubandhu then examines a number of other opinions found in the *Vibhāṣā,* most prominently that of Dharmatrāta, to the effect that it is the visual consciousness that sees *rūpa.* As Katō points out (1989: 24), the commentators think that Vasubandhu favors Dharmatrāta's opinion, but in fact Vasubandhu may just be using it to refute the Vaibhāṣikas. At the end of the discussion, he ascribes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that there is nothing that sees or is seen; consciousness simply arises in dependence on the organ and the object.[69]

atra sautrāntikā āhuḥ/kim idamākāśaṃ khādyate/cakṣur hi pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam / tatra kaḥ paśyati ko vā dṛśyate / nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātraṃ hetuphalamātraṃ ca / tatra vyavahārārthaṃ cchandata upacārāḥ kriyante / cakṣuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijānātīti nātrābhiniveṣṭavyam / uktaṃ hi bhagavatā janapada-niruktiṃ nābhiniveśata saṃjñāṃ ca lokasya nābhidhāved iti
(Pradhan: 31.11-16. The references for the entire discussion are Pradhan: 30.3-31.17; T. 1558:10c8-11b8; Poussin v. 1: 81-86; T. 1562: 363c12-368a11; Katō 1989: 23-24.)

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[68] Saṃghabhadra uses the appellation *ching-chu* 經主 here (T. 1562: 365a11), as well as several other times during this discussion (365b19, 365c25, 366c18, 366c19, 367a6, 367a7).

[69] Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas (T. 1562: 367b24). He does not use the appellation *ching-chu.* Fukuhara comments that this is very close to a Mahāyāna way of thinking (1973: 159).

1.14) The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains a number of statements to the effect that cognition is really the result of the laws of cause and effect, not of something seeing and something else being seen.

See especially the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* on the question of what sees *rūpa:*

mig gis gzugs rnams mthoṅ ba nas yid kyis chos rnams rnam par śes so źes bya ba'i bar du ji skad gsuṅs pa de la / ci mig la sogs pas mthoṅ ba nas rnam par śes pa'i bar du yin nam / 'on te de dag gi rnam par śes pa dag gis mthoṅ ba nas rnam par śes pa'i bar du yin źe na / smras pa / don dam par ni mig la sogs pas kyaṅ ma yin la / de dag gi rnam par śes pa dag gis kyaṅ ma yin no / de ci'i phyir źe na / dṅos po rnams ni rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba'i phyir daṅ skad cig pa'i phyir daṅ / g.yo ba med pa'i phyir ro / brda'i tshul du ni gtso bo yin pa'i mig la sogs pa la mthoṅ ba po la sogs pa ñe bar gdags pa ches rigs so / de ci'i phyir źe na / mig la sogs pa dbaṅ po rnams yod na ni rnam par śes pa 'byuṅ ba ma tshaṅ pa med par ṅes kyi / rnam par śes pa'i rgyun ni yod du zun kyaṅ dmig la sogs pa dbaṅ po rnams tshaṅ ba 'am ma tshaṅ bar dmigs pa'i phyir ro / lta ba la sogs pa tsam la mthoṅ ba la sogs pa ñe bar gdags pa gaṅ yin pa de ni don dam pa yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*ṭ: zi 83a6-b3); 問如説眼見諸色乃至意了諸法。此爲眼等是見者乃至是了者耶。爲彼識耶。答約勝義道理。非是眼等亦非彼識。何以故。諸法自性衆縁生故。刹那滅故。無作用故。約世俗道理。眼等最勝故可於彼立見者等。何以故。若有眼等諸根。識決定生無所缺減。或有識流非眼等根。若缺不缺俱可得故。此中實義唯於見等説見者等 (T. 1579: 610a19-27; cited in Saeki 1978, v. 1: 88)

See also the *Paramārthagāthās* and their commentary (Wayman 1961: 168, 174, 178; *Yogācārabhūmi*ṭ: dzi 236b3-4, 238a4-6; T. 1579: 363a27-b1, 364a27-b1).

1.15) Vasubandhu states his opinions regarding the nature of atoms: 1) he agrees with the Bhadanta that they do not touch one another, but they are conventionally said to do so because there is no interval between them; 2) there is no "mass" that is different from the atoms of which it consists [and, therefore, the Vaibhāṣika statement that masses touch, while atoms do not, is illogical]; 3) whether or not atoms have spatial division, it does not make sense for them to touch one another (if they have spatial division, they must have parts, whether or not they touch, while if they have no spatial division, the [idea that atoms] touch would not lead to the fallacy that they have parts).[70]

na spṛśanti / nirantare tu spṛṣṭasaṃjñeti bhadantaḥ / bhadantamataṃ caiṣṭavyam / anyathā hi sāntarāṇāṃ paramāṇūnāṃ śūnyeṣv antareṣu gatiḥ kena pratibādhyeta / yataḥ sapratighā iṣyante / na ca paramāṇubhyo 'nye saṃghātā iti / ta eva te saṃghātāḥ spṛśyante yathā rūpyante / yadi ca paramāṇor digbhāgabhedaḥ kalpyate spṛṣṭasyāspṛṣṭasya vā sāvayavatvaprasaṅgaḥ / no cet spṛṣṭasyāpy aprasaṅgaḥ (Pradhan: 33.2-7; T. 1558: Poussin v. 1: 91-92; Saṃghabhadra discusses these issues and attributes the first and third opinions to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 373b14-16, 373c5-7; the reference for the entire discussion is T. 1562: 373b14-373c14].)

[70] I find this discussion rather confusing. It seems as though Vasubandhu is attacking the Vaibhāṣika idea of the special reality and independence of atoms as he does more explicitly in the *Viṃśatikā* (6.27-8.24; Kochumuttom 1982: 174-181; see also *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* [T. 1585: 4a7-c5; Poussin 1928-1929: 38-47]).

1.15) (What Vasubandhu says certainly does not contradict the following passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi,* but it is not clear that there is a direct connection.

In the *Manobhūmi,* it is said that an atom is a designation for the smallest unit into which the mind can analyze *rūpa. Rūpa* has place [*sapradeśa*][71] but no parts.

na ca rūpasamudāye kadācit paramāṇur utpadyate / utpadyamānas tu svabījāt samudāya evotpadyate 'ṇur vā madhyo vā mahān vā / na ca punaḥ parmāṇubhiḥ samudāyaś cīyate / buddhyā tu parimāṇaparyantaparicchedataḥ paramāṇuḥ prajñapyate / tatra samudāyo 'pi sapradeśaḥ/ paramāṇur api sapradeśaḥ/ samudāyas tu sāvayavo na paramāṇuḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / paramāṇur eva hy avayavaḥ / sa ca samudāyasyaivāsti na paramāṇoḥ / punar anye paramāṇavaḥ / tasmān na sāvayavaḥ paramāṇuḥ [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 53.9-15]; *gzugs 'dus pa la yaṅ rdul phra rab ni nams kyaṅ skye bar mi 'gyur te / skye ba na raṅ gi sa bon las 'dus pa ñid chuṅ ṅu 'am / 'briṅ ṅam chen po skye par zad kyi / rdul phra rab rnams kyis 'dus pa bskyed par ni ma yin no / rdul phra rab ni blos tshad kyi mtha' yoṅs su bcad pa las 'dogs pa zad de / de la 'dus pa yaṅ phyogs daṅ bcas pa yin la / rdul phra rab kyaṅ phyogs daṅ bcas pa yin te / 'on kyaṅ 'dus pa ni yan lag daṅ bcas pa yin gyi / rdul phra rab ni ma yin no / de ci'i phyir źe na / rdul phra rab ñid yan lag yin la / de yaṅ 'dus pa ñid la yod kyi / rdul phra rab rnams ni rdul phra rab gźan gyi ma yin te / de bas na rdul phra rab ni yan lag daṅ bcas pa ma yin no* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 29b4-8]; 復次於色聚中。曾無極微生。若從自種生時唯聚集生。或細或中或大。又非極微集成色。聚但由覺慧分折諸色極量邊際。分別假立以爲極微。又色聚亦有方分。極微亦有方分。然色聚有分非極微。何以故。由極微即是分。此是聚色所有非極微。復有餘極微。是故極微非有分 [T. 1579: 290a17-23]

As an example of an incorrect conception regarding atoms, the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* mentions [the idea that] one atom and another either come together or separate.

rdul phra rab daṅ rdul phra rab phrad pa daṅ / 'bral bar 'dzin pa daṅ [*Yogācāra-bhūmi*$_t$: zi 53b1-2]; 或謂極微與餘極微或合或散 [T. 1579: 598a25-26])

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[71] The Chinese translations for *digbhāgabheda* and *sapradeśa* are identical: *yu fang fen* 有方分.

2.1) In verse 4, the last of a group of three *kārikās* that represent the opinion of "others,"[72] Vasubandhu uses the word *tathā* with respect to the three *anāsrava indriyas* (*anājñātamājñāsyamīndriya, ājñendriya, ājñātāvīndriya*) and explains in the *Bhāṣya* that it means that these three, like the preceding nineteen items on the list of twenty-two *indriyas*, are separate *indriyas.*

pratyekam indriyam ity upadarśanārthaṃ tathāśabdaḥ
(Pradhan: 40.3; T. 1558: 14a17; Poussin v. 1: 109; Saṃghabhadra attributes this explanation to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 378b21-22] and criticizes it, saying that the word *tathā* should mean: "like *strīndriya* and *puruṣendriya,* which do not exist separately from *kāyendriya*" [T. 1562: 378b22-c3].)[73]

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[72] There is some disagreement regarding who these "others" are. According to Paramārtha, they are Sautrāntikas (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 25: 118 n. 50).

[73] The *Vibhāṣā* emphasizes that the three *anāsrava indriyas,* like *strīndriya* and *puruṣendriya,* lack separate reality (T. 1545: 730a29-b13; see also *Abhidharmadīpa* Chapter Two verse 73 and commentary [*Abhidharmadīpa* 44: 11-15]).

2.1) The *Yogācārabhūmi,* although it equates the three *anāsrava indriyas* with the group of five *indriyas* starting with *śraddhā,*[74] never denies their real existence.

See the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi:*

pho dan mo'i dban po gñis kyi don gan że na / smras pa / reg byas bsdus pa kho na'i[75] *'khrig pa sbyor ba'o / tshor ba'i dban po*[76] *lna'i don gan że na / smras pa / bde ba dan sdug bsnal ba dan yid bde ba dan mi bde ba dan btan sñoms kyi gnas lta bu dag ste dban po drug po de dag ñid kyi don rnams so / dad pa'i dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / span bar bya ba dan / thob par bya ba'i yul lo / brtson 'grus kyi dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / de gñis kho na'i thob par bya ba la źum pa med pa dan span bar bya ba la źum pa med pa'o / dran pa'i dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / mñam pa dan bsam pa dan bsgom pa nes par 'dzin pa'o / tin ne 'dzin gyi dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / źi gnas dan lhag mthon no / śes rab kyi dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / śes bya'i de kho na'o / mi śes pa kun śes par byed pa'i dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / bden pa mnon par rtogs pa la brtson pa dge ba'i chos la 'dun*[77] *pa nas bzun ste / sbyor ba'i lam*[78] *thams cad la dban po lna'i don gan yin pa de ñid 'di'i don yin par blta bar bya'o / kun śes pa'i dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / rgyun du źugs pa'i 'bras bu nas bzun ste / rdo rje lta bu'i tin ne 'dzin gyi bar du dban po lna'i don gan yin pa de ñid 'di'i don yin par blta bar bya'o / kun śes pa dan ldan pa'i dban po'i don gan że na / smras pa / mi slob pa'i lam nas bzun ste / phun po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya nan las 'das pa'i dbyins kyi bar du dban po lna'i don gan yin pa de ñid 'di'i don gan yin par blta bar bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 97b2-8); 問男女根何義。答因欲相應即觸所攝。問五受根何義。答隨順苦樂憂喜捨處。即六根義。問信根何義。答應得應捨所有境界。問精進根何義。答即二種若得若捨俱無所憚。問念根何義。答於聞思修憶持不忘。問定根何義。答奢摩他毘鉢舍那。問慧根何義。答所知眞實。問未知欲知根何義。答修諦現觀者從善法欲已去。於一切方便道中即彼五根義當知是此義。問已知根何義。答從預流果乃至金剛喩定。即彼五根義當知是此義。問具知根何義。答從初無學道乃至無餘涅槃界。即彼五根義當知是此義 (T. 1579: 615c20-616a3)

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[74] *śraddhendriya, vīrendriya, smṛtīndriya, samādhīndriya, prajñendriya.*

[75] The Derge edition includes the phrase *pho dan mo'i dban po phan tshun* between *kho na'i* and *'khrig.*

[76] The Peking edition repeats the word *dban po* here. I omit it on the basis of the Derge.

[77] Corrected from *bdun* on the basis of the Derge.

[78] Corrected from *las* on the basis of the Derge.

2.2) Vasubandhu says that the word *ādi* in verse 4 indicates an alternate explanation (to the one given first in the *Bhāṣya*) of the ascending order of the three *anāsrava indriyas:* 1) *anājñātamājñāsyamīndriya* is instrumental in the destruction of *darśanaheyakleśas;* 2) *ājñendriya* is instrumental in the destruction of *bhāvanāheyakleśas;* 3) *ājñātāvīndriya* is instrumental with respect to *dṛṣṭa-dharmasukhavihāra.*

ādiśabdo 'nyaparyāyadyotanārthaḥ / katamo 'nyaḥ paryāyaḥ / darśanaheya-kleśaparihāṇaṃ praty ājñāsyāmīndriyasyādhipatyam / bhāvanāheyakleśaprahāṇaṃ praty ājñendriyasya / dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāraṃ praty ājñātāvīndriyasya / vimukti-prītisukhasaṃvedanād iti

(Pradhan: 40.5-7; T. 1558: 14a21-24; Poussin v. 1: 110; Saṃghabhadra attributes this explanation to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 378c3-5], criticizes it, saying that it would result in many problems regarding the order of accomplishments on the Path [T. 1562: 378c5-10], and gives his own explanation [T. 1562: 378c10-379a3]. In the course of this, he again refers to the sūtra-master, who, he says, would disagree with Saṃghabhadra's mentioning, with respect to *ājñātāvīndriya,* the *visaṃyogaprāpti* of the *kleśas* that are destroyed by *vajropamasamādhi* [T. 1562: 379a1-3]; this must be an allusion to Vasubandhu's rejection of *prāpti* as a real *dharma.*)[79]

[79] This discussion is very intricate. However, it seems as though Saṃghabhadra feels that Vasubandhu is ignoring the complicated structure of the Vaibhāṣika *mārga,* particularly the distinction between *ānantaryamārga,* in which the *kleśas* are abandoned, and *vimuktimārga,* in which their *visaṃyogaprāpti* arises (see Cox 1995: 89). The Vaibhāṣika understanding of *ānantaryamārga* and *vimuktimārga* is specifically refuted in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (T. 1545: 52b26-c1; Poussin 1928-1929: 641).

2.2) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* defines these three *indriyas:* 1) *anājñātamājñāsyamīndriya* is the five *indriyas* (beginning with *śraddhā*) of one who has abandoned *kuśaladharmachanda* and is in the midst of *prayoga-mārga;* 2) *ājñendriya* is the five *indriyas* of one who is at a stage between attaining *srota-āpattiphala* and *vajropamasamādhi;* 3) *ājñātāvīndriya* is the five *indriyas* of one who is at a stage between attaining arhatship and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.*

śes rab kyi dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ źe na / smras pa / śes bya'i de kho na'o / mi śes pa kun śes par byed pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ źe na / smras pa / bden pa mṅon par rtogs pa la brtson pa dge ba'i chos la 'dun[80] *pa nas bzuṅ ste / sbyor ba'i lam*[81] *thams cad la dbaṅ po lṅa'i don gaṅ yin pa de ñid 'di'i don yin par blta bar bya'o / kun śes pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ źe na / smras pa / rgyun du źugs pa'i 'bras bu nas bzuṅ ste / rdo rje lta bu'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi bar du dbaṅ po lṅa'i don gaṅ yin pa de ñid 'di'i don yin par blta bar bya'o / kun śes pa daṅ ldan pa'idbaṅ po'i don gaṅ źe na / smras pa / mi slob pa'i lam nas bzuṅ ste / phuṅ po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ṅan las 'das pa'i dbyiṅs kyi bar du dbaṅ po lṅa'i don gaṅ yin pa de ñid 'di'i don gaṅ yin par blta bar bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 97b5-8); 問慧根何義。答所知眞實。問未知欲知根何義。答修諦現觀者從善法欲已去。於一切方便道中即彼五根義當知是此義。問已知根何義。答從預流果乃至金剛喩定。即彼五根義當知是此義。問具知根何義。答從初無學道乃至無餘涅槃界。即彼五根義當知是此義 (T. 1579: 615c26-616a3)[82]

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* also explains the purpose (*so-i ch'u* 所依處, *ched du*) of each of these three *indriyas:* 1) *anājñātam-ājñāsyamīndriya* is for the purpose of obtaining the first three *śrāmaṇyaphalas;* 2) *ājñendriya* is for the purpose of obtaining the *śrāmaṇyaphala* of the *aśaikṣa* up to *vajropamasamādhi;* 3) *ājñātāvīndriya* is for the purpose of permanently destroying the basis (*so-i* 所依, *phuṅ po*) of *dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra* immediately upon obtaining permanent destruction of the *kleśas.*

mi śes pa kun śes par byed pa'i dbaṅ po ci źig gi ched du źe na / smras pa / dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gi bras bu daṅ po daṅ gñis pa daṅ gsum pa 'thob pa'i ched du'o / kun śes pa'i dbaṅ po ci źig gi ched du źe na / smras pa / rdo rje lta bu'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi bar daṅ mi slob pa'i dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi 'bras bu 'thob pa'i ched du'o / kun

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[80] Corrected from *bdun* on the basis of the Derge.

[81] Corrected from *las* on the basis of the Derge.

[82] This is a portion of the passage quoted in the previous item; it has been reproduced here for the sake of convenience.

2.2 continued) *śes pa daṅ ldan pa'i dbaṅ po ci źig gi ched du źe na / smras pa / bar chad med par ñon moṅs pa spoṅ ba mṅon du bya ba daṅ / tshe 'di la bde bar gnas pa daṅ phuṅ po 'gag pa'i ched du'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 100b3-5); 問未知欲知根誰所依處。答證初第二第三沙門果之所依處。問已知根誰所依處。答乃至金剛喻定無學沙門果證之所依處。問具知根誰所依處。答無間煩惱永斷作證現法樂住所依永滅之所依處 (T. 1579: 616c26-617a1)

2.3) According to Vasubandhu, *jīvitendriya* is not the result of karma in the case of the arhat, who can prolong his life by the power of his meditation.[83]

samādhiprabhāva eva sa teṣāṃ tādṛśo yena pūrvakarmajaṃ ca sthitikālāvedham indriyamahābhūtānāṃ vyāvartayanty apūrvaṃ ca samādhijam āvedham ākṣipanti / tasmān na tajjīvitendriyaṃ vipākaṃ tato 'nyat tu vipākaḥ
(Pradhan: 43.20-22; T. 1558: 15b27-29; Poussin v. 1: 121; Saṃghabhadra attributes this explanation, to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 380c21-23] and criticizes it, alluding to Vasubandhu's arguments against the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra, jīvitendriya* [T. 1562: 380c23-381a4].)[84]

[83] This position is found in the *Vibhāṣā,* where it is criticized (T. 1545: 657b1-5).

[84] For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Jaini 1958a. Jaini points out that the position adopted by Vasubandhu is the same as the Mahāsāṃghika position criticized in the *Kathāvatthu,* and he refers to the *Abhidharmadīpa,* which condemns Vasubandhu for holding a Mahāyāna view (550-551).

2.3) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, arhats, Tathāgatas, and bodhisattvas have a special type of *jīvitendriya* that gives them the power to extend their *āyuḥsaṃskāras*. This *jīvitendriya* is defined as "proceeding due to own-force." All other types are defined as "not proceeding due to own-force." This seems to be equivalent to the distinction made in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* between *jīvitendriya* that is not *vipāka* (that of the arhat) and ordinary *jīvitendriya*, which is *vipāka*.

dgra bcom pa daṅ de bźin gśegs pa daṅ byaṅ chub sems dpa' gaṅ dag tshe'i 'du byed gtoṅ ba daṅ / spel bar spyod pa dag ni srog gi dbaṅ po la raṅ gis[85] *dbaṅ bsgyur ba yin no / de las gźan pa dag ni raṅ gis dbaṅ bsgyur ma yin par rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 26a1-2); 若阿羅漢等若諸如來若諸菩薩。於壽行中延促自在所有命根。名自勢力轉。當知所餘名非自勢力轉 (T. 1579: 587b7-9)

According to the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi*, the Buddha obtains mastery of *samādhi* (*samādhi-vaśitā*), which he uses to discard his former *āyuḥsaṃskāras* and to produce a new body.

gaṅ gi tshe de bźin gśegs pa naṅ du dgyes par mdzad ciṅ dge sbyoṅ du 'gyur ba la brten nas / tiṅ ṅe 'dzin de la mṅa brñed pas na / ji ltar thugs mñam par gźag pa yin bźin du / sku tshe'i 'du byed rnams źes bya ba srid pa'i 'du byed rnams spaṅs te / de dag spaṅs pas mtshuṅs pa'i gzugs kyi sku 'byuṅ ba de dag mtshuṅs pa ma yin pa'i miṅ gi sku 'byuṅ ba bśad ste (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 292a5-7); 又佛示現內寂靜樂及妙門樂爲依止故。得定自在。如定心力捨諸壽行及諸有行。彼捨邊際妙色身生。與前正等其名身生。與前不等故有差別 (T. 1579: 383c7-11)

[85] Corrected from *raṅ gi* on the basis of the Derge.

2.4) According to Vasubandhu, the Vaibhāṣikas say that *mahābhūtas* manifest their existence by their activity: the activity of a certain *mahābhūta* in a substance (mass) is stronger; therefore, only that one *mahābhūta* is perceived, although the other three *mahābhūtas* also exist in the substance.

yady atra paṭutamaṃ prabhāvata udbhūtaṃ tasya tatropalabdhiḥ / sūcītūlīkalāpa-sparśavat saktulavaṇacūrṇarasavac ca / kathaṃ punas teṣu śeṣāstitvaṃ gamyate / karmataḥ saṃgrahadhṛtipaktivyūhanāt
(Pradhan: 53.9-10 T. 1558; 18c4-6; Poussin v. 1: 146; but according to Saṃghabhadra [who discusses this in his comment on Chapter One verse 35], Vasubandhu misrepresents Vaibhāṣika doctrine [T. 1562: 355b15-18]. The true Vaibhāṣika position is that a given *mahābhūta* is perceived because its substance is greater than that of the other *mahābhūtas* [T. 1562: 355b18-23]. A bit later, Saṃghabhadra again accuses Vasubandhu of not recognizing the true Vaibhāṣika position regarding this question [T. 1562: 355c27-29]. In fact, the *Vibhāṣā* includes both opinions [T. 1545: 682c23-683a15]. Vasubandhu offers another opinion, which Yaśomitra labels "Sautrāntika" [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* 125.6], to the effect that the unperceived *mahābhūtas* exist as seeds: *bījatas teṣu teṣāṃ bhāvo na svarūpata ity apare / santy asmin dāru-skandhe vividhā dhātava iti vacanāt*[86] [Pradhan 53.14–15; T. 1558: 18c9-11].)

[86] The source of this quotation is *Saṃyuktāgama* (T. 99 [sūtra no. 494]: 129a3; see Pāsādika 1986: 31).

2.4) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi,* all the *mahābhūtas* and *upādāyarūpas* are present simultaneously, but only one is active at a given time; the others are present in the form of seeds that can become active when changing conditions warrant.

raṅ gi sa bon de las grub pa gaṅ dag yin pa de dag ni raṅ gi las byed pa dag yin no / de dag kyaṅ rgyur byas pa'i gzugs daṅ lhan cig gi dṅos pos tha mi dad par 'jug pa dag yin te / de daṅ 'bra ba'i rgyu las grub pa yin pa'i phyir ro / thams cad du yaṅ thams cad 'dres śiṅ ro gcig pa'i goṅ bu lta bu yin gyi / phye daṅ 'bru daṅ / nor bu'i phuṅ po lta bu ni ma yin no / 'dod pa'i khams na ni gzugs 'dus pa gcig tu sra ba gaṅ yin pa de la sa'i khams daṅ / gzugs daṅ dri daṅ ro'i khams dag las byed pa yin no / gzugs kyi khams na ni gzugs kyi khams kho na las byed pa yin no / lhag ma chu daṅ / me daṅ / rluṅ daṅ / sgra'i khams sa bon du gyur pa de daṅ 'brel pa dag ni rkyen dag la bltos pa yin te / de ltar na chu daṅ / me daṅ / rluṅ gi miṅ can 'dus pa dag la go rims ci rigs par blta bar bya'o / de la naṅ gi gzugs 'dus pa la ni skra daṅ / spu la sogs pa'i rab tu dbye bas / sa la sogs pa'i khams thams cad las byed pa daṅ bcas par snaṅ ste / mdo las ji skad gsuṅs pa bźin no / phyi rol la ni sa la sogs pa'i 'dus pa so sor ci rigs par blta bar bya'o / de dag kyaṅ rkyen ji lta ji lta bu dag daṅ phrad pa'i 'bras bu de lta de lta bu'i rgyur gyur pa yin te / 'di lta ste / dper na śiṅ skam po legs par gtsubs pa las me 'byuṅ ba daṅ / tshon mo steṅ daṅ / ro ñe daṅ / lcags daṅ / dṅul la sogs pa źu bar 'gyur ba lta bu'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 229a3-b1); 謂從自種子所生大種。又諸大種與所造色。俱時而有互不相離。由彼種類因所成故。如一味團更相涉入遍一切處。非如麨稻末尼等聚。又於一向堅色聚中。唯有地界能作業用。若於欲界亦有色香味界作業。於色界中但有色界能作業用。餘水火風及與聲界。唯有種子之所隨逐。更待異緣方能作業。如是於水火風名想聚中。如應其所次第亦爾。內色聚中一切地等諸界作業皆具可得。謂髮毛等種種差別。廣説如經。當知於外得有各別地等諸聚。彼若值遇如是如是衆緣差別。即便能作如是如是果法生因。譬如善巧鑽彼乾木即便生火。又如白鑞鉛錫金銀等物融消即流 (T. 1579: 666b13-26)

2.5) Vasubandhu objects to the Vaibhāṣika definition of the *kuśalamahābhūmika, upekṣā,* as the non-turning of the mind toward an object, pointing out that this would be a case of a *dharma* coexisting with its opposite, namely *manaskāra,* which is the turning of the mind toward an object and which is present at every moment of consciousness. He seems to be making the point that these *dharmas* must not exist, or be active, at the same moment (see Poussin v. 1: 160).

katham idānīm etad yokṣyate / tatraiva citte ābhogātmako manaskāro 'nābhogātmakā copekṣeti / nanu coktaṃ durjñāna eṣāṃ viśeṣa iti / asti hi nāma durjñānam api jñāyate / idaṃ tu khalv atidurjñānaṃ yad virodhe 'py avirodha iti/ anyatrābhogo 'nyatrānābhoga iti ko 'tra virodha / na tarhīdānīm ekālambanāḥ sarve saṃprayuktāḥ prāpnuvanti / evaṃjātīyakam atrānyad apy āyāsyatīti yas tasya nayaḥ so 'syāpi veditavyaḥ
(Pradhan: 55.17-21; T. 1558: 19b18-24; Poussin v. 1: 159-160; Saṃghabhadra, in his comment on a later verse [Chapter Two verse 28], attributes this objection to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 392b12-13] and explains that, like the pair, *vīrya,* which is not resting while doing good, and *upekṣā,* which is equanimity while abstaining from doing bad, *manaskāra* and *upekṣā* are not really opposites [T. 1562: 392b8-12].)

2.5) According to the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi,* all of the five *mahābhūmika dharmas* accepted by Yogācāra coexist with the five consciousnesses, but they are active one by one; furthermore, they all arise from their own seeds.

sahāyaḥ katamaḥ/ tatsahabhūsamprayuktāś caitasā dharmāḥ/ tadyathā/ manaskāraḥ sparśo vedanā saṃjñā cetaneti / ye 'py anye cakṣurvijñānena sahabhūsaṃprayuktāś caitasā dhārmās te punar ekālambanā anekākārāḥ sahabhuvaś caikaikavṛttayaś ca / sarve ca svabījān nirjātāḥ samprayuktāḥ sākārāḥ sālambanāḥ sāśrayāḥ (*Yogācāra-bhūmi:* 5.12-15); *grogs gaṅ że na / de daṅ lhan cig 'byuṅ żiṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa sems las 'byuṅ ba'i chos rnams te / 'di lta ste / yid la byed pa daṅ / reg pa daṅ / tshor ba daṅ / 'du śes daṅ sems pa'o / sems las byuṅ ba'i chos gżan gaṅ dag mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ / lhan cig 'byuṅ żiṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa de dag ni / dmigs pa gcig pa rnam pa du ma ste / lhan cig gi 'byuṅ ba dag kyaṅ re re 'byuṅ la / thams cad kyaṅ raṅ gi sa bon las ṅes par 'byuṅ ba / mtshuṅs par ldan pa / dmigs pa daṅ bcas pa / rnam pa daṅ bcas pa / gnas daṅ bcas pa dag go* (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 3b3-6); 彼助伴者。謂彼俱有相應諸心所有法。所謂。作意觸受想思。及餘眼識俱有相應諸心所有法。又彼諸法同一所緣。非一行相。俱有相應一一而轉。又彼一切各各從自種子而生 (T. 1579: 279b18-22)[87]

A similar statement is made in the *Manobhūmi* regarding *manovijñāna* (*Yogācāra-bhūmi:* 11.14-21; *Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 6b5-7a3; T. 1579: 280b13-21).[88]

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[87] This example is in the case of *cakṣurvijñāna,* but the same applies to the remaining four *vijñānas.*

[88] According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, *upekṣā* is not a real entity; because it is composed of *alobha, adveṣa, amoha,* and *vīrya, upekṣā* is simply a designation for the *kleśa*-removing quality of those *dharmas* (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* zi 63b8-64a2; T. 1579: 602b22-27). I am not sure whether there is any relation between this statement and Vasubandhu's argument.

2.6) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of others that *āhrīkya* is lack of shame with respect to oneself, while *anapatrāpya* is lack of shame with respect to others. He cites an objection, namely that it is impossible to think simultaneously about oneself and others, but he defends the opinion of others, saying that *āhrīkya* and *anapatrāpya* are not intended to be simultaneous.

anye punar āhuḥ / ātmāpekṣayā doṣair alajjanam āhrīkyaṃ parāpekṣayā 'napatrāpyam iti / evam api dve apekṣe yugapat kathaṃ setsyataḥ / na khalūcyate yugapad ātmānaṃ paraṃ copekṣata ity api tv asty asau kadācid alajjā yā ātmānam apekṣamāṇasyāpi pravartate sā āhrikyam / asti yā param apekṣamāṇasya pravartate sā 'napatrāpyam
(Pradhan: 59.24-60.3; T. 1558: 21a17-21; Poussin v. 1: 171; Saṃghabhadra says that the objection to this opinion cited by the sūtra-master reflects his misunderstanding [T. 1562: 393b23-24] because the real problem with the opinion is that it does not treat *āhrīkya* and *anapatrāpya* as completely separate *dharmas* [T. 1562: 393b25].)[89]

[89] The *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 179c13-15) includes this as one of many explanations of the difference between *āhrīkya* and *anapatrāpya*. The proviso in the case of the immediately preceding separate definitions of each *dharma* (T. 1545: 179a17-18; 179b13-14), that they differ in wording but not in essence, may also apply here. For similar definitions, see *Abhidharmāmṛta*, Upaśānta's **Abhidharmahṛdaya*, and **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1553: 972b24-25; T. 1552: 881b1-2; T. 1551: 847b19-20). Dharmaśrī's **Abhidharmahṛdaya* is somewhat different and seems to reverse the definitions (T. 1550: 817b21-22; Willemen 1975: 62). See also the **Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (T. 1646: 319b22-23). Poussin notes (1971, v. 1: 171 n. 2) that Vasubandhu adopts this definition in the *Pañcaskandhaka* (si 15b5-6).

2.6) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Samāhitā Bhūmi* defines *āhrīkya* as lack of shame with respect to oneself and *anapatrāpya* as lack of shame with respect to others.

ji ltar na ṅo tsha med pa daṅ / khrel med pa yin že na / bdag ñid dam gžan las brten te / ṅo tsha med pas / bsams bžin du ñes pa byed pa daṅ / ñes pa byuṅ na yaṅ chos bžin du phyir mi phyed pa daṅ / 'thab krol byed pa daṅ / mtshaṅ[90] *'dru bar byed pa daṅ / rtsod par phyed pa daṅ / 'gyed*[91] *par byed pa yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 174b3-4); 云何無慚無愧。謂觀於自或復觀他無所羞恥。故思毀犯。犯已不能如法出離。好爲種種鬪諍違諍 (T. 1579: 644c8-10)

[90] Corrected from *'tshaṅ* on the basis of the Derge.

[91] Corrected from *'gyid* on the basis of the Derge.

2.7) Vasubandhu questions the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra, prāpti,* which is accepted by the Sarvāstivādins.

prāptir nāmāsti kiṃcit bhāvāntaram iti
(Pradhan: 63.3; T. 1558: 22a26; Poussin v. 1: 181; Saṃghabhadra attributes this question to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 397a12-13; Cox 1995: 187] and embarks on a long defense of the reality of *prāpti* and refutation of the *bīja* theory [T. 1562: 397a13-398c1; Cox 1995: 187-197].)

2.7) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* states that *prāpti* is only a *prajñapti,* not a real *dharma.*

'thob pa daṅ rñed pa daṅ ldan pa gaṅ źe na / mdor bsdu na 'byuṅ ba'i rkyen gyis yoṅs su zin ciṅ sa bon yoṅs su rtag pa ni 'thob pa źes bya ba ste / rnam graṅs des na 'thob pa yaṅ btags pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_P$: zi 24b7-8); 復次云何得獲成就。謂若略說。生緣攝受增盛之因説名爲得。由此道理當知得是假有 (T. 1579: 586c25-27)

It goes on to explain *prāpti* in terms of *bīja.*

thob pa de yaṅ mdor bsdu na rnam pa gsum du rig par bya'o / sa bon daṅ ldan pa daṅ / dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa daṅ / kun tu 'byuṅ bar ldan pa'o / de la re źig ñon moṅs pa can daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa daṅ / skyes nas thob pa'i chos ma btsal bar kun tu 'byuṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de dag ni sa bon re źig gi gnas kyi ñams pas kyaṅ ñams par ma byas la / 'phags pa'i lam gyis kyaṅ yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa daṅ / dge ba rnams kyi yaṅ 'di lta ste / dper na dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu bcad pa rnams kyi ltar log par lta bas ñams par ma byas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni sa bon daṅ ldan pa źes bya ste / 'di ltar ji srid du de'i sa bon de ñams par ma byas źiṅ yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa de srid du de ñon moṅs pa can la sogs pa'i chos kun tu 'byuṅ ba'am / kun tu 'byuṅ ba ma yin pa de[92] *dang daṅ ldan pa źes bya ba'i phyir ro / dge ba'i chos mṅon par 'du bya bas bskyed pa rnams daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa de dag kha cig gi 'byuṅ ba'i rkyen gyis rgyu sa bon yoṅs su rtas pa yoṅs su zin pa ni dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa źes bya'o / da ltar gyi chos rnams mṅon sum gyi dṅos pos raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis 'grub pa ni kun tu 'byuṅ ba daṅ ldan pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_P$: zi 25a5-b2); 當知此得略有三種。一種子成就。二自在成就。三現行成就。若所有染污法諸無記法生得。善法不由功用而現行者。彼諸種子若未爲奢摩他乃所損伏。若未爲聖道乃所永害若不爲邪見損伏諸善如斷善根者。如是名爲種子成就。所以者何。 乃至此種子未被損伏。未被永害。爾時彼染汚等法。若現行若不現行皆説名成就。故若加行所生善法。及一分無記法生縁所攝受增盛因種子。名自在成就。若現在諸法自相現前轉。名現行成就 (T.1579: 587a10-20)

[92] Corrected from *kun tu 'byuṅ ba de* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

2.8) According to Vasubandhu, when the seeds of *kleśas* are damaged either in the *ārya* or by the *laukikamārga,* just like seeds burned by fire that change and cannot produce fruit, then that person is called *prahīṇakleśa.*

ato 'gnidigdhavrīhivad abījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate / upahata-bījabhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa
(Pradhan: 63.20-21; T. 1558: 22b26-28; Poussin v. 1: 183-184; this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398a28-b2; Cox 1995: 195], who questions Vasubandhu's use of the simile of burned seeds in the case of both the *ārya* and the ordinary person [T. 1562: 398b2-9; Cox 1995: 195-196]. This is one of several statements about *bīja* that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)

2.8) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* compares seeds burned by fire, which are permanently rendered unproductive, with the seeds of internal *dharmas* that have been destroyed by the *ārya.*

'phags pa ñan thos 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis 'dod pa'i 'dod chags[93] *daṅ bral ba daṅ / khams gsum pa'i 'dod chags daṅ bral pa'i bar thob pa ni de ltar des khams gsum na spyod pa'i chos ñon moṅs pa can de dag thams cad kyi sa bon thams cad kyi thams cad du yaṅ dag par bcom pa yin no / de ci'i phyir źe na / 'di ltar 'phags pa ñan thos de ni tshe 'di ñid la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba de las yoṅs su ñams śiṅ / sa 'og ma pa'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa sṅon du byed mi srid pa daṅ / sa goṅ ma dag tu skyes pa de nas śi'i phos nas yaṅ sa 'og ma rnams su skye ba yaṅ mi srid pa'i phyir ro / 'di lta ste dper na 'bru nas la sogs pa'i sa bon nam mkha' 'am / sa gźi skam por gźag pa rnams ni mi skye yaṅ sa bon ñid med pa ni ma yin no / de dag ñid mes*[94] *kun tu gduṅs na thams cad kyi thams cad du sa bon ñid med pa bźin du / sa bon rnams kyi ñams pa daṅ yaṅ dag par bcom pa 'di'i tshul yaṅ de bźin du rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 17a1-5); 若聖弟子由出世道離欲界欲。乃至具得離三界欲。爾時一切三界染污諸法種子皆悉永害。何以故。由聖弟子於現法中不復堪任從離欲退更起下地煩惱現前。或生上地。亦不堪任從彼沒已還生下地。如穀麥等諸外種子安置空迥或於乾器。雖不生芽非不種子。若火所損爾時畢竟不成種子。内法種子損伏永害道理亦爾 (T. 1579: 584a2-10)

[93] Corrected from *lam gyi 'dod chags* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

[94] Corrected from *med* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

2.9) According to Vasubandhu, even in the *samucchinnakuśalamūla,* the seeds of the *kuśalamūlas* are not completely destroyed.

tatrāyatnabhāvibhir āśrayasya tadbījabhāvānupaghātāt samanvāgata upaghātād asamanvāgata ucyate samucchinnakuśalamūlaḥ / tasya tūpaghāto mithyādṛṣṭyā veditavyaḥ / na tu khalu kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ bījabhāvasyātyantaṃ santatau samudghātaḥ
(Pradhan: 63.23-64.2; T. 1558: 22c6-7; Poussin v. 1: 184; the last part of this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398a9; Cox 1995: 193-194], who argues that Vasubandhu should not refer to the destruction of seeds, which are merely *prajñapti* and hence do not exist to be destroyed, and mentions a *sūtra* that says that the *kuśalamūlas* are in fact completely destroyed [T. 1562: 398a9-19; Cox 1995: 194]. It is one of several statements about *bīja* that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)

2.9) The *Manobhūmi* defines *samucchinnakuśalamūla,* specifying that the destruction of the *kuśalamūlas* does not include the destruction of their seeds. (See also item 2.42.)

kathaṃ kuśalamūlāni samucchinatti / tīkṣṇendriyasyādhimātraṃ pāpāśayādhyācāra-dharmasamanvāgatatayā tadanulomamitralābhatayā tasya ca mithyādṛṣṭi-paryavasthānasya ghanīkaraṇaparyantopagamanatayā sarvapāpādhyācāreṣv asaṃkocākaukṛtyapratilābhatayā ca / tatra bījam api kuśalamūlaṃ / alobhādayo 'pi kuśalamūlaṃ / kuśalamūlasamudācāravirodhena santānasthāpanakuśalamūla-samucchedana[95] *bījoddharaṇatayā ca* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 14.18-15.3); *ji ltar dge ba'i rtsa ba rnams rgyun 'chad par byed ce na / dbaṅ po rno la sdig pa'i bsam pa śas chen po la lhag par spyod pa'i chos daṅ ldan pa daṅ / de daṅ mthun pa'i grogs rñed pa daṅ / log par lta ba'i kun nas dkris pa de lhun stug par byed pas / mthar thug par 'gro ba daṅ / sdig pa thams cad la lhag par spyod pa dag la mi ldog ciṅ / 'gyod par*[96] *mi byed par 'gyur ro / de la sa bon yaṅ dge ba'i rtsa ba yin la / ma chags pa la sogs pa yaṅ dge ba'i rtsa ba yin te / dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu spyod pa daṅ mi mthun pas rgyud gnas par byed ciṅ / dge ba'i rtsa ba gcod pas sa bon 'byin par*[97] *byed do* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: dzi 8b8-9a3); 云何斷善根。謂利根者。成就上品諸惡意樂現行法故。得隨順彼惡友故。彼邪見纏極重圓滿到究竟故。彼於一切惡現行中得無畏故。無哀愍故。能斷善根。此中種子亦名善根。無貪瞋等亦名善根。但由安立現行善根。相違相續名斷善根。非由永拔彼種子故 (T. 1579: 281a22-28)[98]

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[95] The manuscript reads *samucchedo na bījoddharaitayā.*

[96] Derge reads *pas.*

[97] Derge reads *pas.*

[98] However, there is a textual problem. The Tibetan translation states that by destroying the *kuśalamūla*s one destroys their seeds. The Sanskrit, as emended by Bhattacharya, seems to agree with the Tibetan. But the manuscript, as Bhattacharya represents it in the note, would appear to agree with the Chinese.

2.10) Vasubandhu says that a person is said to be endowed (*samanvāgata*) with good *dharmas* produced by effort, once they have been produced, since the power (*vaśitva*) to reproduce these *dharmas* is not damaged.

ye punar yatnabhāvinas tair utpannais tadutpattir vaśitvāvighātāt santateḥ samanvāgata ucyate
(Pradhan: 64.2; T. 1558: 22c7-9; Poussin v. 1: 184; this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398a20-21; Cox 1995: 194], who claims that Vasubandhu's statement is inconsistent with his denial of the existence of future *dharmas* [T. 1562: 398a22-26; Cox 1995: 194-195]. It is one of several statements about *bīja* that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)

2.10) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* defines **vaśitvasamanvāgama* as follows: it is the grown (matured?) seeds that are the cause comprising the condition (*hetupratyaya*?) for the arising of good *dharmas* produced by effort and a portion of neutral *dharmas*.

dge ba'i chos mṅon par 'du bya bas bskyed pa rnams daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa de dag kha cig gi 'byuṅ ba'i rkyen gyis rgyu sa bon yoṅs su rtas pa yoṅs su zin pa ni dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: zi 25a8-b1); 若加行所生善法。及一分無記法生縁所攝受增盛因種子。名自在成就 (T. 1579: 587a18-19)

2.11) Vasubandhu defines *bīja* as nothing more than *nāmarūpa* that is capable of producing result immediately (in the future) or later.

kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāraṃparyeṇa vā
(Pradhan: 64.4-5; T. 1558: 22c12-13; Poussin v. 1: 185; this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398b11; Cox 1995: 196] and refuted [T. 1562: 398b12; Cox 1995: 196]. It is one of several statements about *bīja* that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)

2.11) The *Śrāvakabhūmi* identifies *bīja* with the *ṣaḍāyatanas* or *āśraya*.

'o na rigs de'i raṅ bźin ji lta bu źe na / de ni lus las khyad par du gyur pa daṅ / skye mched drug gis zin pa daṅ / chos ñid kyis thab pa daṅ / thog ma med pa'i dus nas brgyud de 'oṅs pa de lta bu yin te / gaṅ la 'di lta ste / rigs daṅ / sa bon daṅ / khams daṅ / raṅ bźin źes bya ba'i miṅ gi rnam graṅs 'di dag yod pa de ni rigs źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: wi 2b1-3); 問今此種姓以何爲體。答附在所依有如是相。六處所攝。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得。於此立有差別之名。所謂種姓種子界性。是名種姓 (T. 1579: 395c24-27)[99]

sa bon de ni skye mched drug po de dag las logs śig na tha dad pa'i mtshan ñid med do / thog ma med pa'i dus nas brgyud de 'oṅs pa daṅ / chos ñid kyis thob pa'i skye mched drug po de lta bur gyur pa'i gnas skabs de la rigs daṅ / sa bon daṅ / khams daṅ / raṅ bźin źes bya ba'i miṅ daṅ tha sñad de dag btags par zad pas (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: wi 2b6-8); 即於如是種類分位六處殊勝。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得。有如是想及以言說。謂爲種姓種子界性 (T. 1579: 396a6-9)[100]

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* identifies *bīja* with the *saṃskāras* and says that it is not a separate entity. It also says that *bīja* and *phala* (result) are different words for the same thing.

de la sa bon gaṅ źe na / sa bon[101] *ni 'du byed rnams las logs śig na rdzas gźan med de / 'du byed de ltar gyur pa daṅ / de ltar byuṅ ba daṅ / de ltar gnas pa de dag ñid la sa bon źes bya bar zad de / 'bras bu źes kyaṅ bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 29b1-2); 復次種子云何非析諸行別有實物名爲種子。亦非餘處。然即諸行如是種性如是等生如是安布。名爲種子亦名爲果 (T. 1579: 588c10-12)[102]

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[99] See Yamabe 1990.

[100] Neither of these passages is extant in Sanskrit.

[101] Corrected from *sa la sa bon* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

[102] See Yamabe 1990.

2.12) Vasubandhu says that the means of producing result is a specific feature of the transformation of the series (*saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa*). He defines transformation as the change-in-state of the series, and he defines the series as the *saṃskāras* as causes and results in the three times. Finally, the Chinese translations[103] define specific feature as the capacity to produce a result immediately.

santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt / ko 'yam pariṇāmo nāma / santater anyathātvam / kā ceyaṃ santatiḥ / hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ
(Pradhan: 64.5-6; T. 1558: 22c13-15; Poussin v. 1: 185; this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398b12-15; Cox 1995: 196], who says that Vasubandhu's idea of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* is inconsistent with his denial of the reality of past and future [T. 1562: 398b15-17; Cox 1995: 196]. It is one of several statements about *bīja* that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)

[103] 何名差別謂有無間生果功能 (T. 1558: 22c15); 何者爲勝類與果無間有生果能 (T. 1559: 181b17). This explanation is found neither in the Sanskrit nor in the Tibetan translation.

2.12) The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* uses the phrase *viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate* in explaining how good or bad actions produce desired or undesired results.

yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandha-patitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaṃ nirvartate (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 128.2-4); *'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags źes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa daṅ mi sdug pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir* (*Yogācārabhūmi*t: dzi 75b4-5); 謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生 (T.1579: 305b3-6)[104]

[104] See Yamabe 1990.

2.13) Vasubandhu approves of the Sautrāntika definition of *pṛthagjanatvam* as the *saṃtati* in which the *āryadharmas* have not yet arisen.

evaṃ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / kathaṃ ca sautrāntikānām / anutpannārya-dharmasantatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam iti
(Pradhan 66.16-18; T. 1558: 23c2-3; Poussin v. 1: 193; Saṃghabhadra identifies the last sentence as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 399b10-11; Cox 1995: 203] and criticizes Vasubandhu for denying the real existence of *pṛthagjanatvam* [T. 1562: 399b11-c7; Cox 1995: 203-206].)[105]

[105] Cox points out that Vasubandhu does not specifically state here that *pṛthag-janatvam* is unreal, but she says that its unreality is implied in its definition as a *saṃtati,* "which, as a composite entity, cannot be real" (1995: 224 n. 109).

2.13) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* defines *pṛthagjanatvam* as a designation for the state in which the *lokottara āryadharmas* have not yet arisen.

so so'i skye bo gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / 'jig rten las 'das pa 'phags pa'i chos ma bskyed pa'i gnas skabs la 'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 77a8); 問依何分位建立異生性。此復幾種。答依未生起一切出世聖法分位。建立異生性 (T. 1579: 607c8-9)[106]

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[106] The other passage in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* that deals with the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* says that *pṛthagjanatvam* refers to the seeds of *darśanaheya dharmas* in the three worlds that have not yet been destroyed (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 26b1-2; T. 1579: 587b25-26). I have argued that there is no contradiction between the two definitions in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, or between this and the definition favored by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Kritzer 1999: 246-248).

2.14) Vasubandhu quotes the opinion of the *pūrvācāryas,* who say that the moment of consciousness after an unconscious trance arises from the body that is endowed with the sense organs because consciousness and the body endowed with the sense organs contain each other's seeds.

apare punar āhuḥ / kathaṃ tāvad ārūpyopapannānāṃ ciraniruddhe 'pi rūpe punar api rūpaṃ jāyate / cittād eva hi taj jāyate na rūpāt / evaṃ cittam apy asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāj jāyate na cittāt / anyonyabījakaṃ hy etad ubhayaṃ yad uta cittaṃ ca sendriyaś ca kāya iti pūrvācāryāḥ
(Pradhan: 72.18-21; T. 1558: 25c22-262.14; Poussin v. 1: 212; Saṃghabhadra identifies this, without quoting it completely or exactly, as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 404a2-3; Cox 1995: 273] and criticizes it along with the seed theory that underlies it [T. 1562: 404a3-20; Cox 1995: 273-274].)

2.14) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* states that, if the *indriyas* and the *mahābhūtas* that support them did not contain the seeds of consciousness and of the *caittas*, consciousness could not resume after the unconscious trances or birth in heaven.

gal te dbaṅ po gzugs can raṅ gi 'byuṅ ba chen po daṅ bcas pa dag sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos rnams kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pa ma yin du zin na / 'di na 'gog pa la sñoms par źugs pa daṅ / 'du śes med pa la sñoms par źugs pa daṅ / 'du śes med pa'i sems can lha rnams kyi naṅ du skyes pa'i rnam par śes pa phyis yaṅ 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur ba źig na 'byuṅ ste / de lta bas na dbaṅ po gzugs can sems daṅ / sems las byuṅ bai sa bon daṅ ldan pa las brten te 'byuṅ bar rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 16a2-4); 復次若諸色根及自大種。非心心所種子所隨逐者。入滅盡定入無想定生無想天。後時不應識等更生。然必更生。是故當知心心所種子隨逐色根。以此爲緣彼得更生 (T. 1579: 583c2-6)[107]

[107] Yamabe has identified the longer passage from which this is taken as the basis for the theory of the mutual perfuming of *rūpa* and *vijñāna* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (2000a: 131-132).

2.15) Vasubandhu says that *asaṃjñisamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti* are *prajñaptis,* not real *dharmas.* What prevents thoughts from arising is not *asaṃjñisamāpatti* or *nirodhasamāpatti* but the *samāpatticitta* (the moment preceding the trance state). *Asaṃjñi-samāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti* are nothing more than the non-operation of thought.

samāpatticittenaiva tatpratibandhanāt / samāpatticittam eva hi tac cittāntaraviruddham utpadyate yena kālāntaraṃ cittasyāpravṛttimātraṃ bhavati / tadviruddhāśrayāpādanāt / yā 'sau samāpattir iti prajñapyate tac cāpravṛttimātram na pūrvam āsīn na paścāt bhavati vyutthitasyeti saṃskṛtā 'sau samāpattiḥ prajñapyate / athavā āśrayasyaiva tathā samāpādanaṃ samāpattiḥ
(Pradhan: 73.6-10; T. 1558: 26a13-19; Poussin v. 1: 214; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 403c25-404a1; Cox 1995: 272-273] and criticizes Vasubandhu's statement that something can be *saṃskṛta* while at the same time being merely provisional [T. 1562: 404a21-27; Cox 1995: 274-275].)

2.15) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* states that *asaṃjñisamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti* are the mere suppression and pacification, the mere non-operation, of *citta* and the *caittas,* and that they are *prajñaptis,* not real things.

de la 'du śes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa gaṅ źe na / dge rgyas kyi 'dod chags daṅ bral la / goṅ ma'i 'dod chags daṅ ma bral ba'i 'byuṅ ba'i 'du śes sṅon du btaṅ ba'i yid la byed pas sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos rnams 'gog pa tsam daṅ / ñe bar źi źiṅ mi 'byuṅ ba tsam ni 'du śes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa śes bya ste / de yaṅ btags pa'i yod pa yin gyi / rdzas su ni ma yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*.: zi 38b4-6); 復次云何無想定。謂已離遍淨貪未離上貪。由出離想作意爲先故。諸心心所唯滅靜唯不轉。是名無想定。此是假有非實物有 (T. 1579: 592c13-16)

de la 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa gaṅ źe na / ci yaṅ med pa'i skye mched kyi 'dod chags daṅ bral goṅ ma'i 'dod chags daṅ ma bral yaṅ ruṅ / 'dod chags daṅ bral yaṅ ruṅ ba'i gnas pa'i 'du śes sṅon du btaṅ ba'i yid la byed pas sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos rnams 'gog pa tsam daṅ / ñe bar źi źiṅ mi 'byuṅ ba tsam ni 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa źes bya ste / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa tsam ñe bar źi bar zad kyi / kun gźi rnam par śes pa ñe bar źi ba ni ma yin no / de yaṅ btags pa'i yod pa yin gyi rdzas su ni ma yin par rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*.: zi 39a3-6); 復次云何滅盡定。謂已離無所有處貪未離上貪。或復已離由止息想作意爲先故。諸心心所唯滅靜唯不轉。是名滅盡定。此定唯能滅靜轉識。不能滅靜阿賴耶識。當知此定亦是假有非實物有 (T. 1579: 593a1-5)[108]

[108] Schmithausen suggests that the occurrence of the term *ālayavijñāna* here is a later addition, perhaps made by the compiler(s) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1987: 271-272 n. 131).

2.16) Vasubandhu says that *āyus* (*jīvitendriya*) is not a real *dharma* but merely a (provisional) term referring to the force resulting from past karma that determines the duration of the *nikāyasabhāga*. He compares it to the force contained in the seed that determines the time of the fruition of grain and to the force that determines the duration of the flight of an arrow.

na hi nāstīti brūmo na tu dravyāntaram / kiṃ tarhi / traidhātukena karmaṇā nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikālāvedhaḥ / yāvad hi karmaṇā nikāyasabhāgasyāvedhaḥ kṛto bhavaty etāvantaṃ kālam avasthātavyam iti tāvat so 'vatiṣṭhate tad āyur ity ucyate / sasyānāṃ pākakālāvedhavat kṣipteṣu sthitikālāvedhavac ca
(Pradhan: 74.3-5; T. 1558: 26b14-20; Poussin v. 1: 216-217; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 404b26-c3; Cox 1995: 291] and criticizes it, denying that the force referred to by Vasubandhu can continue without interruption and showing that the suggested similes are not apposite [T. 1562: 404c3-22; Cox 1995: 291-292].)

2.16) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* states that *jīvitendriya* is the force that, due to previous karma, determines the duration of an *ātmabhāva* born in a particular place.

de la srog gi dbaṅ po gaṅ źe na sṅon gyi las kyis de daṅ der lus mṅon par grub pa gnas pa'i 'dus ṅes pa 'phaṅs pa ni tshe daṅ srog[109] *daṅ srog gi dbaṅ po źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 25b2-3); 復次云何命根。謂由先業於彼彼處。所生自體所有住時限量勢分。説名爲壽生氣命根 (T. 1579: 587a21-23)

For a similar definition, see also *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 76b7-8; T. 1579: 607b15-16.

Elsewhere in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, *jīvitendriya* is explicitly stated to be a *prajñapti*.

smras pa / srog gi dbaṅ po de ñid yin te btags pa'i chos yin pa'i phyir ro (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*$_t$: zi 98a2); 答即此命根是假法故 (T. 1579: 616a6-7)

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[109] Corrected from *srogs* on the basis of the Derge.

2.17) Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are not real entities since, unlike real *dharmas* such as *rūpa,* they cannot be known by perception, inference, or scripture.

tad etad ākāśaṃ pāṭyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hy ete jātyādayo dharmā dravyataḥ saṃvidyante yathā vibhajyante[110] */ kiṃ kāraṇam/ pramāṇābhāvāt / na hy eṣāṃ dravyato 'stitve kiṃcid api pramāṇam asti pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamo vā yathā rūpādīnāṃ dharmāṇām iti*
(Pradhan: 76.20-23; T. 1558: 27b24-26; Poussin v. 1: 226; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 406b16-20; Cox 1995: 311-312] and criticizes it on the grounds that Vasubandhu must accept the provisional reality of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas;* however, according to Saṃghabhadra, their provisional reality cannot be proven by perception or scripture, while proof by inference of their provisional reality would imply proof by inference of their ultimate reality [T. 1562: 406b20-29; Cox 1995: 312].)

[110] Emended from *abhivyajyante* by Shastri (v. 1: 257.2), presumably on the basis of Yaśomitra (173.26). This emendation is not made by Hirakawa, but it is accepted by Cox (1995: 358 n. 31).

2.17) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* asks why the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas,* including *jāti,* are not real entities, separate from *rūpa-skandha,* etc.

ci'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa 'du byed rnams las skye ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / mi rtag pa ñid dag rdzas gźan du yod pa ma yin par khoṅ du chud par bya źe na (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 21b1-2); 復次云何應知生老住無常離色等蘊無別實有 (T. 1579: 585c9-10)

This question is answered in the passage that follows (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 21b2-22a4; T. 1579: 585c10-28).

2.18) Vasubandhu says that the purpose of the *sūtra* statement that there are three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* is to show that the stream of *saṃskāras* is conditioned and has originated conditionally, not to say that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* belong to each moment (i.e., that each *saṃskṛtadharma* is simultaneously associated with all three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*). This is because one cannot know the three *lakṣaṇas* of a moment.

granthajño devānāṃ priyo na tv arthajñaḥ / arthaś ca pratiśaraṇam uktaṃ bhagavatā / kaḥ punar asyārthaḥ / avidyāndhā hi bālāḥ saṃskārapravāham ātmata ātmīyataś cādhimuktā abhiṣvajante / yasya mithyādhimokṣasya vyāvartanārthaṃ bhagavāṃs tasya saṃskārapravāhasya saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatāṃ dyotayitukāma idam āha trīṇīmāni saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni / na tu kṣaṇasya / na hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante / na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇaṃ bhavitum arhanti / ata evātra sūtre saṃskṛtasyotpādo 'pi prajñāyata ity uktam
(Pradhan: 76.24-77.3; T. 1558: 27b28-c5; Poussin v. 1: 226-227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 406c23-407a2; Cox 1995: 315] and argues at length that in fact the Buddha taught the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* with respect to the moment and not to the stream [T. 1562: 407a2-b5; Cox 1995: 315-317].)

2.18) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamano-bhūmi*, the Buddha mentioned only three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* because the *saṃskāras* are analyzed in terms of the three times: *jāti* refers to *saṃskṛtadharmas* in the future, *maraṇa* to *saṃskṛtadharmas* in the past, and *sthiti* (together with *anyathātva*) to *saṃskṛtadharmas* in the present.

gal te 'dus byas la 'dus byas kyi mtshan ñid bźi po skye ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / 'jig pa 'di dag dmigs na ci'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis skye ba daṅ / 'jig pa daṅ gnas pa las gźan du 'gyur ba ñid daṅ gsum kho na gsuṅs śe na / 'du byed rnams ni dus gsum gyis rab tu phye ba yin te / des na ma 'oṅs pa'i dus na ma byuṅ ba las 'byuṅ bar 'gyur bas / de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis ma 'oṅs pa'i dus las brten te 'byuṅ ba yaṅ 'dus byas kyi mtshan ñid yin par gsuṅs so / 'byuṅ ba rnams 'das pa'i dus su źig par gyur pas de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis 'das pa'i dus las brten te źig pa yaṅ 'dus byas kyi mtshan ñid yin par gsuṅs so / gnas pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / gźan du 'gyur ba ñid gaṅ yin pa'i mtshan ñid gñis ni da ltar gyi dus kyi rab tu phye ba yin te / 'di ltar gnas pa yaṅ da ltar gyi dus ñid na dmigs pa yin la / sṅa ma las phyi ma gźan ñid du[111] *gyur pa ñid kyaṅ da ltar kyi dus ñid na dmigs pa yin pas / de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis da ltar byuṅ ba'i dus las brten te / gnas pa daṅ / gźan du 'gyur ba ñid gcig tu bsdus nas 'dus byas kyi mtshan ñid yin par gsuṅs so* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 22a4-b1); 問若有爲法。生老住滅四有爲相具足可得。何故世尊但說三種。一生。二滅。三住異性。答由一切行三世所顯故。從未來世本無而生。是故世尊由未來世於有爲法。說生有爲相。彼既生已落謝過去。是故世尊由過去世於有爲法。說滅有爲相。現在世法二相所顯。謂住及異。所以者何。唯現在時有住可得。前後變異亦唯現在是。故世尊由現在世於有爲法。總說住異爲一有爲相 (T. 1579: 585c29-586a8)[112]

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[111] Corrected from *gźan ñid du gźan du gyur pa* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

[112] Although the focus of this explanation is different from that of Vasubandhu's explanation, the substance is the same.

2.19) According to Vasubandhu, when the Buddha said that the arising, etc., of conditioned things is known, he was referring to the series, not to the moment, because the arising, etc., of a moment is impossible to know. (Later [see item 2.24], he says that the *lakṣaṇas* can be applied to the moment, as long as they are understood not to be real *dharmas*.)[113]

bhagavāṃs tasya saṃskārapravāhasya saṃskrtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatāṃ dyotayitukāma idam āha trīṇīmāni saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni / na tu kṣaṇasya / na hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante
(Pradhan: 76.26-77.2; T. 1558: 27c3-5; Poussin v. 1: 226-227; Rospatt 1995: 60-64; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 406c28-29; Cox 1995: 315] and contradicts it, as mentioned in item 2.18 [T. 1562: 407a13-20; Cox 1995: 316].)

[113] Note that this is a portion of the passage mentioned in item 2.18.

2.19) The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain an argument similar to Vasubandhu's. Rospatt points out that the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* refers only to individual entities (1995: 64-65). However, there are several passages in which the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* are taken to refer to the series.

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* in a list of varieties of the *lakṣaṇas,* mentions two types of *jāti,* at least, that apply to the series, **prati-saṃdhijāti* and **abhinirvṛttijāti.*

kun tu sbyor ba mtha 'dag yod pa 'am / kun tu sbyor ba ma tshaṅ ba yaṅ ruṅ sems can gyi ris de daṅ / de nas śi 'phos nas sems can gyi ris de daṅ der phuṅ po mṅon par 'grub pa ni mtshams sbyor ba'i skye ba śes bya'o / thor bu daṅ gźon nu la sogs pa'i gnas skabs dag[114] *nas rgas pa'i gnas skabs kyi bar du 'gyur ba ni mṅon par 'grub pa'i skye ba źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 23a1-3); 若具諸結或不具結。從彼彼有情聚沒往彼彼有情聚。諸蘊續生名相續生。若從嬰孩童子等位。乃至往趣衰老等位。名增長生 (T. 1579: 586a22-25)

Similarly, it mentions **saṃtatisthiti.*

de daṅ der mṅon par 'grub pa'i lus de daṅ de dag zas de daṅ de la brten nas tshe ji srid par gnas pa daṅ / phyi rol gyi snod kyi 'jig rten rnams bskal pa chen po'i mthar thug par gnas pa ni rgyun gnas pa źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 24a4-5); 若諸衆生於彼彼處彼彼自體。由彼彼食爲依止故。乃至壽住。外器世間大劫量住。名相續住 (T. 1579: 586c2-4)

In addition, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* specifically states that the *lakṣaṇas* are established with respect to two contexts, that of rebirth and that of moments, but in both cases the text refers to the series (*rgyun*).

mtshan ñid gsum po de dag kyaṅ 'du byed kyi rgyun gñis la brten nas śes par 'gyur te / 'di lta ste tshe rabs gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa'i rgyun daṅ skad cig pa gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa'i rgyun no / de la rgyun sṅa ma śos kyi sems can gyi ris de daṅ der skye ba gaṅ yin pa de ni skye ba'o / tha mar 'chi ba ni 'jig pa'o / thog ma daṅ tha ma'i bar gźon nu la sogs pa'i gnas skabs rnams su ni gnas pa las gźan du 'gyur ba ste / tshe'i tshad ji tsam par gnas pas na gnas pa'o / gnas skabs phyi ma phyi ma'i bye brag yod pas na gźan du 'gyur ba'o / de nas rgyun phyi ma śos kyi skad cig skad cig la 'du byed rnams sar pa sar pa skye ba gaṅ yin pa de ni skye ba'o / skye ba'i skad cig pa de las lhag par mi gnas pa ni 'jig pa'o / skye ba'i skad cig pa tsam la gnas pa ni gnas pa'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 204b 8-205a4); 如是三相

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[114] Corrected from *dags* on the basis of the Derge.

2.19 continued) 依二種行流轉安立。一依生身展轉流轉。二依刹那展轉流轉。依初流轉者。謂於彼彼有情衆同分中。初生名生。終沒名滅。於二中間嬰孩等位立住異性。乃至壽住説名爲住。諸位後後轉變差別。名住異性。依後流轉者。謂彼諸行刹那刹那新新而生。説名爲生。生刹那後不住名滅。唯生刹那住故名住 (T. 1579: 795c22-29)[115]s

[115] Rospatt points out that both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (18.31-19.1) and the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (T. 1602: 550c16-20) apply the *lakṣaṇa*s to the series. However, in another passage, the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* applies them to all *saṃskṛtadharma*s (T. 1602: 484b15-18).

2.20) Vasubandhu says that that which is not known should not be called a *lakṣaṇa.*

na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇaṃ bhavitum arhanti
(Pradhan: 77.2-3; T. 1558: 27c6; Poussin v. 1: 226-227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 407b5-6; Cox 1995: 317] and says that certain *lakṣaṇas* that are unknowable to the ordinary mind actually exist [T. 1562: 407b6-8; Cox 1995: 317].)

2.20) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says that at every moment only the *saṃskāra* can be perceived; none of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* can be separately perceived. (However, a connection with Vasubandhu's statement here is doubtful.)

tatra bodhisattvaḥ saṃskāramātraṃ sthāpayitvā na tasya jātiṃ na sthitiṃ na jarāṃ nānityatāṃ sarvakālaṃ dravyasvabhāvapariniṣpattitaḥ paśyati / tat kasya hetoḥ saṃskāramātram utpadyamānam upalabhate nāsyānyāṃ jātiṃ na sthitiṃ na jarāṃ nānityatāṃ (*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 279.6-11); *de la byaṅ chub sems dpa' ni 'du byed tsam ma gtogs par de'i skye ba daṅ gnas pa daṅ / rga ba daṅ / mi rtag pa'i rdzas kyi ṅo bo ñid yoṅs su grub pa rtag tu ma mthoṅ ṅo / de ci'i phyir źe na / des 'du byed tsam źig 'byuṅ bar dmigs par zad kyi / de'i skye ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / rga ba daṅ / mi rtag pa gźan ni ma dmigs te* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: źi 167b1-2); 此中菩薩觀一切時唯有諸行除此更無生住老滅。恒有實物自性成就。何以故。諸行生時唯即如是諸行可得。無別有餘生住老滅 (T. 1579: 544b17-20; Rospatt 1995: 64)

2.21) Vasubandhu explains that the fact that the *sūtra* uses the word *saṃskṛta* twice does not indicate that the *saṃskṛtas* and the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are different entities.

punaḥ saṃskṛtagrahaṇaṃ saṃskṛtatve lakṣaṇānīti yathā vijñāyeta / maivaṃ vijñāyi saṃskṛtasya vastuno 'stitve lakṣaṇāni jalabalākāvat sādhvasādhutve vā kanyālakṣaṇavad iti
(Pradhan: 77.4-5; T. 1558: 27c8-9; Poussin v. 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 407b12-14; Cox 1995: 318] and gives several different reasons why the fact that the word *saṃskṛta* is used twice must indicate that *saṃskṛtadharmas* and the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are not identical [T. 1562: 407b14-24; Cox 1995: 318-319].)

2.21) (Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not mention that the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* have a separate existence, I cannot find anything resembling this argument of Vasubandhu's in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)[116]

[116] However, a similar argument can be found in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*, although without the same examples (T. 1585: 5c23-25; Poussin 1928-1929: 64).

2.22) Vasubandhu gives his own explanation of the four *lakṣaṇas:* the first arising of the series of *saṃskāras* is *jāti;* the series in the state of cessation is called *vyaya* (here equivalent to *anityatā*); the procession of the series is called *sthiti;* the difference between earlier and later moments of the stream is called *anyathātva.*

tatra pravāhasyādir utpādo nivṛttir vyayaḥ / sa eva pravāho 'nuvartamānaḥ sthitiḥ / tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam
(Pradhan: 77.5-7; T. 1558: 27c11-12; Poussin v. 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, Saṃghabhadra says, is following the school of the Sthavira [T. 1562: 407c9-11; Cox 1995: 320], and criticizes it at length, refuting Vasubandhu's definitions of each of the four *lakṣaṇas* in turn [T. 1562: 407c17-408b28; Cox 1995: 321-326].)

2.22) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* when, due to causes, formerly nonexistent *saṃskṛtadharmas* arise, this is called *jāti.*[117] When the *saṃskṛtadharmas* that arise later are different from the earlier ones, this is called *jarā.* When these *saṃskṛtadharmas,* having been produced, persist for a limited time, this is called *sthiti.* And when, after the moment of production, the characteristics of these *saṃskṛtadharmas* are destroyed, this is called cessation or *anityatā.*

de lta bas na skye ba la sogs pa yaṅ 'du byed rnams la brtags pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o / de la rgyu yod na raṅ gi mtshan ñid sṅon ma byuṅ ba 'grub pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi skye ba źes bya'o / sṅa ma las phyi ma gźan ñid du gźan du 'gyur ba ñid ni 'du byed rnams kyi rga ba źes bya'o / skye ba'i dus tsam la gnas pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi gnas pa źes bya ste / de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: zi 22a2-4); 故知生等於諸行中假施設。有由有因故諸行非本自相始起説名爲生。後起諸行與前差別説名爲老。即彼諸行生位暫停説名爲住。生刹那後諸行相盡説名爲滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c24-28; see Kritzer 1999: 234-235)

[117] Miyashita finds in the *Yogācārabhūmi* the origin of the *pen-wu chin-yu* (本無今有) theory in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1986).

2.23) In support of his understanding of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (see the previous item), Vasubandhu quotes a *sūtra* passage in which Nanda is commended for knowing the arising, the abiding, and the destruction of feelings.[118]

evaṃ ca kṛtvoktaṃ viditā eva nandasya kulaputrasya vedanā utpadyante viditā avatiṣṭhante viditā astaṃ parikṣayaṃ paryādānaṃ gacchantīti
(Pradhan: 77.7-8; T. 1558: 27c13-14; Poussin v. 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra quotes the same *sūtra* passage [T. 1562: 407c12-13; Cox 1995: 320] and says that Vasubandhu's position is not supported by the *sūtra,* which suggests that Nanda knows past and future feelings, while Vasubandhu denies the existence of past and future *dharmas* [T. 1562: 408b28-c5; Cox 1995: 326-327].)

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[118] *Saṃyuktāgama sūtra* no. 275 (T. 99: 73a22-c21, specifically 73b23-25). For parallels, see Pāsādika 1989: 39.

2.23) (The same *sūtra* passage is commented upon in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 269a3-270a3; T. 1579: 821a19-b21].[119] However, the context is different, and it does not appear to have any relevance to the discussion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.)

[119] Specifically *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 269a8-b1; T. 1579: 821a29-b2. See Mukai 1985: 33.

2.24) Vasubandhu says that the *lakṣaṇas* can be applied to the moment, as long as they are recognized as not being real *dharmas: jāti* is the existence of that which formerly did not exist; *vyaya* is the nonexistence of that which existed; *sthiti* is the connection between earlier and later moments; and *sthityanyathātva* is the difference between earlier and later moments.

pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpi saṃskṛtasyaitāni lakṣaṇāni yujyante vinā 'pi dravyāntarakalpanayā / katham iti / pratikṣaṇam abhūtvā bhāva utpādaḥ / bhūtvā 'bhāvo vyayaḥ / pūrvasya pūrvasyottarakṣaṇānubandhaḥ sthitiḥ / tasyāvisadṛśatvaṃ sthityanyathātvam iti / yadā tarhi sadṛśā utpadyante / na te nirviśeṣā bhavanti
(Pradhan: 77.18-22: T. 1558: 27c28-28a3; Poussin v. 1: 229; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 408c7-12; Cox 1995: 327] and argues that calling the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* provisional in this context leads to contradictions that can only be reconciled by admitting that the *lakṣaṇas* are real *dharmas* [T. 1562: 408c12-409a2; Cox 1995: 327-329].)

2.24) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* defines *jāti* and *vyaya* in terms identical to those of Vasubandhu.

ma byuṅ ba las 'byuṅ ba ni 'byuṅ ba yin la / byuṅ nas med par 'gyur ba ni 'jig pa yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 22b6-7); 本無今有是名爲生。有己還無是名爲滅 (T. 1579: 586a17-18)

At the end of an enumeration of different types of *jarā,* the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* states that there is, in addition, one type that can accomplish (become?) all the others, namely *jarā* that is the nature of all *saṃskṛta-dharmas* to change from moment to moment.

gaṅ la rten nas rga ba'i rnam pa ji skad bstan pa de dag thams cad 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba'i rga ba gcig pa yaṅ yod de 'du byed rnams kyi skad cig skad cig la gźan ñid du 'gyur ba rga ba gaṅ yin pa'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 24a2); 復有一老爲緣。能成如上所説一切種老。所謂諸行刹那刹那轉異性老 (T. 1579: 586b26-28)

(I cannot find a definition of *sthiti* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that closely resembles Vasubandhu's in wording.)

2.25) Vasubandhu argues that, if the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* were real, the production, cessation, etc., of the *saṃskṛtadharmas* would be simultaneous.

athāpi nāma dravyāntarāṇyeva jātyādīni bhaveyuḥ / kim ayuktaṃ syāt / eko dharmaḥ ekasminn eva kāle jātaḥ sthito jīrṇo naṣṭaḥ syād eṣāṃ sahabhūtvāt
(Pradhan: 78.10-12: T. 1558: 28a22-23; Poussin v. 1: 231; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 409a2-4; Cox 1995: 329] and, as Cox points out [1995: 366 n. 92], relies on the theory of the difference between *kāritra* and *sāmarthya* in arguing that the activity of the different *lakṣaṇas* is not simultaneous [T. 1562: 409a4-c8; Cox 1995: 329-333].)

2.25) (Although the *Yogācārabhūmi,* like Vasubandhu, denies the reality of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas,* it does not seem to employ an argument similar to Vasubandhu's.)

2.26) In connection with the preceding item, Vasubandhu says that, if the Sarvāstivādins maintain that the last three *lakṣaṇas* perform their function simultaneously, they must admit that a *dharma* persists, changes, and is destroyed at the same time.

kim ayaṃ tatra kāle tiṣṭhatv āhosvij jīryatu vinaśayatu vā
(Pradhan: 78.19; T. 1558: 28b4; Poussin v. 1: 232; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 409c17-18; Cox 1995: 333] and criticizes it, although, as Cox notes [1995: 368 n. 106], the point that Saṃghabhadra makes is unclear [T. 1562: 409c18-21; Cox 1995: 333-334].)

2.26) (As in the case of item 2.25, the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain a similar argument.)

2.27) Vasubandhu says that *anyathātva,* since it describes the difference between earlier and later states, cannot be applied to an individual *dharma,* which cannot change.

syāc ca tāvad ekasya dharmasyotpannasyāvināśaḥ sthitiḥ vināśo 'nityatā / jarā tu khalu sarvathātvena na tathā / pūrvāparaviśeṣāt vipariṇāmāc ca / atas tadanyathātve 'nya eva / uktaṃ hi tathātvena jarā 'siddhir anyathātve 'nya eva saḥ / tasmān naikasya bhāvasya jarā nāmopapadyate
(Pradhan: 79.5-9; T. 1558: 28b21-26; Poussin v. 1: 233; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 410a19-25; Cox 1995: 336] and again appeals to the reality of the three times and his own theory of *kāritra* in order to refute Vasubandhu [T. 1562: 410a25-c6, Cox 1995: 336-339].)

2.27) The following passage, already mentioned in item 2.24, may be relevant here:

At the end of an enumeration of different types of *jarā,* the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* states that there is, in addition, one type that can accomplish (become?) all the others, namely *jarā* that is the nature of all *saṃskṛtadharmas* to change from moment to moment.

gaṅ la rten nas rga ba'i rnam pa ji skad bstan pa de dag thams cad 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba'i rga ba gcig pa yaṅ yod de 'du byed rnams kyi skad cig skad cig la gźan ñid du 'gyur ba rga ba gaṅ yin pa'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 24a2); 復有一老爲縁。能成如上所説一切種老。所謂諸行刹那刹那轉異性老 (T. 1579: 586b26-28)

2.28) Vasubandhu argues that *nāma, pada,* and *vyañjana* are sound by nature and therefore belong to *rūpaskandha;* thus, they are not *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras.*

nanu caite vāksvabhāvatvāc chabdātmakā iti rūpasvabhāvā bhavanti / kasmāc citta-viprayuktā ity ucyante
(Pradhan: 80.22-23; T. 1558: 29a23-24; Poussin v. 1: 240; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 413c11-13; Cox 1995: 383] and both quotes from *sūtra* and provides reasoned arguments to show that *nāma, pada,* and *vyañjana* are different from sound [T. 1562: 413c13-414a11; Cox 1995: 383-385].)

2.28) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi* includes *nāmakāya, padakāya,* and *vyañjanakāya,* along with the other *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras, vijñapti, avijñapti,* and *bīja,* as *prajñaptis,* saying that they are nominal designations for *saṃskṛtadharmas*. (This passage denies their reality, but the reasoning is different from Vasubandhu's.)[120]

'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dṅos po la skye ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / mi rtag pa daṅ / sa bon daṅ rnam par rig byed daṅ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa daṅ / thob pa daṅ / 'thob pa ma yin pa daṅ / srog gi dbaṅ po daṅ / ris mthun pa daṅ / miṅ gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs daṅ / yi ge'i tshogs rnams daṅ so so'i skye bo ñid daṅ / tshogs pa daṅ ma tshogs pa daṅ / 'jug pa so sor ṅes pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / mgyogs pa daṅ / go rims daṅ / dus daṅ yul daṅ graṅs ñe bar 'dogs pa daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 208a4-6); 於有爲諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身文身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)

The **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī*, in a long discussion about language, gives a number of lists of **lakṣaṇārthas* (*hsiang-i* 相義), one of which is *neng-ch'uan hsiang* 能詮相, which refers to the ability of speech to indicate. This is said to be synonymous with **parikalpitasvabhāvalakṣaṇa* (*pien-chi so-chi tzu-hsing hsiang* 遍計所執自性相), which is further said to have many names, among them, "only consisting of sound" (*wei yu yin-sheng* 唯有音聲) and "not possessing marks" (*wu-yu t'i hsiang* 無有體相).[121]

能詮相者。謂即於彼依止名等。爲欲隨說自性差別所有語言。應知此即是遍計所執自性相。此遍計所執自性。有差別名。所謂亦名遍計所執。亦名和合所成。亦名所增益相。亦名虛妄所執。亦名言說所顯。亦名文字加行。亦名唯有音聲。亦名無有體相 (T. 1579: 751a24-b1)

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[120] The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun,* however, follows Vasubandhu in arguing that they do not exist independently from *rūpa* (T. 1585: 6a21-6b11; Poussin 1928-1929: 668-70).

[121] This passage is difficult, but a comparison between it and the passage in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* mentioned directly above shows that they are related in meaning. The passage is lacking in the Tibetan.

2.29) Vasubandhu says that not all sound is speech, but only sound by which an object can be indicated.

naiva ghoṣamātraṃ vāg yena tu ghoṣeṇārthaḥ pratīyate sa ghoṣo vāk / kena punar ghoṣeṇārthaḥ pratīyate / yo 'rtheṣu kṛtāvadhir vaktṛbhis
(Pradhan: 80.24-25; T. 1558: 29a26-29; Poussin v. 1: 240; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 414a11-15; Cox 1995: 385] and insists that sound is not adequate for conveying meaning; in fact, syllables (*tzu* 字) give rise to *nāmas,* which convey meaning [T. 1562: 414a15-24; Cox 1995: 385-386].)

2.29) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not accept *nāma* as real, but it does not contain a statement similar to Vasubandhu's, which is a response to a Sarvāstivādin argument.)

2.30) Vasubandhu argues that *nāma* cannot logically exist as a separate entity since it is neither produced nor manifested by speech.

idaṃ cāpi na jñāyate kathaṃ vāṅ nāmni pravartata iti / kiṃ tāvad utpādayaty āhosvit prakāśayati / yady utpādayati / ghoṣasvabhāvatvād vācaḥ sarvaṃ ghoṣamātraṃ nāmotpādayiṣyati yādṛśo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa iṣyate nāmna utpādakaḥ sa evārthasya dyotako bhaviṣyati / atha prakāśayati / ghoṣasvabhāvatvād vācaḥ sarvaṃ ghoṣamātraṃ nāma prakāśayiṣyati yādṛśo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa iṣyate nāmnaḥ prakāśakaḥ sa evārthasya dyotako bhaviṣyati
(Pradhan: 81.5-10; T. 1558: 29b7-12; Poussin v. 1: 240-241; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 414a24-26; Cox 1995: 386] and rejects it, insisting that without *nāma*, the meaning of speech could not be understood [T. 1562: 414a26-b9; Cox 1995: 386-387.])

2.30) (As in item 2.29, Vasubandhu's statement here is part of his response to the Sarvāstivādin argument. A similar statement does not appear in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

2.31) Vasubandhu says that *nāma* cannot be produced (or manifested) by speech because the moments of sound cannot come together, and no *dharma* is gradually produced in parts.

na khalv api śabdānāṃ sāmagryam asti kṣaṇāikamilanaṃ / na caikasya bhāgaśa utpādo yukta iti katham utpādayantī vāṅ nāmotpādayet / kathaṃ tāvad atītāpekṣaḥ paścimo vijñaptikṣaṇa utpādayaty avijñaptim / evaṃ tarhi paścima eva śabde nāmna utpādād yo 'pi tam evaikaṃ śṛṇoti so 'py arthaṃ pratipadyeta / athāpy evaṃ kalpyeta vāg vyañjanaṃ janayati vyañjanaṃ tu nāmeti / atrāpi sa eva prasaṅgo vyañjanānāṃ sāmagryābhāvāt / eṣa eva ca prasaṅgo nāmnaḥ prakāśakatve vācaḥ / vyañjanaṃ cāpi vāg viśiṣṭaprajñā apy avahitacetaskā lakṣaṇataḥ paricchetuṃ notsahanta iti vyañjanasyāpi vāk naivotpādikā na prakāśikā yujyate
(Pradhan: 81.10-16; T. 1558: 29b12-20; Poussin v. 1: 241; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 415a25-b3; Cox 1995: 393-394] and claims that Vasubandhu's argument contradicts his own rejection of the reality of past and future [T. 1562: 415b3-14; Cox 1995: 394].)

2.31) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that sound does not travel relying on a series composed of *rūpa* that has come together: it is not like the light from a fire.[122]

de la sgra ni brjod ma thag tu 'jig pa'i phyir gzugs 'dus pa la rgyun brtan pa ma yin te / yul de daṅ phyi rol la dmigs pa yin no / de ni de las brten te lan cig byuṅ ba na yul gaṅ du grag pa'i yul de thams cad du cig char kho nar khyab par byuṅ ste / me'i 'od daṅ 'bra ba yin gyi ches che ba daṅ che bar 'byuṅ źiṅ 'gro ba ni ma yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 55b4-5); 復次諸聲纔宣發已尋即斷滅。故於色聚中不恒相續。又此音聲依質生時。質處及外俱頓可得。隨所聞處於此處所。遍滿頓起如焰光明。非漸漸生展轉往趣 (T. 1579: 599a23-26)

[122]The context of this passage is a discussion of *rūpa*, not of speech, but it seems relevant to at least the first part of Vasubandhu's argument.

2.32) Vasubandhu suggests that *vyañjana* has a greater degree of reality than *nāma* or *pada,* which are merely collections of *vyañjanas.*[123]

astu vā vyañjanamātrasya dravyāntarabhāvaparikalpanā / tatsamūhā eva nāma-kāyādayo bhaviṣyantīty apārthikā tatprajñaptiḥ
(Pradhan: 81.22-23; T. 1558: 29b29; Poussin v. 1: 242; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 414b9-11; Cox 1995: 387] and criticizes it, saying that even though a collection is not real, that which arises depending on it can be real [T. 1562: 414b11-22; Cox 1995: 387-388].)

[123] As far as I can tell, the *Vibhāṣā* does not state that *vyañjana* is in any way more basic than *nāma* or *pada.*

2.32) *Vyañjanakāya* is defined in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñāna-kāyamanobhūmi* as the collection of syllables that are the basis for *nāmakāya* and *padakāya*, and it is the most condensed indicator of that which is known and that which is expressed, although it makes known only sound, not meaning.

yi ge'i tshogs rnams gaṅ źe na / miṅ gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs kyi rten gyi dṅos por yi ge'i 'bru'i tshogs rnams ni yi ge'i tshogs rnams źes bya ste / śes bya brjod par bya ba'i dṅos po la / thams cad las bsdus pa ni yi ge'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*, zi 27a3-4); 云何文身。謂名身句身所依止性所有字身。是謂文身。又於一切所知所詮事中。極略相是文 (T. 1579: 587c15-17)[124]

[124] For a similar definition, see also the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (19.3-4) and the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (T. 1602: 484b20-21).

2.33) Vasubandhu criticizes an objection to the Vaibhāṣika statement that future *dharmas* cannot be *sabhāgahetu*. According to this objection, future *dharmas* in the state of being produced are *sabhāgahetu*, and thus the statement in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, that a *dharma* that is a cause is always a cause, is not contradicted. Vasubandhu says that another statement in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, that something cannot be *samanantara-pratyaya* when it has not been produced, applies also to *sabhāgahetu*.

tasyāyam aparihāro yasmāt sa dharma utpadyamānāvasthāyāḥ pūrvaṃ sabhāgahetur abhūtvā paścāt bhavati / ihāpi ca praśne yo dharmo yasya dharmasya samanantaraḥ kadācit sa dharmas tasya dharmasya na samanantara iti śakymanayā kalpanayā vaktuṃ syān na kadācid iti / kasmād evam āha / yadi sa dharmo notpanno bhavatīti (Pradhan: 86.6-9; T. 1558: 31b26-c2; Poussin v. 1: 258; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 422c23-25] and criticizes it on the grounds that *sabhāgahetu*, which, like a seed, continues to exist while being produced and has the ability to yield result after it already has been produced, actually does not resemble *samanantarapratyaya*, the efficacy of which is based on its departure, and which must therefore be produced before it can be called *pratyaya* [T. 1562: 422c25-423a4].)

2.33) (I have not been able to find any basis for Vasubandhu's opinions regarding *sabhāgahetu* [items 2.33-2.35] in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* which does not recognize *sabhāgahetu.*)[125]

[125]The *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* contains a criticism of the concept of *sabhāgahetu* (T. 1602: 470a15-22).

2.34) Vasubandhu accuses the author of the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* of being bad at words, presumably for making statements that allow contradictory interpretations.

evaṃ sati ko guṇo labhyata ity akauśalam evātra śāstrakārasyaiva saṃbhāvyeta (Pradhan: 86.10-11; T. 1558: 31c4; Poussin v. 1: 259; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 423a8-9] and defends the *Jñānaprasthāna* [T. 1562: 423a9-18].)

2.34) (see item 2.33)

2.35) As an example of a case in which a previously produced *anāsravadharma'* is not *sabhāgahetu* with respect to a subsequent one, Vasubandhu says that when a person falls from a higher attainment (*phala*) and realizes a lower one, the higher attainment is not the cause of the lower.

syāt pūrvotpanno 'nāsravo dharmaḥ paścād utpannasyānāsravasya na hetuḥ (Pradhan: 88.10; T. 1558: 32b22; Poussin v. 1: 266-267; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 424c25-26] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu should have simply stated that *sabhāgahetu* is unlike *vipākahetu* in that it does not necessarily yield result, or at a fixed time; for example, an arhat may have *sabhāgahetus* that have not yielded result, and yet he may enter nirvana [T. 1562: 424c26-425a15].)

2.35) (see item 2.33)

2.36) In a discussion of the meaning of *vipākahetu*, Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhāṣika understanding, which, according to him, states that any cause that produces a result that is necessarily morally different from it (i.e., a good or bad cause that produces a neutral result) is *vipākahetu*. He says that this implies that the other causes give result, albeit result that is not necessarily morally different. But Vasubandhu insists that *vipāka* must be produced by *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* and it must be "result-bound," which Hsüan-tsang explains as limited in duration according to the strength or weakness of the cause.[126]

visadṛśaḥ pāko vipākaḥ / anyeṣāṃ tu hetūnāṃ sadṛśaḥ pākaḥ / ekasyobhayatheti vaibhāṣikāḥ / naiva tu teṣāṃ pāko yuktaḥ / pāko hi nāma santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajaḥ phalaparyantaḥ / na ca sahabhūsaṃprayuktahetvoḥ santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajaṃ phalam asti / na cāpi sabhāgahetvādīnāṃ phalaparyanto 'sti / punaḥ punaḥ kuśalādyāsaṃsāraphalatvāt
(Pradhan: 89.24-90.3; T. 1558: 33a10-26; Poussin v. 1: 272 n. 1; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 427b18-22] and criticizes Vasubandhu's representation of the Vaibhāṣika position, saying that the Vaibhāṣikas do not say that everything resulting from the six causes is *pāka;* even if they did, *pāka* would not be a synonym for *phala,* and it would not imply *vipāka* [T. 1562: 427b22-24].)[127]

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[126] 由隨因勢力勝劣時有分限 (T. 1558: 33a20, 23)

[127] There is a problem with the text here. Neither Paramārtha's nor the Tibetan translation includes the passage referred to here. Saṃghabhadra quotes only the portion of this passage that presents Vasubandhu's understanding of the Vaibhāṣika position, and he criticizes it. Saṃghabhadra does not comment on the portion in which Vasubandhu expresses his own opinion.

2.36) There are a number of statements in the *Yogācārabhūmi* according to which *vipākaphala* is the new entity born as a result of the good or bad karma of the previous life. In the *Manobhūmi,* the beginningless stream of *bījas* proceeds by renewing itself through repeatedly seizing the *vipākaphala* due to perfuming by good and bad karma.

sa ca bījasantānaprabandho 'nādikālikaḥ / anādikālikatve 'pi śubhāśubhakarma-viśeṣaparibhāvanayā punaḥ punar vipākaphalaparigrahān navībhavati /[128] *prādur-bhūte ca phala upayuktaphalaṃ bhavati tad bījaṃ / evaṃ hi saṃsāraprabandhaḥ pravartate yāvan na parinirvāti* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 25.20-26.2); *sa bon gyi rgyud kyi rgyun de yaṅ thog ma med pa'i dus nas yod la / thog ma med pa'i dus nas yod pa ñid du zin yaṅ / dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las kyi bye brag gis yoṅs su*[129] *bsgos pas / yaṅ daṅ yaṅ rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu yoṅs su 'dzin pa'i phyir sar par 'gyur ro / 'bras bu byuṅ nas sa bon de 'bras bu spyad zin pa yin te / de ltar yoṅs su mya ṅan las ma 'das kyi bar du 'khor ba'i rgyun 'jug go* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 14b3-5); 又種子體無始時來相續不絶。性雖無始有之。然由淨不淨業差別熏發。望數數取異熟果。説彼爲新。若果已生。説此種子爲已受果。由此道理生死流轉相續不絶。乃至未般涅槃 (T. 1579: 284b19-23)

In the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition of the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* the *vipākaphala* that is the fruition of karma from the past life that must result in rebirth is identified with *vipākavijñāna* in the present life.

sahā pratisandhibandhāc ca tasya vijñānasya yat tadupapattisaṃvartanīyam karma tad dattaphalaṃ bhavati vipākataḥ (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 199.5-7);[130] *rnam par śes pa de ñid ñiṅ mtshams sbyar ma thag tu skyes nas myoṅ bar 'gyur ba'i las gaṅ yin pa de / rnam par smin pa'i tshul gyis 'bras bu 'byin par 'gyur te* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 116a1-2); 爾時感生受業名已與異熟果 (T. 1579: 321a29-b1)

In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* it is said that when a *śrāvaka* enters *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa,* his seeds of good and neutral *dharmas* have been damaged because his seeds of defiled *dharmas* have been destroyed, and he can no longer produce *vipākaphala* in the future.

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[128] There is some question about the last two words of this sentence. See *Yogācāra-bhūmi:* 26 n. 1; Schmithausen 1987: 336 n. 417).

[129] Corrected from *loṅs su* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

[130] I have incorporated Schmithausen's corrections based on the manuscript (1987: 329 n. 374).

2.36 continued) *'phags pa ñan thos phuṅ po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ṅan las 'das pa'i dbyiṅs su yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'das pa de'i dge ba daṅ / luṅ du ma bstan pa'i chos kyi sa bon gaṅ yin pa de ni kun nas ñon moṅs pa can gyi sa bon yaṅ dag par bcom pa'i phyir ñams pa yin pas des ni phyi ma la rnam par smin pa mṅon par 'grub par byed pa daṅ / raṅ ñid skye bar yaṅ mi nus te* (*Yogācārabhūmi*.: zi 17a5-7); 若聖弟子將入無餘涅槃界時。所有一切善及無記諸法種子皆被損害。由染污法種子滅故。不復能感當來異熟果。亦不復能生自類果 (T. 1579: 584a10-13)

2.37) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of the Sautrāntikas that the *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* are not real and separate *dharmas.*

sarvam evāsaṃskṛtam adravyam iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hi tad rūpavedanādivat bhāvāntaram asti
(Pradhan: 92.3-4; T. 1558: 34a12-14; Poussin v. 1: 278; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a21-23] and says that he will refute Vasubandhu by proving the reality of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and the other two *asaṃskṛtadharmas* [T. 1562: 429a20-21].)

2.37) (I have not found any passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that explicitly states that the category of *asaṃskṛta* is not really existent. However, in various places the text questions or denies the real existence of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha, apratisaṃkhyānirodha,* and *ākāśa* [see below].)

2.38) In the continuation of the passage immediately above, Vasubandhu explains that *ākāśa* is merely an appellation for the absence of touchable things. If, in the dark, one does not touch anything, one says that there is *ākāśa.*

kiṃ tarhi / spraṣṭavyābhāvamātram ākāśam / tadyathā hy andhakāre pratighātam avindanta ākāśam ity āhuḥ
(Pradhan: 92.4-5; 34a14-16; Poussin v. 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a23-25] and agrees that the absence of touchable things is called *ākāśa,* but he insists that *ākāśa* is nonetheless an independent entity [T. 1562: 429a27-430a7].)

2.38) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that *ākāśa* is simply an appellation expressing the absence of *rūpa*. If some place does not contain anything, the notion arises that the place contains *ākāśa*. Therefore, *ākāśa* is only a *prajñapti* and is not real. (Yamabe Nobuyoshi has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* [personal communication].)

de la nam mkha' gaṅ źe na / gzugs med pa tsam gyis rab ti phye ba ni nam mkha' yin te / 'di ltar gaṅ la gzugs yi rnam pa mi dmigs pa de la nam mkha'i 'du śes 'byuṅ bar 'gyur pas de'i phyir de yaṅ btags pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'i rdzas su ni ma yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 39b1-2); 復次虛空云何。謂唯諸色非有所顯。是名虛空。所以者何。若處所行都無所得。是處方有虛空想轉。是故當知此唯假有非實物有 (T. 1579: 593a15-18)

See also *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*:

觀待假有者。謂虛空非擇滅等。虛空無為待諸色趣而假建立。若於是處色趣非有假說虛空。非離色無所顯法。外別有虛空實體可得。非無所顯得名實有 (T. 1579: 879a14-18).[131]

[131] Not in the Tibetan.

2.39) In the continuation of the same passage, Vasubandhu explains that *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is the non-arising due to wisdom of a new *anuśaya* or birth when the present *anuśayas* and birth have ceased.

utpannānuśayajanmanirodhaḥ pratisaṃkhyābalenānyasyānutpādaḥ pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ
(Pradhan: 92.5-6; T. 1558: 34a17; Poussin v. 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a25-26] and criticizes it in very great detail, thus indicating how important the real existence of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is to the Sarvāstivādin system [T. 1562: 430a18-434b6].)

2.39) The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, in a definition of **phalaprajñapti* (*kuo chia-yu* 果假有), mentions *pratisaṃkhyānirodha,* which, it says, is not nonexistent, since it is an attainment of the path, but is not really existent, since it is simply a designation for the total non-arising in the future of *kleśas* that have already been destroyed.

果假有者。所謂擇滅是道果故。不可説無。然非實有。唯約已斷一切煩惱。於當來世畢竟不生而假立故 (T. 1579: 879a5-8)[132]

[132] Not in the Tibetan. The *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* gives a definition of *prati-saṃkhyānirodha* that is similar but mentions *prajñā:* 釋滅者。謂由慧方便有漏諸行畢竟不起滅是離繫性 (T. 1602: 484c3-4).

2.40) In the continuation of the same passage, Vasubandhu explains that *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is non-arising, due not to wisdom but to an insufficiency of conditions.

vinaiva pratisaṃkhyayā pratyayavaikalyād anutpādo yaḥ so 'pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ / tad yathā nikāyasabhāgaśeṣasyāntarāmaraṇe
(Pradhan: 92.7-8; T. 1558: 34a18; Poussin v. 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a26-27] and again criticizes it in detail, questioning Vasubandhu's reduction of *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* to "an insufficiency of conditions" and insisting that it is a real and independent *dharma* [T. 1562: 434b9-435b2].)

2.40) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is simply an appellation expressing destruction or pacification when a certain *dharma,* its conditions for arising having been actualized, does not arise because another *dharma* arises. Whenever the time for a *dharma* to be produced is exceeded, that *dharma* is destroyed and will not arise. (However, if the conditions for arising are encountered, it may arise in the future, so this is not an absolute destruction.) Because it has no separate *svalakṣaṇa, apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is a *prajñapti,* not a real entity.

so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa gaṅ źe na / de las gźan pa skye ba'i rkyen mṅon du gyur pa na de las gźan pa skye bas / de las gźan pa mi skye źiṅ ñe bar źi ba'i 'gog pa tsam ni so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa źes bya ste / gaṅ de'i tshe na ma skyes śiṅ skye bas'i dus las thal ba de ni de'i tshe na ma yaṅ skye bar mi 'gyur bas / de'i phyir de yaṅ btags pa'i yod pa yin gyi rdzas su yod pa ni ma yin te / de'i raṅ gi mtshan ñid ni gźan cuṅ zad kyaṅ mi dmigs so / de yaṅ chos kyi rnam pa daṅ ma bral ba'i phyir dus gźan gyi tshe rkyen daṅ phrad na 'byuṅ bar 'gyur bas de'i phyir so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa de ni gtan du ba ma yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 39b2-5); 復次云何非擇滅。謂若餘法生縁現前。餘法生故餘不得生。唯滅唯靜名非擇滅。諸所有法此時應生。越生時故彼於此時終不更生。是故此滅亦是假有非實物有。所以者何。此無有餘自相可得故。此法種類非離繫故。復於餘時遇縁可生。是故非擇滅非一向決定 (T. 1579: 593a19-25)

See also *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*

觀待諸行不俱生起。於未來世不生法中。立非擇滅無生所顯。假說為有非無生所顯可說為實有 (T. 1579: 879a18-20)[133]

[133] Not in the Tibetan.

2.41) In a definition of *puruṣakāraphala,* Vasubandhu says that the efficacy (*kāritra*) of a *dharma* is called *puruṣakāra.*

ko 'yaṃ puruṣakāro nāma / yasya dharmasya yat kāritram
(Pradhan: 95.2; T. 1558: 35a28-29; Poussin v. 1: 289; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 436a7-8] and criticizes it at length, saying that *puruṣakāra* is *sāmarthya,* not *kāritra,* which is restricted to the result-projecting force of a present *dharma;* the types of simultaneous causes (*saṃprayuktahetu* and *sahabhūhetu*) that produce *puruṣakāraphala* do not project result [T. 1562: 436a8-26].)[134]

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[134] For a discussion of the distinction between *kāritra* and *sāmarthya* in (neo)-Sarvāsti-vāda, see Cox 1995: 141-146. I am grateful to Fukuda Takumi for this reference, as well as for help in understanding Saṃghabhadra's objection.

2.41) (The system of causality in the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not use the term *kāritra,* in contrast with *sāmarthya,* to refer to the present activity of a *dharma;* for one thing, it does not admit the real existence of past and future *dharmas,* so it does not have to assign a special type of causal function to present *dharmas* to distinguish them from past or future ones [see the refutation of the reality of the past and future in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*].[135] Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not use the term *kāritra* in this context, the explanation of the *svakarmakaraṇa* of *dharmas* in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*[136] and of *kāryakāraṇayukti* in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*[137] both suggest that the role of the organ in

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[135] *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* zi 14a6-15b4; T. 1579: 583a5-b17.

[136] *svakarmakaraṇaṃ tadyathā cakṣuṣo darśanaṃ / evam avaśiṣṭānām indriyāṇāṃ svakasvakaṃ karma veditavyaṃ / tathā pṛthivī dhārayati / āpaḥ kledayanti / agnir dahati / vāyuḥ śoṣayatīty evaṃbhāgīyaṃ bāhyānām api bhāvānāṃ svakasvakaṃ karma veditavyaṃ* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 106.6-9); *raṅ gi las byed de / 'di lta ste / mig gi las ni lta ba'o / de bźin du dbaṅ po lhag ma rnams kyaṅ raṅ raṅ gi las byed par rig par bya'o / de bźin du sa ni rten par byed chu ni rlan par byed / me ni sreg par byed / rluṅ ni skems par byed / de lta bu daṅ mthun pa'i phyi rol gyi dṅos po rnams kyaṅ raṅ raṅ las byed par rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* dzi 63b5-7); 何等名爲自業作用　謂眼以見爲業。如是餘根各自業用應知。又地能持水能爛火能燒風能燥。如是等類當知外分自業差別 (T. 1579: 301b1-4)

[137] *kāryakāraṇayuktir* (Wayman [1961: 79] gives *kārya-kāraṇa-yukti*[*ḥ katamā /*]) *yā* [*ta*]*d utpannānāṃ skandhānāṃ svena hetunā svena pratyayena tasmiṃs tasmin svakāryakaraṇe viniyogas tadyathā / cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi draṣṭavyāni / śrotreṇa śabdā*[*ḥ*] *śrotavyāḥ / yāvan manasā dharmā vijñeyā iti / rūpeṇa cakṣuṣo gocare avasthātavyaṃ / śabdena śrotrasya evaṃ* yā[va]d *dharmair manasa iti / yad vā punar anyad apy evaṃbhāgīyaṃ / tatra tatra dharmāṇāṃ* anyonyaṃ *kāryakāreṇa pratiyuktir yoga upāya iyam ucyate / kāryak*[*ā*]*raṇayuktiḥ* (*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 142.3-11; non-italicized portions represent my corrections); *bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa gaṅ źe na / phuṅ po raṅ gi rgyu daṅ / raṅ gyi rkyen gyis bskyed pa gaṅ yin pa rnams ni raṅ gi bya ba byed pa de daṅ de dag la sbyor bar byed pa yin te / 'di lta ste / dper na mig gis* [corrected from *gi* on the basis of the Derge, Sanskrit, and Chinese] *gzugs rnams la lta bar byed pa daṅ / rna bas sgra rnams ñan par byed pa daṅ / yid kyis* [corrected from *gi* on the basis of the Derge, Sanskrit, and Chinese] *chos rnams śes par byed pa'i bar lta bu daṅ gzugs kyis mig gi spyod yul du gnas par byed pa daṅ / sgras rna ba'i spyod yul du gnas par byed pa daṅ / de bźin du chos rnams kyis yid kyi spyod yul du gnas par byed pa'i bar lta bu daṅ / gźan yaṅ de lta bu daṅ / mthun pa'i chos rnams daṅ / de daṅ de dag gcig la cig bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ thabs su gyur pa gaṅ yin pa de ni bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* wi 68a7-b3); 云何名爲作用道理。謂諸蘊生已由自縁故。有自作用各各差別。謂眼能見色

耳能聞聲。鼻能嗅香舌能嘗味。身能覺觸意能了法。色爲眼境爲眼所行。乃至法爲意境爲意所行。或復所餘如是等類。於彼彼法別別作用當知亦爾。即此諸法各別作用。所有道理瑜伽方便。皆說名爲作用道理 (T. 1579: 419b16-23)

2.41 continued) producing sense consciousness is its activity. This is denied elsewhere by Saṃghabhadra,[138] for whom this role is only the organ's *sāmarthya*.)

[138] See Cox 1995: 142-143.

2.42) According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the *prāptis* of the *kuśalamūlas* that are obtained when someone first regains the *kuśalamūlas* give result but do not project it.[139] Vasubandhu corrects this statement: "only the *prāptis* of the *kuśalamūlas* that were given up at the moment of destroying the *kuśalamūlas* give result at the time of regaining the *kuśalamūlas* but do not project it." Yaśomitra explains this, saying that the Vaibhāṣikas do not make the necessary distinction between the past *prāptis* that are obtained when one regains the *kuśalamūlas* and present *prāptis* that are also obtained at the same time. These present *prāptis,* unlike the past ones, also project their result (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 227.6-19; Poussin v. 1: 295 n. 1).

dvitīyā kuśalamūlāni pratisaṃdadhāno yāḥ sarvaprathamaṃ pratilabhate / evaṃ tu vaktavyam / syāt tā eva pratisaṃdadhānasya
(Pradhan: 96.20-21; T. 1558: 35c20-21; Poussin v. 1: 294-295; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 438a19-20] and defends the Vaibhāṣika position, saying that the present *prāpti* is actually the result projected by the last moment of the past *prāpti* and therefore cannot project a new result [T. 1562: 438a20-25].)

[139] The root *grah* literally means "to take," but Yaśomitra explains that in this context *grah* means "to project" by acting as a cause (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 226.12-13).

2.42) According to the *Manobhūmi,* the *samucchinnakuśalamūla* destroys the *kuśalamūlas,* but the seeds of the *kuśalamūlas* are not completely destroyed. (See item 2.9.) The implication is that, in the person who regains the *kuśalamūlas,* these seeds give their result in the form of the actualized *kuśalamūlas.* Their result has already been projected, so they do not project it at the moment of regaining the *kuśalamūlas.*

kathaṃ kuśalamūlāni samucchinatti / tīkṣṇendriyasyādhimātraṃ pāpāśayādhyācāradharmasamanvāgatatayā tadanulomamitralābhatayā tasya ca mithyādṛṣṭiparyavasthānasya ghanīkaraṇaparyantopagamanatayā sarvapāpādhyācāreṣv asaṃkocākaukṛtyapratilābhatayā ca / tatra bījam api kuśalamūlaṃ / alobhādayo 'pi kuśalamūlaṃ / kuśalamūlasamudācāravirodhena santānasthāpanakuśalamūlasamucchedanā[140] *bījoddharaṇatayā ca / kathaṃ kuśalamūlāni pratisandadhāti / prakṛtyā tīkṣṇendriyatayā mitrajñātisahāyakānāṃ puṇyakriyābhisaṃyogasandarśanatayā satpuruṣānupasaṅkramya saddharmaśravaṇatayā vicikitsotpattiniścayādhigamanatayā ca* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 14.18-15.6); *ji ltar dge ba'i rtsa ba rnams rgyun 'chad par byed ce na / dbaṅ po rno la sdig pa'i bsam pa śas chen po la lhag par spyod pa'i chos daṅ ldan pa daṅ / de daṅ mthun pa'i grogs rñed pa daṅ / log par lta ba'i kun nas dkris pa de lhun stug par byed pas / mthar thug par 'gro ba daṅ / sdig pa thams cad la lhag par spyod pa dag la mi ldog ciṅ / 'gyod par*[141] *mi byed par 'gyur ro / de la sa bon yaṅ dge ba'i rtsa ba yin la / ma chags pa la sogs pa yaṅ dge ba'i rtsa ba yin te / dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu spyod pa daṅ mi mthun pas rgyud gnas par byed ciṅ / dge ba'i rtsa ba gcod pas sa bon 'byin par*[142] *byed do / ji ltar dge ba'i rtsa ba rnams mtshams sbyor bar byed ce na / raṅ bźin gyis dbaṅ po rno ba daṅ / mdza' bśes*[143] *daṅ / ñe du daṅ / rten grogs rnams bsod nams bya ba la mṅon par brtson pa mthoṅ ba daṅ / skyes bu dam pa'i thad du soṅ nas dam pa'i chos ñan pa daṅ / the tshom skye źiṅ ṅes par rtogs par byed do* (*Yogācārabhūmi.:* dzi 8b8-9a4); 云何斷善根。謂利根者。成就上品諸惡意樂現行法故。得隨順彼惡友故。彼邪見纏極重圓滿到究竟故。彼於一切惡現行中得無畏故。無哀愍故。能斷善根。此中種子亦名善根。無貪瞋等亦名善根。但由安立現行善根。相違相續名斷善根。非由永拔彼種子故　云何續善根。謂由性利根故。見親朋友修福業故。詣善丈夫聞正法故。因生猶豫證決定故。還續善根 (T. 1579: 281a22-b2)

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[140] The manuscript reads *samucchedo na bījoddharaitayā.*

[141] Derge reads *pas.*

[142] Derge reads *pas.*

[143] Corrected from *mdza' śes* on the basis of the Derge.

2.43) According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the *prāptis* of the *akuśala dharmas* that are obtained when someone first falls from *kāmavairāgya* give result but do not project it. Vasubandhu corrects this statement: "only the *prāptis* of the *akuśala dharmas* that are abandoned when someone attains to *kāmavairāgya* give result at the time of falling from *kāmavairāgya* but do not project it."

dvitiyā kāmavairāgyāt parihīyamāṇo yāḥ sarvaprathamaṃ pratilabhate / evaṃ tu vaktavyam / syāt tā eva parihīyamāṇasya
(Pradhan: 96.23-25; T. 1558: 35c24-25; Poussin v. 1: 295; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 438c29-b1] and says that the same arguments apply as in the case of the previous item [T. 1562: 438b1-2].)

2.43) In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* it is said that a *pṛthagjana* who attains the first *dhyāna* by means of *laukikamārga* only weakens the seeds of *kleśas* and other *kāmadhātu dharmas,* and so, when he falls from this *dhyāna,* the *kleśas* are again actualized.

so so'i skye bo 'jig rten pa'i lam gyi bsam gtan daṅ po la sñoms par źugs śiṅ skyes pa ni[144] *de las gźan pa 'dod pa na spyod pa'i chos ñon moṅs pa can de dag gi sa bon gaṅ yin pa de ni ñams pa yin gyi / yaṅ dag par bcom pa ni ma yin par rig par bya'o / de ci'i phyir źe na / 'di ltar so so'i skye bo de ni tiṅ ṅe 'dzin*[145] *de las yoṅs su ñams nas yaṅ 'dod pa na spyod pa'i chos ñon moṅs pa can rnams mṅon du byed pa daṅ / bsam gtan daṅ po'i sñoms par 'jug pa de nas śi 'phos nas yaṅ 'dod pa'i khams su skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 16a6-b1); 復次若諸異生由世間道入初靜慮。若得生彼爾時欲界諸染污法。及餘欲界諸法種子。但被損伏不能永害。何以故。由此異生從彼定退欲界染法復現前故。從初靜慮沒已。復還生欲界故 (T. 1579: 583c11-15)

[144] Corrected from *skyes pa'i* on the basis of the Derge.

[145] Corrected from *tiṅ 'dzin* on the basis of the Derge.

2.44) Vasubandhu quotes an opinion according to which one, in a moment of *kuśalacitta,* can obtain six types of *cittas.* He states that this should be corrected to seven, specifying that at the moment of entering the *mārga,* one obtains *śaikṣacitta,* while at the moment of attaining arhatship, one obtains *aśaikṣacitta.*

anye punar abhedenāhuḥ / kliṣṭe citte navānāṃ hi lābhaḥ ity ucyate buddhaiḥ / ṣaṇṇāṃ tu kuśale citte tasyaivāvyākṛte khalu / tatra saptānāṃ kuśale citta iti vaktavyam / kāmāvacārasya kuśalasya samyagdṛṣṭyā kuśalamūlapratisaṃdhānāt kāmarūpāvacārayor anivṛtāvyākṛtayor vairāgyataḥ rūpārūpyāvacārayoḥ kuśalayos tat asty asamādhilābhataḥ śaikṣāśaikṣasya ca niyāmāvakrānty arhattvayoḥ śeṣam ata eva vyākhyānād avadhāryam
(Pradhan: 109.21-110.2; T. 1558: 40c5-12; Poussin v. 1: 330-331; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 456a1] and explains that these last two moments are mentioned as one since they are both *anāsrava* [T. 1562: 456a1-2].)

2.44) (I have found no similar enumeration of *kuśalacittas* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, it is perhaps possible that Vasubandhu's insistence on listing *śaikṣacittas* and *aśaikṣacittas* as separate items has something to do with an issue mentioned by Schmithausen [1987: 147-148], namely the existence of a type of morally neutral *satkāyadṛṣṭi* that can "occur even in Śaikṣas" [1987: 148, 439 n. 28].[146] To the extent that the *śaikṣa* has such a *dṛṣṭi*, even though it is not *akuśala*, Vasubandhu may have thought that the *śaikṣacitta* was significantly different from that of the *aśaikṣa* and should not be conflated with it.)[147]

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[146] See the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi:*

de la 'jig tshogs la lta ba gaṅ źe na / ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lṅa po dag la bdag gam bdag gir lta ba daṅ / mṅon par źen pa daṅ sems la 'jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba źes bya'o / de'aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhan cig skye pa daṅ kun brtags pa'o / de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha na ri dags daṅ bya ba rnams kyi yaṅ yin no / kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi yin par blta bar bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 112b6-113a1); 薩迦耶見者。於五取蘊心執增益見我我所名薩迦耶見。此復二。種一者俱生。二分別起。俱生者。一切愚夫異生乃至禽獸並皆現行。分別起者。諸外道等計度而起 (T. 1579: 621b6-10)

See also the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*:

bdag tu lta ba rnam pa bźi ni ṅa'o sñam pa'i brgyal skye ba'i rkyen gyi bya ba byed pa yin te / 'di lta ste rnam par brtags pa ni 'di las phyi rol pa'i mu stegs can rnams kyi gaṅ yin pa'o / lhan cig skyes pa'i tha na ri dags daṅ bya ba rnams la yaṅ yod pa gaṅ yin pa'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 162a5-7); 復次有四種我見爲所依止能生我慢。一有分別我見。謂諸外道所起。二俱生我見。謂下至禽獸等亦能生起 (T. 1579: 779c10-12)

[147] Elsewhere, as Schmithausen (1987: 439 n. 928) notes, Vasubandhu attributes the assertion of the existence of such a *sahaja satkāyadṛṣṭi* to the *pūrvācāryas* (Pradhan: 290. 19-21; T. 1558: 102c26-27; Poussin v. 4: 41).

3.1) According to Vasubandhu, in *ārūpyadhātu* there is no support for consciousness external to consciousness itself. (According to the Ābhidhārmikas, the support is *nikāyasabhāga* and *jīvitendriya.*)[148] The projecting cause (*ākṣepahetu*) is sufficient to establish consciousness in a new lifetime, regardless of whether the realm contains *rūpa* or not.

tasmān nāsty arūpiṇāṃ sattvānāṃ cittasantater anyaṃ niśraya iti sautrāntikāḥ / api tu yasyāś cittasantater ākṣepahetur avītatṛṣṇo rūpe tasyāḥ saha rūpeṇa saṃbhavād rūpaṃ niśritya pravṛttir yasyās tu hetur vītatṛṣṇo rūpe tasyā anapekṣya rūpaṃ pravṛttiḥ / hetos tadvimukhatvād iti

(Pradhan: 112.18-20; T. 1588: Poussin v. 2: 6; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 458c1-8] and criticizes it, insisting that *nikāya-sabhāga* and *jīvitendriya* are necessary to support consciousness in the absence of *rūpa* and showing that Vasubandhu's explanation regarding *ārūpyadhātu* is inconsistent with how consciousness arises in the other realms [T. 1562: 458c8-458c25].)

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[148] On this occasion, Vasubandhu does not explicitly deny the reality of *nikāyasabhāga* and *jīvitendriya.* However, Saṃghabhadra, using the term *ching-chu* ("sūtra-master"), points out that Vasubandhu's rejection of the Ābhidhārmika position is based on such a denial (T. 1562: 458b19-c1).

3.1) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi* includes *nikāya-sabhāga* and *jīvitendriya,* along with the other *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras,* in a long list of *saṃskṛtadharmas* that are *prajñapti* and thus not real (see item 1.3).

'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dṅos po la skye ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / mi rtag pa daṅ / sa bon daṅ rnam par rig byed daṅ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa daṅ / thob pa daṅ / 'thob pa ma yin pa daṅ / srog gi dbaṅ po daṅ / ris mthun pa daṅ / miṅ gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs daṅ / yi ge'i tshogs rnams daṅ so so'i skye bo ñid daṅ/ tshogs pa daṅ ma tshogs pa daṅ / 'jug pa so sor ṅes pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / mgyogs pa daṅ / go rims daṅ / dus daṅ yul daṅ graṅs ñe bar 'dogs pa daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 208a4-6); 又於有爲諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* specifies that the *saṃskāras* perfumed by karma, i.e., *ākṣepahetu,* which consists of *bījas,* project a new lifetime in all three realms.

tatra vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hi / śubhāśubhakarmaparibhāvitāḥ saṃskārās traidhātukeṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣv iṣṭāniṣṭātma-bhāvān ākṣipanti (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 107.20-108.2); *de la rgyu'i gnas bag chags la brten nas / 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs par byed de / de ci'i phyir źe na / 'di ltar dge ba daṅ / mi dge ba'i las kyis yoṅs su bsgos pa'i 'du byed rnams kyis khams gsum du sdug pa daṅ / mi sdug pa'i 'gro ba rnams su / sdug pa daṅ mi sdug pa'i lus rnams 'phen par byed pa daṅ / de ñid kyi dbaṅ gis phyi rol gyi dṅos po rnams kyaṅ / phan sum tshogs pa daṅ / rgud par 'gyur ba'i phyir te / de bas na 'du byed rnams kyi dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las kyi bag chags la brten nas 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs so* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 64b5-8); 依習氣因依處。施設牽引因。所以者何。由淨不淨業熏習三界諸行。於愛不愛趣中牽引愛不愛自體。又即由此增上力故外物盛衰。是故依諸行淨不淨業習氣依處。施設牽引因 (T. 1579: 301b28-c3)[149]

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that, if consciousness did not contain the seeds of *rūpa,* rebirth after falling from *ārūpyadhātu* would be impossible.

gal te rnam par śes pa gzugs kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pa ma yin du zin na / so so'i skye bo gzugs med pa rnams su skyes pa tshe zad ciṅ las zad nas de nas 'ci 'pho źiṅ yaṅ 'og tu skye pa'i gzugs kyi sa bon med pas 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur ba źig na 'byuṅ ste / de lta bas na gzugs kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pa'i rnam par śes pa de la brten nas / de'i gzugs

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[149] For other relevant definitions of *ākṣepahetu* in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* see Kritzer 1999: 155-165.

3.1 continued) *'byuṅ bar rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 16b4-6; see Schmithausen 1987: 21, 288 n. 172 b); 復次若諸識非色種子所隨逐者。生無色界異生。從彼壽盡業盡沒已還生下時。色無種子應不更生。然必更生。是故當知諸色種子隨逐於識。以此爲縁色法更生 (T. 1579: 583c7-10)[150]

[150] The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* also says that the *bījas* of *rūpa* exist in *ārūpyadhātu* consciousness: *gzugs med pa dag ni rnam par śes pa med la yaṅ brten la gzugs kyi sa bon la yaṅ brten to / miṅ daṅ gzugs kyi sa bon yaṅ rnam par śes pa la brten ciṅ 'dug ste / gzugs kyi rgyun chad zin pa las kyaṅ gzugs kyi sa bon de las phyi ma la 'byuṅ bar 'gyur te* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 285b7-286a1); 在無色界。諸有情類識。依於名及色種子。名及色種依識而轉。由彼識中有色種故。色雖間斷後當更生 (T. 1579: 827c29-828a2). This would appear to be an example of a case in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which consciousness in *ārūpyadhātu* maintains a connection with matter (see Schmithausen 1987: 47-50).

3.2)[151] In a discussion of the *vijñānasthitis,* Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of the Sautrāntikas that the Ābhāsvara gods are said to have different ideas because, at the time of destruction of the universe, some of them have the idea of fear, while others do not. (According to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is because their feelings alternate between pleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant.)

sautrāntikā vyācakṣate / sūtra uktaṃ yathā te nānātvasaṃjñinaḥ / tatra ye sattvā ābhāsvare devanikāye 'ciropapannā bhavanti naiva saṃvartanīkuśalā na vivartanīkuśalā asya lokasya te tām arciṣaṃ dṛṣṭvā bhītāḥ santa udvijante saṃvegam āpadyante / sahaivaiṣā 'rciḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhvā 'rvāg āgamiṣyatīti / tatra ye sattvā ābhāsvare devanikāye ciropapannāḥ saṃvartanīkuśalā vivartanīkuśalāś cāsya lokasya te tān sattvān bhītān āśvāsayanti / mā bhaiṣṭa mārṣāḥ mā bhaiṣṭa mārṣāḥ / pūrvam apy eṣā 'rciḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhvā 'traivāntarhite ti / ato 'rciḥ āgamavyapagama saṃjñitvāt bhītā bhītasaṃjñitvāc ca te nānātvasaṃjñino na sukhāduḥkhāsukhasaṃjñitvād iti
(Pradhan: 116.16-23; T. 1588: 43a10-19; Poussin v. 2: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the position of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 463b5], with which the Sthavira's position is said to agree [T. 1562: 463b11-13], and he rejects it, saying that fear is inconsistent with *vijñānasthiti,* which implies pleasant feelings and mental stability [T. 1562: 463b6-11].)

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[151] Before this item, in the context of a discussion of whether *antarābhava* is a *gati,* Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of "others" that the *gati*s can be *kuśala* and *kliṣṭa.* According to the Vaibhāṣikas, they must only be *avyākṛta* (Pradhan: 115.3-6; T. 1558: 42b13-16; Poussin 2: 14). Saṃghabhadra identifies the opinion mentioned by Vasubandhu as the argument of the sūtra-master (T. 1562: 459c2-5) and criticizes it (T. 1562: 459c5-460a21). But P'u-kuang says that this is a Mahāsāṃghika position (T. 1821: 152a14). I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* to suggest disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika position on this issue.

Saṃghabhadra refers to the sūtra-master three more times (T. 1562: 460b11, 26, 29) in the remainder of the discussion (Pradhan: 115.6-13; T. 1558: 42b17-28; Poussin 2: 14; T. 1562: 460a21-460b29).

3.2) According to the *Śrutamayī Bhūmi*, the Ābhāsvara gods have different ideas because when they see Brahmā's conflagration, some are afraid and some are not.

'od gsal gyi lha gnas na ni sṅa phyir skyes pa rnams / tshaṅs pa'i 'jig rten tshig pa'i me lce mthoṅ ba las 'jigs pa daṅ / mi 'jigs pa'i 'du śes su 'gyur bas / de dag ni 'du śes mi 'dra bar rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*: dzi 211a5-6); 光音天衆先後生者。由覩梵世猛焰燒然。爾時便有怖不怖想。是故於彼有異類想 (T. 1579: 354c20-22)

3.3) One of Vasubandhu's explanations for why there are only four *vijñānasthitis* (i.e., why *vijñānaskandha* is not also a *vijñānasthiti*) compares *vijñāna* to a seed and *vijñānasthiti* to a field: these two must be different.

api ca kṣetrabhāvena bhagavatā catasro vijñānasthitayo deśitāḥ / bījabhāvena ca sopādānaṃ vijñānaṃ kṛtsnam eveti na punar bījaṃ bījasya kṣetrabhāvena vyavasthāpayāṃ babhūvety abhiprayaṃ parikalpayāmāsa / ye dharmāḥ sahavartino vijñānasya te 'sya kṣetrabhāvena sādhīyāṃso bhavantīti ta evāsya sthitaya uktāḥ (Pradhan: 118.10-13; T. 1588: 43c8-c14; Poussin v. 2: 25-26; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 465b7-14] and says that the simile of seed and field is valid since it does not contradict *sūtra,* but he rejects Vasubandhu's explanation of the simile for several reasons [T. 1562: 465b14-c9].)

3.3) The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 201a2-b2; T. 1579: 794b6-24; Mukai 1985: 30) comments on *Saṃyuktāgama, sūtra* 39 (T. 99: 8c26-9a27), in an explanation of how the sprout of the next life arises from the seed, which is *vijñāna*. In this passage, *vijñāna* is said to be the *hetu* and the four *vijñānasthitis,* which are compared to a field, are said to be *pratyayas.*

yaṅ srid par skye ba'i myu gu 'byuṅ ba la ni rgyu gcig daṅ rkyen gñis yod de / 'du byed rnam pa lṅa po dag la ñon moṅs pa sa bon daṅ ldan pa'i rnam par śes pa ni rgyu'o / rnam par śes pa'i gnas bźi źiṅ daṅ 'dra ba daṅ / dga' ba daṅ 'dod chags des rnam par śes pa skye ba de daṅ der ñiṅ mtshams sbyar ba'i phyir rlan par byed pa ni rkyen yin no / de la kha cig ni rnam par śes pa'i gnas bźi phuṅ por gtogs par 'gyur la dga' ba daṅ 'dod chags ni des tshe 'di la gsar du bsags śiṅ bsdus na (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 201a2-4); 復次一因二縁令後有芽當得生長。謂五品行中煩惱種子所隨逐識。説名爲因。與田[152]相似四種識住。説名爲縁。又由憙貪滋潤其識。令於彼彼當受生處結生相續。感薩迦耶。亦名爲縁。此中有一由四識住攝受所依由憙貪故。於現法中新新造集及以增長 (T. 1579:794b6-12)

See also an explanation in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* of defilement (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 314b2-315a2; T. 1579: 840a12-24; Mukai 1985: 36), which comments on *Saṃyuktāgama, sūtra* 374 (T. 99: 102c28-103a12).

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[152] Corrected from *yin* 因 on the basis of the alternate reading in the Taishō note and the Tibetan translation, *źiṅ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 201a3), which corresponds to *kṣetra*.

3.4) One Vaibhāṣika answer to the question of why the Buddha chose birth in the womb over an apparitional birth is that it was in order to leave a body as a relic.[153] Vasubandhu objects that this explanation will not satisfy those who think the Buddha has *ādhiṣṭhānikī ṛddhi,* the power to maintain his body after death.

ādhiṣṭhānikīm ṛddhiṃ bhagavata icchatām na yukta eṣa parihāraḥ
(Pradhan: 119.25-26; T. 1558: 44a27-28; Poussin v. 2: 31; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 467c25-26] and rejects it in favor of the Vaibhāṣika explanation, saying that a body maintained after death by *ṛddhi* would not be impregnated with the Buddha's special powers and so would not be very beneficial to the world [T. 1562: 467c27-468a15].)

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[153] See the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 627c9-15).

3.4) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says that the Buddhas and bodhisattvas can use their magical power to continue to exist after death.

kiṃcic ca nirmāṇam adhitiṣṭhati yad uparate 'pi bodhisattve tathāgate vā 'nuvartata eva (*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 64.23-25); *byaṅ chub sems dpa' 'am / de bźin gśegs pa 'das pa'i og tu yaṅ sprul pa la la gnas pa kho nar byin gyis rlob pa daṅ* (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*; źi 42a4-5); 於中或有諸佛菩薩雖滅度後由住持力而故隨轉 (T. 1579: 493b6-7)

3.5) According to Vasubandhu, denying the existence of *antarābhava* by comparing death and rebirth to an object and a reflected image is wrong because the reflected image is not real.

pratibimbam asiddhatvād asāmyāc cānidarśanam/ pratibimbaṃ nāmānyad evotpadyate dharmāntaram ity asiddham etat
(Pradhan: 120.19-20; T. 1588:44b28-c11; Poussin v. 2: 34-35; Kritzer 2000a: 243-247; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 470a18-b2] and criticizes it at very great length, refuting each of Vasubandhu's arguments and insisting that the reflected image is in fact real [T. 1562: 470b2-472a22].)

3.5) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, the comparison between death and rebirth and object and image is invalid and does not disprove the existence of the *antarābhava*.

bar mdo'i srid pa yod par rgyu gaṅ gis khoṅ du chud par bya źe na / smras pa / śi 'phos nas sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba gnas med pa rnams yul gźan du phyin mi srid pa'i phyir daṅ / rnam par 'khrul pa tsam yin pas brag ca lta bur yaṅ mi ruṅ ba daṅ / ma 'gags pa'i phyir gzugs brñan lta bur yaṅ mi ruṅ ba daṅ / 'gro bab med pa'i phyir dmigs pa 'dzin pa lta bur yaṅ mi ruṅ ste / gaṅ gi phyir dpe de dag mi ruṅ ba de'i phyir bar mdo'i srid pa yod par rig par bya ste (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 55a5-8); 問何因得知有中有耶。答從此沒已。若無所依諸心心所。無有道理轉至餘方故。不應如響唯惑亂故。不應如影彼不滅故。亦不應說如取所緣。非行往故。由如是等所說譬喻。不應道理。是故當知定有中有 (T. 1579: 599a9-14)

3.6) According to Vasubandhu, the reflected image, which is not real, appears due to the power of the coming together of causes and conditions. He says that the variety of the capabilities of *dharmas* is unthinkable.

sāmagryās tu sa tasyās tādṛśaḥ prabhāvo yat tathā darśanaṃ bhavati / acintyo hi dharmāṇāṃ śaktibhedaḥ
(Pradhan: 121.4-5; T. 1558: 44c10-11; Poussin v. 2: 35; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 472a22-24] and criticizes it bitterly, suggesting that if one denies the reality of the reflected image, one might as well deny the reality of all *dharmas* [T. 1562: 472a24-c10]; see Fukuda 1998a: 3-9; Kritzer 2000a: 243-244.)

3.6) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Sacittikā Bhūmi,* the *pravṛtti-vijñānas* depend on the *ālayavijñāna* as the reflected image depends on the mirror; this suggests the relative unreality of the reflected image.[154]

don dam pa'i tshul rnam par bźag pas 'jug pa gaṅ źe na / mdor bsdu na rnam par śes pa ni rnam pa gñis te / kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa'o / de la kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni gnas yin no / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa ni gnas pa yin te / de yaṅ rnam pa bdun te / mig gi rnam par śes pa nas / yid daṅ yid kyi rnam par śes pa'i bar te / chu'i cho bo daṅ / rlabs lta bu'am / me loṅ daṅ gzugs brñan lta bu yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 189b1-3; see Schmithausen 1987: 325-326 n. 357); 云何名爲勝義道理建立差別。謂略有二識。一者阿賴耶識。二者轉識。阿賴耶識是所依。轉識是能依。此復七種。所謂眼識乃至意識。譬如水,浪依止暴流。或如影像依止明鏡。如是名依勝義道理建立所依能依差別 (T. 1579: 651b13-17)

The definitions in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* of *śaktivaicitrya hetvadhiṣṭhāna* and *sāmagrīhetvadhiṣṭhāna* may be relevant here: *śaktivaicitrya* refers to the multiplicity of forces necessary to produce the variety of *dharmas* associated with *kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu,* and *ārūpyadhātu,* as well as non-associated (*anāsrava*) *dharmas,* while in the case of *sāmagrī* of production, when the totality of causes necessary for the production of any *dharma* is realized, the *dharma* arises.

tatra śaktivaicitryaṃ hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hi / kāmapratisaṃyuktā dharmā vicitrasvabhāvā vicitrād svabhāvaviśeṣāc chaktivaicitryād utpadyante / yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktā evaṃ rūpa-pratisaṃyuktā ārūpyapratisaṃyuktā apratisaṃyuktāḥ / tasmāc chaktivaicitryam adhiṣṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tatra sāmagrīhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hi / svām utpatti-sāmagrīm āgamya kāmapratisaṃyuktānāṃ dharmāṇām utpādo bhāvāti / yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktānām evaṃ rūpapratisaṃyuktānām ārūpyapratisaṃyuktānām apratisaṃyuktānāṃ / yathotpattisāmagry evaṃ prāptisāmagrī siddhisāmagrī niṣpatti-sāmagrī kriyāsāmagrī / tasmāt sāmagrīm adhiṣṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate

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[154] In a similar passage in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*), the meditational image is said to be no different from the consciousness in which it is perceived, just as the reflected image depends on the mirror, with the object acting as a condition; this suggests that the reflected image has no independent reality (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 74b6-75a3; T. 1579: 724a3-13; *Saṃdhi-nirmocanasūtra*$_t$: 90.22-91.17; T. 676: 698a22-b9). Fukuda thinks that Vasubandhu carefully avoids stating a position similar to the one that underlies this famous passage (1998a: 9). However, as we can see, Saṃghabhadra clearly thinks that Vasubandhu's statement has radical implications.

3.6 continued) (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 109.19-110.7); *de la rgyu'i gnas daṅ mthu sna tshogs la brten nas / so sor ṅes pa'i rgyu 'dogs par byed de / de ci'i phyir że na / 'di ltar 'dod pa ldan pa'i chos ṅo bo ñid rnam pa sna tshogs pa rnams ni / ṅo bo ñid kyi khyad par rnam pa sna tshogs / mthu rnam pa rna tshogs can las byuṅ ba'i phyir ro / 'dod pa daṅ ldan pa rnams ji lta ba bźin du / gzugs daṅ ldan pa rnams daṅ / gzugs med pa daṅ ldan pa rnams daṅ / ldan pa ma yin pa'i rnams kyaṅ de daṅ 'dra ste / de bas na mthu sna tshogs la brten*[155] *nas / so sor ṅes pa'i rgyu 'dogs so / de la rgyu'i sna tshogs pa brten nas / lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu 'dod par byed de / de ci'i phyir że na / 'di ltar raṅ skye ba'i tshogs daṅ phrad nas 'dod pa daṅ ldan pa'i chos rnams skye ba'i phyir ro / 'dod pa daṅ ldan pa rnams ji lta ba bźin du / gzugs daṅ ldan pa rnams daṅ / gzugs med pa daṅ ldan pa rnams daṅ / ldan pa ma yin pa rnams kyaṅ de daṅ 'dra'o / skye ba'i tshogs pa ji lta ba bźin du thob pa'i tshogs pa daṅ / grub par gyur pa'i tshogs pa daṅ / 'grub pa'i tshogs pa daṅ / gnas pa'i tshogs pa daṅ / byed pa'i tshogs pa rnams kyaṅ de daṅ 'dra ste / de bas na tshogs pa la brten nas lhan cig byed pa'i ryu 'dogs so* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 66a3-b1); 依差别功能因依處。施設定異因。所以者何。由欲繫諸法自性功能有差别故能生種種自性功能。如欲繫法。如是色無色繫及不繫法亦爾。是故依差别功能依處。施設定異因。依和合因依處。施設同事因。所以者何。要由獲得自生和合故。欲繫法生如欲繫法。如是色無色繫及不繫法亦爾。如生和合。如是得成辦用和合亦爾。是故依和合依處施設同事因 (T. 1579: 302a2-10)[156]

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[155] Corrected from *rten* on the basis of the Derge.

[156] See the definition in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of *sāmagrī* as a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra:* all the causes and conditions that can produce *dharmas* are referred to by the single term *sāmagrī* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 26b3-4; T. 1579: 587b29-c2). See also Kritzer 1999: 249-253.

3.7) According to Vasubandhu, *avidyā* in the *āvasthika* interpretation of *pratītya-samutpāda* is accompanied by all the other *kleśas,* like a king by his retinue.

sāhacaryāt tadvaśena teṣāṃ samudācārāc ca / rājāgamanavacane tadanu-yātrikāgamanasiddhavat
(Pradhan: 131.19-20; T. 1588: 48b21-23; Poussin v. 2: 63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 484a12-14] and, objecting to Vasu-bandhu's understanding of the word *sāhacarya* on the grounds that it establishes an improper separation between *avidyā* and the rest of the *kleśas,* refers approvingly to the Vaibhāṣika position that *avidyā* here refers to the five *skandhas* of the past life in the state of defilement [T. 1562: 484a15-27].)

3.7) (Perhaps it is relevant that in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi, avidyā* is said to be *viparyāsamūla,* while *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* part of *antagrāhadṛṣṭi, śīlavrataparāmarśa,* and *rāga* are *viparyāsa* proper, and *mithyādṛṣṭi,* part of *antagrāhadṛṣṭi, pratigha, māna,* and *vicikitsā* are *viparyāsaniṣyanda.*

tatra viparyāsamūlam avidyā / viparyāsaḥ[157] *satkāyadṛṣṭir antagrāhakadṛṣṭer ekadeśo dṛṣṭiparāmarśo rāgaś ca / viparyāsaniṣyando mithyādṛṣṭir antagrāhadṛṣṭer ekadeśaḥ pratigho māno vicikitsā ca* [*Yogācārabhūmi* 166.16-18; see Schmithausen 1987: 449 n. 963]; *de la phyin ci log gi rtsa ba ni ma rig pa'o / phyin ci log ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba daṅ / mthar 'dzin par lta ba'i phyogs gcig daṅ / lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa daṅ / tshul khrims daṅ brtul źugs mchog tu 'dzin pa daṅ / 'dod chags so / phyin ci log gi rgyu mthun pa ni / log par lta ba daṅ/ mthar 'dzin pa'i lta ba'i phyogs gcig daṅ / koṅ khro ba daṅ / ṅa rgyal daṅ / the tshom mo* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 97a8-b2]; 倒根本者。謂無明。顛倒體者。謂薩迦耶見。邊執見一分。見取戒禁取及貪。倒等流者。謂邪見邊執見一分。恚慢及疑 [T. 1579: 314b14-16])

[157] Corrected by Schmithausen from *viparyāsaniṣyandaḥ* on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese.

3.8) Vasubandhu questions the *āvasthika* interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda:* if each member contains all five *skandhas,* why should the members receive the name, *avidyā,* etc.?

āvasthikaḥ kileṣṭo 'yam yady aṅgam aṅgaṃ pañcaskandhāḥ kiṃ kāraṇam avidyādīn eva dharmān kīrtayati sma / prādhānyāt tv aṅgakīrtanam/ avidyāpradhānām avasthām avidyāṃ jagāda saṃskārapradhānāṃ saṃskārān yāvaj jarāmaraṇam ity adoṣaḥ
(Pradhan: 133.10-13; T. 1588: 48c22-26; Poussin v. 2: 66-67; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who uses the word *kila* to show that he does not accept the Vaibhāṣika *āvasthika* interpretation [T. 1562: 494b15-19]. Saṃghabhadra then presents the first of the Sthavira's six detailed objections to the *āvasthika* interpretation [494b21-c10] and refutes it [494c10-495b19].)

3.8) (Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not have a discussion of this issue, it nowhere states that the members of the formula consist of the five *skandhas,* and none of the various *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions in the text resembles the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation.)

3.9) Vasubandhu refutes the Sthavira's explanation of why *ayoniśo manasikāra* is not mentioned as an *aṅga* of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula. According to the Sthavira, *ayoniśo manasikāra* is said in a *sūtra* to be the cause of *avidyā*, but another *sūtra* says that it is produced by *avidyā*. Thus, the mutual dependence of the two eliminates the need to mention *ayoniśo manasikāra* as a separate *aṅga*. According to Vasubandhu, the real reason is that the purpose of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* was to explain the connections between the past and present lives and the present and future lives; therefore, no further members are required.

avidyājarāmaraṇayoḥ pareṇāṅgāntarānabhidhānāt saṃsārasyādyantavattvaprasaṅgaḥ / na cāparipūrṇo nirdeśa iti / kiṃ kāraṇam / pravṛttisaṃmūḍhebhyo vineyebhyaḥ kathaṃ paralokād ihaloka ihalokāc ca punaḥ paralokaḥ saṃbadhyata ity etāvato 'trārthasya vivakṣitatvāt / etasya ca pūrvam evoktatvāt / pūrvāparāntamadhyeṣu saṃmohavinivṛttaye[158]
(Pradhan: 135.21-136.1; T. 1588: 49c10-17; Poussin v. 2: 72; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 497b22-28], and he criticizes Vasubandhu for inventing his own explanation, which differs from the perfectly adequate Vaibhāṣika explanation, which Vasubandhu already has mentioned,[159] namely that *avidyā*, as a *kleśa*, arises from *kleśa* and from karma [T. 1562: 497b28-c12].)

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[158]The passage quoted contains only Vasubandhu's explanation of his own position.

[159]Pradhan: 135.2-3; T. 1588: 49b13; Poussin v. 2: 69.

3.9) The *śarīra* portion of the *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* and the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* states that *pratītyasamutpāda* can be summarized with reference to three aspects: how one is born into the present from the past; how one is born into the future from the present; and how one can attain to purification in the present life.

śarīraṃ katamat / samāsatas tribhir ākāraiḥ pratītyasamutpādasya vyavasthānaṃ bhavati / yathā pūrvāntān madhyānte sambhavati / yathā ca madhyāntād aparānte sambhavati / yathā ca ca madhyānte sambhūto vartate vyavadānāya ca paraiti (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 198.17-19); *lus gaṅ źe na / mdor bsdu na / rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba ni rnam pa gsum du gźag pa yin te / sṅon gyi mtha' nas ji ltar dbus kyi mthar 'byuṅ ba daṅ / dbus kyi mtha' nas ji ltar phyi ma'i mthar 'byuṅ ba daṅ / dbus kyi mthar byuṅ nas ji ltar gnas pa daṅ / rnam par byaṅ bar 'gyur ba'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 115b3-4); 略說由三種相建立縁起。謂從前際中際生。從中際後際生。中際生已若趣流轉。若趣清淨究竟 (T. 1579: 321a17-19)[160]

[160] The remainder of the *śarīra* portion explains this process in detail (see Kritzer 1999: 82-87). See also *Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* 'i 287b5-6; T. 1579: 828c9-12.

3.10) Vasubandhu sees a contradiction between the *sūtra* statement, "I teach *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpannadharmas,*" and the *abhidharma* teaching that both terms refer to all *saṃskṛtadharmas*. Arguing on the Sarvāstivādins' own terms, he shows that they would have to include future *dharmas* among the *pratītyasamutpannadharmas,* which would not make sense. Instead, he follows the opinion of Vasumitra in the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 118b25-c5; Poussin v. 2: 74 n. 1) in explaining that the *aṅgas* of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula are *pratītyasamutpāda* in that they are cause and *pratītyasamutpanna* in that they are result.

tajjātīyatvāt tat tatraivātideśo yathā na ca tāvad rūpyate rūpaṃ cocyate tajjātīyatvād ity adoṣaḥ / sūtrābhiprayas tv ayam ucyate / hetur atra samutpādaḥ samutpannaṃ phalaṃ matam / hetubhūtam aṅga[m][161] *pratītyasamutpādaḥ samutpadyate 'smād iti kṛtvā phalabhūtam aṅga[m]*[162] *pratītyasamutpannam / evaṃ sarvāṇy aṅgāny ubhayathā sidhyanti / hetuphalabhāvāt / na caivaṃ satyavyavasthā bhavanty apekṣābhedāt / yad apekṣya pratītyasamutpādo na tad evāpekṣya pratītyasamutpannaṃ hetuphalavat pitṛputravac ca*
(Pradhan: 136.6-11; T. 1588: 49c23-50a3; Poussin v. 2: 74; Saṃghabhadra discusses Vasubandhu's explanation at great length [T. 1562: 498b15-499a1], stating that Vasubandhu misunderstands the *sūtra,* while the Ābhidhārmikas understand it correctly [T. 1562: 498c26-499a1].)

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[161] See Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 420.

[162] See Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 267.

3.10) In the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi, pratītyasamutpāda* is defined as the nature of *saṃskāras* to arise, while *pratītyasamutpannatā* is defined as the fact that they have arisen.

katamaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ / katamā pratītyasamutpannatā / yā utpattidharmatā[163] *saṃskārāṇām ayaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ / yā punar utpannataiva sā pratītya-samutpannatety ucyate* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 219.8-11); *rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba ni gaṅ / rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba ñid ni gaṅ źe na / 'du byed rnams kyi skye ba'i chos ñid gaṅ yin pa de ni / rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba'o / skyes pa ñid gaṅ yin pa de ni rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba ñid ces bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 128b7-8); 云何縁起。云何縁生。謂諸行生起法性是名縁起。即彼生已說名縁生 (T. 1579: 325c10-12)

In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* it is said that, among those *dharmas* that arise due to conditions, causes are called *pratītyasamutpāda,* while results are called *pratītyasamutpanna.* The same principle is applied to the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula.

de la rgyu gaṅ yin pa de la ni rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba źes bya'o / 'bras bu gaṅ yin pa de ni rten ciṅ 'brel par byuṅ[164] *ba źes bya bar blta bar bya'o / de la ma rigs pa'i bag la ñal ma spaṅs pa yod pas ma rig pa'i kun nas dkris pa 'byuṅ ṅo / ma rig pa'i kun nas dkris pa skyes pa'i phyir 'du byed rnams kyi 'jug pa skye'o / de bźin du 'du byed kyi sa bon ma spaṅs pa yod pas 'du byed rnams 'byuṅ ṅo / 'du byed rnams skyes pa'i phyir rnam par śes pa 'jug pa skye'o / de bźin du rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba'i yan lag lhag ma rnams kyi 'jug pa'i tshul yaṅ ci rigs par rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 86b4-7); 當知此中因名縁起果名縁生。此無明隨眠不斷有故。彼無明纒有。此無明纒生故。彼諸行轉。如是諸行種子不斷故。諸行得生。諸行生故得有識轉。如是所餘諸縁起支流轉道理。如其所應當知亦爾 (T. 1579: 611b19-24)

[163] Punctuation corrected from Bhattacharya's *pratītyasamutpannatā yā utpatti-dharmatā /* on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese.

[164] Derge reads *'byuṅ.*

3.11) Vasubandhu criticizes the *āvasthika* interpretation as being unjustifiable by *sūtra* because the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* is *nītārtha*.

atra tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kiṃ khalv etā iṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭir āhosvit sūtrārthaḥ / sūtrārtha ity āha / yadi sūtrārtho naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ / kathaṃ kṛtvā / yat tāvad uktam āvasthika eṣa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśapañcaskandhikā avasthā dvādaśāṅgānīty etad utsūtram / sūtre 'nyathā nirdeśād / avidyā katamā / yat tat pūrvānte 'jñānam iti vistareṇa / yac ca nītārthaṃ na tat punar neyaṃ bhavatīti naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ
(Pradhan: 136.14-18; T. 1588: 50a7-13; Poussin v. 2: 75; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 495c22-27], relates it to the last of the Sthavira's six detailed objections to the *āvasthika* interpretation [T. 1562: 494c6-10], and refutes it, turning Vasubandhu's argument about *nītārtha* and *neyārtha sūtras* against him [T. 1562: 495c27-496a11].)[165]

[165] See item 3.8.

3.11) In the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition of the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* the explanation of the individual members essentially follows and comments upon the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 204.1-212.3; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: dzi 119a1-124a6; T. 1579: 322b2-324a15; see Kritzer 1999: 33-52 for a summary of this section). Due to the length of the passage, I do not provide the text here.

3.12) Vasubandhu's defense of the etymology of the word *pratītyasamutpāda*[166] against the criticism of the Grammarians is based on the idea that, although past and future *dharmas* are nonexistent, the coming together of conditions results in the arising of *dharmas*. The meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* is expressed in the *sūtra* statement: "this being, that exists; from the arising of this, that arises."

naiṣa doṣaḥ / idaṃ tāvad ayaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ śābdikaḥ / kim avastho dharmaḥ utpadyate vartamāna utāho 'nāgata iti / kiṃ cātaḥ / yadi vartamāna utpadyate / kathaṃ vartamāno yadi notpannaḥ / utpannasya vā punar utpattāv anavsthāprasaṅgaḥ / athānāgata utpadyate / katham asataḥ kartṛtvaṃ siddhaty akartṛkā vā kriyeti / ato yad avastha utpadyate tad avastha eva pratyeti / kim avasthaś cotpadyate / utpādābhimukho 'nāgataḥ / tad avastha eva pratyayaṃ pratyetīty ucyate / aniṣpannaṃ cedaṃ yad uta śābdikīyaṃ kartṛkriyāvasthānaṃ bhavatīty eṣa kartābhūtir ity eṣā kriyā / na cātra bhavitur arthāt bhūtim anyāṃ kriyāṃ paśyāmaḥ / tasmād acchalaṃ vyavahāreṣu / eṣa tu vākyārthaḥ / asmin saty asya bhāvaḥ asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti yo 'rthaḥ so 'rthaḥ pratītyasamutpāda iti
(Pradhan: 138.9-16; T. 1588: 50b25-c7; Poussin v. 2: 78-79; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 481b23-29] and refutes it, saying that it implicitly accepts that the moment of arising of a *dharma* belongs to the future; this is inconsistent with Vasubandhu's denial of the real existence of future *dharmas* [T. 1562: 481b29-c4].)

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166 Vasubandhu, in response to a question (according to P'u-kuang [T. 1821: 169c18], from the Mahāsāṃghikas), gives an etymological definition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which Saṃghabhadra attributes to the sūtra-master (T. 1562: 481b8-13). Saṃghabhadra also identifies the Grammarians' objections as hypothetical ones posed by the sūtra-master (T. 1562: 481b16-17).

3.12) In the *nirukti* portion of the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Savitarkādibhūmi,* the momentary nature of conditioned origination is stressed, since conditions quickly perish, but the efficacy of these conditions, even though they are in the past and no longer existent, is maintained. Furthermore, it is said that the complete meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* is expressed in the *sūtra* statement: "this being, that exists; from the arising of this, that arises."

punaḥ pratyayata utpādaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ / kṣaṇikārtham adhikṛtya / punaḥ pratyayād atītād atyaktāt svasantatāv utpādaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ / asmin satīdaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idam udpadyate nānyathā ity etam artham adhikṛtyaitan nirvacanaṃ draṣṭavyam (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 214.7-10);[167] *rkyen las skyes pa daṅ / skad cig ma'i don gi dbaṅ du bya ste / myur du 'jig pa daṅ ldan par skye pa ni rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba'o / gźan yaṅ rkyen 'das pa daṅ / ma btaṅ ba las raṅ gi rgyud du skye ba ni / rten ciṅ 'grel par 'byuṅ ba'o / 'di yod pas 'di byuṅ / 'di skyes pas 'di skye pa ste / gźan du ma yin no / źes bya ba'i don 'di'i dbaṅ du byas nas / de ṅes pa'i tshig tu lta bar bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: dzi 125b5-7); 復次依託衆縁。速謝滅已。續和合生故。名縁起。此依刹那義釋。復次衆縁過去而不捨離。依自相續而得生起故。名縁起。如說此有故彼有。此生故彼生。非餘。依此義故。釋名應知 (T. 1579: 324c3-7)

[167] Bhattacharya's notes contain some questionable remarks about both the Tibetan translation and the contents of the manuscript. I have here reproduced his text without attempting to improve on it.

3.13) According to the *pūrvācāryas,*[168] "this being, that exists" refers to the fact that if the cause is not abandoned, the result will arise; for example, "if *avidyā* is not abandoned, the *saṃskāras* will not be abandoned." "From the arising of this, that arises" corresponds to "Due to the arising of [*avidyā*], [the *saṃskāras*] arise."

aprahīṇotpattijñāpanārtham ity ācāryāḥ / avidyāyām aprahīṇāyāṃ saṃskārā na prahīyante / tasyā evotpādād utpadyanta iti vistaraḥ
(Pradhan: 139.12-14; T. 1588: 51a6-8; Poussin v. 2: 82-83; Saṃghabhadra identifies these teachers as the sūtra-master's own teachers, whom he, Saṃghabhadra, does not respect [T. 1562: 483a7-13], and refutes them, reasoning that their argument would logically imply that *avidyā* is conditioned by the *saṃskāras* and that, if the *saṃskāras* are not abandoned, *avidyā* will not be abandoned [T. 1562: 483a13-19].)

[168] *ācāryā iti pūrvācāryāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 298.18-19).

3.13) In the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* it is said that "this being, that exists" means that, from undestroyed conditions, something else arises.

katham asmin satīdaṃ bhavatīty ucyate / aprahīṇāt pratyayāt tadanyotpādārthena (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 221.16); *ci'i phyir 'di yod pas 'di 'byuṅ źes bya źe na / rkyen ma spaṅs pa las de las gźan pa skye ba'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* dzi 130a6-7); 問云何説言此有故彼有。答由未斷縁。餘得生義故 (T. 1579: 326a27-28)

In the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī,* the *sūtra* (*Saṃyuktāgama*) statement, "this being, that exists" (T. 99 [*sūtra* 298]: 85a14; Mukai 1985: 35), is explained as meaning "because this cause is not destroyed, that result is not destroyed." "From the arising of this, that arises" means "Since this undestroyed cause arises, that undestroyed result will arise."

rgyu ma spaṅs pa lta ba las 'bras bu ma spaṅs pa skye bar 'gyur ba gaṅ yin pa 'di ni ji lta ba bźin du yod pa'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* 'i 299b8); 及有此因未斷故。有彼果未斷。此未斷因生故。彼未斷果生。如是名爲如所有性 (T. 1579: 833c9-11)

3.14) Vasubandhu criticizes another opinion (that of the Sthavira), according to which "this being, that exists" means that, when the effect exists, the destruction of the cause exists. According to Vasubandhu, if the Buddha had had this intention, he would have said, "this being, that does not exist." Furthermore, why would the Buddha, when expounding *pratītyasamutpāda,* have spoken first about the destruction of the cause?

punar āha asmin satīdaṃ bhavatīti kārye sati kāraṇasya vināśo bhavatīti / syān matam ahetukaṃ tarhi kāryam utpadyata ity ata āha nāhetukaṃ / yasmād asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti / eṣa cet sūtrārtho 'bhaviṣyad asmin satīdaṃ na bhavatīty evācakṣata / pūrvaṃ ca tāvat kāryasyotpādānevācakṣata[169] *paścād asmin satīdaṃ na bhavatīti / evaṃ hi sādhuḥ kramo bhavati / itarathā tu pratītyasamutpādaḥ katama ity āder arthe kaḥ prathamo vināśavacanasya / tasmān naiveṣa sūtrārthaḥ*
(Pradhan: 139: 17-21; T. 1588: 51a12-19; Poussin v. 2: 83; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the criticism of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 482c5-28] and condemns Vasubandhu for only criticizing the wording of the Sthavira's interpretation of the *sūtra;* according to Saṃghabhadra, the Sthavira should also be condemned for suggesting that the result can arise before the cause has ceased to exist.[170] Saṃghabhadra seems to be implying that Vasubandhu accepts this idea, which, as we have seen, is attributed to Vasubandhu's teachers.)

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[169] The reading *pūrvaṃ ca kāryasyotpādam* in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (289.34-35) seems preferable.

[170] At the end of the discussion, Saṃghabhadra again criticizes the sūtra-master for arguing with the Sthavira about the meaning of the *sūtra* rather than completely rejecting his argument (T. 1562: 483a5-7).

3.14) (The following is the same passage that is quoted in item 3.13.) In the *pratītyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* it is said that "this being, that exists" means that, from undestroyed conditions, something else arises.

katham asmin satīdaṃ bhavatīty ucyate / aprahīṇāt pratyayāt tadanyotpādārthena (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 221.16); *ci'i phyir 'di yod pas 'di 'byuṅ źes bya źe na / rkyen ma spaṅs pa las de las gźan pa skye ba'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*ṭ: dzi 130a6-7); 問云何說言此有故彼有。答由未斷縁。餘得生義故 (T. 1579: 326a27-28)

3.15) Vasubandhu mentions an opinion that good *prajñā* can be mixed with defiled *prajñā* in the same way that consciousness can be defiled by *rāga*, even when *rāga* is not currently active.

kiṃ punar evaṃ neṣyate / kliṣṭayā prajñayā kuśalā prajñā vyavakīryamāṇā na viśudhyati / ato 'sau tasyā upakleśa iti / yad vāpi rāgopakliṣṭaṃ cittaṃ na vimucyate / kiṃ tad avaśyaṃ rāgaparyavasthitaṃ bhavati / upahataṃ tu tat tathā rāgeṇa bhavati yan na vimucyate / taṃ punarbhāvanāṃ vyāvartayato vimucyate / evam avidyopakliṣṭā prajñā na viśudhyatīty avidyopahatāṃ parikalpayāmaḥ
(Pradhan: 141.19-23; T. 1588; 51c29-52a6; Poussin v. 2: 91; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master is presenting a hypothetical argument (*chia tso chiu* 假作救) for the theory that *avidyā* is actually *kuprajñā* [T. 1562: 501a5-12]; Saṃghabhadra refutes this argument in detail and concludes by reiterating that *avidyā* is a separate, real *dharma* [T. 1562: 501a12-c23]. Neither Yaśomitra [*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 301.34-302.1] nor the Chinese commentators (T. 1821: 173c20; T. 1822: 605b29) think that Vasubandhu agrees with this position.)[171]

[171] La Vallée Poussin says that Fa-pao and P'u-kuang disagree on this point (v. 2: 91 n. 1), but he appears to be mistaken. They both say that Vasubandhu accepts the Sarvāstivādin position here, and Fa-pao adds that Vasubandhu does not necessarily adopt the position of any one school: he accepts what reason dictates (T. 1822: 605b29-c1).

3.15) (Although a passage in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* implies that *avidyā* may exist as a *bīja* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 86b4-7; T. 1579: 611b19-24; see item 3.10], I have found no discussion in the *Yogācārabhūmi* concerning the mixture of good and defiled *prajñā*.)

3.16) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of others that not all the mental *vedanās* are *manopavicāras;* only the defiled ones are. For example, the arhat has a mental satisfaction, the object of which is a *dharma* that is good but *laukika.*

apara āha / asty evaṃ manopavicārāṇāṃ vaibhāṣikīyo 'rthaḥ / sūtrārthas tv anyathā dṛśyate / na hi yo yasmād vītarāgaḥ sa tad ālambanam upavicaratīti yuktam / ataḥ sāsravā api na sarve saumansyādayo manopavicārāḥ / kiṃ tarhi / sāṃkleśikā yair mano viṣayān upavicaratīti / kathaṃ copavicarati / anunīyate ca pratihanyate cāpratisaṃkhyāya copekṣate yeṣām pratipakṣeṇa ṣaṭ sātatā vihārā bhavanti / cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā naiva sumanā bhavati na durmanā upekṣako viharati smṛtimān saṃprajānan evaṃ yāvan manasā dharmān vijñāyeti / na hy arhato laukikaṃ nāsti kuśalaṃ dharmālambanaṃ saumanasyaṃ yat tu tat sāṃkleśikaṃ manasa upavicārabhūtaṃ tasyaiva pratiṣedho lakṣyata iti
(Pradhan: 149.23-150.7; T. 1588: 54b3-12; Poussin v. 2: 114-115; Saṃghabhadra says that this alternate opinion is hypothetically offered (*chia wei i shuo* 假為異說) by the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 508a20-29] and criticizes it, upholding the Vaibhāṣika position that even an undefiled mental *vedanā* is *manopavicāra* [T. 1562: 508b1-18].)

3.16) (I have been unable to find anything in the *Yogācārabhūmi* relevant to this discussion.)

3.17) According to Vasubandhu, a moment (*kṣaṇa*) endures for as long as a *dharma* takes to obtain its existence when all conditions are present.

kṣaṇasya tu kiṃ pramāṇam / samagreṣu pratyayeṣu yāvatā dharmasyātmalābhaḥ (Pradhan: 176.12; T. 1588: 62a20-22: Poussin v. 2: 177; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the rash explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 521b23-25] and criticizes it from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint, saying that, since past and future *dharmas* are actually real, it makes no sense to talk of "obtaining existence" [T. 1562: 521b25-c14].)

3.17) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* in an explanation of why the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are *prajñapti,* at least strongly implies that the *kṣaṇa* of the arising (*jāti*) of a *saṃskṛtadharma* is the very duration of the *dharma* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 21b1-24b7; T 1579: 585c9-586c25; see Rospatt 1995, especially pages 94-110). In particular, *vyaya* is defined as the destruction of the *lakṣaṇas* of all *saṃskṛtadharmas* after the moment of arising.

de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 22a3-4); 生刹那後諸行相盡説名爲滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c27-28)

**Kṣaṇajāti* is defined as the fact that all *saṃskṛtadharmas* arise anew from moment to moment.

de la 'du byed rnams skad cig skad cig la skye ba ni skad cig gi skye ba źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 23a1); 此中諸行刹那刹那新新而起。名刹那 (T. 1579: 586a21-22)

3.18) According to Vasubandhu, the reason that the Buddhas do not appear in the world during the period of diminishment, when people's life spans shrink from one hundred years to ten years, is that the five *kaṣāyas* become very strong then.

kasmān na śatāt / tadā hi pañcakaṣāyā abhyutsadā bhavanti / tadyathā 'yuṣkaṣāyaḥ kalpakaṣāyaḥ kleśakaṣāyaḥ dṛṣṭikaṣāyaḥ sattvakaṣāyaś ca
(Pradhan: 183.1-2; T. 1588: 64a20-22; Poussin v. 2: 193; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the position of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 523c26-27] and says that the reasoning is wrong; in fact, a Buddha will appear even when lives are short and the *kaṣāyas* are strong, as long as someone can properly achieve what the Buddha accomplished [T. 1562: 523c27-524a8].)

3.18) (I have been unable to find any discussion in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which the non-appearance of the Buddha is linked to the five *kaṣāyas.* However, it is perhaps relevant that in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi, āyuṣkaṣāya* is defined as the period, like our own, in which the human life span diminishes to less than a hundred years.

tadyathā etarhy alpaṃ jīvitaṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ / yaś ciraṃ jīvati / sa varṣaśataṃ [*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 252.19-20]; *'di lta ste / da ltar gyi mi rnams ni 'tsho ba'i yun thuṅ ste / gaṅ yun riṅ du 'tsho ba des kyaṅ lo brgya*[172] *thub par zad do* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* źi 152a4-5]; 如於今時人壽短促。極長壽者不過百年。昔時不爾。是名壽濁 [T. 1579: 538a7-9])

[172] Corrected from *rgya* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

Chapter 4 *Karmanirdeśa*

4.1) According to Vasubandhu, *kṣaṇika* means "possessing a moment," that is, being destroyed immediately after coming into existence. He compares this to the word *daṇḍika,* which means "possessing a stick (*daṇḍa*)."

ko 'yaṃ kṣaṇo nāma / ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī / so 'syāstīti kṣaṇikam / daṇḍikavat (Pradhan: 193.2; T. 1558: 67c11-12; Poussin v. 3: 4; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 533b21-22] and criticizes it on the grounds that, unlike a man and a stick, which are different things, there are no two separate things corresponding to *kṣaṇa* and *kṣaṇika* [T. 1562: 533b22-c4; Poussin 1936-1937: 146]; see Rospatt 1995: 105-110.)

4.1) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding specifically to this argument, but similar notions of momentariness appear in the text. See, for example, item 3.17.)

4.2) Vasubandhu asserts that destruction is not dependent on a cause.

saṃskṛtasyāvaśyaṃ vyayāt ākasmiko hi bhāvānāṃ vināśaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / kāryasya hi kāraṇaṃ bhavati / vināśaś cābhāvaḥ / yāś cābhāvas tasya kiṃ kartavyam / so 'sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpannamātrasya na syāt paścad api na syād bhāvasya tulyatvāt / athānyathībhūtaḥ na yuktaṃ tasyaivānyathātvam / na hi sa eva tasmād vilakṣano yujyate

(Pradhan: 193.5-10; T. 1558: 67c17-20; Poussin v. 3: 5; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 533c6-9] and criticizes it, saying that, because of the validity of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas,* destruction must have a cause [T. 1562: 533c9-21]; see Rospatt 1995: 180-181.)

4.2) In the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, it is said that all *saṃskāras* are destroyed due to their own nature.

tatra sākalyena rūpaskandaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ vaktavyaḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / utpannasya vināśopalambhataḥ / na cotpādakāraṇaṃ vināśakāraṇaṃ [/] yujyate vilakṣaṇatvāt / nā-(lacuna) *<ata->ḥ svarasavināśaḥ sarvasaṃskārāṇāṃ veditavyaḥ / ataś ca kṣaṇikatvaprasiddhiḥ* (Sanskrit manuscript as quoted by Rospatt [1995: 182 n. 399]); *de la gzugs kyi phuṅ po thams cad ni skad cig pa yin par brjod par bya'o / de ci'i phyir źe na / skyes nas 'jig pa dmigs pa'i phyir ro / skye ba'i rgyu ni 'jig pa'i rgyu yin par mi ruṅ ste / mtshan ñid mi 'dra ba'i phyir ro / skyes pa gnas pa'i rgyu de las gźan pa yaṅ mi dmigs pas de'i phyir 'du byed thams cad ni raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis 'jig pa yin par rig par bya ste / de'i phyir skad cig pa ñid rab tu grub bo* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 58a4-6); 復次一切色蘊當言皆是刹那滅性。何以故。諸行纔生尋即壞滅。現可得故。又不應謂能生之因即是滅因。其相異故。又法生已餘停住因不可得故。是故當知一切諸行皆任運滅。由此道理刹那義成 (T. 1579: 600a18-22)[173]

[173] This passage is translated by Rospatt, who also provides the Tibetan text and the text from the Sanskrit manuscript (1995: 181-182 n. 399). Rospatt thinks that the argument here is somewhat different from that of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1995: 181-182).

4.3) Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that *saṃsthānarūpa* is only a *prajñapti,* because if it were real, then a single *saṃsthānarūpa,* for example, length, would be perceived by two *rūpīndriyas,* for example, the eye and the body.

nāsti saṃsthānaṃ dravyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / ekadiṅmukhe hi bhūyasi varṇa utpanne dīrghaṃ rūpam iti prajñapyate / tam evāpekṣyālpīyasi hrasvam iti / caturdiśaṃ bhūyasi caturasram iti / sarvatra same vṛttim iti / evaṃ sarvam / tad yathā 'lātam ekasyāṃ diśi deśāntareṣv anantareṣu nirantaram āśu dṛśyamānaṃ dīrgham iti pratīyate sarvato dṛśyamānaṃ maṇḍalam iti na tu khalu jātyantaram asti saṃsthānam / yadi hi syāt dvigrāhyaṃ syāt cakṣuṣā hi dṛṣṭvā dīrgham ity avasīyate kāyendriyeṇāpi spṛṣṭveti dvābhyām asya grahaṇaṃ prāpnuyāt / na ca rūpāyatanasya dvābhyāṃ grahaṇam asti / yathā vā spraṣṭavye dīrghādigrahaṇaṃ tathā varṇe saṃbhāvyatām (Pradhan: 194.14-21; T. 1558: 68b1-11; Poussin v. 3: 8-9; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 535c23-536a4] and criticizes it at length, arguing that a single *indriya,* for example, the eye, perceives two different characteristics, for example, length and whiteness [T. 1562: 536a4-b5].)

4.3) In the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, *saṃsthānarūpa* (shape) is said to be a *prajñapti* because it is nothing more than a conglomeration of *rūpa* with no characteristics of its own.

riṅ po daṅ thuṅ ṅu ñid la sogs pa gaṅ dag dbyibs źes bya ba de dag kyaṅ ci rdzas su yod pa 'am / btags pa'i yod pa yin par brjod bar bya źe na / smras pa / btags pa'i yod pa yin par brjod par bya'o / de ci'i phyir źe na / bsags pa las gnas pa ni dbyibs śes bya ba'i ṅes pa'i tshig yin pa daṅ bsags pa tsam dmigs pa daṅ / mtshan ñid las gźan pa'i don mi dmigs pa daṅ / bltos śiṅ bltos na ṅo bo ñid 'dres par 'gyur ba daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 56a1-3); 問諸長短等所説形色。當言實有爲假有耶。答當言假有。何以故。積集而住故名爲形。唯有衆色積集可得。餘形色相不可得故。又必相待。相待之法有自性者。彼法便有雜亂過失 (T. 1579: 599b7-11)

See also the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi,* where the definition is the same, but *saṃsthānarūpa* is not said to be a *prajñapti* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 4.15-17; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 3a4; T. 1579: 279b6-7).

In a passage in the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi* (just after the one mentioned above), it is stated that *saṃsthānarūpa* is a conglomeration of *rūpa* having features distinguished as "long," etc.

saṃsthānaṃ katamat / yo rūpapracayo dīrghādiparicchedākāraḥ (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 5.2); *dbyibs gaṅ źe na / gaṅ gzugs rgyas par riṅ po la sogs par yoṅs su bcad* [corrected from *gcad* on the basis of the Derge] *pa'i rnam pa'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 3a6); 形色者謂若色積集長短等分別相 (T. 1579: 279b8-9)

4.4) The Sarvāstivādins explain that *saṃsthānarūpa* is not perceived by touch, etc. Instead, the notion of length, etc., arises from our memory when we perceive something, just as when we see a fire, we remember that fire is hot. Vasubandhu argues that this is a false analogy, because fire and heat are invariably associated, whereas touch and shape are not.

smṛtimātraṃ tatra spraṣṭavyasāhacaryāt bhavati / sa tu sāhacaryāt bhavati na tu sākṣāt grahaṇam / yathā 'gnirūpaṃ dṛṣṭvā tasyoṣṇatāyāṃ smṛtir bhavati puṣpagandhaṃ ca ghrātvā tad varṇa iti / yuktam atrāvyabhicāratvād anyenānyasya smaraṇaṃ na tu kiṃcit spraṣṭavyaṃ kvacit saṃsthāne niyataṃ yatas tatra smaraṇaṃ niyamena syāt / athāsaty api sāhacaryaniyame saṃsthānasmaraṇaṃ niyamena syāt / varṇe 'pi syāt varṇavad vā saṃsthāne 'py aniyamena syāt / na caivaṃ bhavati / ayuktam asya spraṣṭavyāt smaraṇam
(Pradhan: 194.22-195.3; T. 1558: 68b11-20; Poussin v. 3: 9-10; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 536b5-7] and says that Vasubandhu's argument does not successfully disprove the real existence of *saṃsthānarūpa* as a separate entity from *varṇa* [T. 1562: 536b7-18].)

4.4) (Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* states that *saṃsthānarūpa* is not a real entity [see item 4.3], nothing corresponding to this argument can be found in the text.)

4.5) Vasubandhu argues that *saṃsthānarūpa,* unlike real *rūpa* (i.e., *varṇa*), cannot be found in an atom. It is merely a designation for many things arranged in a certain way.

yac cāpi kiṃcit pratighaṃ rūpam asti tad avaśyaṃ paramāṇau vidyate / na cāṇau tat na ca saṃsthānaṃ paramāṇau vidyate dīrghādi / tasmād bahuṣv eva tathā saṃniviṣṭeṣu dīrghādiprajñaptiḥ / atha mataṃ saṃsthānaparamāṇava eva tathā saṃniviṣṭā dīrghādisaṃjñāṃ labhanta iti / so 'yam kevalaḥ pakṣapātas teṣām asiddhatvāt / siddha-svalakṣaṇānāṃ hi teṣāṃ saṃcayo yujyate / na ca saṃsthānāvayavānāṃ varṇādivat svabhāvaḥ siddha iti kuta eṣāṃ saṃcayaḥ
(Pradhan: 195.6-10; T. 1558: 68b22-29; Poussin v. 3: 10-11; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as another "proof" of the unreality of *saṃsthānarūpa,* presumably the idea of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 536b19-26], and criticizes it, arguing that *varṇa* and *saṃsthānarūpa* are in fact two independently existing types of *rūpa* and that, just as atoms of *varṇa* are proved to exist, so are atoms of *saṃsthānarūpa* [T. 1562: 536b26-c21].)

4.5) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* adduces, as another reason for why *saṃsthānarūpa* is a *prajñapti,* the fact that it can be divided by thought, like a cart.

de blos bye bas śiṅ rta la sogs pa daṅ 'dra ba'i phyir ro (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 56a3); 又如車等彼覺可壞故 (T. 1579: 599b11)

4.6) The Sarvāstivādins ask what *kāyavijñapti* is, if it is not *saṃsthānarūpa.* Vasubandhu answers that it is *saṃsthānarūpa* but that *saṃsthānarūpa* is *prajñapti,* not *dravya.*

athedanīṃ kāyasya gatiṃ nirākṛtya saṃsthānaṃ ca tatra bhavantaḥ sautrāntikāḥ kāṃkāyavijñaptiṃ prajñapayanti / saṃsthānam eva hi te kāyavijñaptiṃ prajñapayanti / na tu punar dravyataḥ
(Pradhan: 195.15-17; T. 1558: 68c8-9; Poussin v. 3: 12; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master is stating the opinion of his own school [T. 1562: 537a24-26] and criticizes it, suggesting that since Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas argue that *saṃsthānarūpa* is not different from *varṇa,* then they must think that *varṇa* is *prajñapti,* too [T. 1562: 537a26-b13].)[174]

[174] In the course of this argument, Saṃghabhadra refers to Sautrāntika three times (T.1562: 537b3, b7, b8). It seems as though he is all but identifying Sautrāntika as the school of the sūtra-master.

4.6) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not define *kāyavijñapti* as *saṃsthānarūpa*. But see 4.3 and 4.5 for its assertion that *saṃsthānarūpa* is *prajñapti*.)

4.7) Vasubandhu defines *kāyavijñapti* as an action that has the body as its object. He equates this action with the volition that initiates the movement of the body. *Vāgvijñapti* and *manovijñapti* are to be understood similarly.

tāṃ ca prajñapayantaḥ kathaṃ kāyakarma prajñapayanti / kāyādhiṣṭhānaṃ karma kāyakarma yā cetanā kāyasya tatra tatra praṇetrī / evaṃ vāṅmanaskarmaṇī api yathā-yogaṃ veditavye / yat tarhi cetanā karma cetayitvā cety uktaṃ saṃkalpacetanā pūrvaṃ bhavaty evaṃ caivaṃ ca kariṣyāmīti / tathā cetayitvā paścāt kriyā cetanotpadyate / yayā kāyaḥ preryate sā 'sau cetayitvā karmety ucyate
(Pradhan: 195.17-21; T. 1558: 68c10-17; Poussin v. 3: 12-13; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 537b13-21] and criticizes it in great detail [T. 1562: 537b21-539b29]; in the course of this argument, Saṃghabhadra attributes to Sautrāntika the belief that all karma is *cetanā,* a belief that he refutes from the Sarvāstivādin point of view (T. 1562: 537c17-538b7.)

4.7) According to the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*, both *kāyābhisaṃskāra* and *vāgabhisaṃskāra* arise due to, and after, *abhisaṃskāralakṣaṇa.*[175]

karmasvabhāvaḥ katamaḥ / yo dharma utpadyamāno abhisaṃskāralakṣanaś cotpadyate tasya cotpādāt kāyābhisaṃskāro vāgabhisaṃskāras tad uttarakālaṃ pravartate / ayam ucyate karmasvabhāvaḥ (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 170.17-19); *las kyi ṅo bo ñid gaṅ źe na / chos gaṅ skye ba na mṅon par 'du byed pa'i*[176] *mtshan ñid kyaṅ skye la / de skyes pas de'i rjes la lus kyi mṅon par 'du byed pa daṅ / ṅag gi mṅon par 'du byed pa 'jug par 'gyur de / 'di ni las kyi ṅo bo ñid ces bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 99b5-6); 業自性云何。謂若法生時。造作相起。及由彼生故。身行語行於彼後時造作而轉。是名業自性 (T. 1579: 315a18-20)

The *Manobhūmi* says that the activity of *cetanā* is to arouse *vitarka, kāyakarma, vākkarma,* etc.

cetanā kiṃkarmikā / vitarkakāyavākkarmādisamutthānakarmikā (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 60.13-14); *sems pa las ci byed ce na / rtog pa daṅ / lus daṅ ṅag gi las*[177] *la sogs pa bsloṅ ba'i las byed do* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 34b1); 思作何業。謂發起尋伺身語業等爲業 (1579: 291c11-12)

See also the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* for the same statement (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 62b1; T. 1579: 602a2).

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* defines karma as *cetanā* as well as *kāyakarma* and *vākkarma,* which arise after a volition.

kṛtaṃ karma katamat / yac cetitaṃ cetayitvā punaḥ kāyena vācā samutthāpitaṃ (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 190.6-7); *byas pa'i las gaṅ źe na / bsams pa 'am / bsams nas kyaṅ lus daṅ ṅag gis kun nas bslaṅ ba gaṅ yin pa'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 110b4); 作業者。謂若思業。若思已所起身業語業 (1579: 319b13-14)

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[175] The *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation equates *abhisaṃskāralakṣaṇa* with *manaskarma* and says that the point of the passage is that karma is *cetanā* in essence (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Yuga-bu 1: 151 n. 27; the contents of this note are based on the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* [T. 1609: 785c22-28], a portion of which is quoted by P'u-kuang [T. 1821: 205a6-8]).

[176] Corrected from *pa pa'i* on the basis of the Derge.

[177] Corrected from *ṅag gi la sogs pa* on the basis of all other versions.

4.8) One Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that the *sūtra* says that there are three types of *rūpa,* one of which is invisible and not subject to collision (*apratigha*). According to Sarvāstivāda, this must be *avijñapti* (Pradhan: 196.6-9; T. 1558: 68c29-69a4; Poussin v. 3: 14). Vasubandhu, in making what he describes as the Sautrāntika argument against Sarvāstivāda, quotes those who practice *yoga* (*yogācārāḥ*) as saying that, due to the power of meditation, a *rūpa* that is the object of meditation is produced in meditators. This *rūpa* is invisible because it is not the object of *cakṣurindriya,* and it is not subject to collision because it does not cover any place. Vasubandhu defends this statement against a possible Sarvāstivādin objection.

yat tāvad uktaṃ trividharūpokter iti / tatra yogācārā upadiśanti/ dhyāyināṃ samādhi-viṣayo[178] *rūpaṃ samādhiprabhāvād utpadyate / cakṣurindriyāviṣayatvāt anidarśanam / deśānāvaraṇatvād apratigham iti / atha matam/ katham idānīṃ tat rūpam iti / etad avijñaptau samānam*
(Pradhan: 197.4-7; T. 1558: 69a29-b4; Poussin v. 3: 18; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 540c21-24] and criticizes it, saying that *rūpa* produced by meditation, like other types of *rūpa,* such as *rūpa* in the *antarābhava,* and *rūpa* in a dream, is based on visible *rūpa;* the implication, I believe, is that in contrast *avijñaptirūpa* has no relation whatsoever to visible *rūpa* [T. 1562: 540c24-541a8].)

[178] The reading in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* is better: *samādhiviṣayarūpam* (355.15).

4.8) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* includes, in the category of really existent, *rūpa* that is: 1) like a transformation belonging to the domain of *samādhi* as the result of supernatural power; 2) the result of that [*samādhi*]; 3) the object of that [*samādhi*]; 4) the object of the consciousness associated with that [*samādhi*]. This is contrasted with **saṃvararūpa* and **asaṃvararūpa*, which are merely *prajñapti*. (See also item 1.2.)

dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ punā rūpaṃ dvividhaṃ dravyasat prajñaptisac ca / yat prabhāvataḥ samādhigocaraṃ nirmitavat tatphalaṃ tadviṣayaṃ tatpra*tisaṃyukta-vijñānaviṣayaṃ ca tad dravyasat / saṃvarāsaṃvarasaṃgṛhītaṃ tu prajñaptisat;*[179] *chos kyi skye mched du gtogs pa'i gzugs ni rnam pa gñis te / rdzas su yod pa daṅ btags pa'i yod pa'o / mthu las byuṅ ba'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi spyod yul sprul pa lta bu de'i 'bras bu daṅ / de'i yul daṅ de daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i rnam par śes pa'i yul gaṅ yin pa de ni rdzas su yod pa yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*T: zi 51a8-b1); 墮法處色亦有二種。謂實有假有。若有威德定所行境猶如變化。彼果彼境及彼相應識等境色是實物有。若律儀色不律儀色皆是假有 (T. 1579: 597b6-9)

[179] According to Matsuda Kazunobu (private communication), this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has transcribed it as above (non-italicized portions represent Matsuda's reconstruction).

4.9) Another Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that the *sūtra* says that there is an *anāsravarūpa*. Vasubandhu again quotes those who practice *yoga,* who say that the *rūpa* produced by the power of *samādhi* is *anāsrava* if the *samādhi* in which it is produced is *anāsrava.*

yad apy uktam anāsravarūpokter iti tad eva samādhiprabhāvasaṃbhūtaṃ rūpam anāsrave samādhāv anāsravaṃ varṇayanti yogācārāḥ
(Pradhan: 197.7-8; T. 1558: 69b4-6; Poussin v. 3: 18-19; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 541a11-13], questions the identity of these *yogācāras,* expressing surprise that Vasubandhu quotes from them in interpreting *sūtra* (T. 1562: 541a13-15), and allows that an *anāsravarūpa,* different from both *varṇa* and *saṃsthānarūpa,* may be produced by the power of *samādhi;* however, this *rūpa* can actually be nothing other than *avijñaptirūpa* [T. 1562: 541a13-19].)

4.9) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that the *rūpa* that is the object of *samādhi* arises on the basis of the *mahābhūtas* associated with that *samādhi,* and it arises on the basis of *laukikasamādhi,* whether *sāsrava* or *anāsrava.* However, it does not arise on the basis of *lokottarasamādhi* because it is caused by a *samādhi* in which *prapañca* is present.

tat punaḥ samādhigocaraṃ rūpaṃ yatpratisaṃyuktaḥ samādhiḥ tatpratisaṃyuktāny eva tanmahābhūtāny upādāya laukikaṃ sāsravānāsravaṃ samādhim upādāyotpadyate na tu lokottaraṃ / saprapaṃcākārasamādhihetukatvāt tasya;[180] *tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs de yaṅ tiṅ ṅe 'dzin*[181] *'byuṅ ba chen po dag rgyur byas pa'i gzugs gaṅ daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa de dag ñid daṅ de yaṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa yin no / 'jig rten pa'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ zag pa med pa la brten nas skye ba yin gyi / 'jig rten las 'das pa las ni ma yin te / de ni spros pa'i rnam pa daṅ bcas pa'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi rgyu las byuṅ ba'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 51b1-3); 又定所行色若依此繫定。即由此繫大種所造。又此定色但是世間有漏無漏由定而生。非出世間由此定色有戲論行定爲因故 (T. 1579: 597b9-12)

[180] According to Matsuda Kazunobu [private communication], this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has transcribed it as above.

4.10) A third Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that the *sūtra* says that merit increases. Vasubandhu quotes the *pūrvācāryas,* who say that the merit increases when the recipients of a gift use the gift, even though, in the time between the giving of the gift and its use, the giver of the gift might have a bad thought. Due to the nature of *dharmas,* the *saṃtatis* of the givers of gifts are perfumed by the volition toward the recipient that accompanied the gift, and their *saṃtatis* undergo a gradual transformation until they can give rise to greater results.[181]

yad apy uktaṃ puṇyābhivṛddhivacanād iti tatrāpi pūrvācāryā nirdiśanti dharmatā hy eṣā yathā yathā dātṝṇāṃ dāyāḥ paribhujyante tathā tathā bhoktṝṇāṃ guṇaviśeṣād anugrahaviśeṣāc cānyamanasām api datṝṇāṃ tadālambanadānacetanābhāvitāḥ saṃtatayaḥ sūkṣmaṃ pariṇāmaviśeṣaṃ prāpnuvanti yenāyatyāṃ bahutaraphalābhiniṣpattaye samarthā bhavanti
(Pradhan: 197.14-17; T. 1558: 69b13-20; Poussin v. 3: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 541c8-14], explains the terms *saṃtati, pariṇāma,* and *viśeṣa,* says that he has already refuted similar ideas that Vasubandhu is now deviously expressing in different words, and proceeds once again to criticize the theory of *pariṇāmaviśeṣa* and the *bīja* metaphor from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint [T. 1562: 541c14-542b6].)

[181] Hakamaya mentions this passage and suggests the possibility that the idea of *pariṇāmaviśeṣa* here may be that of a Sautrāntika group that preceded Vasubandhu and that cannot be identified with Yogācāra. But he leaves the question open (1986).

4.10) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not explain the accumulation of merit in terms of the transformation of the *saṃtati.* However, the following passages may be relevant:

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* uses the phrase *viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate* in explaining how good or bad actions produce desired or undesired results. [See item 2.12.]

yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaṃ nirvartate [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 128.2'-4]; *'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags źes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa daṅ mi sdge pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 75b4-5]; 謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生 [T. 1579: 305b3-6]

In the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi,* it is said that wealth accrues due to good karma produced by *dāna* and accumulated in former lives.

ji ltar na sbyin pa las loṅs spyod can du 'gyur ba yin źe na / 'di ltar 'di na la la sṅon gyi tshe rabs gźan dag tu sbyin pa las byuṅ bai bsod nams bya ba'i dṅos po byas śiṅ bsags par gyur te / de da ltar phyug pa'i khyim daṅ / nor che ba nas mdzod daṅ / baṅ mdzod kyi tshogs maṅ ba'i bar gyi khyim du skye bar 'gyur ba 'blta bu'o [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 269a2-4]; 云何布施能具珍財。謂如有一昔餘生中及增長施福事業。由此因緣。今生巨富大財寶家。乃至衆多府軍盈積云 [T. 1579: 375b13-16]

The idea that certain observable phenomena are attributable to the nature of *dharmas* [*dharmatā*] appears in various places in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in definitions of *dharmatāyukti,* for example in the *Śrāvakabhūmi:*

dharmatā-yuktiḥ katamā / kena kāraṇena tathābhūtā ete skandhā[*s*] *tathābhūto lokasaṃniveśaḥ kena kāraṇena khara-lakṣaṇā pṛthivī drava-lakṣaṇā āpaḥ uṣṇalakṣaṇaṃ teja*[*ḥ*] *samudīraṇa-lakṣaṇo vayuḥ / anityāḥ skandhā*[*ḥ*] */ kena kāraṇena śāntaṃ nirvāṇam iti / tathā rūpa*[*ṇa*]*-lakṣaṇaṃ rūpam anubhavana-lakṣaṇā vedanā saṃjānanā-lakṣaṇā saṃjñā abhisaṃskaraṇa-lakṣaṇāḥ saṃskārā vijānanā-lakṣaṇaṃ vijñānam iti / prakṛtir eṣāṃ dharmāṇām idaṃ svabhāva eṣa īdṛśaḥ dharmataiṣā*[*ṃ*] *caiva cāsau dharmatā / saivātra yuktir yoga upāyaḥ evaṃ vā etasmāt / anyathā vā naiva vāsmāt sarvatraiva ca dharmataiva pratiprasaraṇaṃ dharmataiva yuktiḥ / cittanidhyapanāya cittasaṃjñapanāya iyam ucyate dharmatā-yuktiḥ* [Wayman 1961: 79; *Śrāvakabhūmi:* 143.4-16]; *chos ñid kyi rigs pa gaṅ źe na / ci'i phyir phuṅ po rnams de lta bur gyur pa yin / 'jig rten gnas pa de lta bur gyur pa yin / ci'i phyir sa'i*

4.10 continued) *mtshan ñid sra ba yin / chu'i mtshan ñid gśer ba yin / me'i mtshan ñid tsha ba yin / rluṅ gi mtshan ñid g.yo ba yin / ci'i phyir phuṅ po rnams mi rtag pa yin / ci'i phyir mya ṅan las 'das pa źi ba yin / de bźin du ci'i phyir gzugs kyi mtshan ñid gzugs su ruṅ ba yin / tshor ba'i mtshan ñid myoṅ ba yin / 'du śes kyi mtshan ñid kun śes par byed pa yin / 'du byed rnams kyi mtshan ñid mṅon par 'du byed pa yin / rnam par śes pa'i mtshan ñid rnam par śes par byed pa yin źe na / de ni chos ñid yin te / chos de dag gi raṅ bźin de yin źiṅ / de dag gi ṅo bo ñid de lta bu yin pas chos ñid de gaṅ kho na yin pa de ñid 'dir rigs pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / thabs yin no / de bźin du de lta bu 'am / gźan nam / gźan du ma 'gyur pa ni sems la bźag par bya ba daṅ / sems la go bar bya ba'i phyir thams cad du yaṅ chos ñid kho na la brten pa daṅ / chos ñid kho na'i rigs pa yin te / de ni chos ñid kyi rigs pa źes bya'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*,: wi 68b6-69a4]; 云何名爲法爾道理。謂何因縁故即彼諸蘊。如是種類。諸器世間。如是安布。何因縁故地堅爲相。水濕爲相火煖爲相風用輕動以爲其相。何因縁故諸蘊無常諸法無我涅槃寂靜。何因縁故色變壞相受領納相。想等了相行造作相。識了別相。由彼諸法本性應爾。自性應爾。法性應爾。即此法爾説名道理瑜伽方便。或即如是或異如是或非如是。一切皆以法爾爲依。一切皆歸法爾道理。令心安住令心曉了。如是名爲法爾道理 [T. 1579: 419b28-c9])

4.11) Vasubandhu raises a hypothetical objection to the argument of the *pūrvācāryas* that he supports in 4.10: how can the recipient's action affect the donor? He answers this objection by saying that the argument would apply equally even if one attributed the increase in merit to *avijñapti.*

atha mataṃ katham idānīṃ saṃtānāntaraviśeṣād anyamanaso 'pi saṃtānāntarasya pariṇāmaḥ setsyatīti / etad avijñaptau samānam / katham idānīṃ saṃtānāntaraviśeṣāt saṃtānāntare dharmāntaram avijñaptiḥ setsyatīti
(Pradhan: 197.18-20; T. 1558: 69b20-23; Poussin v. 3: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 542b6-11] and, after complaining that Vasubandhu confuses issues by not properly understanding the reasoning of his own or other schools, explains that the *avijñapti* is continually replicated in the donor's *saṃtāna* and that, since all *saṃskṛtadharmas* depend on external causes, it is not wrong to say that a special quality of the recipient can result in an increase in the donor's merit [T. 1562: 542b11-28].)

4.11) (I can find no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.12) After explaining that merit increases in the case of non-material meritorious actions because the *saṃtāna* undergoes a subtle transformation due to the repetition of volitions with the Tathāgata and the *śrāvakas* as objects,[182] Vasubandhu points out that the Sarvāstivādins would say that there is no *vijñapti* in the case of non-material meritorious actions, and therefore there should be no *avijñapti.*

nirupadhikeṣv idānīṃ puṇyakriyāvastuṣu kathaṃ bhaviṣyatīti / abhīkṣṇaṃ tad-ālambanacetanābhyāsāt svapneṣv api tā anuṣaṅginyo bhavanti / avijñaptivādinas tu niraupadhike yatra vijñaptir nāsti tatra katham avijñaptiḥ syāt
(Pradhan: 197.20-22; T. 1558: 69b23-26; Poussin v. 3: 20-21; Saṃghabhadraidentifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 542b28-29] and criticizes it, saying that when one honors the Tathāgata and the *śrāvakas,* one does in fact produce *vijñapti* as well as *avijñapti* because there is a physical manifestation that accompanies the non-material meritorious action; furthermore, the increase in merit would be impossible without *avijñapti* [T. 1562: 542b29-c12].)

[182] See the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 356.10-12.

4.12) (I can find no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.13) A fourth Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that, if *avijñapti* did not exist, it would be impossible for the action of a person who orders someone else to do something to be *karmapatha*. Vasubandhu responds that the person who gives the orders will have a subtle transformation of his *saṃtāna* at the moment the action is carried out. This transformation is called *karmapatha*.

yad apy uktaṃ kārayataḥ kathaṃ karmapathāḥ setsyantīti tatrāpy evaṃ varṇayanti / tatprayogeṇa pareṣām upaghātaviśeṣāt prayoktuḥ sūkṣmaḥ saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣo jāyate yata āyatyāṃ santatir api[183] *bahutaraphalābhinirvartanasamarthā bhavatīti svayam api ca kurvataḥ kriyāphalaparisamāptāv eṣa eva nyāyo veditavyaḥ / so 'sau saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ karmapatha ity ākhyāyate / kārye kāraṇopacārāt / kāyikavācikatvaṃ tu tatkriyāphalatvād yathā 'vijñaptivādināṃ avijñapter iti* (Pradhan: 198.2-6; T. 1558: 69c6-11; Poussin v. 3: 21-22; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 542c12-18] and refutes it, yet again criticizing the theory of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* from the Vaibhāṣika point of view [T. 1562: 542c18-543a17].)

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[183] Corrected from *samante 'pi* by Funahashi on the basis of the Tibetan (1987: 66 n. 11).

4.13) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain an argument regarding the karma of one who orders an action to be committed. However, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* explains how a person belonging to the ranks of those who are *asaṃvara* repeatedly accumulates bad thoughts, thereby activating bad actions and increasing unmeritorious karma. When his bad thoughts enable him to actualize karma, and when, due to seeds and due to their actualization, there is a change in his *saṃtāna,* he is called "one who is *asaṃvara.*"

sdom pa ma yin pa'i rigs su skyes pa ji lta ba bźin du gaṅ su yaṅ ruṅ ba gaṅ daṅ gaṅ nas 'oṅs kyaṅ ruṅ ste / sems skyed par byed pa yaṅ de bźin du rgyas par rig par bya'o / de ni ji srid du sdom pa ma yin pa'i sems pa spoṅ bar mi byed pa de srid du ma bsdams par brjod par bya ste / de ni ñin gcig bźin du sems pa de maṅ du sogs pa daṅ / las de kun tu sbyor bas bsod nams ma yin pa mṅon par 'phel bar rig par bya'o / de'i log par smon pa'i sems pa ma dad pa daṅ / le lo daṅ brjed ṅas pa daṅ / rnam par g.yeṅ ba daṅ / śes rab 'chal pa daṅ ldan pa las de yaṅ dag par len par byed pa / las de kun nas sloṅ bar byed pa de yaṅ ji srid du gtoṅ ba'i rgyu dag gi spoṅ bar mi byed / yoṅs su gtoṅ bar mi byed kyi bar du de phyin chad kyaṅ sa bon daṅ kun tu spyod pa las rgyud du gtogs pa 'byuṅ ba ni sdom pa ma yin pa źes bya'o [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 31b1-4]; 如生不律儀家如是。隨是何人。隨由何事起決猛心。廣説應知。此人乃至不律儀思未捨己來。常得説名不律儀者。於日日分彼不善思廣積集故。彼不善業多現行故。當知非福運運增長復次此邪惡願思。恒與不信懈怠忘念散亂惡慧俱行。能受彼業能發彼業。從此己後由種子故及現行故。處相續中現在轉時名不律儀者。乃至由捨因縁未捨未棄 [T. 1579: 589c3-11])

4.14) The sixth Sarvāstivādin argument for the existence of *avijñapti* is that, without *avijñapti,* three members of the eightfold noble path, namely *samyagvāc, samyakkarmānta,* and *samyagājīva,* would be lacking in the case of an *ārya* in *samādhi.* Vasubandhu responds by asking whether the Sarvāstivādin thinks that the *ārya* engages in correct speech, etc., while in *samādhi.*

yad apy uktam aṣṭāṅga āryamārgo na syād iti / aṅgaṃ tāvad ācakṣva / kathaṃ mārgasamāpannasya samyagvākkarmāntājīvā bhavantīti / kim asau vācaṃ bhāṣyate kriyāṃ vā karoti cīvarādīn vā paryeṣate
(Pradhan: 198.17-19; T. 1558: 69c28-70a1; Poussin v. 3: 23; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 543a28-b2] and says that Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas should be asked the same question [T. 1562: 543b2-5].)

4.14) (I can find no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*)

4.15) Vasubandhu gives his own explanation for how the *ārya* in *samādhi* can be said to have all members of the eightfold path: the *ārya* has an intention (*āśaya*) and an *āśraya*[184] that, after he emerges from meditation, enable him to continue to produce *samyagvāc,* etc.

yady evam ihāpy evaṃ kiṃ na gṛhyate mārgasamāpanno vināpy avijñaptyā tadrūpam āśayaṃ ca āśrayaṃ ca pratilabhate yasya pratilambhāt vyutthito 'pi na punar mithyāvāgādiṣu pravartate samyagvāgādiṣu ca pravartate / ato nimitte naimittikopacāraṃ kṛtvā aṣṭau mārgāṅgāni vyavasthāpyanta iti
(Pradhan: 198.22-199.1; T. 1558: 70a4-7; Poussin v. 3: 24; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 543b5-8] and argues that, according to Vasubandhu's logic, the same thing could be said about *samyagdṛṣṭi,* which in fact must be present in *samādhi;* according to the Ābhidhārmikas, *samyagvāc,* etc., are actually present in *samādhi* in the form of *avijñapti* [T. 1562: 543b8-27].)

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[184] The *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* glosses *āśraya* as *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (357.31).

4.15) According to the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, *ālayavijñāna* is the cause of the activity of *kleśas* and of the non-activity of the Path,[185] while *āśrayaparivṛtti* is the cause of the non-activity of the *kleśas* and the activity of the Path.

kun gźi rnam par śeṡ pa ni ñon moṅs pa rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu daṅ lam gyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin la / gnas gyur pa ni ñon moṅs pa rnams kyi 'jug ma yin pa daṅ / lam du 'jug pa'i rgyu yin te (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 9b6-7); 又阿賴耶識。是煩惱轉因。聖道不轉因。轉依是煩惱不轉因。聖道轉因 (T. 1579: 581c12-14; see Schmithausen 1987: 369 n. 570)

[185] This is according to the Chinese translation. According to the Tibetan translation, *ālayavijñāna* is the cause of the activity of *kleśas* and is not the cause of the activity of the Path.

4.16) Vasubandhu says that the reason why *vipākaja citta* can be neither the cause (*pravartaka*) nor the accompaniment (*anuvartaka*) of karma is that it occurs without effort.[186]

vipākajaṃ tu cittaṃ naiva pravartakaṃ nānuvartakaṃ nirabhisaṃskāravāhitvāt (Pradhan: 205.2; T. 1558: 71c24-25; Poussin v. 3: 41; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 547b17-18] and criticizes it on the grounds that not all things that are not produced by effort fail to give rise to karma. He gives the example of innate *kuśala*, which can cause the production of *vijñaptikarma*, and says that the real reason is that *vipākaja citta* is too weak to act as a cause[187] [T. 1562: 547b26-29].)

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[186] Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation explains Vasubandhu's earlier statement that *anāsrava citta* is likewise neither the cause nor the accompaniment of karma: he says that this is because *anāsrava citta* is only produced in meditation (T. 1558: 71c25). Although this explanation is not found in the Sanskrit, the Tibetan, or Paramārtha's translation, it is supported by the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (366.26-27; see Poussin, v. 3: 40 n. 1). Saṃghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu's reasoning, saying that the *citta* of *sāsrava* meditation likewise is neither cause nor accompaniment of karma (T. 1562: 547b15-16).

[187] This is the reason offered by the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 610b24-26).

4.16) (I have found no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.17) Vasubandhu poses the question: does the moral nature of *vijñaptikarma* correspond to its *pravartaka* or its *anuvartaka*? He finds objections with each possibility and concludes that if the *pravartaka* is *bhāvanāheya,* the *vijñapti* must correspond to it. But if the *pravartaka* is *darśanaheya,* the *vijñapti* does not (necessarily?) correspond to it. According to Vasubandhu, there must be a *bhāvanāheya pravartaka* moment between the first *pravartaka* and the *vijñapti,* and the *vijñapti* will correspond to this second *pravartaka.*

kim idānīṃ yathā pravartakaṃ tathā vijñaptir āhosvid yathā 'nuvartakam / kiṃ cātaḥ / yathā pravartakaṃ cet / ihāpi nivṛtāvyākṛtā vijñaptiḥ prāpnoti / satkāyāntagrāhadṛṣṭipravartitatvāt / na vā sarvaṃ darśanaprahātavyaṃ pravartakam iti viśeṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam / yathānuvartakaṃ cet akuśalāvyākṛtacittasya prātimokṣavijñaptiḥ kuśalā na prāpnoti / yathā pravartaka tathā vijñaptir na tu yathā darśanaprahātavyam / bhāvanāheyāntaritatvāt
(Pradhan: 205.2-7; T. 1558: 72a13-18; Poussin v. 3: 41-42; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 547c23-29] and accuses Vasubandhu of expressing his own opinion while claiming to be presenting the view of the Ābhidhārmikas [T. 1562: 547c29-548a5].)

4.17) (I have found no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*)

4.18) Vasubandhu says that the *sūtra,* when it says that *mithyādṛṣṭi* causes *vijñapti,* does not contradict his own opinion that *vijñapti* does not correspond to a *darśana-heya pravartaka. Mithyādṛṣṭi* causes another *pravartaka,* one that is *bhāvanāheya,* which causes *vijñapti.* (This seems like little more than a restatement of Vasubandhu's position in 4.16.)

yadi nānuvartakavaśād vijñapteḥ kuśalāditvaṃ na tarhīdaṃ vaktavyam / hetu-samutthānaṃ saṃdhāyoktaṃ sūtre na tatkṣaṇasamutthānam / ato nāstīha nivṛtāvyākṛtā vijñaptir iti / evaṃ vaktavyam / anyavyavahitaṃ hetusamutthānaṃ saṃdhāyoktam iti
(Pradhan: 205.7-9; T. 1558: 72a20-25; Poussin v. 3: 42-43; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 548a5-8], explains it, and criticizes it, again complaining that Vasubandhu does not accurately present the Sarvāstivādin position [T. 1562: 548a8-23].)

4.18) (I have found no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The *sūtra* to which Vasubandhu refers [Pradhan 203.11-12; T. 1558: 71b25; Poussin v. 3: 39] is *Saṃyuktāgama*, *sūtra* 749 [T. 99: 198b13 ff.], which is not commented on in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*.)

4.19) In verse 26ab, Vasubandhu says that *saṃvara* that is produced by *dhyāna* is obtained by means of the *dhyānabhūmi,* that is to say, at the moment of obtaining the *citta* of the *dhyānabhūmi.*

dhyānajo dhyānabhūmyaiva labhyate yadā dhyānabhūmikaṃ cittaṃ pratilabhyate maulīyaṃ sāmantakīyaṃ vā sāsravaṃ tadā dhyānasaṃvaro 'pi sahabhūtatvāt (Pradhan: 211.19-21; T. 1558: 74b5-16; Poussin v. 3: 59; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 551a23, referring to what was quoted at 551a9-12] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu should have said "by means of *dhyāna,*" not "by means of *dhyānabhūmi*" because the word *dhyānabhūmi* refers to all the *dharmas* in *dhyāna.* In other words, if I understand correctly, Vasubandhu does not distinguish between the *dhyāna* and the *saṃvara* obtained therein [T. 1562: 551a20-24].)

4.19) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* concerning this question. However, an explanation of *dhyānasaṃvara* can be found in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 33b1-3; T. 1579: 590b23-27].)

4.20) Vasubandhu objects to the Sarvāstivādin statement that refraining from eating at an improper time is both fasting and a "member of fasting" (*upavāsāṅga*). The Sarvāstivādins say that it is analogous to *samyagdṛṣṭi, dharmapravicaya,* and *samādhi,* which are, respectively, *mārga, bodhi,* and *dhyāna* and, at the same time, *mārgāṅga, bodhyaṅga,* and *dhyānāṅga.* Vasubandhu says that the Sarvāstivādin explanation implies that the earlier *samyagdṛṣṭi* is a member of the later *samyagdṛṣṭi,* in which case the first moment of the *mārga* would not have eight members.

na tu teṣām eva samyagdṛṣṭyādīnāṃ ta evāṅgatvāya kalpanta iti / pūrvakāḥ samyagdṛṣṭyādaya uttareṣām aṅgaṃ yadi syuḥ prathamakṣaṇotpanna āryamārgo nāṣṭāṅga syāt
(Pradhan: 214.20-21; T. 1558: 75c14-17; Poussin v. 3: 69; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 552c19-12] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu misrepresents the Sarvāstivādin position, according to which *samyagdṛṣṭi,* etc., do not act as *aṅgas* with respect to themselves but only with respect to the other members [T. 1562: 552c12-22].)[188]

[188] See *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 28: 424 n. 41.

4.20) (I have found no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.21) According to Sarvāstivāda, one becomes an *upāsaka* simply by taking the triple refuge: one is thereby endowed with the *upāsaka* discipline. However, Vasubandhu points out that this contradicts the Buddha's statement that there are different kinds of *upāsakas,* who practice varying numbers of the five rules. The Sarvāstivādin explanation is that all *upāsakas* are endowed with the five rules but that some *upāsakas* do not observe all of them. Vasubandhu says that the Sarvāstivādins base their opinion on a *sūtra* that is not directly relevant to the definition of an *upāsaka.*[189]

yadi sarva evopāsakā upāsakasaṃvarasthāḥ kathaṃ bhagavatā ekadeśakārī pradeśakārī yadbhūyaḥkārī paripūrṇakārī copāsaka uktaḥ / tatpālanāt kila proktāḥ yo hi yacchikṣāpadaṃ pālayati sa tatkārīty uktaḥ / sarve tu samaṃ saṃvarasthāḥ / idam utsūtraṃ vartate / kim atrotsūtram / upāsakatvābhyupagamād eva saṃvaralābho yasmāt prāṇātipātam ity aheti / na hy evaṃ sūtrapāṭhaḥ ukto yathā mahānāmasūtre pāṭhaḥ / tatraiva copāsakalakṣaṇopadeśo nānyatra / yatra tv eṣa pāṭho yāvajjīvaṃ prāṇāpetaṃ śaraṇagatam abhiprasannam iti / tatra te dṛṣṭasatyā avetyaprasādānvayaṃ prāṇair api saddharmopagamanaṃ sma / jīvitahetor apy abhavyā vayam enaṃ dharmaṃ parityaktum iti / na tv eṣa lakṣaṇopadeśaḥ saṃvarasya / prāṇapetaṃ tu na kvacit paṭhyate
(Pradhan: 215.14-22; T. 1558: 76a19-28; Poussin v. 3: 73-74; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 553b3-12] and defends the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of *sūtra* [T. 1562: 553b12-c2].)

[189] Mochizuki suggests that Vasubandhu's is the standard Buddhist position (1974: 2: 1119). I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for this reference.

4.21) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains nothing explicit regarding this subject. However, the threefold division of *upāsaka saṃvara* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* might be relevant:[190]

de la dge bsñen gyi sdom pa ni yan lag gsum gyis bsdus pa yin te / yan lag gsum gaṅ źe na / gźan la gnod pa'i dṅos po[191] *spoṅ ba yaṅ dag par blaṅ ba'i yan lag daṅ / yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa las ñams pa phyir gso ba'i yan lag daṅ / yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa las mi ñams pa'i yan lag go / de la gźan gyi srog la gnod pa daṅ / loṅs spyod la gnod pa daṅ / chuṅ ma la gnod pa spoṅ ba ni yan lag daṅ po yin no / brdzun du smra ba spoṅ ba ni yan lag gñis pa yin no / chaṅ daṅ bcos pa'i chaṅ daṅ sbyar ba'i chaṅ bag med pa'i gnas spoṅ ba ni yan lag gsum pa yin par rig par bya'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 34b7-35a2]; 近事律儀由三支所攝。何等爲三。一受遠離最勝損他事支。二違越所受重修行支。三不越所受支。若永遠離損害他命損壞他財損他妻妾。是名初支[。] 遠離妄語是第二支。遠離諸酒衆放逸處。是第三支 [T. 1579: 591a9-14]

Furthermore, another passage in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* clearly shows a gradual obtainment of *saṃvara* in the case of the *bhikṣu.*

sdom pa yaṅ dag par blaṅ ba de yaṅ rnam pa brgyar gtogs par rig par bya ste / mi dge ba'i las kyi lam bcu spoṅ ba las[192] *brten te / srog gcod pa'i phyogs gcig spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar gyi phyogs gcig spoṅ ba 'di dag ni rnam pa bcu'o / srog gcod pa phal cher spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar phal cher spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ*

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[190] This description of the *upāsaka saṃvara* does not mention rules, in which respect it differs from the description of the *bhikṣu saṃvara,* which immediately precedes it: *dge sloṅ gi sdom pa ni yan lag tu źig gis bsdus / dge bsñen gi sdom pa ni yan lag tu źig gis bsdus / bsñen gnas pa'i sdom pa ni yan lag tu źig gis bsdus par rig par bya źe na / dge sloṅ gi sdom pa ni yan lag bźis bsdus par rig par bya ste / yan lag bźi gaṅ źe na / bsñen par rdzogs pa'i yan lag daṅ / de daṅ mthun pa'i chos kyi bslab pa'i gźi yaṅ dag par blaṅ ba'i yan lag daṅ / gźan gyi sems rjes su bsruṅ ba'i yan lag daṅ / bslab pa'i tshogs yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa rjes su sruṅ ba'i yan lag go / de la gsol ba daṅ bźi'i las bya ba daṅ / ji ltar bslab pa'i gźi che loṅ dag nod pa ni bsñen par rdzogs pa'i yan lag yin te / yan lag de daṅ ldan na dge sloṅ de daṅ po kho nar dge sloṅ* [Derge adds *gi dṅos po'i*] *tshul khrims des tshul khrims daṅ ldan pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 34a7-b4); 問苾芻近事近住律儀。當知各由幾支所攝。答苾芻律儀四支所攝。何等爲四。一受具足支。二受隨法學處支。三隨護他心支。四隨護如所受學處支。若作表白第四羯磨。及略攝受。隨麁學處。是名受具足支。由具此支故。名初苾芻具苾芻戒 (T. 1579: 590c24-29).

[191] Derge reads *dṅos po chen po.*

[192] Derge reads *la.*

4.21 continued) *gźan rnam pa bcu'o / srog gcod thams cad spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar thams cad spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / dus yun thuṅ ṅu ñin mtshan nam zla ba phyed dam / zla ba'am lor srog gcod pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / dus yun riṅ po lo phan chad nas ji srid 'tsho'i bar du ni ma yin par srog gcod pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / ji srid 'tsho'i bar du srog gcod pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / bdag ñid srog gcod pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / gźan dag de dag ñid yaṅ dag par len du 'jug pa 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / de dag gi bsṅags pa rnam graṅs du mar rjod par byed pa 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / srog gcod pa sboṅ ba nas log par blta ba'i bar spoṅ ba mthoṅ na yid bde bar 'dzin gciṅ dga' ba daṅ yid bde ba skye ba 'di dag kyaṅ gźan rnam pa bcu'o / bcu pa rnam pa bcu po de dag gcig tu bsdus nas rnam pa brgyar 'gyur te / bsod nams skye ba yaṅ de tsam kho nar rig pa bya'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 32b2-8]; 復次當知由百行所攝而受律儀。謂於十種不善業道少分離殺。乃至少分遠離邪見。是名初十行。若多分離殺生。乃至多分離邪見。是名第二十行。若全分離殺生。乃至全分離邪見。是名第三十行。若少時離殺生乃至離邪見。謂或一日一夜。或半月一月。或至一年。是名第四十行。若多時離殺生乃至離邪見。謂過一年不至命終。是名第五十行。若盡壽離殺生乃至離邪見。是名第六十行。若自離殺生乃至離邪見。是名第七十行。若於此事勸進他人。是名第八十行。若即於彼以無量門稱揚讚述。是名第九十行。若見離殺生者乃至離邪見者。深心慶悅生大歡喜。是名第十十行。如是十十行總説爲百行。所生福量當知亦爾 [T. 1579: 590a13-28])[193]

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[193] I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for bringing this passage to my attention.

4.22) According to Vasubandhu, the Sarvāstivādin argument that *upāsakas* are endowed with all the rules but break some of them does not make sense. The Sarvāstivādins assert that, if *upāsakas* were not always endowed with all the rules, then *bhikṣus* and *śrāmaṇeras* would likewise not always be endowed with all the rules. Vasubandhu replies that this argument is invalid because, unlike in the case of *upāsakas*, the Buddha has not mentioned *bhikṣus* or *śrāmaṇeras* who are not completely endowed with the rules.

ekadeśakāryādīṃs tu khaṇḍitaśikṣān adhikṛtya praśna eva na yujyate / kuto visarjanam āveṇikadharmāṇām / ko hy upāsakasaṃvaraṃ jānan etan na jñāsyate yo hi yacchikṣapādaṃ na khaṇḍayati sa tatkārī bhavatīti / upāsakasaṃvarasya tu parimāṇānabhijñāṃs tanmātraśikṣākṣamān praty eṣa praśno yujyate / kiyatā bhadantopāsaka ekadeśakārī bhavati yāvat paripūrṇakārī bhavati / yadi tarhi vinā saṃvareṇopāsakaḥ syād vikalena vā bhikṣuśrāmaṇerāv api syātām / kathaṃ tāvad eṣām upāsakasaṃvarādīnām aṅgapratiniyamo bhavati / śāstṛprajñaptivaśāt / upāsakatvādipratiniyamo 'pi śāstṛprajñaptivaśād iṣyatām / vināpi hi saṃvareṇopāsakaḥ prajñaptito na tu bhikṣuśrāmaṇerāv iti te tv etan na gacchanti kāśmīrāḥ
(Pradhan: 216.1-8; T. 1558: 76a29-b12; Poussin v. 3: 74-75; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 553c2-9] and insists that the Sarvāstivādin understanding that *upāsakas* are endowed with all five rules but observe varying numbers of them is correct [T. 1562: 553c9-554a21].)

4.22) (See 4.20.)

4.23) According to the Sarvāstivādins, when one takes refuge in the Buddha, one takes refuge in the *aśaikṣadharmas,* not in the physical body of the Buddha. Vasubandhu objects that, if the Buddha were nothing more than these *dharmas,* injuring him would not be a major offense (*ānantaryakarma*).[194] Vasubandhu discounts the Sarvāstivādin answer to this objection and says that their own texts never deny that the Buddha's *āśraya* also comprises *buddhatva.*

yady aśaikṣā dharmā eva buddhaḥ katham tathāgatasyāntike duṣṭacittarudhirotpādanād ānantaryaṃ bhavati / āśrayavipādanāt te 'pi vipāditā bhavantīti vaibhāṣikāḥ / śāstraṃ tu naivaṃ vācakam aśaikṣā dharmā eva buddha iti / kiṃ tarhi / buddhakārakā iti / ata āśrayasya buddhatvāpratiṣedhād acodyam evaitat
(Pradhan: 216.23-217.2; T. 1558: 76c7-12; Poussin v. 3: 78-79; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 556b7-11] and criticizes it, saying that if one took refuge in the Buddha's body, then even those who had not attained the *aśaikṣa-dharmas* could accomplish Buddhahood; furthermore, even if one did take refuge in the Buddha's body, it would have to be in his *paramārtha* body, which is equivalent to the *aśaikṣadharmas* [T. 1562: 556b11-25].)

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[194] This objection, attributed to Vasubandhu or to the Sautrāntikas by P'u-kuang (T.1821: 227b4-5), seems to be a hypothetical one.

4.23) In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*), the characteristic of the Tathāgata's *dharmakāya* is defined as the perfection of his *āśraya* resulting from his practice.

bcom ldan 'das la byaṅ chub sems dpa' 'jam dpal gyis źu bźus pa / bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa rnams kyi chos kyi sku źes bgyi na / bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa rnams kyi chos kyi sku'i mtshan ñid ji lta bu lags / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / 'jam dpal de bźin gśegs pa rnams kyi chos[195] *sku'i mtshan ñid ni sa daṅ pha rol tu phyin pa bsgoms pa'i ṅes par 'byuṅ bar gyur pa*[196] *yaṅ dag par grub pa yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 100b6-101a1); 曼殊室利菩薩摩訶薩請問佛言。世尊。如佛所說如來法身。如來法身有何等相。佛告曼殊室利菩薩曰。善男子。若於諸地波羅蜜多。善修出離。轉依成滿。是名如來法身之相 (T. 1579: 733c16-20)

This is contrasted with the *āśrayas* of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha,* which are not called *dharmakāya.*

bcom ldan 'das ci lags ñan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas rnams kyi sa gnas gyur pa gaṅ lags pa de yaṅ chos kyi sku legs par brjod par bgyi'am / 'jam dpal brjod par mi bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 101a2-3); 世尊。聲聞獨覺所得轉依。名法身不。善男子。不名法身 (T. 1579: 733c23-24)

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[195] Corrected from *de bźin gśegs pa rnams kyi sku'i* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

[196] Derge reads *ṅes par 'byuṅ bas gnas gyur pa.*

4.24) Vasubandhu says that if the Buddha is nothing more than the *aśaikṣa-dharmas,* then the *saṃgha* is likewise nothing more than the *śaikṣadharmas* and *aśaikṣadharmas* of the various monks. Thus, no one with a *laukikacitta* could be either the Buddha or a monk.

anyathā hi laukikacittastho na buddhaḥ syān na saṃghaḥ
(Pradhan: 217.2-3; T. 1558: 76c12-13; Poussin v. 3: 79; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 556b25-28] and criticizes it, saying that one does not lose these *dharmas* simply because one has a *laukikacitta* [T. 1562: 556b28-c4].)

4.24) (I can find nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that corresponds to this part of Vasubandhu's argument.)

4.25) Vasubandhu says that yet another undesirable consequence of the Buddha's being nothing more than the *aśaikṣadharmas* is that the word *bhikṣu* would refer only to the vows and not to the body of the *bhikṣu*.

śīlam eva ca bhikṣukarakaṃ bhikṣuḥ syāt
(Pradhan: 217.3; T. 1558: 76c13; Poussin v. 3: 79; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 556c4], says that the word *bhikṣu* is provisionally used to indicate the body of the *bhikṣu* because he takes the vows, and criticizes Vasubandhu for misunderstanding the "*abhidharma* tradition" [T. 1562: 556c4-7].)

4.25) (I can find nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that corresponds to this part of Vasubandhu's argument.)

4.26) The Sarvāstivādins argue that the unrestrained person is unrestrained with respect to all beings. But Vasubandhu argues that the sheep-killer has the intention only to kill the sheep, not, contrary to the Sarvāstivādins, to kill his own parents, who have been reborn as sheep. He maintains that, if the sheep-killer has the intention to kill his future parents, he is not unrestrained in the present with respect to the sheep.

yadi cānāgatātmabhāvāpekṣayā vartamānād asaṃvṛtaḥ syād urabhrādīn api te putrībhūtāt sarvathā na hanyur iti na syāt tebhyo 'saṃvaraḥ
(Pradhan: 221.20-21; T. 1558: 78c18-21; Poussin v. 3: 92; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 563a29-b3] and criticizes it, arguing that the evil intention is pervasive and is directed at all beings [T. 1562: 563b3-10].)

4.26) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain a similar argument. However, the explanation of the unrestrained person in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: zi 31a6-b4; T. 1579: 589b24-c11, partially quoted in item 4.13] suggests that becoming unrestrained is a gradual process resulting from the accumulation of bad actions based on bad thoughts or intentions. If so, it would not be unreasonable for one to be unrestrained toward certain beings and not toward others.)

4.27) In order to refute the Sarvāstivādin insistence that one who is not restrained is unrestrained with respect to all the infractions, Vasubandhu gives examples of sheep-killers who logically cannot be unrestrained with respect to all the other infractions: one who does not steal; one who is content to have sex only with his wife; one who is mute (and therefore cannot lie).

yaś caurabhriko janmanāpy[197] *ādatte svadāraparituṣoṭ mūkaś ca / katham asya sarvāṅgebhyo*[198] *'saṃvaraḥ syāt*
(Pradhan: 222.2-3; T. 1558: 78c25-26; Poussin v. 3: 93; Saṃghabhadra quotes this [T. 1562: 563b10-11] after his criticism of the preceding item, obviously treating it as part of the opinion of the sūtra-master, and says that, by killing the sheep, the sheep-killer destroys all his good intentions and therefore obtains all the *asaṃvaras* [T. 1562: 563b11-16].)

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[197]Funahashi says that a negative should be added on the basis of all the translations (1987: 219 n. 1).

[198]Corrected from *pūrvāṅgebhyo* (Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 431).

4.27) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains neither these examples nor the argument in general.)

4.28) Vasubandhu, in order to refute the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas, who say that monks who break even the most serious rules do not lose their *bhikṣu śīla,* quotes a passage from the *Vinaya* that implies that they do. The Sarvāstivādins argue that this passage cannot be taken literally: it really means that one who breaks a serious rule is not a "true" *bhikṣu,* that is to say, an arhat. However, Vasubandhu insists that the passage can be taken literally. He refers to another *Vinaya* passage that mentions four types of *bhikṣus,* the last of whom is the arhat. But he says that the first *Vinaya* passage refers to yet another type of *bhikṣu,* one who has taken the four vows (in other words, the ordinary *bhikṣu*). If a monk were an arhat to begin with, he would not be capable of breaking a rule and losing the quality of being a *bhikṣu.*[199]

yat tarhi bhagavatoktam bhikṣur[200] *bhavaty aśramaṇo 'śākyaputrīyo dhvasyate bhikṣubhāvāt / katamasya*[201] *bhavati śrāmaṇyam dhvastaṃ patitaṃ parājitam iti / paramārthabhikṣutvaṃ saṃdhāyaitad uktam / idam abhisāhasaṃ vartate / kim atrābhisāhasam / yat bhagavatā nītārthaṃ punar anyathā nīyate / dauḥśīlyāya ca bahukleśebhyaḥ pratyayā dīyante / katham etan nītārtham / eṣa hi vinaye nirdeśaḥ / caturvidho bhikṣuḥ / saṃjñābhikṣuḥ pratijñābhikṣur bhikṣata iti bhikṣur bhinnakleśatvāt bhikṣuḥ / asmiṃs tv arthe jñapticaturthakarmopasampanno bhikṣur iti / na cāsau pūrvaṃ paramārthabhikṣur āsīd yataḥ paścād abhikṣur bhavet*
(Pradhan: 223.11-18; T. 1558: 79b14-24; Poussin v. 3: 96-97; Saṃghabhadra quotes the portion beginning with *idam abhisāhasaṃ,* identifying it as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 565a14-22], and criticizes it, saying that the Sarvāstivādin idea of a "true" *bhikṣu* is correct and that Vasubandhu's argument does not successfully refute it [T. 1562: 565a22-b12].)

[199] Mochizuki suggests that Vasubandhu's is the standard Buddhist position (1974: 5: 4273). Again, I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for this reference.

[200] Funahashi (1987: 232 n.3) says that this should be read as *abhikṣur* on the basis of all the translations and the quotation in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā.*

[201] Funahashi says that *katamasya* is a mistake for *hatamasya* (1987: 232 n. 4).

4.28) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* states that a *bodhisattva* who breaks even one *pārājika* rule becomes incapable of having the full requisites of the *bodhisattva* and of having purity of intention. He is a *bodhisattva* in appearance only, not a real *bodhisattva*. If he breaks the rule with a weak or medium *paryavasthāna,* he does not lose his *bodhisattvaśīlasaṃvara,* but if he breaks it with a strong *paryavasthāna,* he does. Furthermore, unlike a *bhikṣu,* who loses his *pratimokṣasaṃvara* by breaking a *pārājika* rule even one time, the *bodhisattva* only loses his *bodhisattvaśīlasaṃvara* if he repeatedly breaks a rule badly, without guilt or shame, with pleasure, and thinking it is good to do so. And even this *bodhisattva* can regain his *bodhisattva-śīlasaṃvara* in the same lifetime, unlike the *bhikṣu,* who cannot.

itīme catvāraḥ pārājayika-sthānīyā dharmāḥ yeṣāṃ bodhisattvaḥ anyatamānyatamaṃ dharmam adhyāpadya prāg eva sarvān a-bhavyo bhavati dṛṣṭe dharme vipulasya bodhi-saṃbhārasyopacayāya parigrahāya. a-bhavyo bhavati dṛṣṭa eva dharme āśaya-viśuddhaye. sa bodhisattvaḥ prati-rūpakaś ca bhavati. no tu bhūto bodhisattvaḥ. mṛdu-madhya-paryavasthānataś ca bodhisattvaḥ ebhiś caturbhiḥ pārājayika-sthānīyair dharmair na tac-chīla-saṃvara-samādānaṃ vijahāti. adhimātra-paryavasthānatas tu vijahāti. yataś ca bodhisattvaḥ eṣāṃ caturṇāṃ pārājayika-sthānīyānāṃ dharmāṇām abhīkṣṇā-samudācārāt parīttam api hrī-vyapatrāpyaṃ notpādayati. tena ca prīyate. tena ca ramate. tatraiva guṇa-darśī bhavati. iyam adhimātratā paryavasthānasya veditavyā. na tu bodhisattvaḥ sakṛd eva pārājayika-sthānīya-dharmasamudācārād bodhisattva-śīla-saṃvara-samā-dānaṃ vijahāti. tad-yathā pārājayikair dharmair bhikṣuḥ prātimokṣa-saṃvaraṃ. parityakta-samādāno 'pi ca bodhisattvo dṛṣṭe dharme bhavyaḥ punar ādānāya bodhisattva-śīla-saṃvara-samādānasya bhavati. nābhavya eva tad-yathā pārājayikādhyāpannaḥ prātimokṣa-saṃvara-stho bhikṣuḥ (*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 159.3-23); *bźi po de dag ni pham pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos rnams yin te / de dag las byaṅ chub sems dpa'*[202] *chos gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba byas na yaṅ tshe 'di la byaṅ chub kyi tshogs rgya chen po sogs pa daṅ / yoṅs su 'dzin pa'i skal ba med par 'gyur na thams cad la byas na lta ci smos / tshe 'di ñid la bsam pa rnam par dag par 'gyur ba'i skal pa yaṅ med de / de ni byaṅ chub sems dpa' ltar bcos pa yin gyi yaṅ dag pa'i byaṅ chub sems dpa' ma yin no / pham pa'i gnas lta bu bźi po 'di dag gis kun nas dkris pa chuṅ ṅu daṅ / 'briṅ gis ni tshul khrims kyi sdom pa yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa de byaṅ chub sems dpas btaṅ bar mi 'gyur ro / kun nas dkris pa chen pos ni btaṅ bar 'gyur te / gaṅ gi phyir byaṅ chub sems dpas pham pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos bźi po 'di dag rgyun mi 'chad par kun tu spyod pa daṅ / ṅo tsha śes pa daṅ / khrel yod pa chuṅ ṅu tsam yaṅ mi skyed pa daṅ / des mgu bar byed ciṅ de la dga' ba daṅ / de ñid la yon tan du lta ba can du gyur pa 'di ni kun nas dkris pa chen po yin par rig par bya'o / 'di lta ste / pham pa'i chos rnams byas pa'i dge sloṅ gis so sor thar pa'i sdom pa btaṅ bar 'gyur pa bźin du / byaṅ chub sems*

[202] Derge reads *dpas.*

4.28 continued) *dpa'i pham pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos can lan cig tsam kun tu dpyad*[203] *pas ni byaṅ chub sems dpa'i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa btaṅ bar mi 'gyur ro / byaṅ chub sems dpa' ni yaṅ dag par blaṅs par yoṅs su btaṅ du zin kyaṅ tshe 'di la byaṅ chub sems dpa'i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa yaṅ dag par blaṅs pa phyir mnod pa'i skal pa yod do / 'di lta ste / dge sloṅ so sor thar pa'i sdom pa la gnas pa pham pa byuṅ ba bźin du skal pa med pa kho nar 'gyur pa ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: źi 96b4-97a3); 菩薩於四他勝處法。隨犯一種況犯一切。不復堪能於現法中增長攝受菩薩廣大菩提資糧。不復堪能於現法中意樂清淨。是即名爲相似菩薩。非眞菩薩。菩薩若用軟中品纒。毀犯四種他勝處法。不捨菩薩淨戒律儀。上品纒犯。即名爲捨。若諸菩薩毀犯四種他勝處法。數數現行都無慚愧。深生愛樂見是功德。當知説名上品纒犯。非諸菩薩。暫一現行他勝處法。便捨菩薩淨戒律儀。如諸苾芻犯他勝法即便棄捨別解脱戒。若諸菩薩由此毀犯。棄捨菩薩淨戒律儀。於現法中堪任更受非不堪任。如苾芻住別解脱戒犯他勝法。於現法中不任更受 (T. 1579: 515c7-20)[204]

The *Śrāvakabhūmi* lists five types of *bhikṣus:* the same four that are mentioned in the *Vinaya* passage quoted by Vasubandhu, as well as one who has taken the four vows.

tatra pañca bhikṣavaḥ / bhikṣatīti bhikṣuḥ / pratijñābhikṣuḥ / saṃjñābhikṣuḥ / bhinnakleśatvād bhikṣuḥ / jñapticaturthena karmaṇopasampādito bhikṣuḥ (*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 341.10-12); *de la dge sloṅ ni rnam pa lṅa ste / 'di lta ste / sloṅ ba'i*[205] *dge sloṅ daṅ / khas 'che ba'i dge sloṅ daṅ / miṅ gi dge sloṅ daṅ / ñon moṅs pa bcom pa'i phyir dge sloṅ daṅ / gsol ba daṅ bźi'i las kyis bsñen par rdzogs pa'i dge sloṅ ṅo* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: wi 152a7-8); 苾芻復有五種一乞匃苾芻。二自稱苾芻。三名想苾芻。四破壞煩惱苾芻。五白四羯磨受具足戒苾芻 (T. 1579: 447a19-21)

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[203] Derge reads *spyad.*

[204] Elsewhere, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* again says that the *bodhisattva* who breaks one of the *pārājika* rules with a strong *paryavasthāna* loses his *śīlasaṃvara* and has to receive it once again (*saced bodhisattvaḥ pārājayika-sthānīyaṃ dharmam adhyāpanno bhavaty adhimātreṇa paryavasthānena tena tyaktaḥ saṃvaraḥ. dvir api punar ādātavyaḥ* [*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 180.26-181.2]; *gal te kun nas dkris pa chen pos byaṅ chub sems dpa' la pham* [corrected from *phan* on the basis of the Derge] *pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos byuṅ bar gyur na des sdom pa gtaṅ ba lan gñis su slar yaṅ nod par bya'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: źi 108b2]; 若諸菩薩以上品纒違犯。如上他勝處法失戒律儀。應當更受 [T. 1579: 521a22-23]).

[205] Derge reads *sloṅ ba'i phyir.*

4.29) Vasubandhu invokes the Buddha, who compares the monk who has broken an important rule to a palm tree, the head of which has been cut off. Just as the palm tree cannot continue to grow, the remaining rules cannot thrive if an important rule has been broken.

yac coktam ekadeśakṣobhād iti atra śāstraiva datto 'nuyogas tad yathā tālo mastakācchinno 'bhavyo 'ṅkuritatvāya abhavyo virūḍhim vṛddhiṃ vipulatām āptum ity upamāṃ kurvatā
(Pradhan: 223.18-19; T. 1558: 79b24-27; Poussin v. 3: 97; Saṃghabhadra does not discuss this in order but returns to it slightly later, identifying it as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 566a6-10], and criticizing Vasubandhu's understanding of the Buddha's simile, which, according to Saṃghabhadra, does not prove Vasubandhu's contention that by breaking one rule a monk loses his *bhikṣu śīla* [T. 1562: 566a10-b5].)

4.29) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain such a simile in this context.)[206]

[206] In a note, La Vallée Poussin (1971, v. 3: 96 n. 1) points out that this simile appears in this context in the Sarvāstivādin *Vinaya* (*Shih-sung lü* [T. 1435: 157a6-9]). He also indicates that the palm tree simile is used elsewhere (he cites the *Majjhimanikāya*) in a different context, that of destroying the *āsravas* (1971, v. 3: 97 n. 3). In the same note, he also mentions the *Vibhāṣā*, but he does not make it clear that, in the *Vibhāṣā*, too, the simile appears in the context of the *āsravas*, not of the breaking of the *pārājika* rules (T. 1545: 356b24-26). Pāsādika repeats La Vallée Poussin's citation of the *Vibhāṣā*, without making clear that the context is different from that of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1986: 81).

The simile does, in fact, appear in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 302a4, 303a7-8; T. 1579: 387b14,387c19-21) and the *Sopadhikā Bhūmi* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 329a4-5; T. 1579: 576c10-13), but the context in both places is that of defilement.

4.30) Vasubandhu, responding to the Sarvāstivādin insistence that the evil (*mārga-dūṣin*) *śramaṇa* is still a *śramaṇa,* argues that he is only called a *śramaṇa* because he has the external form of a *śramaṇa*. Vasubandhu gives a number of similes, e.g., burnt wood, which, once it is burnt, is no longer wood but is still called "wood."

sa tv eṣa ākṛtimātrāvaśeṣatvāc chramaṇa ukto dagdhakāṣṭhaśuṣkahradaśukanāśā-pūtibījālātacakramṛtasattvavat

(Pradhan: 224.9-10; T. 1558: 79c12-13; Poussin v. 3: 98; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 565b20-22] and, in support of the idea that even a bad *bhikṣu* is still a *bhikṣu,* argues that the similes are not apposite: for example, wood that is only partially burnt is still called "wood"; only totally burnt wood is no longer called "wood" [T. 1562: 565b22-c12].)

4.30) The definition in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *mārgadūṣin* emphasizes this *śramaṇa*'s alienation from the Buddhist path.

tatra yoyaṃ pudgalo duḥśīlaḥ pāpadharmā yāvad abrahamacārī [brahmacārī] (ri) pratijñaḥ / ayam ucyate mārgadūṣī dūṣitonena mārgo bhavati mūlata āditaḥ / yenāyam abhavyo bhavaty apratibalaḥ / abhājanabhūto mārgasyotpattaye / satyāṃ saṃvidyamānāyāṃ mārgadeśanāyāṃ sati saṃvidyamānedhigame tasmān mārgadūṣīty ucyate[207] (*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 339.16-340.1); *de la gaṅ zag tshul khrims 'chal pa sdig pa'i chos can / tshaṅs par spyod pa ma yin par tshaṅs par spyod pa khas 'che ba'i bar gaṅ yin pa de ni / lam sun par byed pa źes bya ste / des ni lam bźi daṅ po nas*[208] *sun par byed pas / des na de lam bskyed par bya ba daṅ / lam bstan pa yod ciṅ med pa ma yin la rtogs par bya ba yod ciṅ / med pa ma yin na yaṅ / skal pa daṅ mthu med la snod du gyur pa ma yin pas na de'i phyir lam sun par byed pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* wi 151b6-8); 若諸犯戒補特伽羅多行惡法。廣說乃至實非梵行自稱梵行。名壞道沙門。由彼破壞最初所有正道根本。無力無能非生道器。雖現前有說正道教及現前有證正道者。而彼不得。是故名爲壞道沙門 (T. 1579: 446c26-447a2)[209]

In a description of the characteristics of the fifth of six types of people who are without *gotra,* the *Śrāvakabhūmi* mentions the qualities of a false *śramaṇa,* who seems to be pure externally, while harboring rottenness inside.

lha 'am lha gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba dag tu smon pa'i phyir tshaṅs par spyad pa spyod par byed pa daṅ / bslab pa phul nas spaṅs pa la 'jug par 'gyur ba daṅ / tshul khrims 'chal pa daṅ / naṅ myags pa daṅ / ñes 'dzag tu gyur pa daṅ / śiṅ rul pa lta bur gyur pa daṅ / luṅ boṅ ltar kun tu spyod ciṅ dge sbyoṅ ma yin par dge sbyoṅ du khas 'che ba daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* wi 9a5-7); 謂求生天或餘天處。或樂退捨所學禁戒或犯尸羅。

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[207] I have simply transcribed Shukla's text here; I have not attempted to make any emendations.

[208] I have emended from the Peking, which reads *des ni lam gźi daṅ / daṅ po nas,* on the basis of the Derge. The Tibetan text diverges from both the Sanskrit and the Chinese at this point and includes material found in neither .

[209] This is in contrast with the *Vibhāṣā,* which says that the *mārgadūṣin* possesses a *sāsrava āryamārga:* 問善賢經說。若此處有八支聖道當知是處有四沙門。汚道沙門豈此所攝。答亦此所攝。以聖道支有實有假。實謂無漏正見等八。假謂有漏正見等八。汚道沙門亦得成就有漏正見。故彼亦是初沙門攝 (T. 1545: 342a24-28). Furthermore, although he breaks his vows and his preliminary practices, he does not destroy his understanding or his intention: 汚道沙門雖復破戒而不破見。雖破加行不破意樂 (T. 1545: 342b5-6).

4.30 continued) 內懷朽敗外現眞實。如水所生雜穢蝸牛螺音狗行。實非沙門。自稱沙門 (T. 1579: 398b9-12;[210] see also the *Śrāvakabhūmi* [51.4-8; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: wi 25a6-b1; T. 1579: 404c1-6] and the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 51b3-52a2; T. 1579: 770b9-22] for similar passages)

[210] Most of this passage seems to be missing from the Sanskrit manuscript. Shukla claims to have reconstructed the damaged leaf (*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 18 n. 4), but, in fact, he does not seem to have understood the extent of the missing portion. Of our passage, the only portion that he includes is *aśramaṇaḥ śramaṇapratijñaḥ*, of which all but the final *-jñaḥ* is reconstructed (*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 18.11).

4.31) The Sarvāstivādins argue that if monks who break a rule lose the quality of being a *bhikṣu,* then there could be no penitent *bhikṣus*. Vasubandhu answers that he is not saying that all rule-breakers are *pārājika,* but that no *pārājikas* can be *bhikṣus*. He goes on to explain that, if someone breaks a serious rule but, due to the special nature of his *saṃtāna,* does not think to hide his transgression, he is not *pārājika*.[211]

yadi hi dauḥśīlyād abhikṣuḥ syāt śikṣādattako na syāt / na vayaṃ brūmaḥ sahādhyāpattyā sarvaḥ pārājikaḥ iti / yas tu pārājikaḥ so 'vaśyam abhikṣuḥ / kaścit tu saṃtānaviśeṣān na pārājika ekacittenāpy apraticchādanād iti vyavasthāpitaṃ dhārmasvāminā
(Pradhan: 224.10-12; T. 1558: 79c14-18; Poussin v. 3: 98-99; Saṃghabhadra identifies the passage as far as *avaśyam abhikṣu* as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 565c24-26] and criticizes it, saying that this is what the Sautrāntikas, not the Ābhidhārmikas,[212] say [T. 1562: 565c26-566a5]. Saṃghabhadra does not comment on the reasoning implicit in Vasubandhu's argument concerning the state of the *saṃtāna,* namely that the volition behind an action causes a change in the *saṃtāna;* in this case, it is concealing the transgression, rather than the transgression itself, that is powerful enough to leave the transgressor no longer capable of being a monk.)

[211] This seems to correspond to the position of the "foreign masters" (*wai-kuo chu shih* 外國諸師) in the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 623a13-16).

[212] Saṃghabhadra also uses the term *wo-kuo chu shih* 我國諸師, presumably refer-ring to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas.

4.31) In the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, several cases are mentioned in which there is no serious transgression even though *pārājika* rules have been broken. One of these is the case in which there is no thought of hiding the transgression.

制立所犯。要由意樂增強力故。若雖有犯。而無一念起覆藏心。彼亦可出。於沙門果仍有堪能其 (T. 1579: 869b6-8)[213]

[213] This is from the portion of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* that is not found in the Tibetan translation.

4.32) Vasubandhu says that, as long as someone who has broken rules is still a *bhikṣu*, one should honor his being a *bhikṣu*, even if he is such a bad one.

kaś cāyam anarthe nirbandho yady asau tathābhūto 'pi bhikṣur namo 'stu tasmai tādṛśāya bhikṣutvāya
(Pradhan: 224.15; T. 1558: 79c23-25; Poussin v. 3: 99; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 566b5-7] and criticizes it, saying that the word *bhikṣu* should be replaced by the word *śramaṇa* because [see item 4.30] the Buddha said that even the *mārgadūṣin* still possesses *śīla* [T. 1562: 566b8-16].)

4.32) (I have not found any corresponding statement in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, see item 4.30 for a possible basis in the *Yogācārabhūmi* for Vasubandhu's not using the word *śramaṇa* in this passage.)

4.33) Vasubandhu says that *dhyānasaṃvara* can be lost due to birth in a different stage, due to leaving a meditation state, and due to dying (in the case of *pṛthagjanas*).

sarvam eva dhyānāptaṃ kuśalaṃ dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyāṃ parityajyate / upapattito vā bhūmisaṃcārād ūrdhvaṃ cāvaśyaṃ[214] *pārihāṇito vā samāpatter nikāyasabhāgatvāc ca*[215] *kiṃcit*

(Pradhan: 224.19-20; T. 1558: 80a1-5; Poussin v. 3: 100; Saṃghabhadra criticizes the sūtra-master for not mentioning another occasion for losing *dhyānasaṃvara*, namely at the time of *vairāgya* [T. 1562: 566c6-7].)[216]

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[214] Funahashi corrects this to *cādhaś ca* (1987: 235 n. 1).

[215] Funahashi corrects this to *sabhāgatyāgāc ca* (1987: 235 n. 2).

[216] P'u-kuang gives a long and complicated explanation of the difference between Vasubandhu's and Saṃghabhadra's opinions on this point (T. 1821: 237c15-238b7).

4.33) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains no specific explanation of how one loses *dhyānasaṃvara*. However, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāya-manobhūmi* explains the five ways by which *bhikṣus* can lose their *saṃvara* in general: by losing their *śikṣā;* by breaking a *pārājika* rule; by being reborn in a different state; by destroying their *kuśalamūlas;* and by dying. Losing *saṃvara* at the time of *vairāgya* is not mentioned.

de la rgyu dus na dge sloṅ gi sdom pa blaṅs kyaṅ gtoṅ bar 'gyur źe na / mdor bsdu na rgyu lṅas te bslab pa'i gźi 'bul ba daṅ / ltuṅ ba'i rtsa ba lhag par spyod pa daṅ / mtshan nub ciṅ mtshan gñis skyes pa daṅ dge ba'i rtsa ba chad pa daṅ / rigs mthun pa spaṅs kyaṅ dge sloṅ gi sdom pa blaṅs pa gtoṅ bar 'gyur ro [*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 38a7-b1]; 問有幾因緣苾芻律儀受已還捨。答或由捨所學處故。或由犯根本罪故。或由形沒二形生故。或由善根斷故。或由棄捨衆同分故。苾芻律儀受已還捨 [T. 1579: 592b29-c3])

4.34) Vasubandhu says that there are three ways to lose that which is both good and pure: by obtaining a *phala,* one loses the previous *pratipannakamārga;* by purifying one's *indriyas,* one loses the *mārga* of weak *indriyas;* by falling, one loses a *phala* or a higher *mārga* of a *phala.*

anāsravaṃ tu kuśalaṃ tribhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ parityakṣyate / phalaprāptitaḥ pūrvako mārgaḥ parityakṣyate / indriyottāpanena mṛdvindriyamārgaḥ / parihāṇita uttaro mārgaḥ / phalaṃ phalaviśiṣṭo vā
(Pradhan: 224.23-225.1; T. 1558: 80a6-9; Poussin v. 3: 100-101; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 566c7-10] and criticizes him, saying that there are really only two ways, since the first way [obtaining a *phala*] really includes the second way [purifying one's *indriyas*] [T. 1562: 566c10-14].)

4.34) (I cannot find anything relevant to this topic in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.35) Vasubandhu says that the last of six ways to destroy *avijñapti* that is neither *saṃvara* nor *asaṃvara* is to begin to destroy the *kuśalamūlas.*

yadā kuśalamūlāni samucchettum ārabhata ity
(Pradhan: 225.17-18; T. 1558: 80b7-8; Poussin v. 3: 102; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 567a22-23] and criticizes him, saying that Vasubandhu should not have limited his statement to the *kuśalamūlas;* the *akuśalamūlas* should also be included, and the verse is correct in simply saying *mūlaccheda* [T. 1562: 567a23-27].)

4.35) (I cannot find anything relevant to this topic in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.36) Vasubandhu attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the statement that the three types of mental misconduct (*abhidhyā, vyāpāda,* and *mithyādṛṣṭi*), which the Sarvāstivādins say are essentially *kleśa,* are actually karma.[217]

abhidhyādaya eva manaskarmeti dārṣṭāntikāḥ / saṃcetanīyasūtre vacanāt / evaṃ tu sati karmakleśayor aikyaṃ syāt / kiṃ syād yadi kaścit kleśo 'pi karma syāt / naitad asti (Pradhan: 237.17-18; T. 1558: 84b3-6; Poussin v. 3: 136; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 574b28-29][218] and criticizes it, saying that the causes of karma should not be conflated with karma itself [T. 1562: 574b29-c15].)

[217] As La Vallée Poussin points out, Yaśomitra explains that these "Dārṣṭāntikas" are a type of Sautrāntika (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 400.17). La Vallée Poussin also claims that Vasubandhu later attributes the same opinion to the Sautrāntikas (1971, v. 3: 169), but in fact both the Sanskrit (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 248.10-11) and the Chinese (T. 1558: 88c13) mention Dārṣṭāntika. The Tibetan, however, reads *mdo sde pa,* i.e., Sautrāntika (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya$_t$:* gu 241a5).

[218] However, Vasubandhu actually rejects this and favors the Vaibhāṣika opinion. See the introduction for a discussion of this passage. A passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that agrees with Vaibhāṣika appears on the next page.

4.36) According to the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi, abhidhyā, vyāpāda,* and *mithyādṛṣṭi* consist, at least in part, of mental karma.

abhidhyā katamā / parasvīkaraṇābhiprāyasya kliṣṭacetasaḥ parasvīkaraṇābhiprāye niścayaprayoge tanniṣṭhāyāṃ ca yan manaskarma / vyāpādaḥ katamaḥ / paravyāpādābhiprāyasya kliṣṭacetasaḥ paravyāpādābhiprāyaniścayaprayoge tanniṣṭhāyāṃ ca yan manaskarma / mithyādṛṣṭi katamā / apavādābhiprāyasya kliṣṭacetaso 'pavādābhiprāyaniścayaprayoge tanniṣṭhāyāṃ ca yan manaskarma (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 182.9-14); *brnab sems gaṅ źe na / gźan gyi nor bdag gir bya ba'i bsam pa can ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems daṅ ldan pas / gźan gyi nor bdag gir bya ba'i bsam pa la / ṅes par sbyor ba byas pa daṅ / de mthar thug par byas pa'i yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa'o / gnod sems gaṅ źe na / gźan la gnod par bya ba'i bsam pa can gyi ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems daṅ ldan pas / gźan la gnod pa bya ba'i bsam pa la ṅes par sbyor ba byas pa daṅ / de mthar thug par byas pa'i yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa'o / log par lta ba gaṅ źe na / skur pa 'debs pa'i bsam pa can ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems daṅ ldan pas / skur pa 'debs pa'i bsam pa de la ṅes par sbyor ba byas pa daṅ / de la mthar thug par byas pa'i yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 105b5-8); 云何貪欲。謂於他所有。起己有欲樂起染污心。若於他所有。起己有欲樂決定方便。及於彼究竟中所有意業。云何瞋恚。謂於他起害欲樂。起染污心。若於他起害欲樂決定方便。及於彼究竟中所有意業。云何邪見。謂起誹謗欲樂。起染污心。若於起誹謗欲樂決定方便。及於彼究竟中所有意業 (1579: 317b22-29)

However, according to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* they are *karmapatha* but not karma.

brnab sems daṅ / gnod sems daṅ / log par lta ba dag ni las kyi lam kho na yin la las ni ma yin par blta bar bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* 153b); 貪恚邪見業道非業 (T. 1579: 636a29)

4.37) Vasubandhu disagrees with the Sarvāstivādins regarding the meaning of *dṛṣṭam* (seen), *śrutam* (heard), *vijñātam* (known), and *matam* (felt). The Sarvāstivādins say that they refer to what is perceived by the eye, ear, mind, and the three organs of smell, taste, and touch, respectively. Vasubandhu attributes to "some people"[219] the following opinion: that which is immediately perceived by the five material sense organs is *dṛṣṭam;* that which is learned from another is *śrutam;* that which is accepted on the basis of proper inference is *matam;* that which is perceived immediately by mental cognition is *vijñātam.* In other words, the five material objects are seen, heard, known, and felt, while mental objects are heard, known, and felt, but not seen. Vasubandhu then attributes to the *pūrvācāryas* a somewhat similar opinion: that which is perceived by the eye is *dṛṣṭam;* that which is perceived by the ear or which is transmitted by another is *śrutam;* that which is thought by oneself is *matam;* that which is experienced internally or which is understood is *vijñātam.*[220]

sūtraṃ tāvad ajñāpakam[221] *anyārthatvāt / na hy atra sūtre bhagavān vyavahārāṇāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ śāsti sma / kiṃ tarhi / atra ca te ṣaḍvidhe viṣaye caturṣu vyavahāreṣu dṛṣṭādivyavahāra-mātraṃ bhaviṣyati na priyāpriyanimittādhyāropa ity ayam atra sūtrārtho dṛśyate / kiṃ punar dṛṣṭaṃ kiṃ ca yāvad vijñātam / kecit tāvad āhuḥ / yat pañcabhir indriyaiḥ pratyakṣaṃ tad dṛṣṭaṃ / yat parata āgamitaṃ tac chrutam / yat svayaṃ yuktyanumānato rucitaṃ tan matam / yan manaḥpratyakṣabhāvanādhiṣṭhitaṃ*[222] *pratyātmavedyaṃ tad vijñātam iti / ete ca*

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[219] P'u-kuang identifies "some people" as "some Sautrāntikas." It appears as though he is taking this opinion to be one Sautrāntika position, not necessarily Vasubandhu's (有餘師說至亦爲非理者。經部答。有餘經部師說 [T. 1821: 261a13-14]). He identifies the *pūrvācāryas* as those who study the *yü-ch'ieh lun* 瑜伽論 (T. 1821: 261a25-27). This certainly appears to be a reference to the *Yogācārabhūmi,* especially since P'u-kuang's only other use of the term *yü-ch'ieh lun* clearly refers to the title of a book from which he quotes (T. 1821: 269c4). I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for informing me that P'u-kuang here seems to be referring to a passage from the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 111b4-112a1; T. 1579: 621a4-13).

It is quite possible that P'u-kuang intends to say that the *pūrvācārya*s are Sautrāntikas who study the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

[220] This passage is mentioned by Hakamaya, who identifies the corresponding passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (1986).

[221] Funahashi rejects Hirakawa's addition of *na* before *sūtram* and instead corrects from *tāvaj jñāpakam* (1987: 356 n. 4).

[222] Corrected by Funahashi (1987: 356 n. 5) from *manaḥpratyakṣabhāvenādhiṣṭhitaṃ*

4.37) In its explanation of the four *vyavahāras,* the *Manobhūmi* gives definitions of *dṛṣṭam, śrutam, matam,* and *vijñātam* similar to those that Vasubandhu ascribes to the *pūrvācāryas.*

catvāro vyavahārāḥ katame / dṛṣṭo vyavahāraḥ śruto mato vijñāto vyavahāraḥ / dṛṣṭo vyavahāraḥ katamaḥ / yad anena bahirdhā pratyakṣīkṛtaṃ bhavati cakṣuṣā tad upādāya yat pareṣāṃ vyavaharaty ayam ucyate dṛṣṭo vyavahāraḥ / śruto vyavahāraḥ katamaḥ / yat parataḥ śrutaṃ bhavati tad upādāya yat pareṣāṃ vyavaharati / mato vyavahāraḥ katamaḥ / yad anena na dṛṣṭaṃ bhavati na śrutam api tu svayam eva cintitaṃ tulitam upaparīkṣitaṃ tad upādāya yat pareṣāṃ vyavaharati / vijñāto vyavahāraḥ katamaḥ / yad anenādhyātmaṃ prativeditaṃ bhavaty adhigataṃ sparśitaṃ sākṣātkṛtaṃ ca bhavati tad upādāya yat pareṣāṃ vyavaharaty ayaṃ ucyate vijñāto vyavahāraḥ (*Yogācāra-bhumi:* 50.9-16); *tha sñad bźi gaṅ źe na / mthoṅ ba'i tha sñad daṅ / thos pa'i tha sñad daṅ / bye brag phyed pa'i tha sñad daṅ / rnam par śes pa'i tha sñad do / mthoṅ ba'i tha sñad gaṅ źe na / gaṅ des mig gis*[223] *phyi rol mṅon sum du byas nas de la brten te / gźan dag la tha sñad du brjod pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mthoṅ ba'i tha sñad ces bya'o / thos pa'i tha sñad gaṅ źe na / gaṅ gźan las thos nas de la brten te / gźan dag la tha sñad du brjod pa gaṅ yin pa'o / bye brag phyed pa'i tha sñad gaṅ źe na / gaṅ des*[224] *ma mthoṅ ma thos par bdag ñid kyis bsams śiṅ gcal la ñe bar brtags nas / de la brten te / gźan dag la tha sñad du brjod pa gaṅ yin pa'o / rnam par śes pa'i tha sñad gaṅ źe na / gaṅ des naṅ so sor raṅ gis rig pa daṅ / rtogs pa daṅ / reg pa daṅ / mṅon sum du byas nas de la brten te / gźan dag la tha sñad du brjod pa gaṅ yin pa de ni / rnam par śes pa'i tha sñad ces bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: dzi 27b3-8); 云何四種言説。謂依見聞覺知所有言説。依見言説者謂依眼故現見外色。由此因縁爲他宣説。是名依見言説依聞言説者。謂從他聞。由此因縁爲他宣説。是名依聞言説。依覺言説者。謂不見不聞。但自思惟稱量觀察。由此因縁爲他宣説。是名依覺言説。依知言説者。謂各別於内所受所證所觸所得。由此因縁爲他宣説。是名依知言説 (T. 1579: 289b13-21)

on the basis of the Tibetan.

[223] Corrected from *mig gi* on the basis of the Derge and the Sanskrit.

[224] Corrected from *de°* on the basis of the Derge and the Sanskrit.

4.37 continued) *pañca viṣayāḥ pratyekaṃ dṛṣṭvā iti kṛtvā vyavahriyante / śrutā matā vijñātā iti vā / ṣaṣṭo 'nyatra dṛṣṭād iti nāsti gandhādiṣu vyavahārābhāva-prasaṅgaḥ / tasmād yuktir apy eṣā yuktir na bhavati / pūrvācāryā evam āhuḥ / tad dṛṣṭam*[225] *yat pratyakṣīkṛtam cakṣuṣā / śrutam yac chrotreṇa parataś cāgamitam*[226] */ mataṃ yat svayaṃ cintitam / vijñātaṃ yat pratyātmapratisaṃveditam adhigataṃ ca*[227]
(Pradhan: 245.24-246.8; T. 1558: 87c14-27; Poussin v. 3: 161-162; Saṃghabhadra identifies the opinion of "some people" as that of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 579a28-b8] and, criticizing Vasubandhu for his idiosyncratic interpretation, insists that the intention of the *sūtra* is to match each of the six types of objects of consciousness with one term indicating how it is perceived [T. 1562: 579b8-579c15]. Saṃghabhadra also criticizes the opinion of the *pūrvācāryas,* which, he says, would lead to a conflation of that which is seen and that which is known, as well as a loss of distinction between that which is perceived and knowledge [T. 1562: 579c15-21].)

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[225] Corrected by Hirakawa from *yad dṛṣṭaṃ* (1973-1978, v. 1: 432).

[226] Corrected by Hirakawa from *cākharitam* (1973-1978, v. 1: 432).

[227] Pradhan's text reads *cotpannam*. Funahashi corrects this to *ca niṣpannaṃ* and takes *niṣpannaṃ* as the first word of the next paragraph (1987: 356 n. 8).

4.38) According to Sarvāstivāda, it is possible to commit murder without moving one's body and to lie without speaking. Vasubandhu rejects this, saying that both would be impossible since in *kāmadhātu,* there can be no *avijñapti* without *vijñapti,* and there would be no *vijñapti* in these types of murder or lying.

yady ubhayathā 'pi na parākrameta na cāvjiñaptikāsty avijñaptiḥ kāmāvacarī kathaṃ tayoḥ karmapathaḥ siddhyati / kartavyo 'tra yatnaḥ
(Pradhan: 246.13-14; T. 1558: 88a4-6; Poussin v. 3: 163; Saṃghabhadra identifies this rejection as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 579c25-28] and criticizes it, showing that there really is a *vijñapti* in these cases and mentioning an opinion that not all *avijñapti* in *kāmadhātu* depends on *vijñapti* [T. 1562: 579c28-580c15; partially quoted in *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 408.13-24; translated in Poussin v. 3: 163-164 n. 5].)

4.38) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain any similar discussion.)

4.39) Vasubandhu describes the various combinations of *cetanās* and bad *karmapathas*. According to him, one *karmapatha* accompanies one *cetanā* in two cases: 1) when someone has desire, etc., without doing another, physical *karmapatha*, such as murder; 2) when someone has ordered another person to perform a bad *karmapatha* but his own mind is *akliṣṭa* at the moment that the deed is done.

ekena tāvat saha vartate / vinā 'nyenābhidhyādisaṃmukhībhāve akliṣṭacetaso vā tat prayogeṇa rūpiṇām anyatamaniṣṭhāgamane
(Pradhan: 251.9-10; T. 1558: 89c9-11; Poussin v. 3: 177-178; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 581c11, 13] and criticizes what Vasubandhu says about both cases: according to Saṃghabhadra, in the second case, certain *kleśas,* such as *māna* (pride), can indeed be present [T. 1562: 581c12-13]; in the first case, certain non-physical *karmapathas* should also be included [T. 1562: 581c13-15].)

4.39) (I can find nothing relevant to this issue in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.40) According to Vasubandhu, two *karmapathas* accompany one *cetanā* in the following cases: 1) when a man commits murder while his mind is afflicted with anger; 2) when a man who is overcome by desire steals, commits adultery, or speaks nonsense.

dvābhyāṃ saha vartate / vyāpannacittasya prāṇivadhe abhidhyāviṣṭasya vā 'dattādāne kāmamithyācāre saṃbhinnapralāpe vā
(Pradhan: 251.10-11; T. 1558: 89c11-12; Poussin v. 3: 178; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 581c24-26] and criticizes what Vasubandhu says about both cases. According to Saṃghabhadra, one must specify in both cases whether the person himself does the actions or orders another to do them. If the person himself does the actions, it goes without saying that his mind is afflicted, respectively, with anger or desire. If the person orders another person to do the actions, then any combination of the three mental and the seven material *karmapathas* may be present [T. 1562: 581c26-582a1].)[228]

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[228]This is summarized by Poussin (1971, v. 3: 178 n. 2), who also gives Vasubandhu's hypothetical rejoinders, apparently on the basis of P'u-kuang (T. 1821: 267b16-c4).

4.40) (I can find nothing relevant to this issue in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

4.41) In an explanation of the *niṣyandaphala* of the *karmapathas,* Vasubandhu says that *mithyādṛṣṭi* will cause one to be very confused in a future human existence because confusion is predominant in *mithyādṛṣṭi.*

mithyādṛṣṭyā tīvramohaḥ / tasyā mohabhūyastvāt[229]
(Pradhan: 254.4; T. 1558: 90c5; Poussin v. 3: 186; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 583b9] and criticizes the explanation, *tasyā mohabhūyastvāt,* saying that *mithyādṛṣṭi* is not associated with *avidyā* [T. 1562: 583b9-17].)[230]

[229] Regarding an identical sentence found in the same context in Tatia's text of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (65.13-14), see Kritzer 2003c.

[230] The *Vibhāṣā* refers to an opinion resembling Vasubandhu's according to which, even though *mithyādṛṣṭi* actually destroys the *kuśalamūlas,* confusion associated with *mithyādṛṣṭi* is said to destroy them because of the predominance of confusion at that time: 復有說者。此説邪見相應癡不善根能斷善根不説前位貪等。雖實邪見能斷善根爾時癡增故作是説如念住等 (T. 1545: 181c18-20).

4.41) According to the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi,* one type of *mithyādṛṣṭi* increases as a result of one's encountering misleading teachings and thus being unable to achieve liberation. Due to confusion with respect to causally produced *dharmas,* and as a result of being bound by this type of *dṛṣṭi,* one cannot escape from *saṃsāra.*

lta ba'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa gaṅ źe na / de sred pa de ñid kyi kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas / gal te kun nas ñon moṅs pa la rnam par thar pa 'dod pa de la / kun nas ñon moṅs pa las rnam par thar pa'i chos phyin ci log tu ston pa'i sdig pa'i grogs po gaṅ yin pa la brten na de phyin ci log gi chos bstan pa de la brten nas / thar pa yaṅ ñams su mi len la / lta bar gyur pa drug rtsa gñis las gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba'i lta ba rnam par 'phel bar byed de / de rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba rmoṅs pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas / de lta bu'i kun tu sbyor ba daṅ de daṅ ldan pa las 'gro ba lṅa'i 'khor ba nas yoṅs su grol bar mi 'gyur ba'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 283a5-8); 何諸見雜染。謂即由彼貪愛集諦增上力故。曾遇惡友説顛倒法爲令雜染得解脱故。彼雖悕求雜染解脱。由遇如是倒説法故。不證解脱。於六十二諸見趣中。隨令一種邪見增長。於諸縁起法愚癡增上故。彼由如是見結所繫。於五趣等生死大海不得解脱 (T. 1579: 380b3-9)

However, in the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī,* it is argued that *avidyā* and *mithyādṛṣṭi* are separate entities and that the two are normally not associated. Nevertheless, it is possible for that which is not *avidyā* in essence to become *avidyā* in the way that *prajñā* becomes defiled by association with other *kleśas,* even though its essence is not defiled.

gal te ma rig pa daṅ lta ba rnams mtshan ñid 'dra bar gyur na / des na bcom ldan 'das kyis bag la ñal bdun po dag tu lta ba'i bag la ñal rnam par gźag pa mdzad par mi 'gyur la / bcom ldan 'das kyis lta ba rnams la ma rig pa źes bya ba'i miṅ ni gaṅ du'aṅ ma bstan to / gal te ñon moṅs pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i log pa'i śes pa ma rig pa yin par gyur na de ltar na 'jig tshogs la lta ba la sogs pa lta ba lṅa po gaṅ dag yin pa de dag kyaṅ śes pa'i ṅo bo ñid yin pas / śes pa'i rdzas gñis mtshuṅs par ldan pa ni med pas / de dag ni ma rig pa daṅ mi ldan pa yin par 'gyur ro / gal te 'dod chags la sogs pa ñon moṅs pa'i dbaṅ gis śes pa de gti mug ñid yin ni / des na 'dod chags la sogs pa'i dbaṅ gis gti mug tu 'gyur gyi / gti mug gi dbaṅ daṅ gti mug sṅon du 'gro ba las 'dod chags la sogs pa ñon moṅs pa rnams 'byuṅ ba ma yin par 'byuṅ ṅo / ji ltar ñon moṅs pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i śes rab ni mtshuṅs par ldan pa las ñon moṅs pa can yin gyi / de'i ṅo bo ñid ni ma yin pa de bźin du / gti mug gi bdag ñid ma yin pa de yaṅ gti mug bdag ñid du draṅ bar rjod mi nus te / dper na de las gźan pa'i sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos ñon moṅs pa can gyi bdag ñid ma yin pa / ñon moṅs pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa dag lta bu'o / de lta bas na ma rig pa ni sems las byuṅ ba'i chos sems daṅ mtshuṅs pa ldan payin par lta bar bya'o [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 88a4-b2); 又若無明與諸見相無差別者。世尊不應七隨眠中於無明外立見隨

4.41 continued) 眠。又佛世尊曾無一處於諸見上示無明名。若諸煩惱相應邪智是無明者。薩迦耶等五種邪見智爲自性。無二智體俱有相應。是則諸見應與無明常不相應。又若貪等煩惱力故令相應智成愚癡性。即應貪等增上力故得有愚癡。非癡增上。癡爲導首故有貪等一切煩惱。又應可說如餘煩惱相應之慧。由相應故得成染汚非彼自性。非愚癡體可成癡性。又如諸餘煩惱相應。非煩惱性諸心心所。是故當知別有無明。是心所性與心相 (T. 1579: 612a15-26; see Miyashita 1992)

4.42) Vasubandhu says that a brief human life span is not in itself the result of a murder committed in a former life, since even a short human life is the result of good karma. Rather, the murder acts as an obstructing cause that shortens the life span.

alpam apy āyur manuṣyeṣu kuśalaphalam / tat katham prāṇātipātasya niṣyandaphalam / nocyate tad evāyus tasya phalam / kiṃ tarhi / tenālpāyur bhavatīti / ato 'ntarāyahetuḥ prāṇātipātas tasyāyuṣo bhavatīti veditavyam

(Pradhan: 254.5-7; T. 1558: 90c5-8; Poussin v. 3: 186-187; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 583b18-20] and criticizes the explanation, which he characterizes as very difficult to understand, saying that a brief human life is in fact the *niṣyandaphala* of an act of murder [T. 1562: 583b20-c10].)

4.42) (The *Savitarkādi-bhūmis* of both the *MaulīBhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 184.1-5; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 106b7-107a2; T. 1579: 318a14-18] and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 144a8-b1; T. 1579: 633b27-29] contain passages in which a shortened life span is said to be the *niṣyandaphala* of murder. There is no contradiction of this position in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

However, the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* defines two types of *niṣyandaphala:* 1) similar dharmas caused by repetition of good, etc., and 2) subsequent result that resembles the previous action [T. 1585: 42b1-2].[231] The notes in the *Shindōjōyuishikiron* say that the first type is really *niṣyandaphala,* while the second type is only provisionally designated as *niṣyandaphala.* They give the example of the short life span resulting from murder in a previous existence: this is actually *adhipatiphala,* but it is called *niṣyandaphala* since it is a result of karma [Poussin 1928-1929: 464; *Shindōjōyuishikiron:* 346].

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* mentions an *antarāyahetvadhiṣṭhāna,* which is associated with *virodhahetu* [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 110.8-12; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 66b1-4; T. 1579: 302a10-14].[232] Furthermore, *virodhahetu* only establishes *adhipatiphala* [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 111.4-5; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 67a3-4; T. 1579: 302a25-26]. Perhaps there is some connection between Vasubandhu's *antarāyahetu* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s *virodhahetu.* If so, then the short life would logically be *adhipatiphala,* not *niṣyandaphala.*)

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[231] A similar distinction is found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (102.20-24; *Yogācāra-bhūmi*$_t$: źi 65a1-3; T. 1579: 502b4-6) and in the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (T. 1602: 571a6-8).

[232] *Virodhahetu* is defined in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* as the cause that prevents arising (*utpattāv āntarāyiko hetur virodhahetuḥ* [*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 98.6-7; *Yogācāra-bhūmi*$_t$: źi 62a6; T. 1579: 501a27]).

5.1) Vasubandhu says that the other five *anuśayas* exist in a latent form with respect to an object due to the force of the first *anuśaya, rāga*.

tathāgrahaṇaṃ rāgavaśenānyeṣām ālambanānuśāyitajñāpanārtham
(Pradhan: 277.12; T. 1558: 98c1-2; Poussin v. 4: 2; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 596c5-7] and criticizes it, saying that the word *tathā* does not indicate a causal relationship among the *anuśayas;* it is just used to fill out the verse [T. 1562: 596c7-15].)

5.1) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding to this argument.)

5.2) The Sarvāstivādins argue that the *anuśayas* cannot be *cittaviprayukta* because, if they were *cittaviprayukta,* they would always be present, and if *anuśayas* were always present, then good could never arise. Vasubandhu refutes this by saying that those who argue that *anuśayas* are *cittaviprayukta* attribute the functions of defilement to active *kleśas,* not to *anuśayas.* Since the active *kleśas* are not always present, the Sarvāstivādin argument does not prove that the *anuśayas* are *saṃprayukta.*

anuśayānāṃ cittakleśakaratvād āvaraṇatvāc chubhair viruddhatvāt / yasmād anuśayaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ cittaṃ bhavaty apūrvaṃ kuśalaṃ notpadyate utpannāc ca parihīyate tasmān na viprayuktāḥ / atha viprayuktair apy evaṃ syāt / kuśalaṃ na kadācid upalabhyeta teṣāṃ nityaṃ saṃnihitatvāt / upalabhyate ca / ataḥ kuśalasya copalambhād aviprayuktāḥ atha ihānuśayāḥ iti / tad idam ajñāpakaṃ yasmād yo viprayuktam anuśayam icchati sa etat sarvam anuśayakṛtaṃ necchati / kleśakṛtam evecchati
(Pradhan: 278.9-17; T. 1558: 98c23-99a1; Poussin v. 4: 5-6; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 599b20-23][233] and criticizes Vasubandhu, saying that he does not do justice to Dharmaśrī's argument and insisting that *kleśas* and *anuśayas* are not separate entities [T. 1562: 599b23-27.])

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[233] Saṃghabhadra discusses this passage somewhat out of order.

5.2) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain a discussion of why *anuśayas* are not *cittaviprayukta*. But it does maintain that *anuśaya* and *kleśa* are not synonymous, a position that lies behind Vasubandhu's argument here. See the next item.)

5.3) Vasubandhu approves of the theory of the Sautrāntikas, who define *anuśaya* as *kleśa* in the state of a seed and say that it is not a separate *dravya*.

evaṃ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / kathaṃ ca sautrāntikānām / kāmarāgasyānuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśaya iti / na cānuśayaḥ saṃprayukto na viprayuktas tasyādravyāntaratvāt / prasuto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate / prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam / kā ca tasya prasuptiḥ / asaṃmukhībhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ / kaḥ prabodhaḥ / saṃmukhībhāvaḥ / ko 'yam bījabhāvo nāma / ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ / yathānubhavajñānajā smṛtyutpādanaśaktir yathā cāṅkurādīnāṃ śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir iti

(Pradhan: 278.17-22; T. 1558: 99a1-9; Poussin v. 4: 6-7; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 596c24-597a2] and criticizes it, pointing out that, as Vasubandhu himself admits, *anuśayas* are not real, separate entities and arguing that Vasubandhu's ideas of *anuśaya* and *bīja* are illogical [T. 1562: 597a2-15].)

5.3) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* contains an explanation of *anuśaya* and *paryavasthāna* that is almost identical to the one attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*

ñon moṅs pa'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i rab tu dbye ba rnam par bźag pa gaṅ źe na / mdor bsdu na ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñon moṅs pa'i ji skad bstan pa rnams kyis ni rgyu gñis kyis sems can rnams kun nas ñon moṅs par byed de / 'di lta ste / kun nas dkris pa daṅ bag la ñal gyis so / de la ñon moṅs pa kun tu 'byuṅ ba mṅon du gyur pa ni kun nas dkris pa źes bya'o / de ñid kyi sa bon ma spaṅs śiṅ yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la ñal źes bya ste / gnas ṅan len kyaṅ de yin no / ma sad pa'i phyir ni bag la ñal yin la sad pa'i gnas skabs kyi phyir ni kun nas dkris pa yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 118a8-b3); 云何建立煩惱雜染染淨差別。謂如所說本隨二。惑略二緣故染惱有情。一由纏故。二隨眠故。現行現起煩惱名纏。即此種子未斷未害。名曰隨眠亦名麁重。又不覺位名曰隨眠。若在覺位說名爲纏 (T. 1579: 623a20-24)

The *Yogācārabhūmi* in several other places identifies *anuśayas* as being the seeds of *kleśas.* See the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi:*

sarvalaukikotkarṣabījānugamyatvād anuśayāḥ (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 167.6); *'jig rten pa'i yar 'phel ba thams cad kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pas na bag la ñal rnams so* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 97b8-98a1); 一切世間增上種子之所隨逐故名隨眠 (T. 1579: 314b25-26)

See also the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi:*

de la daṅ ba'i gzugs daṅ / sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos ji skad bstan pa thams cad la ñon moṅs pa'i sa bon yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa daṅ / ma spaṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de ni bag la ñal źes bya ste / gnas ṅan len kyaṅ de yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 215a5-6); 若於清淨諸色。及於如前所說一切心心所中。煩惱種子未害未斷。說名隨眠。亦名麁重 (T. 1579: 661b26-29)

According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi, bījas* are *prajñapti:*

'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dṅos po la skye ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / mi rtag pa daṅ / sa bon daṅ rnam par rig byed daṅ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa daṅ / thob pa daṅ / 'thob pa ma yin pa daṅ / srog gi dbaṅ po daṅ / ris mthun pa daṅ / miṅ gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs daṅ / yi ge'i tshogs rnams daṅ so so'i skye bo ñid daṅ / tshogs pa daṅ ma tshogs pa daṅ / 'jug pa so sor ṅes pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / mgyogs pa daṅ / go rims daṅ / dus daṅ yul daṅ graṅs ñe bar 'dogs pa daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 208a4-6); 又於有爲諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有

5.3 continued) 表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)

5.4) The Sarvāstivādins insist that the *sūtra,* when it says that a certain person has *rāgānuśaya* with respect to pleasurable feelings, uses the term as a synonym for *rāga*. Vasubandhu points out that the *sūtra* does not specify that the person has *rāgānuśaya* at that particular moment. In other words, the *sūtra* may be specifying the person's latent desire for future pleasurable feelings. Another explanation is that the *sūtra* may be designating the cause (*rāga*) by the name of the effect (*rāgānuśaya*).

bhavatīti vacanān nāsau tadaivānuśayaḥ / kadā tarhi bhavati / yadā prasupto bhavati / hetau vā tadupacāra eṣa draṣṭavyaḥ
(Pradhan: 279.3-4; T. 1558: 99a13-15; Poussin v. 4: 7; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 598b16-18] and criticizes it, saying that: 1) it would not make sense to say that, at the moment of the arising of *rāga paryavasthāna*, *rāgānuśaya* is actualized because saying, "there is *rāgānuśaya* for pleasurable feelings," means "*rāgānuśaya* is present among the pleasurable feelings"; 2) *anuśayas* have no intrinsic existence; 3) Vasubandhu's statement that the *sūtra* designates the cause by the effect is groundless [T. 1562: 598b18-c16].)

5.4) The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, commenting on a related *sūtra* statement, makes it clear that the *anuśayas* are the latent state of *kleśas*.

bde ba las ni 'dod chags / sdug bsṅal ba las ni źe sdaṅ / sdug bsṅal ba yaṅ ma yin bde ba yaṅ ma yin pa las ni ma rig pa rgyas par 'gyur te / 'di ni tshor ba rnams las kun nas ñon moṅs pa'o / bde ba la sogs pa'i gnas skabs thams cad la gnas pa'i ni thams cad ma spaṅs[234] *bag la ñal rgyas par 'gyur mod kyi / 'on kyaṅ dmigs pa raṅ raṅ gi spyod yul des kun nas dkris pa skyes pa de dag de'i rjes la rgyud de ñid la ñon moṅs pa daṅ 'brel pa gñid*[235] *log pa bźin 'dug pas na bag la ñal źes bya'o / de la 'dir tshaṅs par spyod pa spyad pa ni bag la ñal gźom pa'i phyir yin gyi / kun nas dkris pa'i bsal ba tsam gyi phyir ni ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 340b5-8); 於樂受中有貪隨眠。於苦受中有瞋隨眠。於非苦樂無明隨眠。是名於受所起雜染。難[236]於樂等所有諸受現前分位。一切未斷煩惱隨眠之所隨眠。然由緣彼各別所行諸纒。生起此後睡眠煩惱隨縛。即名於彼相續隨眠。爲欲永害諸隨眠故。熟修梵行。非唯爲遣諸纒因緣 (T. 1579: 851a3-9)

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[234] Derge reads *ma spaṅs pas*.

[235] Corrected from *gñis* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

[236] The *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation corrects *nan* 難 to *sui* 雖 without any com-ment (Yuga-bu 6: 274). This is supported by the Tibetan.

5.5) According to Vasubandhu, *bhavarāga* is attachment to the *ātmabhāva* in *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu* because the desire for sensual objects has been overcome.

ātmabhāva eva tu bhavaḥ / te ca sattvāḥ samāpattiṃ sāśrayām āsvādayanta ātmabhāvam evāsvādayanti kāmavītarāgatvāt
(Pradhan: 279.11-12; T. 1558: 99a22-25; Poussin v. 4: 8; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 599c29-600a3] but says that it is not significantly different from the Sarvāstivādin position [T. 1562: 600a3-7].)

5.5) (Schmithausen, in connection with a passage in the *Manobhūmi* that lists synonyms for *bīja*,[237] mentions Vasubandhu's statement that *bhava* means *ātmabhāva*. Schmithausen equates *ātmabhāva* with *bīja* here [1987: 511 n. 1405].

Furthermore, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Samāhitā Bhūmi* refers to two types of *rāga*, attachment to the *ātmabhāva* and attachment to objects.

gñis pas ni lus daṅ yul la mṅon par źen pa sad par byed pa spoṅ bar 'gyur ro [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: zi 179a3]; 第二作意修習多修習。故能斷保著内身外境二種貪欲 [T. 1579: 646c9-10]

However, it is not clear that there is any direct connection between Vasubandhu's statement and the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

[237] *bījaparyāyāḥ punar dhātur gotraṃ prakṛtir hetuḥ satkāyaḥ prapañca ālaya upādānaṃ duḥkhaṃ satkāyadṛṣṭyadhiṣṭhānam asmimānādhiṣṭhānaṃ cety evambhāgīyāḥ paryāyā veditavyāḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 26.18-19); *sa bon gyi rnam graṅs ni / khams daṅ rigs daṅ / raṅ bźin daṅ / rgyu daṅ / 'jig tshogs daṅ / spros pa daṅ / kun gźi daṅ / len pa daṅ / sdug bsṅal ba daṅ / 'jig tshogs la lta ba'i gnas daṅ / ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal gyi gnas daṅ / de lta bu daṅ 'thun pa rnams ni rnam graṅs su gtogs par rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: dzi 15a5-6); 又諸種子。乃有多種差別之名。所謂名界。名種姓。名因。名薩迦耶。名戲論。名阿頼耶。名取名苦。名薩迦耶見所依止處。名我慢所依止處如是等類差別應知 (T. 1579: 284c10-14)

5.6) Vasubandhu explains the meaning of *darśanaheya* and *bhāvanāheya:* those *anuśayas* the objects of which can be destroyed by *darśana* of a certain truth are said to be destroyed by insight into that truth, while the remainder can be destroyed by practice.

ye yaddarśanaheyālambanās te taddarśanaheyā avaśiṣṭā bhāvanāheyāḥ
(Pradhan: 280.13; T. 1558: 99b29-c2; Poussin v. 4: 12; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 601b13-15] and criticizes his explanation of the term *darśanaheya,* saying that *anuśayas* that are destroyed by the *dharmajñānakṣānti* and *anvayajñānakṣānti* regarding a certain truth are said to be *anuśayas* destroyed by insight into that truth [T. 1562: 601b15-23].)

5.6) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain a definition of *darśanaheya* similar to Vasubandhu's. However, in several places, it mentions the objects of the *darśanaheyakleśas.*

In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* ten *darśanaheyakleśas* are said to be without substance because their objects are unreal.

ñon moṅs pa bcu po de dag las mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba gaṅ dag yin pa de dag ni gźi med pa źes bya ste [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 116a3-4]; 又十煩惱見所斷者。名曰無事。彼所縁事非成實故 [T. 1579: 622b15-16]

Also in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* the unsubstantial objects of the four groups of *darśanaheyakleśas* are contrasted with the substantial objects of the *bhāvanāheyakleśas.*

mthoṅ ba daṅ bsgom pas spaṅ bar bya ba'i zag pa ji skad bstan pa de dag gi dmigs pa ni mdor bsdu na rnam pa lṅar rig par bya ste / log par rnam par brtags pa'i dṅos po la dmigs pa daṅ / lta ba la migs pa daṅ / tshul khrims daṅ brtul źugs la dmigs pa daṅ / raṅ gi rnam par brtags pa'i miṅ la dmigs pa daṅ / raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis ye yod pa'i dṅos po la dmigs pa'o [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 122b8-123a2]; 復次即如所説見修所斷諸漏煩惱。當知略有五種所縁。一縁邪分別所起事境。二縁見境。三縁戒禁境。四縁自分別所起名境。五縁任運堅固事境 [T. 1579: 624c12-15])

5.7) Vasubandhu gives the following etymological analysis of the word *satkāyadṛṣṭi: sat,* from the root *sad,* means "to perish"; *kāya* is a collection (*caya, saṃghāta, skandha*); *satkāya* thus means the collection of perishable things, or the *pañcopādānaskandhas.*

sīdatīti sat / cayaḥ kāyaḥ saṃghātaḥ skandha ity arthaḥ / sac cāyaṃ kāyaś ceti satkāyaḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ / nityasaṃjñāṃ piṇḍasaṃjñāṃ ca tyājayitum evaṃ dyotitā / etatpūrvako hi teśv ātmagrahaḥ
(Pradhan: 281.19-21; T. 1558: 100a1-4; Poussin v. 4: 15-17; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 606a3-6] and objects to Vasubandhu's etymology, saying that, according to Vasubandhu's reasoning, the syllable *sat* would be superfluous; *kāya* by itself is adequate to counter the idea of imperishability [T. 1562: 606a6-9; Poussin v. 4: 16 n. 3].)

5.7) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not discuss the etymology of *satkāyadṛṣṭi*.)

5.8) The Sarvāstivādins say that non-Buddhists who think that their non-Buddhist path leads to a pleasant rebirth or to purification are afflicted by *śīlavrataparāmarśa* that can be destroyed by insight into *duḥkhasatya* because these ideas are based on confusion regarding *duḥkha*. Vasubandhu says that, by this reasoning, all *kleśas*, not just the *dṛṣṭis*, would be destroyed by insight into *duḥkhasatya*, and thus no *kleśas* would be destroyed by insight into the other truths.

duḥkhe vipratipannatvāt / sarveṣāṃ sāsravālambanānāṃ duḥkhe vipratipannatvāt[238] (Pradhan: 282.21-22; T. 1558: 100b11-12; Poussin v. 4: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 607b10-11][239]
and criticizes it, saying that there are two types of *śīlavrataparāmarśa* that confuse path with non-path: one is destroyed by insight into *duḥkha*, the other by insight into *mārga* [T. 1562: 607b11-19].)

[238] The Sanskrit text is extremely terse here, and it cannot be understood without the help of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (450.32-451.3).

[239] Saṃghabhadra's discussion is slightly out of order here, coming after his discussion of the following argument in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

5.8) (I can find nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that is directly related to this argument.)

5.9) According to Sarvāstivāda, *śīlavrataparāmarśa* is to be destroyed by insight into the truths of *duḥkha* and *mārga*. Vasubandhu suggests that a certain type of *śīlavrataparāmarśa,* namely following a false path in the belief that it will result in purification, is to be destroyed by insight into the truth of *nirodha,* not *mārga.* Vasubandhu also refers back to his earlier suggestion that other types of *śīlavrataparāmarśa,* for example the belief that throwing oneself into fire or water will result in rebirth in heaven, are to be destroyed by insight into *samudaya,* not *duḥkha.*

athānyaṃ mokṣamārgaṃ parāmṛśya eṣa mokṣamārge nāstīty āha / so 'pi tenaivānyena śuddhiṃ pratyeti na tayā mithyādṛṣṭyeti / tasyāpy asau mārgadarśanaprahātavyālambano na sidhyati / yaś cāpi samudayanirodhadarśanaprahātavyālambanayā mithyādṛṣṭyā śuddhiṃ pratyeti sa kasmān na taddarśanaheyaḥ / tasmāt parīkṣya eṣo 'rthaḥ
(Pradhan: 283.1-4; T. 1558: 100b16-18; Poussin v. 4: 20-21; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 606c21-24], accuses Vasubandhu of not properly explaining the Sarvāstivādin position, refutes him in detail, and concludes that *śīlavrataparāmarśa* can only be destroyed by insight into *duḥkha* and *mārga* [T. 1562: 606c24-607b8].)

5.9) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi, śīlavrata-parāmarśa* specific to confusion regarding *samudayasatya,* which is predicated on false views arising from confusion regarding *samudayasatya,* is to be destroyed by insight into *samudayasatya.*

ji ltar na kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa la bag la ñal brgyad po log par źugs pa dag yin źe na / dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze rgyu med par smra ba rnams kyi log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa de daṅ dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze mi mthun pa rgyur smra ba rnams kyi dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa / dṅos po rnams kyi byin pa po daṅ sprul pa po daṅ byed pa po yin no źes log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa de daṅ / sbyin pa med do mchod sbyin med do / sbyin sreg med do legs par spyad pa med do ñes par spyad pa med do źes log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa de dag dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze lha[240] *mi spoṅ bar smras kyi*[241] *log par lta ba de dag las phyogs gcig gaṅ yin pa daṅ / gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa la skur pa 'debs pa'i log par lta ba dge sbyoṅ gau ta mas ñan thos rnams la kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa gdags pa byas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni med do źes zer ba gaṅ yin pa'i log par lta ba de dag ni kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin no / lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa gaṅ gis lta ba de dag la dam par mchog tu 'dzin ciṅ de dag gis dag pa daṅ grol ba daṅ ṅes par 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ro źes lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa de'aṅ kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin no / lta ba de dag daṅ rjes su mthun pa daṅ de dag daṅ mthun pa'i chos tshul krims daṅ brtul źugs yaṅ dag par blaṅ ba de la dam par mchog tu 'dzin ciṅ des dag pa daṅ grol ba daṅ ṅes par 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ro / źes tshul khrims daṅ brtul źugs mchog tu 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de'aṅ kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin no / lhag ma 'dod chags la sogs pa the tshom gyi mthar thug pa rnams ni sṅa ma bźin du blta bar bya ste / de ltar na ñon moṅs pa brgyad po de dag ni kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa la log par źugs pa daṅ kun 'byuṅ ba mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba dag yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*,: zi 121a4-b3); 云何迷集有八隨眠。謂諸沙門若婆羅門謗因邪見。又有沙門若婆羅門。計自在等是一切物生者化者及與作者。此惡因論所有邪見。又有邪見。無施無愛亦無祠祀。無有妙行亦無惡行。又有邪見不死矯亂。外道沙門若婆羅門所起一分。又有邪見誹謗集諦。謂諸外道作如是計。如彼沙門喬答摩種爲諸弟子所説集諦。此定無有。如是等見是迷集諦所起邪見。若有見取取彼諸見以爲第一能得清淨解脱出離。是迷集諦所起見取。若於隨順此見諸法所受戒禁。取爲第一能得清淨。廣説如前。是迷集諦戒禁取。餘疑貪等如前應知。如是八種煩惱隨眠。迷於集諦見集所斷 (T. 1579: 624a15-28)

[240] Corrected from *lta* on the basis of the Derge.

[241] Derge reads *smra ba rnams kyi*.

5.9 continued) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* makes a similar statement about *śīlavrataparāmarśa* specific to confusion regarding *nirodhasatya*.

ji ltar na bag la ñal brgyad 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin źe na / dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze mtha' daṅ mtha' med pa daṅ lha mi sboṅ bar smra ba rnams kyi lta ba'i phyogs gcig gaṅ yin pa daṅ dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze tshe 'di la mya ṅan las 'da' bar smra ba rnams kyi log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa daṅ / rgyas par 'jig rten na dgra bcom pa dag med do źes log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa las dgra bcom pa de dag kyaṅ spaṅs pas rab tu phye ba daṅ śes pas rab tu phye ba ste / de la spaṅs pa la skur ba 'debs pa'i log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa daṅ gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi 'gog pa'i bden pa la skur ba 'debs pa rnams kyi log par lta ba sṅa ma lta bu gaṅ yin pa daṅ / de dag gi log pa'i thar pa yoṅs su brtags pa'i lta ba gaṅ yin pa'i log par lta ba de dag ni 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin no / lta ba de dag la lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pas sṅa ma bźin du dam par mchog tu 'dzin pa'i lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de'aṅ 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin no / lta ba de dag daṅ rjes su mthun pa daṅ de dag daṅ mthun pa'i chos tshul khrims daṅ brtul źugs yaṅ dag par blaṅ ba de la dam par mchog tu 'dzin ciṅ / des dag pa daṅ grol ba daṅ ṅes par 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ro źes tshul khrims daṅ brtul źugs mchog tu 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de'aṅ 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin no / khoṅ khro ba ma gtogs pa lhag ma 'dod chags la sogs pa ni sṅa ma bźin du rig par bya'o / 'gogs pa la skrag pa'i sems daṅ kun nas mnar sems kyi sems daṅ khoṅ khro ba'i sems daṅ ldan pa'i khoṅ khro ba gaṅ yin pa de'aṅ 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par źugs pa yin te / lhag ma ni sṅa ma bźin no / de ltar na bag la ñal brgyad po de dag ni 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par źugs pa daṅ 'gog pa mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba dag yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*, zi 121b3-122a2); 云何迷滅有八隨眠。謂諸沙門若婆羅門。計邊無邊不死矯亂諸見一分。又有沙門若婆羅門。謂説現法涅槃論者所有邪見。又有邪見撥無世間眞阿羅漢。乃至廣説。彼阿羅漢二德所顯。謂斷及智。此中但取謗斷邪見。又有邪見誹謗滅諦。謂諸外道廣説如前。又有横計諸邪解脱所有邪見。如是諸見是迷滅諦所起邪見。若有見取取彼諸見以爲第一。廣説如前。是迷滅諦所起見取。若於隨順彼見諸法所受戒禁。取爲第一。廣説如前。是迷滅諦戒禁取。所餘貪等如前應知。唯除瞋恚。謂於滅諦起怖畏心起損害心起恚惱心。如是瞋恚迷於滅諦。餘如前説。如是八種煩惱隨眠。迷於滅諦見滅所斷 (T. 1579: 624a29-b14)

5.10) The Sarvāstivādins insist that *sattvadṛṣṭi* and *nityadṛṣṭi* with respect to Brahmā are not *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and *antagrāhadṛṣṭi;* they are not *dṛṣṭi* at all, but merely *mithyājñāna,* not all forms of which are *dṛṣṭi.* Vasubandhu questions this, asking why these two *dṛṣṭis* cannot have Brahmā as an object if the other *dṛṣṭis* can.

kuto nu khalv etadanyā tadālambanā dṛṣṭir eṣā na dṛṣṭir
(Pradhan: 287.17; T. 1558: 102a1-2; Poussin v. 4: 34; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the criticism of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 613a5-6] and refutes it, essentially reiterating the Vaibhāṣika opinion, recorded in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* to the effect that, since beings in *kāmadhātu* do not identify themselves with Brahmā, they cannot be said to have *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and *antagrāhadṛṣṭi* with regard to Brahmā [T. 1562: 613a6-12].)

5.10) (I can find nothing directly related to this issue in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

5.11) Vasubandhu quotes the *pūrvācāryas* as saying that innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* like that of animals and birds, is *avyākṛta,* unlike *vikalpita satkāyadṛṣṭi,* which is *akuśala.*

sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭir avyākṛtā / yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate / vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ
(Pradhan: 290.19-20; T. 1558: 102c25-27; Poussin v. 4: 41; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 618a17-19] and refutes it, saying that that which is *avikalpita* cannot be considered a *dṛṣṭi;* thus, this innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi* should actually be included in the category of *akliṣṭāvyākṛta mithyājñāna* [T. 1562: 618a19-29].)

5.11) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* mentions two types of *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* the innate one of ordinary people, animals, and birds, and the speculative one of non-Buddhists.

de la 'jig tshogs la lta ba gaṅ źe na / ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lṅa po dag la bdag gam bdag gir ba lta ba daṅ / mṅon par źen pa daṅ sems la 'jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba źes bya'o / de'aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhaṅ cig skyes pa daṅ kun brtags pa'o / de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha na ri dags daṅ bya rnams kyi yaṅ yin no / kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi yin par blta bar bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 112b6-113a1); 薩迦耶見者。於五取蘊心執增益見我我所名薩迦耶見。此復二種。一者俱生。二分別起。俱生者。一切愚夫異生乃至禽獸並皆現行。分別起者。諸外道等計度而起 (T. 1579: 621b6-10)

The text goes on to say that the first type is *avyākṛta,* while the second type is *akuśala.*

de la 'dod pa na spyod pa'i 'jig tshogs la lta ba lhan cig skyes pa gaṅ yin pa de ni luṅ du ma bstan pa yin te / yaṅ daṅ yaṅ kun tu 'byuṅ ba'i phyir daṅ / bdag daṅ gźan la śin tu gnod pa'i gnas ma yin pa'i phyir ro / rtog pas mṅon par źen pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mi dge ba yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 115b2-3); 復次俱生薩迦耶見唯無記性。數現行故。非極損惱自他處故。若分別起薩迦耶見由堅執故與前相違。在欲界者唯不善性 (T. 1579: 622a26-28)[242]

[242] This correspondence has been noted by Hakamaya (2001: 510, 513). The subject of innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is discussed by Schmithausen in relation to the origin of *kliṣṭa-manas* (1987: 146-152).

5.12) Vasubandhu argues that if past and future were real, they would be the same as the present and there would be no need to call them "past" and "future." He counters Vasumitra's theory of "change of state," according to which the difference between a present *dharma* and a past or future one is that only the present one is active, with the example of *tatsabhāgacakṣus,* i.e., an organ of sight that exists in the present but which is inactive. Furthermore, if activity were equivalent to yielding result, then past causes such as *sabhāgahetu* would actually have to be present since their activity (of yielding result) takes place in the present.

yady atītam api dravyato 'asty anāgatam iti / kasmāt tad atītam ity ucyate 'nāgatam iti vā / nanu coktam adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitā iti / yady evaṃ pratyutpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuṣaḥ kiṃ kāritram / phaladānapratigrahaṇam / atītānām api tarhi sabhāgahetvādīnāṃ phaladānāt kāritraprasaṅgo 'rdhakāritrasya veti lakṣaṇasaṃkaraḥ (Pradhan: 297.13-17; T. 1558: 105a1-5; Poussin v. 4: 55-56; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 631c1-5; Poussin 1936-1937: 94] and refutes it, saying that Vasubandhu does not understand the nature of *dharmas* and that he does not distinguish between the power to project a result [*kāritra*] and the other powers of a *dharma* [*sāmarthya*] [T. 1562: 631c5-17; Poussin 1936-1937: 94-96].)

5.12) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that, if the *saṃskāras* of the past and future were real, the Buddha would not have talked about their past or future nature. However, it does not mention *tatsabhāgacakṣus* or go into any further detail regarding *kāritra.* (See also items 5.14 and 5.15.)

de ltar na bcom ldan 'das kyis de yaṅ gal te 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa de 'du byed kyi mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa kho nar 'gyur na 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa'i dṅos po de med do źes mi bstan pa źig na (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 21a4-5); 謂若去來諸行性相是實有者。不應由彼去來之性説言是有 (T. 1579: 585b 27-28)[243]

[243] The Tibetan translation differs here from the Chinese: it says that the Buddha would not have said that the past and future nature did not exist (*dṅos po de med do źes mi bstan pa źig na*). But this does not make sense. Paramārtha's version in the *Chüeh-ting tsang lun* agrees with Hsüan-tsang's translation: 謂於過去及未來行除實執故。若去來行其相實有則非去來 (T. 1584: 1023a16-17).

5.13) Vasubandhu argues that if the *kāritra* of a *dharma* is the *dharma* itself, it would have to exist at all times, and therefore the difference among the three times could not be established. The only way to justify the three times is to say that a *dharma* exists after previously not existing and ceases to exist after having existed.

yadi dharma eva kāritraṃ kasmāt sa eva dharmas tenaivātmanā vidyamānaḥ kadācid atīta ity ucyate kadācid anāgata ity adhvanāṃ vyavasthā na sidhyati / kim atra na sidhyati / yo hy ajāto dharmaḥ so 'nāgataḥ / yo jāto bhavati na ca vinaṣṭaḥ sa vartamānaḥ / yo vinaṣṭaḥ so 'tītaḥ iti / etad evātra vaktavyam / yadi yathā vartamānaṃ dravyato 'sti tathā 'tītam anāgataṃ cāsti / tasya tathā sataḥ / ajātanaṣṭatā kena tenaiva svabhāvena sato dharmasya katham idaṃ sidhyaty ajāta iti yo vinaṣṭa iti veti / kim asya pūrvaṃ nāsīd yasyābhāvād ajāta ity ucyāte / kiṃ ca paścān nāsti yasyābhāvād vinaṣṭa ity ucyāte / tasmān na sidhyati sarvathā 'py atrādhvatrayam / yady abhūtvā bhavatīti neṣyate bhūtvā ca punar na bhavatīti

(Pradhan: 298.8-17; T. 1558: 105a17-27; Poussin v. 4: 57; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 633a16-19, b7-13; Poussin 1936-1937: 105-106, 107] and refutes it, denying that he says that the *kāritra* and the *dharma* are identical, maintaining that past, present, and future should be explained in terms of states [*avasthā*] of activity, and accusing Vasubandhu of talking nonsense and being the destroyer of the *sūtras* [T. 1562: 633a19-b7, b13-25; Poussin 1936-1937: 106-107, 107-108].)[244]

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[244] Saṃghabhadra's discussion here is out of order.

5.13) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* in explaining the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas,* says that *jāti* means that something previously not existing now exists, while *vyaya* means that something ceases to exist after having existed. The same argument is relevant to the question of past, present, and future.

mi rtag pa ñid kyaṅ ma byuṅ ba las 'byuṅ bas rab tu phye ba daṅ / byuṅ nas kyaṅ med par 'gyur bas rab tu phye ba yin te ma byuṅ ba las 'byuṅ ba ni 'byuṅ ba yin la / byuṅ nas med par 'gyur ba ni 'jig pa yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 22b6-7); 無常性相本無今有。是名爲生。有已還無是名爲滅 (T. 1579: 586a16-18)

5.14) The Sarvāstivādins claim that the fact that the Buddha mentioned the past and the future proves that they really exist. Vasubandhu agrees that they exist, but not as something ultimately real like the present.[245]

vayam api brūmo 'sty atītānāgatam iti / atītaṃ tu yad bhūtapūrvam / anāgataṃ yat sati hetau bhaviṣyati / evaṃ ca kṛtvā 'stīty ucyate na tu punar dravyataḥ
(Pradhan: 299.1-3; T. 1558: 105b4-7; Poussin v. 4: 58; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 626b20-24; Poussin 1936-1937: 60], takes Vasubandhu to task for his understanding of the verb "to exist" and says that Vasubandhu's real meaning is that the present exists while the past and future do not [T. 1562: 626b29-c19; Poussin 1936-1937: 61-62].)

[245] Saṃghabhadra criticizes this statement together with another statement that follows shortly afterwards (see 5.16).

5.14) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* when the Buddha mentioned the *saṃskāras* of the past and future, his intention was to indicate the fact that the *saṃskāras* of the present are the results of past *saṃskāras* and the causes of future ones. The first of the two misconceptions that the Buddha intended to eliminate was that past and future really exist.[246]

bcom ldan 'das kyis 'du byed 'das pa rnams ni yod de / 'phags pa ñan thos thos pa daṅ ldan pa ni de dag la mi lta bar gnas so / 'du byed ma 'oṅs pa rnams kyaṅ yod de / 'phags pa ñan thos thos pa daṅ ldan pa ni de dag la mṅon par mi dga' bar gnas so źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa de la dgoṅs pa gaṅ źe na / 'du byed 'das pa rnams ni 'bras bu bskyed pa las yod la / 'du byed ma 'oṅs pa rnams ni rgyu yoṅs su 'dzin pa las yod de / 'di ltar da ltar gyi 'du byed rnams ni mtshan ñid gsum gyis rab tu phye ba yin te / 'das pa rnams kyi 'bras bu'i dṅos po daṅ / ma 'oṅs pa rnams kyi rgyu'i dṅos po daṅ / raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi rgyun mi 'chad pas so / de ltar na bcom ldan 'das kyis de yaṅ gal te 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa de 'du byed kyi mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa kho nar 'gyur na 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa'i dṅos po de med do źes mi bstan pa źig na (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 21a1-5); 問如世尊言。有過去行。於彼行中我具多聞聖弟子衆無顧戀住。有未來行。於彼行中我具多聞聖弟子衆無希望住。此何密意。答過去諸行與果故有。未來諸行攝因故有。所以者何。現在諸行三相所顯。一是過去果性故。二是未來因性故。三自相相續不斷故。爲顯此理故佛世尊説如是言。又觀二義故作是説。一爲遮斷於去來法實有執故。顯此道理。謂若去來諸行性相是實有者。不應由彼去來之性説言是有 (T. 1579: 585b 19-28)

[246] Mukai (1972) points out many correspondences between Vasubandhu's criticism of *sarvāstivāda* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and that in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* and he refers to the passage in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamano-bhūmi,* as well. He concludes that "the author" of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* basing himself on Sautrāntika, share an essentially identical position, but he does not suggest that the *Yogācārabhūmi* was Vasubandhu's source.

5.15) Vasubandhu raises an objection: if the past and the future really exist, then how can they be called "past" or "future"?

kathaṃ tad atītam anāgataṃ cocyate yadi nityam astīti
(Pradhan: 299.3-4; T. 1558: 105b9; Poussin v. 4: 58; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master, who, he says, is following the teaching of the Sthavira here [T. 1562: 625b2-4; Poussin 1936-1937: 52], and turns Vasubandhu's argument back on those who deny the past and future: if the past and future did not exist, it would be impossible to talk about them [T. 1562: 625b4-13; Poussin 1936-1937: 52-53].)

5.15) (See item 5.12.)

5.16) According to Vasubandhu, the reason that the Buddha said that past and future exist was to refute those who deny the validity of cause and result. In the expressions "the past exists" and "the future exists," the word "exists" in these cases means "existed" and "will exist," respectively.[247]

tasmāt bhūtapūrvasya ca hetor bhāvinaś ca phalasya bhūtapūrvatāṃ bhāvitāṃ ca jñāpayituṃ hetuphalāpavādadṛṣṭipratiṣedhārtham uktaṃ bhagavatā asty atītam asty anāgatam iti / astiśabdasya nipātatvāt / yathā 'sti dīpasya prāgabhāvo 'sti paścād abhāva iti vaktaro bhavanti yathā cāsti niruddhaḥ sa dīpo na tu mayā nirodhita iti / evam atītānāgatam apy astīty uktam / anyathā hy atītānāgatabhava eva na siddhyet (Pradhan: 299.4-8; T. 1558: 105b10-15; Poussin v. 4: 58-59; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 626b24-28; Poussin 1936-1937: 60] and criticizes it, saying that, if past and future are not real, it is impossible to refute those who deny causality [T. 1562: 626c19-627a10; Poussin 1936-1937: 62-63].)

[247] See *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (473.5-6).

5.16) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, the second of two misconceptions that the Buddha intended to eliminate by mentioning the *saṃskāras* of the past and future was the negation of the present (which is tantamount to a denial of cause and effect).

ji ltar 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa med pa de bźin du / da ltar byuṅ ba yaṅ med do źes mṅon par źen pa rnams kyi mṅon par źen pa de (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 21a6); 謂彼妄計如去來世現在亦爾都無所有 (T. 1579: 585b 29-c1)

5.17) According to Vasubandhu, when the Buddha said that a past action exists, his meaning was that a potential to yield result, which was placed in the *saṃtati* in the past, exists in the *saṃtati* in the present. Furthermore, the Buddha said in the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra*[248] that when *cakṣurindriya* appears, it does not come from anywhere, and when it is destroyed, it does not go into any collection: it exists after not having existed, and after existing, it does not exist.

yat karmābhyatītaṃ kṣīṇaṃ niruddhaṃ vigataṃ viparinataṃ tad astīti / kiṃ te tasya tasya karmaṇo bhūtapūrvatvaṃ necchanti sma / tatra punas tadāhitaṃ tasyām saṃtatau phaladānasāmarthyaṃ saṃdhāyoktam / anyathā hi svena bhāvena vidyamānam atītaṃ na sidhyet / itthaṃ caitad evaṃ yat paramārthaśūnyatāyām uktaṃ bhagavatā cakṣur utpadyamānaṃ na kutaścid āgacchati nirudhyamānaṃ na kvacit saṃnicayaṃ gacchati / iti hi bhikṣavaś cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratigacchatīti[249]
(Pradhan: 299.9-14; T. 1558: 105b16-22; Poussin v. 4: 59; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 627a10-15; Poussin 1936-1937: 63] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu ignores the obvious meaning of the Buddha's statement that past actions exist and tries to twist the Buddha's words in support of his own theory of *bīja*, which Saṃghabhadra has already refuted [T. 1562: 627a15-b11; Poussin 1936-1937: 64-65].)

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[248] *Saṃyuktāgama, sūtra* 335 (T. 99: 92c12-26; see Pāsādika 1986: 98).

[249] Pāsādika emends *pratigacchatīti* to *prativigacchatīti* on the basis of Yaśomitra's commentary and the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (1986: 98).

5.17) The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* explains that when the Buddha said that a past action exists, he was really talking about impressions of the action, not the action itself. These impressions endow the *saṃtati* with the potential to yield results.[250]

yad apy uktam asty atītaṃ karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābaddhā vyābādhāṃ[251] *vedayanti / tatrāpi tadvāsanāyāṃ tadastitvopacāram abhipretyoktaṃ / yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭa-phalaṃ nirvartate iti na yujyate / tato 'pi nāsti doṣaḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 127.19-128.4); *'di ltar sems can rnams gnod pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myoṅ bar byed pa / 'das pa'i las yod do źes gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de la yaṅ / bag chags de la / de yod pa'i 'dogs pa la dgoṅs nas gsuṅs pa yin te / 'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags źes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa daṅ mi sdug pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir mi ruṅ ste* (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* dzi 75b3-5); 又雖説言有過去業。由此業故諸有情受有損害受無。此亦依彼習氣密意假説爲有。謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生。是故於我無過。而汝不應道理 (T. 1579: 305b1-6)

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* gives a similar explanation, but with the addition of the term **karmabīja*.

bcom ldan 'das kyis las 'das pa ni yod de gal te las 'das pa med du zin na 'di na la las gnod pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myoṅ ba mi 'gyur źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa de la dgoṅs pa gaṅ źe na / 'das pa'i tshor bas rnams su las dge ba daṅ mi dge ba bskyed ciṅ 'gags pas phyi ma la 'bras bu 'dod pa daṅ mi 'dod pa mṅon par 'grub par de'i sa bon gyis 'du byed kyi rgyun phyi ma phyi ma yoṅs su bsgom pa las dgoṅs nas (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$:* zi 20b4-6); 問如世尊言。有過去業。若過去業體是無者。不應今時有一領納有損害受。或復不應有一領納無損害受。此何密意。答過去生中淨不淨業已起已滅。能感當來愛不愛果。此業種子攝受熏習。於行相續展轉不斷。世尊爲顯如是相續。是故説言有過去業 (T. 1579: 585b7-13)

The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, although not mentioning *cakṣurindriya*, gives an interpretation of the *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra* (see Mukai 1985: 34) similar to Vasubandhu's, in which it denies the reality of past and future *saṃskāras*.

de la ma 'oṅs pa'i dus na 'du byed rnams 'du byed kyi phuṅ por 'dug ste / de las 'du

[250] Mukai points out the similarity between this argument and Vasubandhu's (1972).

[251] Bhattacharya mentions in his note that the reading is doubtful.

5.17 continued) *byed rnams skye pa'i tshe 'oṅ bar 'gyur ba med do / gal te yod par 'gyur na ma 'oṅs pa'i dus na raṅ bźin gyis yoṅs su grub zin pa de dag ni skyer yaṅ mi ruṅ la mi rtag pa ñid du snaṅ bar yaṅ mi 'gyur ba'i rigs na snaṅ źiṅ yaṅ 'dug ste / de bas na skye ba'i tshe gaṅ nas kyaṅ mi 'oṅ la med pa las yod par yaṅ 'gyur ba 'di ni phyi ma'i mtha' stoṅ pa ñid do / de la 'das pa'i dus na 'du byed rnams phuṅ por 'dug ste / der 'du byed skyes nas 'gag pa rnams sogs par 'gyur ba med de / gal te yod par gyur na 'das pa'i 'du byed kyi tshogs raṅ gi bdag ñid kyis gnas pa'i phyir 'du byed 'gag pa yaṅ med pa kho nar 'gyur la 'gag pa med na ni rtag pa ñid du yaṅ snaṅ bar mi 'gyur ba'i rigs na snaṅ źiṅ yaṅ 'dug ste / de bas na 'du byed rnams 'gag pa'i tshe gaṅ du yaṅ sogs par mi 'gyur la yod pa las 'gag pa'i rgyu la ma bltos par raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis phyir med par 'gyur ba 'di ni sṅon gyi mtha' stoṅ pa ñid do* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 282b4-283a1); 當知此中無有諸行於未來世。實有行聚自性安立諸行生時從彼而來。若有是事彼不應生。於未來世諸行自性已實有故。又不應有無常可得。既有可得。是故當知。諸行生時。無所從來。本無今有。是名後際空。又無諸行於過去世。有實行聚自性。安立。已生已滅。諸行往彼積集而住。若有是事。不應施設諸行有滅。過去行聚自性儼然常安住故。若無有滅。彼無常性應不可知既有可知。是故諸行於正滅時。都無所往積集而住。有已散滅不待餘因。自然滅壞。是名前際空 (T. 1579: 826b12-23)

5.18) According to the *sūtra,* consciousness is always based on two things, an organ and an object. The Sarvāstivādins argue that, since one can think about past or future things, they must be the object of *manas* and hence real. Vasubandhu makes a distinction between those objects that are producing conditions (*janakapratyaya*), which he implicitly admits are necessarily real, and those that are mere objects, for example, nirvana, which cannot possibly be the cause of the production of anything. Such mere objects are not necessarily real, and so the Sarvāstivādin argument does not prove the real existence of past and future.

idaṃ tāvad iha saṃpradhāryam / yan manas pratītya dharmaś cotpadyate mano-vijñānaṃ kiṃ tasya yathā manojanakaḥ pratyaya evaṃ dharmā āhosvid ālambanamātraṃ dharmā iti / yadi tāvat janakaḥ pratyayo dharmāḥ kathaṃ yad anāgataṃ kalpasahasreṇa bhaviṣyati vā na vā tad idānīṃ vijñānaṃ janiṣyati / nirvāṇaṃ ca sarvapravṛttinirodhāj janakaṃ nopapadyate / athālambanamātraṃ dharmā bhavanti / atītānāgatam apy ālambanaṃ bhavatīti brūmaḥ
(Pradhan: 299.17-21; T. 1558: 105b27-c3; Poussin v. 4: 60; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 627c19-25; Poussin 1936-1937: 68] and criticizes it, arguing that the idea of an unreal object of consciousness is against the teachings of the Buddha [T. 1562: 627c25-628a27; Poussin 1936-1937: 68-71].)

5.18) In the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi,* an objection is mentioned: if past and future *saṃskāras* are not real, why did the Buddha say that they are conditions that produce *manovijñāna*? The answer is that even unreal things, such as past and future, can give rise to *manovijñāna* by being its object.[252]

bcom ldan 'das kyis yid ni 'das pa'i 'du byed rnams las kyaṅ brten te 'byuṅ la / yid ni ma 'oṅs pa'i 'du byed rnams las kyaṅ brten te 'byuṅ ṅo źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa de la / gal te 'das pa'i 'du byed rnams kyaṅ med la ma 'oṅs pa rnams kyaṅ med na gaṅ gi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis yid 'byuṅ ṅo źes gsuṅs pa'i yid kyi dmigs pa gaṅ yin / gal te yid dṅos po med pa kho na źig la dmigs na ni de la bcom ldan 'das kyis legs par gsuṅs pa daṅ / legs par brjod pa gaṅ yin pa 'di lta ste / rnam par śes pa ni gñis la brten te 'byuṅ ṅo / gñis gaṅ źe na / mig daṅ gzugs las rgyas par yid daṅ chos kyi bar las so źes bcom ldan 'das kyis legs par gsuṅs pa daṅ / legs par brjod pa de la ji ltar śin tu gnod par byas par mi 'gyur źe na / yid ni rnam par śes pa'i tshogs lṅa po dag gi spyod yul ma yin pa'i don gaṅ yin pa 'dzin par byed de / de la bcom ldan 'das kyis chos gdags par mdzad nas / yid daṅ chos rnams la brten te yid kyi rnam par śes pa 'byuṅ ṅo źes gsuṅs so / bcom ldan 'das kyis dgoṅs pa de yaṅ rgyu gaṅ gis khoṅ du chud par bya źe na / 'di ltar yid kyi rnam par śes pa ni 'das pa'i rnam par śes pa la dmigs pa yaṅ yod / ma 'oṅs pa'i rnam par śes pa la dmigs pa yaṅ yod med kyi / rnam par śes pa ni chos kyi skye mched du gtogs pa ma yin no / gźan yaṅ yod pa yaṅ yod pa'i don gyis rnam par gnas śiṅ yod pa'i don 'dzin par byed la / med pa yaṅ med pa'i don gyis[253] rnam par gnas śiṅ med pa'i don 'dzin par byed pas / de la yid kyi rnam pa śes pas ni yod pa yaṅ don gaṅ gis rnam par gnas pa'i don de ñid kyis rnam par śes par bya la / med pa yaṅ don gaṅ gis rnam par gnas pa'i don de ñid kyis rnam par śes par bya'o / gal te de gñi ga gñi ga'i don gyis rnam par śes par mi byed na ni yid don thams cad la dmigs pa daṅ / don thams cad 'dzin pa yin par mi 'gyur ro / gaṅ de skad ces zer na / des ni grub pa'i mtha' la yaṅ śin tu gnod pa byas par 'gyur te / ji ltar yod pa ñid med pa'o źes brjod du ni tshul ma yin no / de lta bas na ji ltar 'das pa daṅ / ma 'oṅs pa de dṅos po med pa de bźin du de la dmigs pa'i yid kyaṅ med la / dmigs pa yin par khoṅ du chud par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 19a2-b4); 問如世尊言。過去諸行爲縁生意。未來諸行爲縁生意。過去未來諸行非有。何故世尊宣説彼行爲縁生意。若意亦縁非有事境。而得生者。云何不違微妙言説。如世尊言。由二種縁諸識得生。何等爲二謂眼及色。如是廣説乃至意法。答由能執持諸五識身所不行義故。佛世尊假説名法。是故説言縁意及法意識得生。問何因縁故知佛世尊有是密意。答由彼意識亦縁去來識爲境界世現可得。非彼境識法處所攝。又有性者安立有義能持有義若無性者安立無義能持無義故皆名法。由彼意識於有性義。若由此義而得安立。即以此義起識了別。於無性義。若由此義而得安立。即以此義起

[252] Mukai points out the relationship between this argument and Vasubandhu's (1972).

[253] Corrected from *gyi* on the basis of the Derge.

5.18 continued) 識了別。若於二種不由二義起了別者。不應説意縁一切義取一切義。設作是説。便應違害自悉彈多。又不應言如其所有非有亦爾。是如理説。是故意識如去來事非實有相。縁彼爲境。由此故知意識亦縁非有爲境
(T. 1579: 584c18-585a8)

5.19) The Sarvāstivādin challenges Vasubandhu: how can something nonexistent be an object of perception? Vasubandhu answers that something in the past is remembered with the knowledge that it is past, not present, and that something in the future is imagined with the knowledge that it is future, not present. If the object were existent, it would be perceived as being in the present—in other words, it would not be a past or future object.

yadi nāsti katham ālambanam / atredānīṃ brūmaḥ / yadā tad ālambanaṃ tathāsti kathaṃ tad ālambanam abhūt bhaviṣyati ceti / na hi kaścid atītaṃ rūpaṃ vedanāṃ vā smarann astīti paśyati / kiṃ tarhi / abhūd iti / yathā khalv api vartamānaṃ rūpam anubhūtaṃ tathā tad atītaṃ smaryate / yathā cānāgataṃ vartamānaṃ bhaviṣyati tathā buddhyā gṛhyate / yadi ca tat tathaivāsti vartamānaṃ prapnoti / atha nāsti / asad apy ālambanaṃ bhavatīti siddham

(Pradhan: 299.21-25; T. 1558: 105c4-11; Poussin v. 4: 60-61; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the sūtra-master's response to his own objection [T. 1562: 628a27-b5; Poussin 1936-1937: 71] and, calling Vasubandhu "the disciple of the Dārṣṭāntika," criticizes it at length, saying that Vasubandhu's intellectual deficiencies prevent him from contemplating past and future clearly and arguing that Vasubandhu's statement that past objects are remembered actually proves that they are real [T. 1562: 628b5-27; Poussin 1936-1937: 71-73].)[254]

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[254] For a discussion of this issue as treated by Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra, see Cox 1988: 61-68.

5.19) (I am unable to find anything in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding to this argument of Vasubandhu's.)

5.20) Vasubandhu argues that cognition of the absence of sound before the sound is made is based on a nonexistent object, not on a future sound, as the Sarvāstivādins maintain.

yaś ca śabdasya prāgabhāvam ālambate kiṃ tasyālambanam / śabda eva / evaṃ tarhi yaḥ śabdābhāvaṃ prārthayate tasya śabda eva kartavyaḥ syāt / anāgatāvastha iti cet / sati kathaṃ nāstibuddhiḥ / vartamāno nāstīti cet / na / ekatvāt / yāvatā tasya viśeṣas tasyābhūtvābhāvasiddhiḥ / tasmād ubhayaṃ vijñānasyālambanaṃ bhāvaś cābhāvaś ca (Pradhan: 300.9-12; T. 1558: 105c23-29; Poussin v. 4: 62; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 624b4-9; Poussin 1936-1937: 45] and criticizes it, saying that what Vasubandhu sees as the nonexistence of sound is really the supporting conditions (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of sound in the state in which no sound is produced; in any case, Saṃghabhadra insists that future sound actually does exist and can be the support of the cognition of the absence of sound [T. 1562: 624b9-c1; Poussin 1936-1937: 45-47].)[255]

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[255] Saṃghabhadra discusses this passage out of order. For a summary of Saṃghabhadra's argument, see Cox 1988: 58-59.

5.20) (The refutations of the reality of past and future in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi:* 122.12-129.4; *Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 73b3-76a7; T. 1579: 304b24-305b26] and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 20b4-21b1; T. 1579: 585b7-c8] do not include this argument. Nor can I find it elsewhere in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

5.21) The Sarvāstivādins refute Vasubandhu's assertion that both existent and nonexistent things can be objects of cognition. According to them, if this were so, the Buddha would not have stated that it was impossible for him to know that which does not exist in the world. Vasubandhu responds that the Buddha meant that he does not mistake nonexistent things for existent ones. Furthermore, if all cognition had a real object, there could be no uncertainty about whether something is real and thus no distinction between the Buddha and other people.

apare ābhimānikā bhavanty asantam apy avabhāsaṃ santaṃ paśyanti / ahaṃ tu santam evāstīti paśyāmīty āyaṃ tatrābhiprāyaḥ / itarathā hi sarvabuddhīnāṃ sadālambanatve kuto 'sya vimarśaḥ syāt ko vā viśeṣaḥ
(Pradhan: 300.13-16; T. 1558: 106a1-4; Poussin v. 4: 62-63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 622c11-14; Poussin 1936-1937: 34] and criticizes it, saying that illusory cognitions are simply mistaken cognitions, not cognitions of nonexistent objects [T. 1562: 622c15-27; Poussin 1936-1937: 35].)[256]

[256] Again, see Cox 1988: 61-68 for a general discussion of this issue.

5.21) In its refutation of the real existence of the past and the future, the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* answers the objection that, if past and future are unreal, then there must be cognition of nonexistent objects, which contradicts *sūtra*. The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* argues that, if there were no cognition of nonexistent objects, ideas such as the nonexistence of a self, the horn of the hare, or the child of a barren woman would be impossible.[257]

evaṃ vyākṛte ca punaḥ saty uttari vadet / saced atītānāgataṃ nāsti / katham asad-ālambanā buddhiḥ pravartate / sā ca punaḥ pravartate / tat katham āgamavirodho na bhavati / yad uktaṃ sarvam iti yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānīti / sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid icchasi nāstītigrāhikāyā buddher loke 'pravṛttiṃ vā pravṛttiṃ vā / saced apravṛttiṃ / tena yā nairātmyagrāhikā śaśaviṣāṇavandhyāputrādigrāhikā buddhir naivāstīti na yujyate (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 127.8-13); *de skad du lan btab kyaṅ yaṅ 'di skad ces zer te / gal te 'das pa daṅ / ma oṅs pa med du zin na / dmigs pa med pa la ji ltar blo 'jug par 'gyur / gal te 'jug na yaṅ skye mched bcu gñis po thams cad yod do / źes bya ba'i bar du gsuṅs pa'i luṅ daṅ ji ltar 'gal bar mi 'gyur źes zer ba de la / ji skad ces brjod par bya ste / ci 'jig rten na med do / źes 'dzin pa'i blo mi 'jug gam 'on te 'jug par 'dod / gal te mi 'jug na ni des na bdag med par 'dzin pa daṅ / ri boṅ gi rwa daṅ / mog śam gyi bu la sogs par 'dzin pa blo gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ med pa kho na'o / źes byar mi ruṅ ṅo* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* dzi75a1-4); 如是説已復有難言。若過去未來是無。云何縁無而有覺轉。若言縁無而有覺轉者。云何不有違教過失。如説一切有者。謂十二處。我今問。汝隨汝意答。世間取無之覺爲起耶。爲不起耶。若不起者。能取無我兎角。石女兒。等覺皆應是無。此不應理 (T. 1579: 305a10-16)

[257] Mukai points out the relationship between this argument and Vasubandhu's (1972).

5.22) Vasubandhu gives another argument for the cognition of nonexistent objects: the Buddha says that his disciples will know, through his teaching, that existent things exist and that nonexistent things do not exist.[258]

itthaṃ caitat evam / yad anyatra bhagavatoktam etat[259] *bhikṣur mama śrāvako yāvat sa mayā kalpam*[260] *avoditaḥ sāyaṃ viśeṣāya paraiṣyati / sāyam avoditaḥ kalpaṃ viśeṣāya paraiṣyati / sac ca sato jñāsyati asac cāsataḥ sottaraṃ ca sottarataḥ anuttaraṃ cānuttarata iti*

(Pradhan: 300.16-18; T. 1558: 106a4-8; Poussin v. 4: 63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 622c28-623a2, 623a8-9; Poussin 1936-1937: 35-36] and criticizes at length Vasubandhu's misleading understanding of the *sūtra,* saying that in this *sūtra* passage the word *sat* means "good," not "existent," while the word *asat* means "bad," not "nonexistent" [T. 1562: 623a2-8, 623a9-b2; Poussin 1936-1937: 36-37].)

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[258] *Saṃyuktāgama, sūtra* 702 (T. 99: 189a22-b9; see Pāsādika 1986: 98-99).

[259] Citing Honjō 1984, Pāsādika emends *etat* to *etu* (1986: 98).

[260] Pāsādika emends *kalpam* to *kalyam* (1986: 98).

5.22) In a continuation of the passage mentioned in 5.21, the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* quotes the same *sūtra* passage as Vasubandhu as further proof that the cognition of nonexistent objects must be possible.

bcom ldan 'das kyis ñan thos g.yo med pa ni ṅas gdams ṅag byin te / yaṅ dag par grub na / yod pa la yaṅ yod par śes / med pa la yaṅ med par śes sogs gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ mi ruṅ bar 'gyur ro (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$*: dzi 75a4-5); 又薄伽梵説我諸無諂聲聞。如我所説正修行時。若有知有若無知無。此不應道理 (T. 1579: 305a16-18)[261]

[261] There is no corresponding Sanskrit text for this portion or the portion that follows immediately (*Yogācārabhūmi$_t$*: dzi 75a5-8; T. 1579: 305a18-24).

5.23) Referring to his refutation of *ātmavāda* at the end of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that a result does not directly arise from a past action; instead, it arises due to a *saṃtānaviśeṣa* based on a past action.

naiva hi sautrāntikā atītāt karmaṇaḥ phalotpattiṃ varṇayanti / kiṃ tarhi / tatpūrvakāt saṃtānaviśeṣād ity ātmavādapratiṣedhe saṃpravedayiṣyāmaḥ
(Pradhan: 300.19-21; T. 1558: 106a10-13; Poussin v. 4: 63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 629b3-5; Poussin 1936-1937: 77-78], refers to the end of Chapter Nine,[262] where Vasubandhu gives a longer explanation of *saṃtatipariṇāma* [T. 1562: 629b5-17; Poussin 1936-1937: 78], and criticizes it, objecting to Vasubandhu's identification of the series of thought with the series of actions and to his comparison of the series of actions with the series of seed, sprout, etc. [T. 1562: 629b17-630a11; Poussin 1936-1937: 78-82].)

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[262] See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 477.7-18; T. 1558: 158c25-159a5; Poussin v. 5: 295-296.

5.23) It is shown in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* and in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* that the result of a past action does not arise directly from the action, but rather from a modification of the *saṃtati.* (See item 5.17. For the sake of convenience, I again include both passages with their summaries.)

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* explains that when the Buddha said that a past action exists, he was really talking about impressions of the action, not the action itself. These impressions endow the *saṃtati* with the potential to yield results.

yad apy uktam asty atītaṃ karma yataḥ sattvāh savyābaddhā vyābādhāṃ (see note 251) *vedayantīti / tatrāpi tadvāsanāyāṃ tadastitvopacāram abhipretyoktaṃ / yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭa-phalaṃ nirvartate iti na yujyate / tato 'pi nāsti doṣaḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 127.19-128.4). *'das pa'i las yod do źes gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de la yaṅ / bag chags de la / de yod pa'i 'dogs pa la dgoṅs nas gsuṅs pa yin te / 'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags źes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa daṅ mi sdug pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir mi ruṅ ste* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: dzi 75b3-5); 又雖說言有過去業。由此業故諸有情受有損害受無損害受。此亦依彼習氣密意假說爲有。謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生。是故於我無過。而汝不應道理 (T. 1579: 305b1-6)

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* gives a similar explanation, but with the addition of the term **karmabīja.*

bcom ldan 'das kyis las 'das pa ni yod de gal te las 'das pa med du zin na 'di na la las gnod pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myoṅ ba mi 'gyur źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa de la dgoṅs pa gaṅ źe na / 'das pa'i tshor bas rnams su las dge ba daṅ mi dge ba bskyed ciṅ 'gags pas phyi ma la 'bras bu 'dod pa daṅ mi 'dod pa mṅon par 'grub par de'i sa bon gyis 'du byed kyi rgyun phyi ma phyi ma yoṅs su bsgom pa las dgoṅs nas (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 20b4-6); 問如世尊言。有過去業。若過去業體是無者。不應今時有一領納有損害受。或復不應有一領納無損害受。此何密意。答過去生中淨不淨業已起已滅。能感當來愛不愛果。此業種子攝受熏習。於行相續展轉不斷。世尊爲顯如是相續。是故說言有過去業 (T. 1579: 585b7-13)

5.24) Vasubandhu suggests that those who believe in the real existence of past and future are guilty of thinking that results are eternal: if the result always exists, then what efficacy does karma have?

yasya tv atītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tasya phalaṃ nityam evāstīti kiṃ tatra karmaṇaḥ sāmarthyam
(Pradhan: 300.21-22; T. 1558: 106a13-14; Poussin v. 4: 63; Saṃghabhadra in two places identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 630a11-13, 634a23-25; Poussin 1936-1937: 82-83, 113] and answers Vasubandhu's question: karma makes the result produce its special activity; that is, karma brings the result into the present [T. 1562: 630a13-25, 634a25-b9; Poussin 1936-1937: 113-114].)

5.24) In the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi,* the first of sixteen mistaken theories (among which the third is belief in the real existence of past and future) is *hetuphalasadvāda,* the belief that the result is always present in the cause. This theory is shown to be mistaken because: 1) if cause and result have the same characteristics, there is no difference between them and hence it is illogical to say that one is present in the other; 2) if they have different characteristics and if the nature of the result is that it has not yet arisen, then it is illogical to say that the result exists in the cause; 3) if they have different characteristics and the nature of the result is that it has already arisen, then it is illogical to say that the result arises in the cause. Therefore, the result is not already present in the cause; rather, there being a cause, the result arises in dependence on conditions.[263]

sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ kaccid icchasi hetulakṣaṇaṃ phalalakṣaṇaṃ hetor vā punaḥ phalalakṣaṇam abhinnalakṣaṇaṃ vā bhinnalakṣaṇaṃ vā / saced abhinnalakṣaṇaṃ / tena nāsti hetuniyamaḥ / phalaniyama iti nirviśiṣṭatvād hetuphalayor hetau phalaṃ vidyata iti na yujyate / saced bhinnalakṣaṇaṃ / tena kaccid icchasi anutpannalakṣaṇaṃ votpannalakṣaṇaṁ vā / saced anutpannalakṣaṇaṃ / tena hetau phalam anutpannam astīti na yujyate / saced utpannalakṣaṇaṃ / tena hetau phalam utpadyata iti na yujyate / tasmān nāsti hetau phalaṃ/ hetau tu sati pratyayam apekṣyotpadyate (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 119.17-120.3); *de la 'di skad ces brjod par bya ste /* [*ci'i rgyu'i mtshan ñid daṅ 'bras bu'i mtshan ñid daṅ / rgyu la 'bras bu'i mtshan ñid tha dad pa ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid dam*] /[264] *'on te tha dad pa'i mtshan ñid du 'dod / gal te tha dad pa ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid gcig yin na ni / des na rgyu daṅ 'bras bu gñis la bye brag med pa'i phyir / rgyur ṅes pa daṅ 'bras bur ṅes pa med pas / rgyu las 'bras bu yod ces byar mi ruṅ ṅo / gal te mtshan ñid tha da pa źig yin na ni / des na ci ma skyes pa'i mtshan ñid dam / 'on te skyes pa'i mtshan ñid du 'dod / gal te ma skyes pa'i mtshan ñid cig yin na ni / des na rgyu la 'bras bu ma skyes pa źig yod do źes bya bar yaṅ mi ruṅ ṅo / gal te skyes zin pa'i mtshan ñid cig yin na ni / des na rgyu las 'bras bu skyes zin pa źig skye'o źes byar mi ruṅ ṅo / de bas na rgyu la ni 'bras bu med kyi / rgyu yod na rkyen la ltos te skye bar 'gyur ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi,:* dzi 71b8-72a4); 應審問彼。汝何所欲。何者因相。何者果相。因果兩相。爲異不異。若無異相。便無因果二種決定。因果二種。無差別故。因中有果。不應道理。若有異相。便無因果二種決定。因果二種。無差別故。因中有果。不應道理。若有異相。汝意云何。因中果性。爲未生

[263] Unlike Vasubandhu, the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* does not explicitly relate the belief in an eternal result to *sarvāstivāda.* However, it is highly likely that Vasubandhu's criticism of *sarvāstivāda* is borrowed, at least in part, from the criticism of *hetuphalasadvāda* in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi.*

[264] The portion in brackets is from the Derge, which agrees more closely with the Sanskrit and the Chinese. The sentence in the Peking appears to be corrupt: *ci'i rgyu'i mtshan ñid daṅ rgyu las 'bras bu'i mtshan ñid tha dad pa ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid dam.*

5.24 continued) 相。爲已生相。若未生相。便於因中。果猶未生。而說是有。不應道理。若已生相。即果體已生。復從因生。不應道理。是故。因中非先有果。然要有因待緣果生 (T. 1579: 303c25-304a3)

5.25) Vasubandhu accuses the Sarvāstivādins of having the same views as the Sāṃkhyā teacher, Vārṣagaṇya, who says that that which does not exist cannot be produced, while that which exists cannot be destroyed.

vārṣagaṇyavādaś caivaṃ dyotito bhavati / yad asty asty eva tat / yan nāsti nāsty eva tat / asato nāsti saṃbhavaḥ / sato nāsti vināśa iti
(Pradhan: 301.1-3; T. 1558: 106a16-18; Poussin v. 4: 63-64; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 634a5-6; Poussin 1936-1937: 112] and claims that it is Vasubandhu's theory that actually resembles Vārṣagaṇya's because for Vasubandhu the present can only be existent, while the past and future can only be nonexistent [T. 1562: 634a6-19; Poussin 1936-1937: 112-113].)[265]

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[265] Saṃghabhadra discusses this passage out of order.

5.25) The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* attributes to Vārṣagaṇya the belief in *hetuphalasad-vāda,* according to which the result exists eternally in the cause.

hetuphalasadvādaḥ katamaḥ / yathāpīhaikatyaḥ śramaṇo brāhmaṇo vā evaṃdṛṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī nityaṃ nityakālaṃ dhruvaṃ dhruvakālaṃ vidyata eva hetau phalam iti tad yathā vārṣagaṇyaḥ (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 118.14-119.2); *rgyu la 'bras bu yod par smra ba gaṅ źe na / 'di ltar 'di na dge sbyoṅ ṅam bram ze kha cig / rtag pa rtag*[266] *pa'i dus daṅ / ther zug ther zug gi dus su / rgyu la 'bras bu yod pa kho na źes de ltar lta źiṅ / de skad smra ba dag yod de / 'di lta ste / khyu mchog pa'i tshogs lta bu'o* (*Yogācāra-bhūmi$_t$:* dzi 71a8-b1); 因中有果論者。謂如有一若沙門若婆羅門。起如是見立如是論。常常時恒恒時於諸因中具有果性。謂雨衆外道作如是計 (T. 1579: 303c8-10)

[266] Corrected from *brtag* on the basis of the Derge.

5.26) Vasubandhu says that the Sarvāstivādins misunderstand what "all exists" means. He refers to the Buddha's statement, "'all exists' means the twelve *āyatanas* exist,"[267] and adds that "all" can also indicate the three times, as long as this is understood according to Vasubandhu's interpretation.[268]

tasmān naivaṃ sarvāstivādaḥ śāsane sādhur bhavati / yad atītānāgataṃ dravyato 'stīti vadati / evaṃ tu sādhur bhavati / yathā sūtre sarvam astīty uktaṃ tathā vadati / kathaṃ ca sūtra sarvam astīty uktam / sarvam astīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānīti / adhvatrayaṃ vā / yathā tu tad asti tathoktam
(Pradhan: 301.5-8; T. 1558: 106a22-26; Poussin v. 4: 63-64; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the negation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 630c14-19; Poussin 1936-1937: 88] and criticizes it, saying that the intention of the *sūtra* quoted by Vasubandhu was not to say anything about the essential nature of the three times, whereas the *sūtras* read by Saṃghabhadra affirm the existence of past and future; furthermore, Saṃghabhadra implies that Vasubandhu sides with those who think that all *dharmas* are either *prajñapti* or completely unreal [T. 1562: 630c19-631a3; Poussin 1936-1937: 88-89].)

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[267] *Saṃyuktāgama, sūtra* 319 (T. 99: 91a24-b3; see Pāsādika 1986: 99).

[268] P'u-kuang identifies Vasubandhu's statement as a Sautrāntika position, according to which not all of the *āyatanas* consist of exclusively real *dharmas:* some include *dharmas* that are not ultimately real: 如其所有而說有言　經部意說。若假。若實。若曾。若當。如其所有而說有言。非皆實有。猶如現在。過去曾有。未來當有。現是實有。現十二處八處實有。四處少分實有．少分實無。如色處中顯色實有。形色實無。聲處中無記刹那聲實有。相續語業善．惡等聲實無。觸處中四大實有。餘觸實無。法處中定境界色．受．想．思實有。餘心所法思上假立實無。及不相應法。三無為法亦是實無 (T. 1821: 314a3-12).

5.26) The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* cites the same *sūtra* as Vasubandhu in connection with its refutation of past and future. It explains that belief in the real existence of past and future can arise from misunderstanding of *sūtras*. For example, the Buddha's statement, "'all exists' means the twelve *āyatanas* exist," might be taken to mean that the twelve *āyatanas* are real entities.

iha dhārmiko vā punaḥ sūtrāntān ayoniśaḥ kalpayati / tad yathā / sarvam astīti dvādaśāyatanāni / dvādaśāyatanāni lakṣaṇato vidyante (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 124.2-3); *chos 'di pa yaṅ mdo sde la tshul bźin ma yin par rtogs ste / 'di lta ste / skye mched bcu gñis po thams cad yod de skye mched bcu gñis po rnams ni mtshan ñid kyis yod do* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 73b6); 又在此法者。於如來經不如理分別故。謂如經言。一切有者即十二處。此十二處實相是有 (T. 1579: 304b28-c2)

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* later explains that the *sūtra* has a hidden meaning: some "existent" *dharmas* are really existent, while others are not. Existent *dharmas* have a mark that shows they are existent, while nonexistent ones have a mark that shows they are nonexistent. Otherwise, yogins would only be able to know existent *dharmas;* they would not be able to know nonexistent ones.[269] Hence, they would not be able to discern immediately the *dharmas* that they perceive.

yad apy uktaṃ sarvam asti yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānīti tad api sati sallakṣaṇāstitāṃ sandhāyoktaṃ / asati cāsallakṣaṇāstitāṃ / tathāpi sallakṣaṇā api dharmā sallakṣaṇaṃ dhārayanti / asallakṣaṇā api dharmā asallakṣaṇaṃ dhārayanti / tasmād dharmā ity ucyante / anyathā tu sato jñānād asataś cājñānād yogino na nirantarajñeyadharma-parīkṣā syād iti na yujyate (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 127.13-18); *skye mched bcu gñis po ji sñed pa thams cad yod do źes gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ /* [*yod pa la yod pa'i mtshan ñid yod pa daṅ med pa la med pa'i mtshan ñid yod pa la dgoṅs nas gsuṅs pa yin te*] /[270] *'di ltar yod pa'i mtshan ñid kyi chos rnams kyaṅ / yod pa'i mtshan ñid 'dzin la / med pa'i mtshan ñid kyi chos rnams kyaṅ med pa'i mtshan ñid 'dzin te / de bas na chos rnams źes bya'o / de lta ma yin du zin na yod pa mi śes pa daṅ / med pa mi śes pas rnal 'byor pas śes bya'i chos la rgyud chags su rtog par mi 'gyur bas mi ruṅ ṅo* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 75a8-b3); 又雖說一切有者謂十二處。然於有法密意說有有相。於無法密意說有無相。所以者何。若有相法能持有相。若無相法能持無相。是故俱名爲法俱名爲有。若異此者。諸修行者唯知於有不知於

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[269] The Tibetan, however, reads differently from the Sanskrit and Chinese: "due to ignorance of that which exists and due to ignorance of that which does not exist."

[270] The portion in brackets is from the Derge, which agrees more closely with the Sanskrit and the Chinese. The sentence in the Peking appears to be corrupt: *yod pa la yaṅ yod pa'i mtshan ñid yod pa la dgoṅs pa yin te.*

5.26 continued) 無應非無間觀所知法。不應道理 (T. 1579: 305a24-b1)

5.27) The Sarvāstivādin argues that, if the past and future are unreal, it is impossible to explain how one can be bound by a past or future *kleśa* to a thing (*vastu*) in the past or future. Vasubandhu answers that one is bound by an *anuśaya* produced by a past *kleśa* or by an *anuśaya* that is the cause of a future *kleśa*. One is bound to a thing in the past or future due to the *anuśaya* of a *kleśa* that has had or will have that thing as its object.

tajjataddhetvanuśayabhāvāt kleśena tadālambane kleśānuśayabhāvād vastuni saṃyukto bhavati
(Pradhan: 301.9-10; T. 1558: 106a27-29; Poussin v. 4: 64-65; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 634c9-10; Poussin 1936-1937: 116] and maintains that Vasubandhu is contradicting his own position by calling past and future things *vastu* when according to him they do not really exist [T. 1562: 634c10-19; Poussin 1936-1937: 116-117].)

5.27) The *Yogācārabhūmi* asserts the nominal existence of *anuśayas,* which are *kleśas* in the form of seeds (see item 3).

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* also addresses the issue of association with past and future *kleśas,* referring to *anuśayas.* It says that one is not associated with past *kleśas,* because one was already associated with them in the past. In the present, one is associated with the *anuśayas* of this type of (past) *kleśa,* and, if the *klesās* are actualized, then one is associated with their *paryavasthānas.* One is not associated with future *anuśayas* and *paryavasthānas* because one will be associated with them in the future.

de la 'ching ba mtha' dag daṅ ldan pa'i gaṅ zag gis ñon moṅs pa'i kun nas dkris pa bskyed nas 'gog par byed ciṅ spoṅ bar ni mi byed pa'i tshe na / ñon moṅs pa de 'das pa 'am ma oṅs pa 'am da ltar byuṅ ba'i dṅos po gaṅ dag daṅ ldan pa yin źe na / 'das pa daṅ ni ldan par gyur zin pas ldan pa ma yin no / da ltar byuṅ ba daṅ ni de'i rigs[271] *bag la ñal daṅ ldan pa yin te gal te ñon moṅs pa mṅon du gyur na ni / kun nas dkris pa daṅ yaṅ ldan no / ma 'oṅs pa daṅ ni bag la ñal daṅ kun nas dkris pa daṅ yaṅ ldan par 'gyur te ldan pa ni ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 118b8-119a3); 問具一切縛補特伽羅諸煩惱纏起滅未捨是諸煩惱於何事繫。過去耶未來耶現在耶。答過去已繫故不名繫。但於現在由此種類煩惱隨眠。說名爲繫。若諸煩惱正起現前亦由纏故。說名爲繫。於未來世隨眠及纏以當繫故。亦不名繫 (T. 1579: 623b6-11)

[271] The Derge adds *kyi ñon moṅs pa'i* here.

5.28) Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhāṣikas, who believe in the real existence of past and future but cannot explain it, say that the nature of *dharmas* is profound; it cannot be proved logically.

asty eva tv atītānāgatam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ / yatra netuṃ śakyate tatrātmakātmanaivaṃ veditavyam / gambhīrā khalu dharmatā / nāvaśyaṃ tarkasādhyā[272] *bhavatīti*
(Pradhan: 301.10-13; T. 1558: 106b1-4; Poussin v. 4: 65; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 634c19-22; Poussin 1936-1937: 117], criticizes Vasubandhu for attributing to the Vaibhāṣikas words that are not their own, and claims that he has successfully refuted Vasubandhu's (and the Sthavira's) denial of the existence of past and future [T. 1562: 634c22-635a9; Poussin 1936-1937: 117-118].)

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[272] Corrected from *tarhy asādhyā* (Hirakawa: 1973-1978, v. 1: 433).

5.28) The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not specifically explain the past and future with reference to the profound nature of *dharmas*. However, the term *gambhīra*, like *acintya*, appears far more frequently in the *Yogācārabhūmi* than in Sarvāstivādin texts, often to characterize that which is difficult to explain.

The *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* lists four ways in which things are unutterable. One of these is that they are unutterable due to being profound, and one example is the inexpressible nature of *dharmas*.

zab pa'i phyir ni 'di lta ste / chos ñid brjod du med pa daṅ (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 235a6-7); 二甚深故不可說。謂離言法性 (T. 1579: 363a2)

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*) says that the *dharma*-nature of all *dharmas* is very profound.

chos rnams kyi chos ñid kyaṅ zab ste (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 67b6-7); 諸法法性亦最甚深 (T.1579: 721b4)

5.29) Vasubandhu says that one who has destroyed a *kleśa* that is to be destroyed by insight into *duḥkha* is still associated with the remaining defilements that have that as their object, i.e., the other *kleśas* of the same type as the destroyed *kleśa.* Yaśomitra gives the following example: even if an *adhimātrādhimātra kleśa* has been destroyed, one is still associated with the *adhimātramadhya anuśaya,* etc. (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 477.33-478.4).

prahīṇe duḥkhadṛgdheye saṃyuktaḥ śeṣasarvagaiḥ / prāk prahīṇe prakāre ca śeṣais tadviṣayair malaiḥ / duḥkhajñāne samutpanne samudayajñāne 'nutpanne duḥkha-darśanaprahātavyo nikāyaḥ prahīṇo bhavati / tasmin prahīṇe tadālambanaiḥ samudaya-darśanaprahātavyaiḥ sarvatragaiḥ saṃyuktaḥ
(Pradhan: 301.20-302.3; T. 1558: 106b12-16; Poussin v. 4: 66-67; Saṃghabhadra objects to the phrase *tadviṣaya,* which he thinks is unnecessary [T. 1562: 636c7-11], and examines and criticizes the sūtra-master's possible reasons for including it [T. 1562: 636c11-21].)

5.29) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding to this argument.)

5.30) In an explanation of four synonyms for *anuśaya,* Vasubandhu says that *anuśayas* are called *yoga* when they are not strongly active, and they are called *upādāna* because due to them one grasps objects of desire.

nātimātrasamudācāriṇo 'pi yogā vividhaduḥkhasaṃyojanāt / ābhīkṣṇyānuṣaṅgato vā / kāmādyupādānād upādānānīti

(Pradhan: 308.20-21; T. 1558: 108b8-11; Poussin v. 4: 80-81; Saṃghabhadra identifies these as the explanations of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 642a13-19] and criticizes them, saying that, in the case of the first two synonyms (*āsrava* and *ogha*), Vasubandhu's explanation is actually the same as that of the Vaibhāṣikas, while his explanations of *yoga* and *upādāna* are simply wrong: if the *anuśayas* were not strongly active, they could not bond beings to suffering; if *upādāna* were the cause of *tṛṣṇā,* the *pratītya-samutpāda* formula would be contradicted because *upādāna* must be the condition for *bhava* [T. 1562: 642a19-b8].)

5.30) The explanations of the *yogas* and *upādānas* in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* are perhaps more similar to Vasubandhu's explanations than to the presumably standard Sarvāstivādin explanations that precede them (Pradhan: 308.16). The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* states that the *yogas* are the *kleśas* operating together without either increase or destruction (or without either duplication or omission).

mtshuṅs par spyod pa rnams kyi lhag chad med pa'i ñon moṅs pa de dag ñid la ni sbyor ba rnams śes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 224b5); 復次若諸煩惱等分行者非增非減。即上所説一切煩惱。説名爲軛 (T. 1579: 803b20-21)

The same passage states that the *upādānas* function to obtain objects of desire and riches.

gaṅ gi phyir ñe bar len źe na / 'dod pa rnams thob par bya ba'i phyir daṅ loṅs spyod pa'i phyir ni daṅ po'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: 'i 224b8); 問何所爲取。答爲得諸欲及爲受用故起初取 (T. 1579: 803b26-27)

5.31) In a discussion of the antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) to the *kleśas,* one of which is distance (*dūrībhāva*), Vasubandhu objects to the Sarvāstivādin explanation of temporal distance. According to Sarvāstivāda, past and future things are distant because they have no efficacy. Vasubandhu argues that the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* would likewise have to be distant because they have no efficacy. The Sarvāstivādin counters that the two *nirodhas* are not distant since they are possessed at all times. Vasubandhu then states that past and future *dharmas* (according to Sarvāstivāda) can also be possessed at all times and thus could not, according to the Sarvāstivādin logic, be distant.

akāritrāt tarhi tad dūram / asaṃskṛtasya katham antikatvaṃ sidhyāti / sarvatra tat-prāpteḥ / atītānāgate 'pi tat prasaṅgaḥ
(Pradhan: 321.10-11; T. 1558: 111c10-12; Poussin v. 4: 107; Saṃghabhadra identifies this last as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 651c13-14] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu is wrong to apply the same reasoning to the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* as to past and future [T. 1562: 651c14-21].)

5.31) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding to this argument. But see the next item.)

5.32) In a discussion of four types of distance, Vasubandhu offers his own explanation of temporal distance: the future is distant due to the nature of *dharmas* because it has not been acquired; the past is distant because it has already departed.[273]

evaṃ tu yuktaṃ syāt / dharmasvalakṣaṇād anāgataṃ dūram asaṃprāptatvāt / atītaṃ ca pracyutatvād iti
(Pradhan: 321.14-15; T. 1558: 111c16-18; Poussin v. 4: 107; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 651c25-27] and accuses Vasubandhu of being prejudiced when he implies that "distance" is equivalent to "lacking *svabhāva*" and thus insists on his theory of the unreality of past and future [T. 1562: 651c27-652a3].)

[273] P'u-kuang says that, according to Vasubandhu, past and future are distant since they have no real existence, while the present, which is real, is near (T. 1821: 325c26-27).

5.32) Unlike the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain an explanation of four types of distance (*dūrībhāva*), including *pratipakṣa*. However, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi,* immediately after a discussion of the practice of antidotes (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 230b8-231a4; T. 1579: 667a8-14), explains past *dharmas* as having causes that are already exhausted and *svabhāvas* that are already destroyed.

'das pa'i chos rgyu spyad zin pa ṅo bo ñid źig pa (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 231a6); 復次云何過去法。謂因已受盡。自性已滅 (T. 1579: 667a20)

The same passage explains future *dharmas* as not yet having received their causes and not yet having received their *svabhāvas.*

ma 'oṅs pa'i chos rgyu ma spyad pa / ṅo bo ñid ma spyad pa (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 231b5); 復次云何未來法。謂因未受自性未受 (T. 1579: 667b5-6)

5.33) Vasubandhu says that the person who achieves, after becoming detached from *kāmadhātu,* the sixteenth and last moment of *darśanamārga* (*mārgānvayajñāna*), which is equivalent to the beginning of *bhāvanāmārga,* gives up the five preceding *parijñās* while obtaining *avarabhāgīyaprahāṇaparijñā.*

pañca tyajati vītarāgapūrvī mārgānvayajñāne / sa hy avarabhāgīyaprahāṇaparijñā-lābhe pūrvikāḥ pañca parijñās tyajati
(Pradhan: 326.7-8; T. 1558: 113b15-17; Poussin v. 4: 118; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 657b9-10] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu should have said, "the person who achieves *mārgānvayajñānakṣānti* [the fifteenth moment of *darśanamārga*]," because the first five *parijñās* are actually given up at this earlier moment [T. 1562: 657b10-14].)

5.33) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding to this argument.)

Chapter 6 *Mārgapudgalanirdeśa*

6.1) Vasubandhu objects to the Vaibhāṣika definitions of the three types of *prajñā* (*śrutamayī, cintāmayī, bhāvanāmayī*) and mentions the definitions of "other people": *śrutamayī prajñā* is a determination produced by means of the speech of an authoritative person; *cintāmayī prajñā* is produced by logical reasoning; *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* is produced by *samādhi.*

asyāṃ tu kalpanāyāṃ cintāmayī prajñā na siddhyatīty apare / yā hi nāmālambanā śrutamayī prāpnoti yā 'rthālambanā bhāvanāyayīti / idaṃ tu lakṣaṇaṃ nāniravadyaṃ vidyate / āptavacanaprāmāṇyajātaniścayaḥ śrutamayī / yuktinidhyānajaś cintāmayī / samādhijo bhāvanāmayīti
(Pradhan: 335:3-6; T. 1558: 116c17-21; Poussin v. 4: 143-144; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 669a12-16], who, according to Saṃghabhadra, does not understand the *Vibhāṣā,* and repeats the Vaibhāṣika definition given in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* according to which *śrutamayī prajñā* is based on name, *cintāmayī prajñā* is based on both object and name, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* is based only on an object, with no awareness of name [T. 1562: 669a17-b2].)

6.1) A passage from the *Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī* concerning the understanding of impermanence suggests definitions of at least the first two types of *prajñā* that are very close to the definitions attributed by Vasubandhu to "other people": *śrutamayī prajñā* is equated with understanding because knowledgeable people speak thus, and *cintāmayī prajñā* is equated with judgement. However, the definition of *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, which equates *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* with investigation or pondering, does not mention *samādhi*.

kun śes par byed pa ni thos pa las byuṅ ba'i śes rab kyis te / śes pa gsuṅ ba 'di skad du gsuṅ ṅo źes bya ba'o / yaṅ dag par śes par byed pa ni bsams pa las byuṅ ba'o / ṅes par rtog pa ni bsgoms pa las byuṅ ba'i ste (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 47a5-6); 又解了者。聞所成慧。諸智論者如是説故。等解了者。思所成慧。審解了者。修所成慧 (T. 1579: 768b25-27)

6.2) Vasubandhu rejects the Ābhidhārmikas' definitions of *asaṃtuṣṭi* and *mahecchatā*. According to them, *asaṃtuṣṭi* is the desire to have more of what one already possesses, while *mahecchatā* is the desire to get what one does not possess. But Vasubandhu says that *asaṃtuṣṭi* is dissatisfaction with the quantity or quality of what one already possesses, while *mahecchatā* is desire for things of good quality or great number that one does not possess.

evaṃ tu yujyate / labdhenāpraṇītenāprabhūtena paritāso[274] *'saṃtuṣṭiḥ / alabdhapraṇīta-prabhūtecchā mahecchatā*
(Pradhan: 335.16-17; T. 1558: 117a9-12; Poussin v. 4: 145-146; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 669c5-7] and rejects it, defending the Ābhidhārmika definitions [T. 1562: 669c8-24].)

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[274] Hirakawa corrects this to *aparitoṣo* (1973-1978, v. 1: 434), but Sakurabe and Odani leave it as it stands (1999: 72 n. 3).

6.2) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain any explanation of the differences between *asaṃtuṣṭi* and *mahecchatā*.)

6.3) The Buddha taught the four *āryavaṃśas* in order to stop the desire for the object of the notions of "I" and "mine." Vasubandhu equates the object of the notion of "mine" with clothing, the object of the notion of "I" with the body, and desire with thirst.

sa evārthaḥ punaḥ pariśeṣeṇocyate / mamakāravastu cīvarādayo 'haṃkāravastv ātmabhāvaḥ / tatrecchā tṛṣṇā
(Pradhan: 337.4-5; T. 1558: 117b1-2; Poussin v. 4: 148; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 670c17-19] and discusses but does not attack it, except to say that the last *pada* of the verse, on which this is a comment, is superfluous [T. 1562: 670c19-27].)

6.3) (I have found nothing relevant in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

6.4) Some teachers say that the meditator follows his exhalation all the way to the far ends of the universe. But Vasubandhu objects: since *ānāpānasmṛti* is attention to things as they really are (*tattvamanasikāra*), this statement is illogical. (The implication seems to be that a practice such as that ascribed to those teachers would involve imagination, i.e., the *adhimuktimanaskāra* typically associated with practices like *asubhabhāvanā*, rather than observation.)

yāvad vāyumaṇḍalaṃ vairambhāś ca vāyava ity apare / tad etat tattvamanasikāra-tvān na yuktam
(Pradhan: 340.4-5; T. 1558: 118b7-8; Poussin v. 4: 155; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 674a12-13] and, after explaining it, disagrees with Vasubandhu's reasoning, saying that, even if what Vasubandhu suggests is true, the meditator who follows his exhalation to the ends of the universe would not thereby emerge from *ānāpānasmṛti* because his intention to practice *ānāpānasmṛti* would not be destroyed [T. 1562: 674a13-17].)

6.4) The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not specify the maximum distance to which the exhalation can be followed. However, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* explains the relationship between *ānāpānasmṛti* and *yoniśo manasikāra,* which here may be quite similar to *tattvamanasikāra:* the *yogācāra,* when he practices the four *smṛtyupasthānas* on the basis of *ānāpānasmṛti,* recognizes his undestroyed internal *ayoniśo manasikāra,* thereby being able to destroy it and produce *yoniśo manasikāra.*

rnal 'byor pa ni dbugs rṅub pa daṅ 'byuṅ ba dran pa la brten nas dran pa ñe bar gźag pa gźi bsgom pa na tshul bźin yid la byed pa la brten nas naṅ gi tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa ma spaṅs par yod pa la yaṅ tshul bźin ma yin par yaṅ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du rab tu śes so / tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa la tshul bźin ma yin par śes nas kyaṅ tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa spaṅs nas de spaṅ par bya ba'i phyir tshul bźin yid la byed pa 'ba' źig gcig tu ṅes par sgom par byed do / de la lam gyi bźi mdo chen po lta bu ni lus la sogs pa'i chos bźi'o / rṅul gyi phuṅ po lta bu ni tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa ste / mi brtan pa daṅ / sñiṅ po med pa daṅ sems rmoṅs par byed pa'i phyir ro / śar daṅ lho daṅ nub daṅ byaṅ gi phyogs nas 'oṅs pa'i 'khyogs daṅ bźon pa daṅ / śiṅ rta daṅ / śiṅ rta phal pa lta bu ni tshul bźin yid la byed pa ste lus la sogs pa bźi la dmigs pa'i sgo nas 'di lta ste / rṅul gyi phuṅ po lta bu'i tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa de gźom pa'i phyir daṅ / thams cad kyi thams cad du rgyud rnam par dag par bya ba'i phyir źugs so (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_{t}$: 'i 377a8-b4); 復次修瑜伽師。入出息念爲所依止修四念住。如理作意以爲依止。於諸未斷内心所有非理作意。如實了知是爲非理。於内所有如理作意。如實了知是爲如理。既了知已於内所有非理作意一向遠離。於内所有如理作意。一向修習。爲欲令彼永斷滅故。又於此中身等四法如四大路。非理作意如塵土丘。不堅牢故。不眞實故。迷亂心故。如理作意如四方來輿乘車車縁。身等四境界門轉能損害彼如塵土丘非理作意。亦令一切相續清淨 (T. 1579: 866c10-20)

6.5) Vasubandhu explains that the element *dharmajñāna* in the term *dharmajñānakṣānti* expresses the fact that this *kṣānti* is *anāsrava*. It is a case of calling something by the name of its *niṣyandaphala*. He compares it to the appellations "flower tree" and "fruit tree."

anāsravajñānārthaṃ niṣyandena viśeṣaṇam / dharmajñānārthaṃ[275] *kṣāntiḥ / puṣpaphalavṛkṣavat*
(Pradhan: 350.4-5; T. 1558: 121b2-4; Poussin v. 4: 180; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 683a27-29] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu's comparison is invalid, and insists that the real reason *dharmajñānakṣānti* is *anāsrava* is that it is produced immediately after the *laukikāgradharmas;* since they are the highest *sāsrava* state, what follows them must be *anāsrava* [T. 1562: 683a29-b9].)

[275] Corrected from *karmajñānārthaṃ* (Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 434).

6.5) (I have found nothing relevant in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

6.6) According to Vasubandhu, the *kṣāntis* are *ānantaryamārga* because they cannot be impeded from removing the *prāptis* of *kleśas,* while the *jñānas* are *vimuktimārga* because, for those who are free from the *prāptis* of *kleśas,* the *prāpti* of *visaṃyoga* arises at the same time.

ānantaryamārgāḥ[276] *kṣāntayaḥ kleśaprāptivicchedaṃ praty antarayitum aśakyatvāt / vimuktimārgās tu jñānāni / kleśaprāptivimuktānāṃ visaṃyogaprāptisahotpādāt* (Pradhan: 352.13-14; T. 1558: 122a14-16; Poussin v. 4: 190; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the definition of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 690a3-5] and criticizes it, saying that, by Vasubandhu's logic, *vimuktimārga* should also be called *ānantarya;* according to Saṃghabhadra, *ānantaryamārga* is so called because there is no interval between it and *vimuktimārga* [T. 1562: 690a5-13].)

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[276] Corrected from *anantaryamārgāḥ* (Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 434).

6.6) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains several explanations that contrast *ānantarya-mārga* with *vimuktimārga*. However, these passages do not suggest that *ānantarya* means "without impediment."

See the *Śrāvakabhūmi:*

tasya parijñāñābhyāsād ānantaryamārga utpadyate / kleśāṇāṃ prahāṇāya yena prajahāti / prahīṇe ca punar vimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroti [*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 504.14-17]; *de yoṅs su śes śiṅ goms par byas / ñon moṅs pa rnams spaṅs pa'i phyir bar chad med pa'i lam skye bar byed ciṅ des spoṅ bar byed do / spaṅs pas na rnam par grol ba mṅon sum du byed do* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* wi 232b7-8]; 如是知已數修習故無間道生斷諸煩惱。名修故斷。煩惱斷已證得解脫。名修故證 [T. 1579: 476b29-c2]

tatrānantaryamārgabhāvanā yayā prajahāti / tatra vimuktimārgabhāvanā yayā samanantaraprahīṇe kleśavimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroti [*Śrāvakabhūmi:* 505.21-506.2]; *de la bar cad med pa'i lam bsgom pa ni gaṅ gis ñon moṅs pa spoṅ bar byed pa'o / de la rnam par grol ba'i lam bsgom pa ni gaṅ gis ñon moṅs pa spaṅs ma thag tu rnam par grol ba'i mṅon sum du byed pa'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* wi 233b1-2]; 無間道修者。謂由此故正斷煩惱。解脱道修者。謂由此故或斷無間證得解脱 [T. 1579: 476c19-21]

See the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Śrāvakabhūmi:*

de ma thag tu spoṅ ba ni lam gñis pa yin no / spaṅs ma thag pa ni lam gsum pa yin no [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* zi 271a5]; 能無間斷。是第二道。無間斷已。是第三道 [T. 1579: 683a12]

See the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*:[277]

無間道者。謂正斷惑。解脱道者。謂斷無間心得解 [T. 1579: 881a27-29])

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[277] This section is not extant in Tibetan.

6.7) Vasubandhu rejects the opinion of "others," who say that the *sābhisaṃskāra-parinirvāyin anāgāmin* reaches nirvana by a *mārga* the object of which is *saṃskṛta*, while the *anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmin* reaches nirvana by a *mārga* the object of which is *asaṃskṛta*. Instead, he quotes a *sūtra*[278] that mentions the *anabhi-saṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmin* before the *sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmin* and says that this order is correct because the *anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmin*, being more accomplished, requires less time and no effort to attain nirvana.[279]

saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtālambanamārganirvāṇād ity apare / tat tu na / ati prasaṅgāt / sūtre tv anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyī pūrvaṃ paṭhyate / tathaive ca yujyate / vāhyavāhimārgayor anabhisaṃskārābhisaṃskārasādhyatvād ayatnayatnaprāptitaḥ
(Pradhan: 359.5-7; T. 1558: 124b24-29; Poussin v. 4: 212; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 696c23-24] and comments on it, saying that there are also some *sūtras* that mention the *sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmin* first; therefore, there is nothing wrong with the traditional Vaibhāṣika order [T. 1562: 696c24-28].)

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278 A note to the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* translation (Bidon bu 26.2: 271 n. 30) identifies this *sūtra* as *Saṃyuktāgama* no. 821 (T. 99: 211a1-5).

279 P'u-kuang identifies this as a Sautrāntika explanation (T. 1821: 361a23).

6.7) The *Śrāvakabhūmi* lists the *anāgāmins* in the same descending order as Vasubandhu and gives similar definitions of the *sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin* and *anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmins*.

anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyī pudgalaḥ katamaḥ / yo 'nābhisaṃskāreṇāprayatnenākhedena mārgaṃ saṃmukhīkṛtya tatropapannaḥ parinirvāty ayam ucyāte anabhisaṃskāra-parinirvāyī pudgalaḥ / sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyī pudgalaḥ katamaḥ / yo 'bhisaṃskāreṇa prayatnena khedamārgaṃ saṃmukhīkṛtya tatropapannaḥ parinirvāty ayam ucyate sābhisāmskāraparinirvayī pudgalaḥ (*Śrāvakabhūmi;* 180.15-181.6); *gaṅ zag mṅon par 'du byed pa med par yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' ba gaṅ źe na / smra ba / mṅon par 'du byed pa med pa*[280] *daṅ / 'bad pa med pa daṅ / ṅal ba med pas*[281] *lam mṅon du byas śiṅ / der skyes nas yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' ba gaṅ yin pa ste / de ni gaṅ zag mṅon par 'du byed pa med par yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' ba źes bya'o / gaṅ zag mṅon par 'du byed pa bcas pas yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' ba gaṅ źe na / smra ba / mṅon par 'du byed pa daṅ 'bad pa daṅ / ṅal bas lam mṅon du byas śiṅ / der skyes nas yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' ba gaṅ yin pa ste / de ni gaṅ zag mṅon par 'du byed pa bcas pas*[282] *yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' ba źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: wi 83b8-84a4); 云何無行般涅槃補特伽羅。謂生彼已不起加行不作功用。不由勞倦道現在前而般涅槃。是名無行般涅槃補特伽羅。云何有行般涅槃補特伽羅。謂彼生已發起加行作大功用。由極勞倦道現在前而般涅槃。是名有行般涅槃補特伽羅 (T. 1579: 425a24-29)

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[280] Corrected from *mṅon par 'du byed pa* on the basis of the Derge.

[281] Corrected from *ṅal ba med pa daṅ* on the basis of the Derge.

[282] The Derge reads *gaṅ zag mṅon par 'du byed pa med par*, but this is clearly mistaken.

6.8) According to Sarvāstivāda, an *anāgāmin* who has experienced *nirodhasamāpatti* is called *kāyasākṣin* because he experiences it directly with his body, not with consciousness, which is lacking in this state. According to Vasubandhu, however, the *anāgāmin,* when he emerges from meditation, proclaims that *nirodhasamāpatti* is like nirvana and acquires a calmness of his conscious body that he has never before attained. He is said to experience this calmness with his body due both to his experience of obtaining a calm body during meditation and to his recognition of this calmness after emerging from meditation.

evaṃ tu bhavitavyam / sa hi tasmād vyutthāyāpratilabdhapūrvāṃ savijñānakāṃ kāyaśāntiṃ pratilabhate / yato 'syaivaṃ bhavati śāntā vata nirodhasamāpattir nirvāṇasadṛśī vata nirodhasamāpattir iti / evam anena tasyāḥ śāntatvaṃ kāyena sākṣātkṛtaṃ bhavati / prāptijñanasākṣātkriyābhyāṃ pratyakṣīkāro hi sākṣātkriyā
(Pradhan: 363.15-18; T. 1558: 126a21-25; Poussin v. 4: 224; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 699b12-16] and criticizes it, saying that the term *kāyasākṣin* applies to the *anāgāmin* both during and after *nirodhasamāpatti* [T. 1562: 699b16-24].)

6.8) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not explain why the *anāgāmin* who obtains *nirodhasamāpatti* is called *kāyasākṣin.* However, Vasubandhu's explanation of the term may be related to his rejection, similar to that found in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* of the reality of past and future *dharmas:* how can the *anāgāmin* be said to "experience directly" that which occurred in the past? The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādibhūmi* contains a passage in which a person who, being very calm, has arisen from an *āryavihāra* that is similar to nirvana, is said to have arisen from *nirodhasamāpatti.* The temporal relationship between the meditation and the practitioner's awareness of it [as indicated by the use of the perfect tense in the Tibetan translation] may be similar to that proposed by Vasubandhu.

mchog tu rab tu źi źiṅ mya ṅan las 'das pa daṅ 'dra ba'i 'phags pa'i gnas pa las laṅgs pa ni 'di lta ste / 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa las laṅs so [*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 152b4-5]; 三從第一寂靜涅槃樂相似聖住起。謂滅盡等至 [T. 1579: 635c24-25])

6.9) Vasubandhu agrees with the Sautrāntikas, who say that one cannot fall from arhatship.

arhattvād api nāsti parihāṇir iti sautrāntikāḥ / eṣa eva ca nyāyaḥ / katham idaṃ gamyate / āgamād yuktitaś ca (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 375.10-11 [but the whole argument continues until 377.5]; T. 1558: 130a16-130c16; Poussin 4: 258 [-265]; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 711c2-6] and criticizes it in great detail [T. 1562: 711c6-716a13; I have not distinguished here between his brief quotations of Vasubandhu's opinions and his lengthy criticisms]; Katō 1989: 78.)

Vasubandhu argues that the definition of an arhat is one whose *kleśas* are completely destroyed. This implies that the seeds of his *kleśas* are likewise destroyed, in which case it is impossible for the *kleśas* to arise again.

yadi tāvad arhatas tadrūpaḥ pratipakṣa utpanno yena kleśā atyantam anutpatti-dharmatām āpannāḥ / kathaṃ punaḥ parihīyate / atha notpannaḥ / kathaṃ kṣīṇāsravo bhavati / atyantam anayoddhṛtāyāṃ tadbījadharmatāyām akṣīṇāsravo vā punaḥ katham arhan bhavatīty evaṃ yuktiḥ (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 376.17-20; T. 1558: 130c2-4; Poussin 4: 263-264; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 715c29-716a4], and, referring to the Vaibhāṣika theory of *saṃyoga-prāpti* and *visaṃyogaprāpti* [see Cox 1995: 89-92], explains how it is indeed possible to fall from arhatship [T. 1562: 716a4-13; see also Miyashita 1982].)

6.9) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that the arhat, who has destroyed the *kleśas* and their *bījas,* cannot fall from arhatship.

bcom ldan 'das kyis ji skad du dge sloṅ dag dgra bcom pa yaṅ tshe 'di la lhag pa'i sems las byuṅ ba bde bar gnas pa bźi po de dag las gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba las yoṅs su ñams par ṅa smra źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa de la / gal te de'i ñon moṅs pa can gyi chos thams cad kyi sa bon dag yaṅ dag par bcom na ni / ji ltar de la 'og ma pa'i ñon moṅs pa 'byuṅ bar 'gyur / gal te mi 'byuṅ na ni ji ltar de yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur źe na / yoṅs su ñams pa ni gñis po 'di dag yin te / spoṅ ba'i yoṅs su ñams pa daṅ / gnas pa'i yoṅs su ñams pa'o / de la spoṅ ba'i yoṅs su ñams pas ni so so'i skye bo kho na yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur ro / gnas pa'i yoṅs su ñams pas ni 'phags pa daṅ / so so skye bo yaṅ yoṅs su ñams pa 'gyur ro / de la 'jig rten pa'i lam gyis ñon moṅs pa spaṅs pa yaṅ mṅon du byed pa ni spoṅ ba'i yoṅs su ñams pas yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur te / gnas pa'i yoṅs su ñams pas yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur ba yaṅ de yin no / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis ñon moṅs pa spaṅs nas / de las gźan pa'i phral gyi bya ba dag la rab tu chags pa'i blo can yid la mi byed pa'i rgyus de'i mjug thogs su tshe 'di la bde bar gnas pa la sṅon ji lta bar phyis kyaṅ de bźin du mṅon du byed mi nus la / sa 'og ma pa'i ñon moṅs pa ni / mṅon du mi byed pa gaṅ yin pa de ni de lta na gnas pa'i yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur ba yin gyi spoṅ ba'i yoṅs su ñams pa ni ma yin no / gal te dgra bcom pa ñon moṅs pa thams cad spaṅs pa'i ñon moṅs pa can gyi chos de dag thams cad kyi sa bon yaṅ dag par ma bcom na ni / ji ltar na dgra bcom pa sems śin tu rnam par grol ba daṅ / zag pa zad par 'gyur / gal te yaṅ dag par bcom na ni de'i sems kyi rgyud ñon moṅs pa can gyi chos thams cad kyi [corrected from *kyis* on the basis of the Derge] *sa bon med pa la tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa tsam yaṅ 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur na / ñon moṅs pa lta smos kyaṅ ci dgos te / de lta bas na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis ñon moṅs pa spaṅs pa la ni yoṅs su ñams ba med par khoṅ du chud par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 17b7-18b1); 問如世尊言。我説阿羅漢苾芻於四種增上心法現法安樂住中隨一而退。若彼一切染污種子皆已永害。云何復起下地煩惱。若不復起彼云何退。答退有二種。一者斷退。二者住退。言斷退者唯是異生。言住退者。是諸聖者亦是異生。若世間道斷諸煩惱復起現前。當知爾時斷退故退。亦是住退。若出世道斷煩惱已心營世務。不專修習如理作意。由此不能於其中間。現法樂住數起現前如先所得後亦如是。然其下地已斷煩惱不復現前。如是名爲住退故退。非是斷退。又若已斷一切煩惱成阿羅漢。而彼一切染法種子未永害者。云何名爲心善解脱阿羅漢果諸漏永盡。若已永害。於相續中永無一切染法種子。尚不應起不正思惟。況諸煩惱。是故當知由出世道斷煩惱者。定無有退 (T.1579: 584b3-19)[283]

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[283] See also the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Śrāvakabhūmi,* which says that one cannot fall from the four *śrāmaṇyaphalas: rnam par byaṅ ba'i phyogs daṅ mthun pa'i chos rnams kyis de yoṅs su bstan to / dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi 'bras bu bźi po dag ni yaṅ phul yin te / de dag las ltuṅ ba med pa'i phyir daṅ / jig rten las 'das pa yin*

6.10) The Vaibhāṣikas point out that the *Aṅgārakarṣūpamasūtra* says that the *āryaśrāvaka* can produce an *akuśala* thought. Since they identify the *āryaśrāvaka* with the arhat, they say that this *sūtra* disproves the Sautrāntika idea that one cannot fall from arhatship. Vasubandhu counters that the *sūtra* is actually talking about *śaikṣas,* who he admits can fall, not arhats, and therefore does not disprove the Sautrāntika theory.

yāvat tu cāro na supratibaddhas tāvad evaṃ carato 'pi śaikṣasyāsti saṃbhavaḥ kleśotpattāv iti śāikṣāvasthām adhikṛtyaivaṃ vacanād adoṣaḥ / pratijñāyate hi laukikamārgapratilabdhāt phaladvayāt parihāṇiḥ

(*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 377.3-4; T. 1558: 130c11-14; Poussin 4: 265; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 719a22-26], explains it further [T. 1562: 719a26-28], criticizes Vasubandhu's understanding of the *sūtra,* and concludes that the *sūtra* in no way undermines the Vaibhāṣika position that arhats cannot fall [T. 1562: 719a28-720a3].)

。 *pa'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 281a2-3); 又若顯示清淨品法。謂應稱讚四沙門果。從彼決定無退墮故。或出世間故 (T.1579: 687a17-19)

6.10) (I can find no similar argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* does not comment on this *sūtra*.)

6.11) Vasubandhu quotes those who deny the possibility of fall from arhatship as saying that, while all arhats possess an immovable, pure liberation, the type of arhat called "immovable" is thus named specifically because he does not fall from meditational states, namely the *dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāras*. In other words, arhats may be said to be subject to fall, even though they are not subject to fall from arhatship itself. As for the immovable arhat, he is immovable with respect to the spiritual states that he has acquired but not with respect to those that he has not yet acquired or the enjoyment of the states that he has acquired.

sarvasyānāsravā vimuktir akopyā / akopyadharmavyavasthānaṃ tu yathā tathoktam / ata etad acodyam ity aparihāṇavādī
(*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 378.3-4; T. 1558: 131a7-9; Poussin 4: 268; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, explains it briefly [T. 1562: 721b14-19], criticizes Vasubandhu's understanding of the various types of arhats, and concludes that Vasubandhu cannot be depended upon regarding the subject of arhats and their fall [T. 1562: 721b19-722a5].)

6.11) The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* contains a passage that states that, while the only arhats who are not subject to any kind of fall are the immovable arhats, nothing can make any arhat give rise to grief and lamentation by defiling his mind.

de la rnam par grol ba rnam pa gñis ni dus daṅ sbyor ba'i sdug pa daṅ / bskyod du med pa'i sems rnam par grol ba'o / de la dgra bcom pa dbaṅ po rtul ba'i phyir 'jig rten pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa las yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur ba'i chos can gyis[284] *ni sñoms par 'jug pa'i sgrib pa las rnam par grol ba'i phyir dus daṅ sbyor ba'i sdug pa sems rnam par grol ba źes bya ste / 'di ltar yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur ba'i chos can yin pas na dus dus su yoṅs su ñams par 'gyur źiṅ mṅon sum du yaṅ byed do / tshe 'di la bde ba la rig par gnas pas na sdug pa źes bya'o / de la bskyod du med pa ni zag pa med pa'i lam thams cad kyis rnam par grol ba ste / de ni gtan du yoṅs su ñams par mi 'gyur ro / gal te dgra bcom pa dbaṅ po rno ba'i phyir 'jig rten pa'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin las yoṅs su ñams par mi 'gyur ba'i chos can źig yin na ni de'i ṅes pa'i don la dus kyi don źes bya bar rig par bya'o / lhag ma ni sṅa ma bźin no / de la len pa med pa daṅ / yoṅs su yi 'chad pa med pa ni gaṅ la dgra bcom pa'i sems dga' bar 'gyur ba daṅ gaṅ la rnam par 'gyur źiṅ gźan du 'gyur ba las de'i mya ṅan la sogs pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i gzugs de gcig kyaṅ mi dmigs pa'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 'i 249a2-b1); 二解脱者。一時愛心解脱。二不動心解脱。若阿羅漢根性鈍故。於世間定是其退法。未能解脱所有定障故。名時愛心解脱。以退法故。時時退失。時時現前故。説名時。於現法樂憙欲證住故。説名愛。不動心解脱者。謂阿羅漢根性利故。是不退法。一切皆以無漏道力。而得解脱。於一切種都無退失。當知此中決定義。是三昧耶義。餘如前説。無所造作無恐怖者。當知無有異類可得。令阿羅漢心。於中染彼變異故。生愁歎等 (T. 1579: 813a18-28)[285]

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[284] Corrected from *gyi* on the basis of the Derge.

[285] See also another passage in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*: *sems rnam par grol ba ñams pa med pa ni rnam par grol ba bla na med pa ste / de rnams bsdus pa ni śes pa daṅ / spoṅ ba daṅ / tshe 'di la bde bar gnas pa źes bya bar rig par bya'o / slob pa'i śes pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / lam gaṅ yin pa daṅ / rnam par grol ba gaṅ yin pa de dag ni bla na med pa ma yin te bla na yod pa'i phyir ro / dgra bcom pa'i lam thams cad ni mṅon par śes pa sla ba daṅ myur bar rig par bya ste / gnas ṅan len thams cad bcom pa daṅ bya ba byas pa'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 'i 207b7-208a1); 解脱無上者。謂不動心解脱。當知此中總説智斷現法樂住。有學妙智正行解脱。不名無上。猶有上故。當知一切阿羅漢行。皆得名爲樂速通行。一切麁重永滅故。一切所作已故 (T. 1579: 796c26-797a2)

6.12) Vasubandhu says that *samādhi* is called *ṛddhipāda* because, since it is the fulfillment of all good qualities, it is the basis of the *ṛddhis*. But he quotes some people[286] as saying that *samādhi* is in fact *ṛddhi*, while the *ṛddhipādas* are the parts of *ṛddhi*. Vasubandhu refutes this, saying that this would result in a list of thirteen *bodhi-pakṣyadharmas*, rather than the eleven accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas.[287] It would also contradict a *sūtra* definition of *ṛddhi*, according to which *ṛddhis* are multifold magical powers.

samādhiḥ kasmād ṛddhipāda uktaḥ / tatpratiṣṭhatvāt sarvaguṇasampatteḥ / ye tv āhuḥ samādhir evarddhiḥ[288] *pādāś chandādaya iti / teṣāṃ dravyatas trayodaśa bodhipakṣyāḥ prāpnuvanti / chandacittayor ādhikyāt sūtraṃ ca virudhyate / ṛddhiṃ ca vo bhikṣavo darśayiṣyāmi ṛddhipādāṃś ca yāvad ṛddhiḥ katamā / iha bhikṣur anekavidham ṛddhiviṣayaṃ pratyanubhavati / eko bhūtvā bahudhā bhavatīti vistaraḥ*
(*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 384.4-9; T. 1558: 132c6-11; Poussin 4: 285-6; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the criticism of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 727a13-18] and refutes it, saying that the opinion referred to by Vasubandhu actually identifies both *ṛddhi* and the *ṛddhipādas* with *samādhi* [T. 1562: 727a18-b23; see Poussin 4, 286 n. 1 for a partial translation of this passage].)

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[286] The Vaibhāṣikas, according to the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (602.7).

[287] The Vaibhāṣika list of eleven *bodhipakṣyadharmas* includes: *prajñā, vīrya, samādhi, smṛti, prīti, praśrabdhi, upekṣā, śraddhā, samyaksaṃkalpa, samyagājīva*, and *samyagvāc* and *samyakkarmānta* together as one item (Poussin v. 4: 283-284). The four *ṛddhipādas* are *chanda, citta, vīrya*, and *mīmāṃsa*. If *samādhi* were equivalent to these four, two extra *bodhipakṣyadharmas* would have to be added to the list, namely *chanda* and *citta*. *Vīrya* is already on the list, and *mīmāṃsa* duplicates *prajñā* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 601.31-602.10).

[288] Corrected from *samādhir evaddhiḥ* (Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 435).

6.12) (I have found nothing directly relevant to this discussion in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, the explanation of the term *ṛddhipāda* in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* seems more similar to Vasubandhu's than to the Vaibhāṣika explanation, since it suggests that *samādhi* must be perfected for the *ṛddhis* to be experienced.

kena kāraṇena ṛddhipāda ity ucyate / āha / tadyathā / yasya pādaḥ saṃvidyate / so 'bhikramapratikramaparākramasamartho bhavati / evam eva yasyaite dharmāḥ saṃvidyante / eṣa ca samādhiḥ saṃvidyate / paripūrṇaḥ sa evaṃ pariśuddhe citte paryavadāte ana[ṅ]gaṇe vigatopakleśe ṛjubhūte karmaṇyasthite āni[ñ]jyaprāpte abhikramapratikrama[parākrama]-samartho bhavati / lokottarāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ prāptaye sparśanāyai / eṣā hi parā ṛddhiḥ parā samṛddhiḥ / yad uta lokottarā dhārmās tenocyante ṛddhipāda iti [Wayman 1961: 100; see also *Śrāvakabhūmi:* 321.5-14]; *ci'i phyir rdzu 'phrul gyi rkaṅ pa źes bya źe na / smras pa / 'di lta ste / dper na gaṅ la rkaṅ pa yod pa des 'gro ba daṅ / ldog pa daṅ / pha rol gnon par nus pa de bźin du / gaṅ la chos de dag gaṅ yod la / tiṅ ṅe 'dzin de dag kyaṅ yoṅs su rdzog par yod ciṅ / de de ltar sems yoṅs su dag pa daṅ / yoṅs su byaṅ ba daṅ / ñon moṅs pa med pa daṅ / ñe ba'i ñon moṅs pa med pa daṅ bral ba daṅ / draṅ por gyur pa daṅ / las su ruṅ bar gnas pa daṅ / mi g.yo ba thob par gyur na / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams thob par bya ba daṅ / reg par bya ba'i phyir / 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa daṅ / pha rol gnon par nus te / 'di lta ste / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos de dag ni / rdzu 'phrul dam pa daṅ / 'byor pa dam pa daṅ yin pas na / de'i phyir na rdzu 'phrul gyi rkaṅ pa źes bya'o* [*Yogācārabhūmi*: wi 144b7-145a3]; 問何因緣故說名神足。答如有足者能往能還騰躍勇健能得證世間所有殊勝之法。世殊勝法說名爲神。彼能到此故名神足。如是若有如是諸法有三摩地圓滿成辨。彼心如是清淨鮮白無瑕穢。離隨煩惱安住正直。有所堪能獲得不動能往能還騰躍勇健。能得能證出世間法。由出世法最勝自在。是最勝神彼能證此故名神足 [T. 1579: 444a29-b8])

6.13) According to Sarvāstivāda, *saṃskṛta vimukti* is *adhimokṣa.* Vasubandhu objects, saying that, according to "other people," this contradicts a *sūtra.* Finally, he states their opinion, that *vimukti* cannot simply be *adhimokṣa* but must be purity of mind resulting from the elimination of *rāga,* etc., by means of correct knowledge.

tasmān nādhimokṣa eva vimuktiḥ / kiṃ tarhi / tattvajñānāpanīteṣu rāgādiṣu cetaso vaimalyaṃ vimuktir ity apare
(Pradhan: 388.13-14; T. 1558: 133c27-29; Poussin v. 4: 298; Saṃghabhadra identifies this statement and the appeal to *sūtra* that precedes it as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 731b5-13] and criticizes it, arguing that the Sarvāstivādin position does not contradict *sūtra* and insisting that *vimukti* is not purity of mind but rather that which makes the mind pure and that it is in fact *adhimokṣa* [T. 1562: 731b13-c2].)

6.13) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* explains *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti* as being the complete destruction of all impurities.

sarvāsravāṇām aśeṣānuśayaprahāṇād yat tatprātipakṣikam anāsravaṃ cittam anāsravā prajñā paramādhicittādhiprajñasaṃgṛhītā āsravāṇāṃ kṣayād anāsravā cetovimuktiḥ prajñāvimuktir ity ucyate (*Bodhisattvabhūmi:* 392.8-11); *zag pa thams cad kyi bag la ñal ma lus par spaṅs pa'i phyir / de'i gñen por gyur pa zag pa med pa'i sems daṅ / zag pa med pa'i śes rab lhag pa'i sems daṅ / lhag pa'i śes rab mchog gis bsdus pa ni zag pa rnams zad pas / zag pa med pa'i sems rnam par grol ba daṅ / śes rab rnam par grol ba źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: źi 233a2-3); 一切諸漏所有隨眠無餘永斷。逮得能治勝漏心勝無漏慧。是其最勝增上心攝增上慧攝。由漏盡故說名無漏心慧解脱 (T. 1579: 570c18-20)

7.1) The Vaibhāṣikas say that defiled (*kliṣṭa*) thought must be unconcentrated (*asamāhita*), while good (*kuśala*) thought must be concentrated. Vasubandhu argues that this contradicts a *sūtra* that mentions two types of internal thought that are collected (*saṃkṣipta*): thought that is accompanied by both *middha* and *styāna* and internal thought that is accompanied by suppression but that does not possess insight. External uncollected thought, on the other hand, is dispersed among the five objects of pleasure. Vasubandhu's reasoning is that this *sūtra* mentions a type of thought that is defiled, yet concentrated.

evaṃ tu sūtraṃ nānulomitaṃ bhavati / eṣāṃ ca padānāṃ nārthaviśeṣa ukto bhavati / kathaṃ sūtraṃ nānulomitaṃ bhavati / sūtre uktaṃ kathaṃ cittam adhyātmaṃ saṃkṣiptaṃ bhavati / yac cittaṃ styānamiddhasahagatam adhyātmaṃ saṃnirodhasahagataṃ no tu vipaśyanayā samanvāgatam / kathaṃ bahir vikṣiptaṃ bhavati / yac cittaṃ pañcasu kāmaguṇeṣv anuvikṣiptaṃ bhavati anuvisṛtam iti
(Pradhan: 397.10-14; T. 1558: 136a21-24; Poussin v. 5: 20-21; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 739b16-19], mentions that the Pāścāttyas also refer to a *sūtra*[289] that is contradicted by the Sarvāstivādin position [T. 1562: 739b19-22], and criticizes both Vasubandhu's and the Pāścāttyas' interpretation of *sūtra* [T. 1562: 739b22-c6].)

[289] See Pradhan: 396.17-18; T. 1558: 135c27-28; Poussin v. 5: 18.

7.1) I can find no similar argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi* concerning the moral value of concentrated or unconcentrated thought. However, there is a passage in the *Asamāhitā Bhūmi* that contrasts distractedness, defined as the flowing out of thought toward the five objects of pleasure, with collectedness, defined as internal collected thought associated with *styāna* and *middha.*

g.yeṅ ba'i phyir mñam par ma bźag pa'i sa yaṅ yod de / 'di lta ste las daṅ po pa tiṅ ṅe 'dzin la brtson pa rnams 'dod pa'i yon tan lṅa la sems rnam par g.yeṅ źiṅ rjes su 'jug pa lta bu'o / bsdus pa'i phyir mñam par ma bźag pa'i sa yaṅ yod de 'di lta ste / las daṅ po pa tiṅ ṅe 'dzin la brtson pa rnams kyi sems naṅ du bsdus na / rmugs pa daṅ gñid kyis non pa lta bu'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 182a4-5); 或有極散亂故名非定地。謂初修定者。於妙五欲。心隨流散。或有太略聚故名非定地。謂初修定者。於內略心惛睡所蔽 (T. 1579: 344b26-29)

7.2) The Vaibhāṣikas say that the sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the four truths are *prajñā* by nature. Vasubandhu disagrees, arguing that if they were *prajñā,* then two *prajñās* would exist simultaneously (the aspect and the *prajñā* that knows it), which would be impossible. Instead, he says that *ākāra* is the mode of perception of objects on the part of all *citta* and *caittas.*[290]

evaṃ tarhi prajñā sākārā na bhaviṣyati / prajñāntarāsaṃprayogāt[291] */ evaṃ tu yuktaṃ syāt / sarveṣāṃ cittacaittānām ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra ākāra iti*
(Pradhan: 401.18-19; T. 1558: 137c2-4; Poussin v. 5: 39; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, he says, is relying on "another school" [T. 1562: 741b4-5], and criticizes it, arguing that this definition of *ākāra* is unreasonable whether *ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra* is understood as the discrimination of the types of marks of objects or as the ability to grasp the distinctive marks of the object [T. 1562: 741b5-13].)

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[290] Yaśomitra identifies this as a Sautrāntika opinion (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 629.6). In the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā,* Sthiramati gives an almost identical definition of *ākāra* in a completely different context, namely an argument to the effect that things and beings have no real *ākāra* and thus cannot be real objects of consciousness: *ākāro hy ālambanasyānityādirūpeṇa grāhaṇaprakāraḥ / sa cānayor nāsti grāhyarūpeṇa prakhyānāt / ato 'nākāratvād agrāhakatvād ity arthaḥ* (*Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra:* 16.6-8; see Kochumuttom 1982: 52).

[291] Corrected from *prajñāntarāsaṃyogāt* (Sakurabe, Odani, and Honjō 2004: 14).

7.2) (The sixteen *ākāras* are not discussed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

7.3) Vasubandhu says that *saṃvṛtijñāna* pertaining to *kāmadhātu* is wisdom produced by hearing or considering, while *saṃvṛtijñāna* pertaining to *rūpadhātu* is wisdom produced by hearing. *Saṃvṛtijñāna* is not wisdom produced by meditation because the object of wisdom produced by meditation must belong to a particular *bhūmi*. (But this *saṃvṛtijñāna* is the realization that all *dharmas* are *anātman;* therefore, it must encompass objects of different *bhūmis* simultaneously.) If this *saṃvṛtijñāna* were wisdom produced by meditation, it would be possible to gain detachment with respect to all *bhūmis* in a single moment, because wisdom produced by meditation has the power to produce detachment.[292]

tac ca kāmāvacaraṃ śrutacintāmayaṃ rūpāvacaraṃ śrutamayam na[293] *bhāvanāmayam / tasya vyavacchinnabhūmyālamabanatvāt / anyathā hi yugapat sarvato vairāgyaṃ syāt* (Pradhan: 405.4-6; T. 1558: 138a27-28; Poussin v. 5: 46; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 742c21-22] and criticizes it, saying that wisdom produced by meditation gives rise to joy, not detachment, with respect to higher *bhūmis* [T. 1562: 742c22-26; see Poussin v. 5: 46-47 n. 1 for a translation of Saṃghabhadra's opinion].)

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[292] This passage is very difficult to understand. I have relied heavily on the explanation in the note of *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* (Bidon-bu 26.2: 372 n. 120).

[293] This *na* is missing in Pradhan's text. I follow Hirakawa (1973-1978, v. 1: 436). All the translations include *na*.

7.3) (I have found nothing relevant in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

7.4) Vasubandhu objects to the Vaibhāṣika explanation that *abhisamayāntika saṃvṛtijñāna* is "obtained because it is obtained," and he says that this does not explain the practice of *saṃvṛtijñāna*. Instead, he approves of the opinion of the *pūrvācāryas* that *saṃvṛtijñāna* is produced due to the force of *darśanamārga* and is realized after emerging from *darśanamārga*. That is to say, in *darśanamārga* one obtains an *āśraya* that can realize *saṃvṛtijñāna*.

yasmāl labdhaṃ tasmāl labdham ity apūrvaiṣā nirdeśajātiḥ / tasmān naivaṃ bhāvanā sidhyati / evaṃ tu sidhyati yad āhuḥ pūrvācāryāḥ / kathaṃ ca pūrvācāryā āhuḥ / lokottaramārgasāmarthyāt saṃvṛtijñānaṃ bhāvyate yad vyutthitaḥ satyālambanaṃ viśiṣṭaraṃ laukikaṃ jñānaṃ saṃmukhīkaroti / eṣa eva ca tasya lābho yas[294] *tat saṃmukhībhāvasamar thyāśrayalābhaḥ / gotre hi labdhe labdhaṃ gotrikaṃ bhavati*
(Pradhan: 406.19-407.1; T. 1558: 138c2-7; Poussin v. 5: 52; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 743b29-c4] and criticizes it, saying that obtaining an *āśraya* is not equivalent to realization; furthermore, such an *āśraya* would not persist for long enough for realization to occur [T. 1562: 743c4-13].)

[294] Corrected from *yat* (Sakurabe, Odani, and Honjō 2004: 14).

7.4) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Śrāvakabhūmi* explains that at the time of entering *darśanamārga,* the seeds of good *saṃvṛtijñāna* that has previously been practiced are perfumed by that (*darśanamārga*?) and become pure. Therefore, this is called *abhisamayāntika saṃvṛtijñāna*. When one emerges from *darśanamārga,* one gives rise to this knowledge and one obtains liberation from the *darśanaheya dharmas.*[295]

mthoṅ ba'i lam la yaṅ dag par źugs pa de sa bon rnam par dag pas kun rdzob śes pa dge ba zag pa daṅ bcas pa sṅar yoṅs su bsgoms pa de ñid sgom par byed do / mṅon par rtogs pa'i mtha' la mthoṅ ba'i lam laṅs pa de'i mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba'i chos gaṅ dag las sṅon rnam par grol bar ma gyur pa de dag las rnam par grol ba yin pa de yaṅ skye bar 'gyur ro (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: zi 270b4-5); 昇見道時即先所修善世俗智所有種子。由彼熏修皆得清淨亦名爲修。此則名爲諦現觀邊諸世俗智。出見道已生起此智。證見所斷諸法解脱 (T. 1579: 682c20-23)

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295 Hakamaya does not identify a passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that corresponds to the position attributed to the *pūrvācāryas* by Vasubandhu but suggests the possibility that a corresponding passage might be found in the Yogācāra literature (1986: 99). I believe that this is such a passage.

7.5) Vasubandhu says that two *abhijñās,* namely *pūrvanivāsānusmṛti* and *āsrava-kṣayajñānasākṣātkriyā,* have the nature of all four *smṛtyupasthānas.*[296]

anirdhāraṇāc cheṣe catuḥsmṛtyupasthānasvabhāve iti siddham
(Pradhan: 423.8-9; T. 1558: 143b11 Poussin v. 5: 106; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 753c22-23] and criticizes it, saying that *pūrvanivāsānusmṛti* only has the nature of *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* [more specifically, of *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* with a "mixed" object, e.g., both the nature of *dharmas* and the *vedanā* of a past life], while *āsravakṣayajñānasākṣātkriyā* can have the nature of either *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* or of all four *smṛtyupasthānas* [T. 1562: 753c23-27].)[297]

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[296] Hsüan-tsang adds an explanation: 通縁五蘊一切境. Poussin takes this as a general explanation for both *abhijñās:* "because they have all five *skandhas* as their objects" (Poussin, v. 5: 106 n. 5). P'u-kuang, on the other hand, thinks that there are separate explanations for each *abhijñā: pūrvanivāsānusmṛti* is included in all four *smṛtyupasthānas* because its object is the five *skandhas,* while *āsravakṣayajñānasākṣātkriyā* is included in all four *smṛtyupasthānas* because its object is "everything"(宿住通四念住攝。通縁五蘊故。漏盡通四念住攝。通縁一切故 [T. 1821: 411c2-3]). However, it is not clear to me whether P'u-kuang is accurately interpreting Vasubandhu's intention.

[297] As P'u-kuang points out (T. 1821. 411c12-18), Saṃghabhadra's argument is based on the *Vibhāṣā*'s refutation of Ghoṣaka's opinion, according to which *pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti* has the nature of all four *smṛtyupasthānas* (T. 1545: 518b12-18).

7.5) (I have found nothing relevant in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.)

7.6) According to Vasubandhu, the two *abhijñās, divyaśrotra* and *divyacakṣus,* are morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) because they are wisdom associated with aural and visual consciousness. An objection is made: if these two *abhijñās* are associated with these two types of consciousness, they cannot pertain to all four *dhyānas* (and the fact that they do pertain to all four *dhyānas* has already been established).[298] Vasubandhu responds that the two *abhijñās* can be said to pertain to the four *dhyānas* because the sense organs on which they are based are present in the *dhyānas*. Or one can say that the *ānantaryamārga* of these *abhijñās* pertain to the four *dhyānas*.

divyacakṣuḥśrotrābhijñe avyākṛte / te punaś cakṣuḥśrotravijñānasaṃprayuktaprajñe / kathaṃ tarhi te caturdhyānabhūmike sidhyataḥ / āśrayavaśena tadbhūminirdeśāt / tadāśraye hi cakṣuḥśrotre caturdhyānabhūmike / ānantaryamārgavaśena vā
(Pradhan: 423.6-8; T. 1558: 143b12-17; Poussin v. 5: 107; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 753c29-754a5] and criticizes it, saying that wisdom associated with aural and visual consciousness is not *abhijñā,* but rather is caused by *abhijñā* [T. 1562: 754a5-10].)

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[298] See Chapter Seven verse 43cd: *pañca dhyānacatuṣṭe* (Pradhan: 422.1).

7.6) According to the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Śrāvakabhūmi, divyaśrotra* is the name for the *prasādarūpa* that comprises the aural sense organ that is the result of practice. The knowledge that is associated with the consciousness based on that aural sense organ is called "*divyaśrotra* knowledge." The realization of that knowledge is the continuation and growth of the stream of the seeds of that knowledge, which comprise the cause of its arising.[299]

śes pa de ñid kyi sa bon skye ba'i rkyen gyis yoṅs su zin ciṅ / yoṅs su brtas[300] *pa de'i rgyud kyi rjes su 'jug pa gaṅ yin pa de ni rdzu 'phrul gyi yul śes pa mṅon du bya ba źes bya ste / de dag thams cad gcig tu bsdus pa ni / rdzu 'phrul gyi yul śes pa mṅon du bya ba'i mṅon par śes pa źes bya'o / de la lha'i rna ba ni gaṅ / lha'i rna ba'i śes pa ni gaṅ / lha'i rna ba'i śes pa mṅon du bya ba ni gaṅ źe na / de la bsgoms pa'i 'bras bu rnams bsdus pa'i gzugs daṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de ni lha'i rna ba źes bya'o / rna ba de la brten pa'i rnam par śes pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i śes pa gaṅ yin pa de ni lha'i rna ba śes pa źes bya'o / śes pa de mṅon du bya ba ni sṅa ma bźin du rig par bya ste / de dag thams cad gcig tu bsdus pa ni lha'i rna ba'i śes pa mṅon du bya ba'i mṅon par śes pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 267b7-268a3); 即此智種子。由生縁所攝受故。勢力增長相續隨轉。名神境智作證。如是一切總攝爲一。名神境智作證　云何天耳。云何天耳智。云何天耳智作證。謂若修果耳所攝清淨色。是名天耳。與依耳識相應智。名天耳智。此智作證如前應知。如是一切總攝爲一等如前説 (T. 1579: 681c5-11)

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[299] The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* says that the scriptures say that these two *abhijñās* are knowledge associated with visual consciousness and knowledge associated with aural consciousness (T. 1585: 29a23-24). According to the *Shindōjōyuishikiron* (230), the reference is to this passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See Poussin 1928-1929: 317.

[300] Corrected from *rtag* on the basis of the Derge.

8.1) Vasubandhu defines one-pointedness of thought (*cittaikāgratā* = *samādhi*) as the fact that thoughts have a single object.[301]

keyam ekāgratā nāma / ekālambanatā
(Pradhan: 432.16; T. 1558: 145b1; Poussin v. 5: 128-129; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the definition of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 756b25-26] and criticizes it, saying that it would imply that if *cakṣurvijñāna* and *manovijñāna* had the same object, this would be *ekāgratā*. According to Saṃghabhadra, *samādhi* is actually that which, due to its predominance, keeps in operation the continuity of good *cittas* and *caittas* [T. 1562: 756b26-c4].)[302]

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[301] Sthiramati's definition in the *Triṃśikābhāṣya* echoes Vasubandhu's: *samādhir upaparīkṣye vastuni cittasyaikāgratā / upaparīkṣyaṃ vastu guṇato doṣato vā / ekāgratā ekālambanatā* (26.5-6).

[302] There is nothing startling about Vasubandhu's definition here. However, Saṃghabhadra seems to be particularly sensitive because it precedes the controversy over whether *samādhi* is a separate *dharma*. His purpose here seems to be to emphasize that *samādhi* is more than the mere fact of the mind's having a single object: rather, it is a separate *dharma* that keeps the mind focused on the object.

Poussin, following Saeki (1978: 1168), who was probably following P'u-kuang (T. 1821: 417b23), portrays the controversy as a debate between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. Nishi interprets it the same way (*Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Bidon-bu 26.2: 412-413). However, while Paramārtha attributes the unorthodox position that *samādhi* is not a separate *dharma* to the Sautrāntikas, both the Sanskrit and Hsüan-tsang simply mention "others." Moreover, although Saṃghabhadra does not further discuss this issue here, elsewhere (T. 1562: 390b24-c4) he attributes the opinion that *samādhi* is not an independent *dharma* to the Sthavira (see Katō 1989: 204). The same opinion is favored by the **Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (T. 1646: 334b29-c13). Therefore, it might be more accurate to identify this as a Dārṣṭāntika position.

The question remains whether Vasubandhu agrees with the Sarvāstivādin position or the non-orthodox position here. He gives the last word to the Sarvāstivādins, who explain how *samādhi* can be a *cittamahābhūmika dharma,* despite the obvious fact that most moments of consciousness are not what we call *samādhi*. However, he does not explicitly approve or disapprove of either position.

8.1) The *Manobhūmi* defines *samādhi* as one-pointedness of thought based on reflection corresponding to an object that is to be considered.

samādhiḥ katamaḥ / yat parīkṣye vastuni [tatra tatra][303] *tad anugam upaniḍhyāna-saṃniśritaṃ cittaikāgryaṃ* (*Yogācārabhūmi:* 60.6-7); *tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gaṅ źe na / gaṅ brtag pa'i dṅos po de daṅ de la de'i rjes su'gro źiṅ ṅes par sems pa la brten nas sems rtsa gcig pa'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$*:* dzi 34a5); 三摩地云何。謂於所觀察事。隨彼彼行審慮所依心一境性 (T. 1579: 291c3-5)

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303 Added by Bhattacharya on the basis of the Tibetan.

8.2) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of "others," who say that there is no mental *sukhendriya* in *kāmadhātu* and the first three *dhyānas,* only physical.[304] The Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, say that the *sukha* in the first two *dhyānas* is not really *sukhavedanā,* but rather *praśrabdhi.* This *sukha* cannot be bodily *sukha* because the five sense consciousnesses are lacking there. Nor can it be mental *sukha,* because *prīti* is already included in these states, and *prīti,* which is defined as *saumanasya,* cannot coexist with *sukha.* In the third *dhyāna,* however, *sukhavedanā* exists.[305]

At the end of the long discussion of the *dhyānāṅgas,* of which the above forms a part, Vasubandhu points out that the opinions later attributed by Yaśomitra to the Dārṣṭāntikas are different from those of the *pūrvācāryas* and should be examined further (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 440.4-5). Yaśomitra adds, "according to the teaching of the *Yogācārabhūmi*" (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 676.7).

apare punar āhuḥ / nāsty eva caitasikaṃ sukhendriyaṃ triṣv api hi dhyāneṣu / kāyikam eva sukham aṅgaṃ vyavasthāpitam iti
(Pradhan: 439.1-2; T. 1558: 147a6-7; Poussin v. 5: 151; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master, in describing the opinion of "others," is quoting someone else's opinion provisionally or for the sake of argument[306] [T. 1562: 760b7-9].)[307]

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[304] Yaśomitra attributes this position to the Dārṣṭāntikas: *dārṣṭāṃtikānāṃ kilaiṣa pakṣaḥ / teṣāṃ hi na dvibhūmikam eva sukhendriyaṃ / kāmaprathamadhyānabhūmikam iti / kim tarhi / caturbhūmikam api sukhendriyaṃ bhavati / kāmāvacaraṃ yāvat tṛtīyadhyāna-bhūmikaṃ iti* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 673.6-9; Poussin, v. 5: 151 n. 3). P'u-kuang, however, attributes this to Sautrāntika (T. 1821: 423a28).

[305] See Pradhan: 438. 18-21; Poussin, v. 5: 150-151.

[306] *chia yin* 假引.

[307] Later in the same discussion (T. 1562: 761b21), Saṃghabhadra presents the Sthavira's argument that *praśrabdhi* cannot be called *sukha,* and he concludes that this argument can be refuted in the same way as the one quoted by Vasubandhu here.

8.2) In the *Samāhitā Bhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi, sukha* in the first *dhyāna* is said to oppose *dauṣṭhulya,* while *prīti* is said to be the experience of a (mental) object. This seems to be in accord with the Vaibhāṣika explanation of *sukha* in stages lower than the third *dhyāna.*

de la bsam gtan daṅ po'i rtog pa daṅ dpyod pa ni dmigs pa 'dzin pa'i don du'o / tiṅ ṅe 'dzin de dag gi rten gyi don du'o / dga' ba ni dmigs pa myoṅ ba'i don du'o / bde ba ni gnas ṅan len bsal ba'i don du'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: dzi 143b1-2); 初靜慮中。尋伺爲取所縁。三摩地爲彼所依。喜爲受境界。樂爲除麁重 (T. 1579: 330c19-21)

8.3) Vasubandhu says that, in general, the *abhidharma* he has explained is the teaching of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas. However, he adds that he may have made mistakes in including certain things because only the Buddhas and the "sons of the Buddha" are authoritative concerning the interpretation of the Dharma.

prāyeṇa hi kāśmīravaibhāṣikāṇāṃ nītyādisiddha eṣa 'smābhir abhidharma ākhyātaḥ / yad atrāsmābhir durgṛhītaṃ so 'smākam aparādhaḥ / saddharmanītau tu punar buddhā eva pramāṇaṃ buddhaputrāś ca
(Pradhan: 460.1-3 T. 1558: 152b13-16; Poussin v. 5: 223; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as a statement of the general principle of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 775b18-20] and expands on it [T. 1562: 775b20-c2; see Poussin v. 5: 223 n. 1 for a translation].)[308]

[308] Vasubandhu mentions both the Buddha and the great disciples as authority. Saṃghabhadra says that really only the great *munis,* not the *śrāvakas* or *pratyekabuddhas,* can judge *dharmas* correctly; therefore, the *abhidharma* must be the word of the Buddha. (But we know that Vasubandhu does not agree [*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya:* 3.1; Poussin, v. 1: 5-6; *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā:* 11.23-12.1].) Fa-pao explains that, for Vasubandhu, the canonical *abhidharma* texts are authoritative, since they were produced by the great disciples, but the *Vibhāṣā,* which was produced neither by the Buddha nor by the great disciples, is not (T. 1822: 803a2-7).

8.3) The **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* contains a definition of *upadeśa* in which *mātṛkā* is explained and is equated with *abhidharma*.[309] According to this passage, the Buddha's teaching of the characteristics of *dharmas*, as well as the teaching of *śrāvakas* who are established in an understanding based on insight into the truths, are considered to be *mātṛkā* and hence *abhidharma*. These *mātṛkā* are necessary for a correct understanding and propagation of the characteristics of *dharmas*.[310]

de la gtan la bab par bstan pa('i sde) dag ni / mdo sde las ṅes par draṅs pa'i ma mo gaṅ dag yin pa ste / de la ṅes pa('i) don gyi mdo sde thams cad ni ma mo źes bya'o / gaṅ du bcom ldan 'das kyis mtshan ñid bstan pa daṅ gaṅ du ñan thos gźi mthoṅ bas rtogs pa la gnas pas chos kyi mtshan ñid mnoṅ bar bstan pa de yaṅ ma mo yin te chos mṅon pa yaṅ yin no / ji ltar yig 'bru daṅ bzo'i bstan bcos rnams kyi da(ṅ) po yi ge'i phyi mo yin pa ltar chos kyi mtshan ñid rnam par bźad pa yaṅ (dag par) rig par bya'o / ji ltar yi ge'i phyi mo med pa'i yi ge mṅon par mi gsal ba de bźin du mdo sde la sogs pa yan lag bcu gñis kyaṅ chos kyi mtshan ñid rnam par ma bźag na mṅon par mi gsal ba yin gyi rnam par bźag na mṅon par gsal bar 'gyur ro / mtshan ñid tha mi dad par brjod pa'i phyir ma mo de ñid chos mṅon pa źes bya ste / ma mo de la brten nas mdo sde gźan dag rnam par bśad par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de ni gtan la bab par bstan pa'i sde źes bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*$_t$: yi 64b5-65a2);[311] 論議者。謂諸經典循環研竅摩廁理迦。且如一切了義經皆名摩廁理迦。謂於是處世尊自廣分別諸法體相。又於是處諸聖弟子已見諦迹。依自所證無倒分別諸法體相。此亦名爲摩廁理迦。即此摩廁理迦亦名阿毘達磨。猶如世間一切書算詩論等皆有摩廁理迦。當知經中循環研竅諸法體相。亦復如是。又如諸字若無摩廁理迦即不明了。如是契經等十二分聖教。若不建立諸法體相。即不明了。若建立已即得明了。又無雜亂宣說法相。是故即此摩廁理迦。亦名阿毘達磨。又即依此摩廁理迦。所餘解釋諸經義者。亦名論義 (T. 1579: 753b9-21)

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[309] See item I.1.

[310] For a similar definition of *upadeśa*, see *Abhidharmasamuccaya*$_t$: li 120b5; T. 1605: 686b23-24; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 96.11-97.12.

[311] Portions in parentheses are added from or corrected on the basis of the Derge.

Concordance of Passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi*

YBh = Bhattacharya's text of the first five *bhūmis* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*
ŚrBh = Shukla's text of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*
BoBh = Wogihara's text of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*

Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese
YBh: 4.15-17	dzi 3a4	279b6-7
YBh: 5.2	dzi 3a6	279b8-9
YBh: 5.12-15	dzi 3b3-6	279b18-22
YBh: 11.14-21	dzi 6b5-7a3	280b13-21
YBh: 14.18-15.6	dzi 8b8-9a4	281a22-b2
YBh: 18.16-20	dzi 11a2-4	282a7-12
YBh: 25.20-26.2	dzi 14b3-5	284b19-23
YBh: 26.18-20	dzi 15a5-6	284c10-14
YBh: 50.9-16	dzi 27b3-8	289b13-21
YBh: 53.9-15	dzi 29b4-8	290a17-23
YBh: 60.6-7	dzi34a5	291c3-5
YBh: 60.13-14	dzi 34b1	291c11-12
YBh: 106.6-9	dzi 63b5-7	301b1-4
YBh: 107.20-108.2	dzi 64b5-8	301b28-c3
YBh: 109.19-110.7	dzi 66a3-b1	302a2-10
YBh: 110.8-12	dzi 66b1-4	302a10-14
YBh: 111.4-5	dzi 67a3-4	302a25-26
YBh: 118.14-119.2	dzi 71a8-b1	303c8-10
YBh: 119.17-120.3	dzi 71b8-72a4	303c25-304a3
YBh: 122.12-129.4	dzi 73b3-76a7	304b24-305b26
YBh: 124.2-3	dzi 73b6	304b28-c2
YBh: 127.8-13	dzi 75a1-4	305a10-16
	dzi 75a4-5	305a16-18
	dzi 75a5-8	305a18-24
YBh: 127.13-18	dzi 75a8-b3	305a24-b1
YBh: 127.19-128.4	dzi 75b3-5	305b1-6
YBh: 128.2-4	dzi 75b4-5	305b3-6

Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese
YBh: 166.16-18	dzi 97a8-b2	314b14-16
YBh: 167.6	dzi 97b8-98a1	314b25-26
YBh: 170.17-19	dzi 99b5-6	315a18-20
YBh: 182.9-14	dzi 105b5-8	317b22-29
YBh: 184.1-5	dzi 106b7-107a2	318a14-18
YBh: 189.15-16	dzi 110a5	319b3
YBh: 189.19-190.1	dzi 110a8	319b7-9
YBh: 190.6-7	dzi 110b4	319b13-14
YBh: 198.17-19	dzi 115b3-4	321a17-19
YBh: 199.5-7	dzi 116a1-2	321a29-b1
YBh: 204.1-212.3	dzi 119a1-124a6	322b2-324a15
YBh: 204.10-15	dzi 119a5-8	322b11-17
YBh: 214.7-10	dzi 125b5-7	324c3-7
YBh: 219.8-11	dzi 128b7-8	325c10-12
YBh: 221.16	dzi 130a6-7	326a27-28
	dzi 139b8-140a3	329b22-28
	dzi 143b1-2	330c19-21
	dzi 182a4-5	344b26-29
	dzi 211a5-6	354c20-22
	dzi 235a6-7	363a2
	dzi 236b3-4	363a27-b1
	dzi 238a4-6	364a27-b1
	dzi 269a2-4	375b13-16
	dzi 283a5-8	380b3-9
	dzi 292a5-7	383c7-11
	dzi 302a4	387b14
	dzi 303a7-8	387c19-21
	wi 2b1-3	395c24-27
	wi 2b6-8	396a6-9
ŚrBh: 18.11	wi 9a5-7	398b9-12
ŚrBh: 51.4-8	wi 25a6-b1	404c1-6
ŚrBh: 142.3-11	wi 68a7-b3	419b16-23
ŚrBh: 143.4-16	wi 68b6-69a4	419b28-c9
ŚrBh: 180.15-181.6	wi 83b8-84a4	425a24-29
ŚrBh: 321.5-14	wi 144b7-145a3	444a29-b8
ŚrBh: 339.16-340.1	wi 151b6-8	447a2
ŚrBh: 341.10-12	wi 152a7-8	447a19-21
ŚrBh: 448.9-13	wi 203a4-5	467a26-29
ŚrBh: 504.14-17	wi 232b7-8	476b29-c2

Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese
ŚrBh: 505.21-506.2	wi 233b1-2	476c19-21
BoBh: 64.23-25	źi 42a4-5	493b6-7
BoBh: 98.6-7	źi 62a6	501a27
BoBh: 102.20-24	źi 65a1-3	502b4-6
BoBh: 159.3-23	źi 96b4-97a3	515c7-20
BoBh: 180.26-181.2	źi 108b2	521a22-23
BoBh: 252.19-20	źi 152a4-5	538a7-9
BoBh: 279.6-11	źi 167b1-2	544b17-20
BoBh: 392.8-11	źi 233a2-3	570c18-20
	zi 4a24	579c17-22
	zi 9b6-7	581c12-14
	zi 16a2-4	583c2-6
	zi 16b4-6	583c7-10
	zi 16a6-b1	583c11-15
	zi 17a1-5	584a2-10
	zi 17a5-7	584a10-13
	zi 17b7-18b1	584b3-19
	zi 19a2-b4	584c18-585a8
	zi 20b4-21b1	585b7-c8
	zi 20b4-6	585b7-13
	zi 21a1-5	585b19-28
	zi 21a4-5	585b27-28
	zi 21a6	585b29-c1
	zi 21b1-2	585c9-10
	zi 21b1-24b7	585c9-586c25
	zi 21b2-22a4	585c10-28
	zi 22a2-4	585c24-28
	zi 22a3-4	585c27-28
	zi 22a4-b1	585c29-586a8
	zi 22b6-7	586a16-18
	zi 23a1	586a21-22
	zi 23a1-3	586a22-25
	zi 24a2	586b26-28
	zi 24a4-5	586c2-4
	zi 24b7-8	586c25-27
	zi 25a5-b2	587a10-20
	zi 25b2-3	587a21-23

Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese
	zi 26a1-2	587b7-9
	zi 26b1-2	587b25-26
	zi 26b3-4	587b29-c2
	zi 27a3-4	587c15-17
	zi 29b1-2	588c10-12
	zi 31a6-b4	589b24-c11
	zi 31b1-4	589c3-11
	zi 32b2-8	590a13-28
	zi 33b1-3	590b23-27
	zi 34a7-b4	590c24 -29
	zi 34b7-35a2	591a9-14
	zi 38a7-b1	592b29-c3
	zi 38b4-6	592c13-16
	zi 39a3-6	593a1-5
	zi 39b2-5	593a9-25
	zi 39b1-2	593a14-18
	zi 41a4-6	593c18-20
	zi 51a5-7	597b1-3
	zi 51a7-b1	597b4-9
	zi 51a8-b1	597b6-9
	zi 51b1-3	597b9-12
	zi 53b1-2	598a25-26
	zi 55a5-8	599a9-14
	zi 55b4-5	599a23-26
	zi 56a1-3	599b7-11
	zi 56a3	599b11
	zi 58a4-6	600a18-22
	zi 62b1	602a2
	zi 63b8-64a2	602b22-27
	zi 76b7-8	607b15-16
	zi 77a8	607c8-9
	zi 80a4-5	608c16-19
	zi 83a6-b3	610a19-27
	zi 86b4-7	611b19-24
	zi 88a4-b2	612a15-26
	zi 97b2-8	615c20-616a3
	zi 98a2	616a6-7
	zi 100b3-5	616c26-617a1
	zi 111b4-112a1	621a4-13
	zi 112b6-113a1	621b6-10

Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese
	zi 115b2-3	622a26-28
	zi 116a3-4	622b15-16
	zi 118a8-b3	623a20-24
	zi 118b8-119a3	623b6-11
	zi 121a4-b3	624a15-28
	zi 121b3-122a2	624a29-b14
	zi 122b8-123a2	624c12-15
	zi 144a8-b1	633b27-29
	zi 152a3-4	635c5-6
	zi 152b4-5	635c24-25
	zi 153b3	636a29
	zi 174b3-4	644c8-10
	zi 179a3	646c9-10
	zi 189b1-3	651b13-17
	zi 208a1-2	659a7-8
	zi 208a4-6	659a12-16
	zi 208a7	659a16-17
	zi 215a5-6	661b26-29
	zi 229a3-b1	666b13-26
	zi 230b8-231a4	667a8-14
	zi 231a6	667a20
	zi 231b5	667b5-6
	zi 267b7-268a3	681c5-11
	zi 270b4-5	682c20-23
	zi 271a5	683a12
	zi 281a2-3	687a17-19
	'i 67b6-7	721b4
	'i 74b6-75a3	724a3-13
	'i 100b6-101a1	733c16-20
	'i 101a2-3	733c23-24
		751a24-b1
	yi 64b5-65a2	753b9-21
	yi 64b6-7	753b10-14
	yi 47a5-6	768b25-27
	yi 51b3-52a2	770b9-22
	yi 54b2-6	771b26-c8
	'i 162a5-7	779c10-12
	'i 201a2-b2	794b6-24
	'i 204b8-205a4	795c22-29

Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese
	'i 207a3-4	796c2-3
	'i 207b7-208a1	796c26-797a2
	'i 249a2-b1	813a18-28
	'i 269a3-270a3	821a19-b21
	'i 269a8-b1	821a29-b2
	'i 282b4-283a1	826b12-23
	'i 285b7-286a1	827c29-828a2
	'i 287b5-6	828c9-12
	'i 299b8	833c9-11
	'i 314b2-315a2	840a12-24
	'i 340b5-8	851a3-9
	'i 377a8-b4	866c10-20
		869b6-8
		879a5-8
		879a14-18
		879a18-20
		880c14-16

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Several terms, such as *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, **Nyāyānusāra*, Poussin, Pradhan, Saṃghabhadra, sūtra-master, Vasubandhu, and *Yogācārabhūmi*, occur very frequently in the body of the book. Therefore, only occurrences in the introduction have been indexed.